1 MR. TURNBULL: Witness number 878, please,
2 My Lords, Alan Berwick.
3 THE MACER: Number 878 on the Crown roll,
4 Your Lordship, Alan James Berwick.
5 WITNESS: ALAN JAMES BERWICK, sworn
6 LORD SUTHERLAND: Advocate Depute.
7 EXAMINATION IN CHIEF BY MR. TURNBULL:
8 Q Are you Alan James Berwick?
9 A I am indeed so, yes.
10 Q And where do you live, Mr. Berwick?
11 A xxxxxx x xxxxx, Hampshire.
12 Q What age are you, please?
13 A 64.
14 Q Do you presently work with the Defence
15 Evaluation and Research Agency?
16 A No, sir. I retired from that employment
17 on the 22nd of December last.
18 Q At the date of your retirement, were you
19 a security adviser with that agency?
20 A I was, sir, yes.
21 Q In December of 1988, did you work for
22 Pan Am?
23 A I did, sir.
24 Q What position did you hold at that time?
25 A 1988, I was manager, corporate security.
6319
1 Q What was your geographical area of
2 responsibility?
3 A Basically Middle East, India, Pakistan,
4 and occasionally to the U.S. And reporting to New York
5 headquarters.
6 Q Where were you based?
7 A At Heathrow, London.
8 Q I see. And did Heathrow Airport come
9 within your responsibility?
10 A It was within my area, yes, sir.
11 Q And we understand, of course, that
12 Pan Am had stations, as they were called, in other
13 areas of Europe; in particular of interest is
14 Frankfurt. Did Frankfurt come within the area of your
15 responsibility?
16 A It did so, yes.
17 Q Did you have a colleague who worked in
18 Frankfurt called Martin Huebner?
19 A Yes, sir.
20 Q And did he report to you?
21 A Reported to me on a local basis, but
22 also was on occasions kind of dealing with headquarters
23 direct, depending on their needs.
24 Q I see. In the hierarchy, was he a
25 colleague who was your subordinate, or your superior?
6320
1 A In actual grade, I was the senior one.
2 Q Thank you.
<<<<SNIP>>>>
6334
5 Q Yes. And did you consider at that time
6 that training was not as good as it might be for such
7 employees?
8 A No, the training was fine. It was
9 probably at that particular time more a question of
10 turnover of personnel.
11 Q So does that mean that the employees
12 tended to be of short duration?
13 A There was a fairly high turnover at that
14 time.
15 Q Was that in relation to poor pay and
16 conditions, one factor?
17 A That would have been one of the reasons.
18 Q Was the case, though, Mr. Berwick, that
19 such training as was afforded to those employees
20 charged with operating the x-ray machine was of a
21 pretty limited nature?
22 A It depended on the individual. If the
23 person was very, very professional, they could read the
24 screen very effectively. They had good training, they
25 knew what to look for. Somebody not quite so
6335
1 experienced would not be as good.
2 Q Was this work undertaken by a company
3 called Alert Security?
4 A They -- Alert were tasked with that
5 duty, and I can't remember the specific dates when they
6 took over.
7 Q I think that was a company which was
8 effectively owned by Pan Am, but it operated that
9 aspect of the security operation; is that correct?
10 A Alert Management Services was an
11 affiliate company, yes.
12 Q And would it be fair to say that in the
13 aftermath of this disaster, certain inquiries were made
14 into the efficacy or otherwise of Alert Security?
15 A Not that I was aware of, sir. It just
16 heightened the whole of the security industry, as far
17 as passenger screening was concerned.
18 Q Were you not aware of inquiries
19 undertaken by FAA?
20 A That was -- yes, I am aware of those.
21 Q And were you not aware of their findings
22 in relation to the shortcomings applicable to Alert
23 Security?
24 A They were issued with certain
25 violations, a number of violations, that is correct.
6336
1 Q And was it not also discovered during
2 those inquiries that training of Alert employees was
3 extremely limited?
4 A That was not necessarily the case, in my
5 opinion, and in what I saw.
6 Q Was it not also discovered that most
7 employees had been employed only for a very short time,
8 indeed, prior to the date of the disaster?
9 A I cannot recall the date that Alert
10 became operative, but they had not been there that
11 long. The exact date, I cannot recall.
12 Q Would it surprise you to hear that their
13 inquiries revealed that x-ray -- training on the x-ray
14 machine initially consisted of one half-hour's
15 training?
16 A That would surprise me.
17 Q Would it surprise you to hear that it
18 was also discovered that that was supplemented by one
19 half-hour on-job training with a trained operator?
20 A I know there was on-the-job training,
21 kind of was part of the training package for a period
22 of time, but how long that went on, I can't recall.
23 Q Did you appreciate that no training was
24 provided in relation to identification of explosives?
25 A I wasn't aware of that, sir.
6337
1 Q After the disaster, do I take it that a
2 lot of changes to the security system, if I can put it
3 as broadly as that, were made?
4 A Yes, both from -- as far as the U.K. was
5 concerned, from the Department of Transport. Also from
6 the FAA there were changes.
7 Q Was positive baggage reconciliation
8 reintroduced, for one thing?
9 A I cannot recall, but I believe so.
10 Q Mr. Berwick, prior to the disaster, were
11 you aware of a warning which had been circulated which
12 became known as the Toshiba warning?
13 A I was, sir.
14 Q And did that relate to the finding of a
15 quantity of explosives apparently concealed in
16 transistor radio devices in Germany?
17 A Correct, sir, yes.
18 Q And it was considered that those devices
19 had a link to a Palestinian group; is that correct?
20 A That is correct.
21 Q And did you receive circulation of a
22 warning in relation to that discovery, particularly
23 warning those charged with civil aviation security to
24 be on the alert in case such a device was attempted to
25 be put on board an American aircraft?
6338
1 A I cannot remember the exact wording of
2 the warnings, because there were several of them issued
3 at that time.
4 Q Was --
5 A I was aware of them, sir.
6 Q Was the content of that warning, so far
7 as you are aware, Mr. Berwick, circulated to Pan Am
8 employees engaged in the loading process and the Alert
9 Security employees charged with operating the x-ray
10 machinery?
11 A It was, sir, yes.
12 Q Are you sure about that?
13 A Yeah.
14 Q If we were to hear evidence in this
15 case, Mr. Berwick, that a considerable number of those
16 employees, as of 21st December 1988, knew nothing about
17 that warning, would that surprise you?
18 A It would surprise me, sir, because there
19 had been a build-up to this. It was not just the
20 Toshiba radio; it was also some other electronic
21 equipment. I believe there was a VCR; there was even a
22 TV unit that were in the warnings that were received.
23 Q Mr. Berwick, did you become aware also
24 of a warning being circulated which became known as the
25 Helsinki warning?
6339
1 A I was, sir.
2 Q And did that relate to the perceived
3 risk of an unaccompanied Finnish female passenger
4 boarding a plane with an improvised explosive device
5 concealed, possibly in a radio?
6 A As far as I can recall, there is no
7 mention of how it would be carried. It was a female
8 passenger, Finnish female passenger would be duped into
9 carrying a device.
10 Q I'm obliged. Was the contents of that
11 warning circulated to Pan Am staff at Heathrow, those
12 involved in the loading and unloading process, and
13 those Alert employees operating the x-ray machine?
14 A To the best of my knowledge, it was,
15 sir.
16 Q Again, Mr. Berwick, if we were to hear
17 evidence in this case that many of such employees knew
18 nothing about such a warning as of 21st December '88, I
19 take it you'd also be surprised at that?
20 A I would do, yes, sir.
21 Q So far as general security was involved
22 at London Heathrow, you would, presumably, as part of
23 your job, require to know that there were a
24 considerable number of security passes, airside
25 security passes, issued at Heathrow?
6340
1 A Sorry, I missed the first part of the
2 question, sir.
3 Q So far as general security at Heathrow
4 was concerned, and so far as it affected your role,
5 Mr. Berwick, you would require to know, presumably,
6 about the issue of airside security passes to staff at
7 that airport?
8 A The issuance of the airside passes was
9 the responsibility of the British Airports Authority,
10 and they would deal with the individual airlines and
11 their requests, and either issue or not issue, as the
12 case.
13 Q You would know, presumably, though,
14 Mr. Berwick, in general terms, that there was something
15 in the order of 40,000 such passes issued?
16 A That wouldn't surprise me, sir.
17 Q That wouldn't surprise you?
18 A No.
19 Q And you would know that there were an
20 appreciable number that were unaccounted for having
21 been issued?
22 A I wasn't aware of it, but I take your
23 word, sir.
24 Q But again, that wouldn't surprise you?
25 A No. No.
6354
4 Q Now, just one final matter, if you could
5 help me with, please.
6 These dreadful events occurred on the 21st of
7 December of 1988. Do you remember as at that date how
8 many security staff were employed at Heathrow in your
9 section?
10 A Outside of Alert, there would have been
11 only Mr. Jones and myself. Mike Jones.
12 Q So how many?
13 A Two.
14 Q Two. Two security staff at Heathrow.
15 In terms of the airport generally, how many security
16 staff as at the 21st of December 1988 were employed?
17 A You are now talking about airport
18 security?
19 Q Yes.
20 A All would I say, sir, there were
21 hundreds.
22 Q We've spoken about an organisation
23 called Alert Security.
24 A Yes, sir.
25 Q Now, as I understand matters, Alert
6355
1 Security is a specific firm that correlates with Pan Am
2 flights, or did; is that right?
3 A They were an affiliate company who were
4 tasked, so far as London and Frankfurt were concerned,
5 to provide security services in relation to passenger,
6 aircraft and passenger screening and baggage screening.
7 Q I am obliged to you. And in terms of
8 numbers, how many were employed by Alert Security as at
9 the 21st of December of 1988; do you remember? I am
10 not trying to catch you out. If I put a figure to you
11 of 81, would you accept that as being an accurate
12 figure?
13 A I would have thought probably in the
14 region of 100, but if you say 81, I accept that.
15 Q Would I be right in thinking that after
16 the events of the 21st of December, the number of
17 persons employed by Alert Security rose dramatically
18 from 81 to 251?
19 A That was correct, sir.
20 Q Now, does that give us an indication,
21 then, of once a proper analysis had been done of
22 security that was required at Heathrow of the
23 additional personnel that were required in order to
24 satisfy Pan Am that matters were now secure at
25 Heathrow, whereas in the past, plainly, they were not?
6356
1 A I think most of the increase in
2 personnel for Alert, sir, was basically because of new
3 legislation, new instructions from the U.S., FAA, and
4 from the U.K. Department of Transport.
5 Q Indeed. In other words, once people
6 looked at the system that was in operation and saw its
7 failings, they gave guidance as to the new system, and
8 the personnel involved increased dramatically, from 81
9 to 251?
10 A That was correct, sir.
11 Q Yes. Mr. Berwick, thank you very much
12 for your help.
13 A Thank you.
14 LORD SUTHERLAND: Advocate Depute.
15 MR. TURNBULL: I have no re-examination.
16 Thank you, My Lord.
17 LORD SUTHERLAND: Mr. Berwick, I wonder if
18 you can help us on one matter.
19 As far as originating passengers were
20 concerned at Heathrow Airport, if a passenger had
21 checked in, and had checked in, let us say, two
22 suitcases, and then did not show at the departure gate,
23 what would the proper procedure be as far as baggage
24 reconciliation was concerned?
25 A The system I believe that was in place
6357
1 at that time was that you would have to literally get
2 the complete record of that particular passenger, find
3 out where he was -- if you could find out what
4 nationality, all the criteria. Obviously try and trace
5 the bags, and then offload the bags. But there was a
6 certain amount of tolerance, that if there was a good
7 reason, that this passenger was bona fide, no problems
8 at all in their assessment, then the bags on some
9 situations would be allowed to remain on board and go.
10 But the basic procedure was: Get the bags, offload
11 them. And that was it.
12 LORD SUTHERLAND: Yes. Could you look at
13 Production 201, please, page 1.
14 You see there passenger number 9, Basuta, J.
15 A I do, sir.
16 LORD SUTHERLAND: From your knowledge of
17 these documents, would he be an originating passenger
18 at London?
19 A He would have been, sir, yes.
20 LORD SUTHERLAND: Yes. And it would appear
21 also that he had checked in two bags?
22 A Correct, sir.
23 LORD SUTHERLAND: Now, we've been told that
24 he did not show for this flight, being subsequently
25 discovered in a bar, I think, after the flight had
6358
1 taken off, but that his bags travelled on this flight.
2 Are you able to explain how that would come about?
3 A I wasn't there, but the story that my
4 colleague Mike Jones, who was at the gate, gave me that
5 evening was that Mr. Basuta was in actual -- located,
6 although they actually had closed the aircraft and were
7 about to push back. Mr. Basuta was en route to the
8 gate. They then checked out to find out what
9 nationality the gentleman was, and as a consequence,
10 the flight was allowed to depart with the bags on. He
11 was a U.S. citizen, and other questions had been asked,
12 and they were of the opinion that although he was a
13 gate no-show, they had resolved any queries about that
14 particular passenger.
15 LORD SUTHERLAND: I see.
16 Thank you, Mr. Berwick. That's all.
