JJ writes:
You're citing this as an authoritive rerference?
There's no dialog to have here.
No, I've cited _Slaughterhouse_ as an authoritative source. I chose the above work because it approached slaughterhouses from an angle concerned about worker safety, not animal rights. And because I happened to remember it while browsing a related thread.
You're right to say there is no dialog because your facile talking point has been rather easily undermined, theoretically and empirically.
Now go ahead and call me a totalitarian again, you old floppy c*ck. That was fun! It seems you got a lil' red last time. Again, again, again.
Please to show where I said "species is factually substantive"?
This is another interesting fabrication. Look at what I put in quotes and then look at what you put in quotes. If you want to see where you used the turn of phrase, then I suggest looking at page four, searching for the relevant key terms, and then following the threading. Moreover, I did ask this as a question as you were characteristically vague.
It's called falsification.
Then educate them or take their animals away.

and you're still stubbornly missing the larger picture.
Let us couple the next two blocks together as they are related:
I never said that you never make arguments only that your posts are full of invective and rhetoric. You didn't answer my question.
How and why does it seem? What is my belief system?
The statement "you didn't answer my question" fails to appreciate the instrumental questions I asked. You wondered why it was OK for me to use Singer, and why it is not OK for you to use Cohen. That framing, to begin with, is wrong. You can cite anyone you please. I'm saying the argument you put forth appears hurried; it's just plain bad. So I asked when you first read Cohen. If the first time you read him was three days ago, then I think that says something.
I do like the final question here: "What is my belief system?" This is still another red-herring that I laugh and roll my eyes at. Returning to more relevant concerns, the Cohen argument seeks to give exclusive concern to human beings -- all of them -- while trying to minimize concern for other species. But the need to reconcile concern for infants (say) while dismissing the interests of chimps (for example) results in a rather arbitrary, contorted moral outlook. For arguments against this mode of reasoning see my earlier posts and Mumblethrax's reply.
I'm going to couple this with the your last paragraph in order to bring some sense of structure to shameful meanderings:
? So, now I have to prove a negative? What "series of arguments"? Why can't you just make your argument to me? So, please note that so far you are straying far afield. Could you make an argument?
Answer to what? I'm not digging through the thread looking for posts. Link it or quote it.
I didn't think it would be difficult for you to find the arguments I was referencing as I knew they appeared at the top of a post that refuted your silly nonsense. As it stands, it was a reply to a Geckko (post #175). I will append it at the end so as not to give you another excuse for your pussyfooting. Of course, I'm not sure why I bother as you have chronically ignored central arguments. You already avoided Mumblethrax's post (several times now) in spite of my quoting it, so I wonder why I even bother.
People can choose to make any philosophy a social convention. I do not make mine so.
I see; you don't really have any clue as to what you're talking about.
The second statement doesn't follow from the first. I don't speak to [of??] Kantian philosophy only to state that people can choose to make any philosophy a social convention.
Again, it's amusing to see you say one part does not follow the other when you apparently understand neither. In any case the second sentence in the above quote is not exactly a model of clarity.
[snipped- no comment on empty assertion]
No, my point is that humans can be inconsistent and apply morality inconsistent and change moral philosophies. It is certainly possible to consistently follow my moral philosophy but not without a degree of moral conflicts.
The first statement falls under the label of "descriptive", and I do not disagree. Yes, that happens, and it is mundane; philosophically uninteresting. I'm attempting to push the discussion into normative territory since we are ostensibly discussing, you know, morality.
Cain writes:
If no one knows you're torturing animals in your basement, then no one will be offended.... The question is whether or not it's wrong, and why it's wrong.
That would not make it right by my philosophy.... and there is nothing axiomatic to determine that it is wright or wrong. There are no absolute morals [<---- this is actually an example of a non sequitur ].... If it made ALL of us feel good? Why not? What is right and what is wrong? And spare me the rhetoric. Just answer the question.
Earlier you said we have anti-cruelty laws because humans feel bad (as a matter of empathy) when they see animals tortured (I'm not going to use the loaded term "mistreated").
Now I interpret this to be a sort of public anti-obscenity law. If the reason is that it makes people feel bad, then it shouldn't matter if one does it in private and no one on the outside learns about it.
Let's change the scenarios slightly. Let us, in order to understand the fundamentals at work, replace the cat with a human. What "axiomatic" reason, if any, can you cite? I can name a rather simple one: the interests of the victim. Animals do not enjoy being tortured anymore than human beings. Torturing animals is wrong regardless of how humans "feel" about the matter. If by some quirk in our biology, our evolutionary heritage, we were all sadists who loved torturing felines, would that make it OK? Of course not.
How could it NOT make sense? You ask me what argument I would make in a given circumstance. The argument would change based on the audience. So I will ask again, to whom am I making this argument to. It is YOUR hypothetical. So still have not answered the two questions. Assuming the second
I see. So instead of clarifying the question you'd rather rant on, ironcially leaving your leaving your last sentence incomplete (which is what I thought of your second question). The first had a response inside the quote.
[one block of text snipped, another was moved up North]
Here is the text of the original post you've been dodging. As I mentioned earlier, it was hiding at the top of one of consolidated replies, most of the text therein a response to you.
______________________________
I don't see anything ad hoc about the distinction. We hold the rights of children under reserve. As an infant human who will grow into a being who will exercise moral reason the child comes under the umbrella of human rights.
I'm afraid it is not so simple. First, not all infants and children will grow into beings capable of exercising moral reason. Consider the terminally ill, for example. Second, your distinction rests on potentiality confusion: if an X is a potential Y, it does not have the rights of Y (because it's still an X). Third, why bother talking about infants? Would about an eight month old fetus? Four months old? An embryo?
A similar, though different concession is made to those mentally incapable of fully excercising moral reason.
How so? They will never be a member of the "moral community."
Towhit, a 2 year would never find himself on murder charge (or any criminal charge for that matter).
Yes, two year olds seem to lack this thing called "moral agency."
A chimpanzee, or lion or whatever will never possess the moral reason neeeded to understnad what murder or assault is for example. A lion that attacks someone in the wild will not be accused of a crime and prosecuted.
You're right! I failed to consider the truly awesome threat animals pose to humans.