Determining the most parsimonious explanation given incomplete evidence is a matter of opinion. The evidence often seems to more clearly point one way or the other, but that doesn't mean that someone else might not consider the other evidence to be more compelling. Without definitive proof, either belief would be based on some degree of faith.
I see your point, but I don't think it's a matter of opinion. What I mean is that while the most parsimonious explanation given incomplete evidence might turn out to neverthess be wrong (which we could only show if new evidence presented itself), there is nevertheless
a most parsimonious explanation.
Actually, I think I should qualify that. I can imagine that in some situations there might be multiple explanations that fit the evidence equally well, with equal parsimony. I imagine this is rare, however, and in situations like that the rational course is not to choose one at random, but to admit what the evidence suggests - "I don't know, either one is equally likely".
I think the trouble comes in making that determination. What is the correct methodology?
In practice, it might turn out to be a matter of opinion. But in theory it's determinable.
I might make mistakes in looking at what the evidence suggests, but that doesn't mean that it doesn't suggest something.
This is different from saying it's possible to know for certain. Rather I suggest that it's possible to know what the best interpretation of available evidence is. This could mean "Yes", "No", or simply "I don't know".
A better way to look at it is that if we could somehow become perfect unbiased judges of availabe evidence we might say "Based on what I know the God hypothesis has a 99.97% chance of being true." Or "based on what I know the god hypothesis has a 50% chance of being true, thus we cannot say anything one way or the other."
That's an overly simplified way of looking at it. I'm just saying that belief one way or the other doesn't have to be all or nothing. It can be probabalistic. And I do think that it's possible, at least in theory, to determine which way the evidence leans. The problem is in knowing if we've analysed the evidence correctly.
I actually think this is where my disagreement concerning the use of the word faith comes in. You say that we all have faith in those beliefs that we can't be certain of. I think rather that it's possible to say, "I believe this to be true because it is the most likely thing to be true. More correctly I view this statement as having x% chance of being true, and will act accordingly"
Things don't have to be held to be true or false, but we can still answer yes or no questions about our belief in them. Qualified with "but I'm not certain of that."
I think saying that you're not sure about something is the same as saying your belief is probablistic. Of course you also have a belief as to whether that probablistic detmination itself is correct. And this belief could be probablistic as well. And so on. Life is complicated, huh?
Your opinion might be that your viewpoint is more valid than the opposite, but others hold that the opposite viewpoint is more valid. Neither opinion would be irrational given the current evidence (or lack thereof).
I know what you mean. I've always found this to be a very important reason to look critically at things. When arguing with someone, we should realise that they hold their beleifs just as strongly as we hold our own, and there might be a good reason for that.
But that doens't mean that every belief is equally valid. Even if someone did their best to look at the evidence and come to a conclusion (in one sense being completely rational) that doesn't mean that they did so without error.
Of course I can make errors as well. It's difficult to see if I have or not, and that's why it's important to look over your reasoning carefully, and maybe to subject it to the review of others. But in the end I think that it is possible to judge one viewpoint against another. Otherwise I would be rational to believe in ghosts and demons and the sexual powers of rhino horns - not because I've looked at the evidence and come to that conclusion, but because someone else says they did.
Basically, I'm saying that just because someone else holds a belief doesn't mean it's as likely to be true as my own. It does mean, though, that I should analyise it from that perspective (to begin with) in order to see if I'm wrong, or where they made their mistake.
You're the first person I know who believes that Tokyo doesn't exist!
Woops! Bloody grammar!
There are many things that we cannot (currently) explain without God.
Of course there are, but I don't think that God's existence or non-existence changes those explanations at all.
Say for instance there was some irriducibly complex system in biology that scientists simply could not explain. A creationist comes along and says, "Ha, well, that's easy. Goddidit."
The biologist could just as easily say, "Ah, no, although we can't explain it, I would say natural processes did it."
Both are equally good explanations to things that we really have no explanations for. Which is to say they are not explanations at all. Neither tells us anything about, for instance,
why it is a certain way. (I think by this I mean more
how it came to be that way). Of course if we took either viewpoint and it led to some hypothesis that could have some explanitory power, then that would be a way toward an explanation. But neither is an explanation in itself.
Occam's Razor is also wrong much of the time.
Yep, that's true. Nevertheless it seems to be the best way to judge things that we don't have perfect evidence of.
Your viewpoint is quite reasonable! I'm simply saying that the opposite viewpoint may also be reasonable.
Agreed. So long as those holding that viewpoint came to it by way of reason. I don't claim to be perfect at analysing the evidence, and I may have done so incorrectly. In that case a different analysis would be more correct. Maybe the best position based on available evidence is an agnostic theist's. However, my own analysis says no. And if someone were to tell me that they held that position, but were incapable of arguing it in any way, I would find it unreasonable.
I don't think your viewpoint is unreasonable. I do think that if you had made the same analysis of the evidence as I have and still came to the same conclusion, that would be unreasonable. Which isn't to say that my analysis is better than yours. Just that it leads in a certain dirrection.
If I made the same analysis that you've made and still held my beliefs, that would be unreasonable as well.
Which offers us an opportunity. By looking at each other's analysis we can see if there is any problem with our own. One of the reasons I'm enjoying this discussion.
However, if one has a compelling reason to believe otherwise, then I can't say that it's irrational even when the evidence might be slightly against your belief. As an example, if someone believes that the evidence is slightly in favor of no God, but still believes in God because that's how they were raised, I wouldn't necessarily consider this belief to be irrational. This might just be a blurring of what is considered "evidence" though, because a compelling reason might be considered to be evidence.
I agree, in that I think that compelling belief would just be another form of evidence. However, I don't think belief based on how one is raised would qualify, either as a compelling reason, or as evidence, as it doesn't really say anything about god at all.
And, I think that to base one's belief (even if only in a small part) on that would be irrational.
That said, some agnostic weak atheists hold that if the evidence is close, it would be irrational to hold a positive belief either way.
Actually, I think that's a really good point. If I could say "I find the existence of god to be 1% more likely than it's non-existence", I
might say, "I believe there is a god."
However, the way that I would live my life, the other opinions I would form, would not take God's existence as a given. Rather they would admit that uncertainty, even try to take into accout that exact degree of uncertainty as much as possible.
Ideally, anyway...
Which brings up the question - should I say I believe one way or the other? What does that phrase mean? It clearly doesn't mean to be certain. So what degree of certainty is enough, then? hmm...
I actually don't think I'd use that if I only very slightly leaned one way or the other, but with a strong leaning I definintely would. Maybe less degree of certainty would cause me to qualify my statements "Yes, I believe there is no god, but I'm not very sure about that." Something like that.
Right now, though, I'm still confident to make the statement, "I believe there is no God." Of course that could change.
). This is where "faith" comes into play, but if things could be resolved by faith in God, faith could equally come into the equation earlier. Just have faith that free will is existent, faith that consciousness is self-generated.. etc etc. Why need explanations at all?