Lockerbie appeal documents to remain secret

[Rolfe]

I'm not convinced the Scottish police were in on it - not because I think they are or were incorruptible (ask Shirley McKie), but because it looks very much as if the conspiracy was mad as hell that the Scottish police didn't either identify the timer fragment promptly, or call in the FBI to help. If some of them had been in on it, it would have been easy to move that along.

I think there are two levels here. Those actually in the know as regards fabrication of evidence, and those who simply know this investigation is supposed to go in a certain direction. I would put the Scottish cops in the latter category. However, do tell me which decisions you think are strange enough to cast suspicion on them.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

That would probably do it. All I remember is knowing Megrahi was first mentioned in December. Where did you get that particular?

Paul Foot.

Majid Giaka [...] originally approached the American embassy in Malta in August 1988, four months before the Lockerbie bombing. His long series of meetings with American intelligence officials in Malta began in September 1988, the same month he started getting regular payments from the CIA.

His information was patchy and unreliable. He pretended he was a senior official in the Libyan intelligence organisation JSO though in reality (as the Americans quickly realised) he was a former garage mechanic who helped to maintain JSO vehicles and had graduated to the exalted position of assistant station manager for Libyan Arab Airlines.

The CIA kept him on their payroll with increasing reluctance. They had few other direct human contacts with Libyan intelligence, and in view of the American hostility to Libya and the fear of terrorism from there, any source, even if unreliable, was better than none.

Scraps of information passed on by Giaka during 41 clandestine meetings between August 1988 and July 1991 were duly logged. In October 1988 he revealed that a managerial colleague at Luqa airport, Lamin Fhimah, had kept explosives in his desk drawer. In December 1988, the month of the Lockerbie bombing, he was asked about the movements of JSO officials through Luqa airport. He replied that a man he regarded as a senior JSO officer, Abdelbasset Ali Mohamed Al Megrahi, had passed through Luqa airport on 7 December. These two men eventually became the suspects for the Lockerbie bombing.

Rolfe.

 

[Caustic Logic]

I'm not convinced the Scottish police were in on it - not because I think they are or were incorruptible (ask Shirley McKie), but because it looks very much as if the conspiracy was mad as hell that the Scottish police didn't either identify the timer fragment promptly, or call in the FBI to help. If some of them had been in on it, it would have been easy to move that along.

I think there are two levels here. Those actually in the know as regards fabrication of evidence, and those who simply know this investigation is supposed to go in a certain direction. I would put the Scottish cops in the latter category. However, do tell me which decisions you think are strange enough to cast suspicion on them.

Rolfe.

I can buy that characterization. In fact, it's what meant - people I suspect of less than the professional, ethical conduct they all lay claim to. That's not even that ol' triumph of evil good men doing nothing axiom, this is active accomplice territory, if not direct fabrication of evidence, and several folks seem to fit the bill.

The decisions, off the top of my head only:
- Bell's decision to pretend the Gaucis said Dec 7
- Williamson's complicity in Feraday's continuing charade re: PT/30 (perhaps he was just confused...)
- Bell's involvement with refuting ST33's report on 38 minutes=heathrow (rebuttal consisted of endless "maybes" - forthcoming explanation)
- Whoever exactly messed things up with the Gaucis in off the record interviews, agreeing to a photo lineup as soon as Tony showed he knew Magrahi's face from the news, and any earlier decisions to steer him towards Abu Talb (who's also clarly not a real fit for mystery shopper)
- Hendershot probably knowing Giaka's past stories, hearing a whole new batch on that boat in mid-91 and saying 'sound's good.'
- That's without ever racking my brain the slightest. Several people at least had to be compliant, I suspect. The last is FBI, not Scotcop of course.

Crap - right-o on Foot then. I had confused a mental summary with a vague original source. Yeah, movements were on record, Giaka was struggling to give anything useful, so I'd guess the CIA knew of Megrahi's presence within days. It was on file well before it became useful.

- Adam

 

[Rolfe]

"This is the suspect, now we gotta nail him" is SOP for police all over the world, and I don't believe the D&G are any exception to that.

If I was the D&G, and I'd been presented with the news that Megrahi had been present at the check-in for KM180, plus the timer fragment and the manual of the radio both suggested a Libyan origin, I'd be slavering after him too. That doesn't mean complicity in fabricating the crucial line of the printout that pointed to KM180, or the timer fragment, or the Horton fragment though.

Interesting point. When the D&G were first presented with the printout and its implications, and that apparently led pretty quickly to Gauci (interesting sequence in itself I'd like to know more about), their first impulse was to try to shake an IDing of Abu Talb out of him. This continued for months, indeed over a year, starting September 1989.

They only changed tack and started trying to get him to pick out Megrahi in February 1991. Why Megrahi? Not just because the MST-13 timer ID indicated Libya, surely. There are a lot of Libyans in the world, why this particular one? It seems inevitable he was fingered because they had now discovered that he linked up beautifully with KM180.

Who told them, and when, and how long had they known about it?

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

CL, yeah PII is Public Interest Immunity , an application to restrict disclosure of evidence on national security grounds, and the FCO is the UK Foreign and Commonwealth Office (or simply Foreign Office) headed by the foreign secretary of the sitting government.

Rolfe, your post #17 is pretty awesome.

You've succinctly encapsulated what exactly is wrong, not simply with the evidence that was presented at Zeist, but is exhibited through the grand incompetence of the actual investigation and those involved. So much so that this sheer apparent incompetence eventually manifests itself as incredulity. And it should be noted, this doubting arises, not from the very fact that human frailties exist in us all, but that the significant inconsistencies involved in this investigation, are most obvious at the most critical stages.

Inconsistencies, incompetence, mistakes and coincidences we can all accept - to a point. However, when all these factors have played a significant role in all of the critical points of evidence, it's irrational not to suspect there may well be an ulterior agenda at play.

Given the information that has emerged over the last 20 years, it is safe to conclude that all the intelligence and security depts of the US expected retaliation from Iran to avenge the IR655 shoot down. It wasn't a case of if, it was a case of when. The disdain of the US response to that particular tragedy merely exasperated the whole situation, and imo, assured some sort of revenge attack.

Meanwhile, Khreesat, I feel, is another key aspect as to why exactly, not only was the investigation steered away from any Iranian involvement, but also was disconnected from the BKA's uncovering of the PFLP cell in Germany, and the BKA'S subsequent inexplicable release of, someone who almost without fail is acknowledged as a 'master bomb-maker', after his arrest. Lord Fraser even made the absolutely astonishing admission in Lockerbie: Revisited that as far as the Scottish investigation was concerned Khreesat was simply off-limits for questioning due to the fact that he appeared to be coactively working for the Jordanians, the Palestinians and the Americans, at the same time, in some capacity. That suggestion itself would infer it was, or would be, essential that the investigation not to be hot on the trail of the PLFP cell in Germany. In short, I fear it may well have been accepted and realised by senior sources within the US and UK govt., almost immediately, that Iran had raised the contract and gave the order for the bombing of an American airliner, while it was to become clear that, indeed the very group Khreesat had been working with, carried out the revenge mission.

So, in essence, not essentially LIHOP, but an acute awareness by those on both sides of the Atlantic, that an event, an attack, was imminent, and in all truth there would only be a limited amount that could be done by the security and intelligence services to prevent a professional, experienced, state funded and determined group carrying out the revenge attack.

 

[commandlinegamer]

Where are the debunkers? This thread should be full of people explaining exactly how I'm wrong about this. Bring it on, as they say.

Rolfe.

Indeed - like that Haseldine guy. Why isn't he here promoting his South African CT?

 

[Rolfe]

Giaka probably gave the first tip that he was there on 12/20 anyway....

Look, this happened in Europe. The offence was in Scottish jurisdiction. If we can put up with you guys' "9/11" nonsense (what happened on 9th November anyway?), you can at least follow generally-understood conventions. In fact, just type out the month by name, so there's no ambiguity.

At work, I date everything (e.g.) 21-6-10. Second nature. I know what the Yanks are like though, so to save misunderstandings, on the internet I say 21st June 2010. I recommend it. (We already had a date I don't know whether it was before or after the Thatcher/Bush phone call, because it was notated 3/4/89.)

ETA: It was 21st December anyway. Or technically you're right, he arrived on the 20th and left on the 21st; it was the outgoing flight that was supposed to be the scene of the crime though. The crash happened on the 21st. "The Year's Midnight", as some poetic person noted. Today being The Year's High Noon", I suppose. For us northern hemisphere types.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

Indeed - like that Haseldine guy. Why isn't he here promoting his South African CT?

Huh, Charles wanted me to give him my email address. When hell freezes over.

Rolfe.

 

[Rolfe]

You've succinctly encapsulated what exactly is wrong, not simply with the evidence that was presented at Zeist, but is exhibited through the grand incompetence of the actual investigation and those involved. So much so that this sheer apparent incompetence eventually manifests itself as incredulity. And it should be noted, this doubting arises, not from the very fact that human frailties exist in us all, but that the significant inconsistencies involved in this investigation, are most obvious at the most critical stages.

Inconsistencies, incompetence, mistakes and coincidences we can all accept - to a point. However, when all these factors have played a significant role in all of the critical points of evidence, it's irrational not to suspect there may well be an ulterior agenda at play.

Well, thank you kind sir!

Have you read the judgement of the first appeal? I was shying away from it because it's 200 pages, but actually it's not so bad because of the double spacing, also it's very explanatory in its legalese, and repetitive, so I'm not grinding to a halt.

It deals in a lot more detail with the precise areas we're interested in, and clarifies quite a lot. Sometimes it explains why in fact Mr. Taylor's point is not valid, and then other times it just says, well you're accusing the trial court of not giving this point due consideration, but hey look they did consider it, they just didn't agree with you and they're entitled to do that. Nevertheless they do illuminate a lot of detail while they're doing that.

I'm still on the Frankfurt baggage evidence, and if there's one thing for sure, it's a dog's breakfast. I'd rather deal with the detail in the appropriate thread, if only other people would join me there. But it's tending to make me less and less inclined to believe that tray B8849 was genuine, though not containing the bomb, and more inclined to believe it's an interpolation.

Given the information that has emerged over the last 20 years, it is safe to conclude that all the intelligence and security depts of the US expected retaliation from Iran to avenge the IR655 shoot down. It wasn't a case of if, it was a case of when. The disdain of the US response to that particular tragedy merely exasperated the whole situation, and imo, assured some sort of revenge attack.

Meanwhile, Khreesat, I feel, is another key aspect as to why exactly, not only was the investigation steered away from any Iranian involvement, but also was disconnected from the BKA's uncovering of the PFLP cell in Germany, and the BKA'S subsequent inexplicable release of, someone who almost without fail is acknowledged as a 'master bomb-maker', after his arrest. Lord Fraser even made the absolutely astonishing admission in Lockerbie: Revisited that as far as the Scottish investigation was concerned Khreesat was simply off-limits for questioning due to the fact that he appeared to be coactively working for the Jordanians, the Palestinians and the Americans, at the same time, in some capacity. That suggestion itself would infer it was, or would be, essential that the investigation not to be hot on the trail of the PLFP cell in Germany. In short, I fear it may well have been accepted and realised by senior sources within the US and UK govt., almost immediately, that Iran had raised the contract and gave the order for the bombing of an American airliner, while it was to become clear that, indeed the very group Khreesat had been working with, carried out the revenge mission.

So, in essence, not essentially LIHOP, but an acute awareness by those on both sides of the Atlantic, that an event, an attack, was imminent, and in all truth there would only be a limited amount that could be done by the security and intelligence services to prevent a professional, experienced, state funded and determined group carrying out the revenge attack.

It's possible they were trying to stop it, but this went dreadfully wrong and they ended up facilitating it. Which is rather less inflammatory than what some people believe, which is that the US agreed to allow Iran to down one airliner as retaliation, so long as they stopped at one (an eye for an eye being better than five eyes). That's a genuine LIHOP, to the point where some say the bombing was even facilitated by Western intelligence. The corollary of this is that some people "in the know" were able to warn some intending passengers (like Pik Botha), and even that the Helsinki hoax warning was deliberate, to provide a plausible excuse for some diplomatic-leve pulling out of flights (the staff of the US embassy in Moscow, for example).

So there really is a whopping enormous CT here, way beyond anything we've seriously proposed. I started off trying to construct an explanation whereby nothing was fabricated and it was all a misconstruction of genuine evidence, willful perhaps, and not understanding that coincidences happen. I'm less and less inclined to credit that idea, though.

Rolfe.

 

[Buncrana]

On the refusal to disclose these document(s).

I agree Rolfe, there is seemingly a contradiction in so much as a non-disclosure agreement was signed with the CIA with the crown in 2001, but this document actually emanates from a foreign source, who may, or may not, have actually acceded to it's disclosure. An interesting snippet from the hearings during Megrahi's second appeal was a short comment made by the advocate-depute, Ronnie Clancy, QC,

"The documents were passed on the basis they were regarded as being confidential by the authority that passed them over. That being so, the Crown has taken the position that, if possible, confidentiality should be respected and there are public interest considerations in regard to keeping the confidentiality of information coming from a foreign source."

Legal experts expected the reasons for non-disclosure to centre around the foreign country's refusal to hand over the documents on national security grounds. This does not appear to be the case.

I think this vidicates the suggestion that the foreign source of the document has not raised, nor sought, non-dislosure of the document, but the authority, I posit the CIA, has requested non-disclosure and the UK govt has duly oblidged (without much encouragement obviously) in raising the PII.

Crown refuses to reveal secret Lockerbie paper