It's just a coincidence!!!

Besides, the "noisy environment" ad hoc rationale would be easy enough to get around. Person "A" sits in a quiet hotel room above the casino and does whatever it is PEAR claims to do to affect the outcome of a random event (like making the roulette wheel hit "red" more often than "black"). Person "B" goes to the casino and bets on red all night long.

Note--is the effect additive? If so Person A could be a whole committee.

If the PEAR claims were true, the casinos would go bankrupt.
 
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Or you could do it the old fashioned way...

http://www.newscientist.com/article.ns?id=dn4815

Nice!

A point from the article appropriate to this discussion:
Even crude predictions could be profitable because of the way the game is set up. European roulette wheels have 37 resting positions for the ball. In one version of the game, you bet on a number between one and 36, so you have a one in 36 chance of winning.

If you win, the casino pays you 35 times your bet. So any time you increase your odds to better than 1 in 35, you win on average. "Even saying which half of the wheel is extremely powerful because the payoff is so good," Packard says.

I forget what it's called, but there's a betting trick where you've got 3 cards and the bettor has to guess which card is a certain one (this assumes that they don't know or have any reason to suspect which card is which--purely a guess). You give them 3 to 1 odds. (If they bet a dollar and are right, you have to pay them $3.) They pick a card, but before you reveal whether their selection was right, you turn over one of the other two cards (that isn't the target). Now, you tell them, you've got a 50/50 chance of being right. Would you care to make a much larger bet at even money? [Edit: note well: they don't get to change the card they've chosen at this point.] If they accept this offer consistently, the money making odds are now in your favor (as they darn well should be!)
 
Nice!

A point from the article appropriate to this discussion:


I forget what it's called, but there's a betting trick where you've got 3 cards and the bettor has to guess which card is a certain one (this assumes that they don't know or have any reason to suspect which card is which--purely a guess). You give them 3 to 1 odds. (If they bet a dollar and are right, you have to pay them $3.) They pick a card, but before you reveal whether their selection was right, you turn over one of the other two cards (that isn't the target). Now, you tell them, you've got a 50/50 chance of being right. Would you care to make a much larger bet at even money? [Edit: note well: they don't get to change the card they've chosen at this point.] If they accept this offer consistently, the money making odds are now in your favor (as they darn well should be!)

The Monty Hall problem. IIRC the answer is that the card that was not picked by the subject is twice as likely to be the target. I.e. 1 in 3 chance original card is target, 2 in 3 chance the other card left is the target.
 
I forget what it's called, but there's a betting trick where you've got 3 cards and the bettor has to guess which card is a certain one (this assumes that they don't know or have any reason to suspect which card is which--purely a guess). You give them 3 to 1 odds. (If they bet a dollar and are right, you have to pay them $3.) They pick a card, but before you reveal whether their selection was right, you turn over one of the other two cards (that isn't the target). Now, you tell them, you've got a 50/50 chance of being right. Would you care to make a much larger bet at even money? [Edit: note well: they don't get to change the card they've chosen at this point.] If they accept this offer consistently, the money making odds are now in your favor (as they darn well should be!)

That's similar to the Monty Hall Problem. I don't know if it has its own name, though.

Linda
 
The Monty Hall problem. IIRC the answer is that the card that was not picked by the subject is twice as likely to be the target. I.e. 1 in 3 chance original card is target, 2 in 3 chance the other card left is the target.

I'm not sure of the wording you used. The easier way (for me) to think of it is to realize that when he selected the card, he had a 1 in 3 chance of being right. When I reveal one of the wrong cards, it does nothing to change the odds. (When I state that the odds are now 50/50, I'm lying.)

It's a different problem if you let them change choices after revealing one of the wrong cards. (If you're the bettor, it's to your advantage to change, but I don't believe it brings the odds up to make even money a worthwhile bet.)
 
If this were a casino game, the house would simply offer something like a 2.6 to 1 payoff and leave off the second part altogether. "More than double your money if you guess the right card!" In the long run, the house will make money because the odds are 1 in 3, and they're only paying off $2.6 to every dollar bet.

But hey, the buffet is really cheap!
 
I'm not sure of the wording you used. The easier way (for me) to think of it is to realize that when he selected the card, he had a 1 in 3 chance of being right. When I reveal one of the wrong cards, it does nothing to change the odds. (When I state that the odds are now 50/50, I'm lying.)

It's a different problem if you let them change choices after revealing one of the wrong cards. (If you're the bettor, it's to your advantage to change, but I don't believe it brings the odds up to make even money a worthwhile bet.)

I think it would because by choosing the other card the subject would win (on average) 2 times in 3 attempts. An even-odds payout would be very much in the subjects favour.

The way I think about the problem is by partitioning the 3 cards into 2 sets: The card that the subject picked and the 2 cards that (s)he did not. The chance of the picked card being the target is 1/3 and in the not-picked set 2/3. Now, because the card turned over is always i) not the target card and ii) from the not-picked set, the unturned card in the not-picked set "inherits" the 2/3 chance of being the target.
 
Even assuming that, you're neglecting combinations. 10 x 10 = 100 chances of winning both, not 10 + 10 = 20.
It would depend on also how long each ticket was valid. Some tickets are good for a time period; some for a single draw; the low-end assumption of single draw seems more likely in this instance. On your later info that one is played everyday and one is played twice a week, we still have to work out combinations of winning tickets. Assume he was buying ten of each each day, then he would have 10 chances from his Fantasy 5 tickets and either 30 or 40 from his accumulated Super Lotto tickets. Take the lower number, he has 10 x 30 = 300 chances of winning twice.
Okay, you're right there, but that doesn't change the rest of my analysis.

Yeah, there's a lot of rough assumptions here based on the skimpy data in the newspaper story. We're assuming buying patterns are flat lines. But that's not true of course. There are huge spikes. People tend to play favorite lottos until a jackpot hasn't been won in a while, then suddenly everyone who's eligible to is buying lotto tickets. So we might go from 25 million people buying 2 of each to 200 million people buying 25 of each, daily average, for a particular drawing. During such spikes, the odds would be (200/25) x (25x25/2x2) = 1250 times more likely of one person winning both.
Two points here: (1) The Super Lotto jackpot that Gallina won was "only" $17 million, which is far lower than many lotto jackpots, and so I doubt if he or others were buying more tickets than usual for that drawing; (2) When there is a really huge lotto jackpot, such as $200 million, the likelihood is that players switch from the lower jackpot game to the lotto. Therefore, that may actually decrease the probability of a double jackpot winner on the same day. For example, someone like Gallina, who buys an average of 20 tickets per day, may generally buy 10 Super Lotto and 10 Fantasy 5 tickets, but when there is a huge Super Lotto jackpot, he may buy 50 Super Lotto tickets, but no Fantasy 5 tickets.

If we assume this is typical of other states, and accept your low-end estimates, these averages still don't tell the whole story, because of combinations. If 2 people follow these averages, 1 x 3.5 = 3.5 each. But it's unlikely both spend the same amount. If one buys on average .2 & 1, and the other 1.8 & 6, we get .2 x 1 + 1.8 x 6 = 11 vs. 3.5 + 3.5 = 7, a jump up of 57%. Some will be in the middle or very close to it, but many won't. So any linear assumption should be adjusted upwards by (est.) 25% to reflect combinatorial deviation.
Okay, but if someone is buying only 0.2 tickets per Fantasy 5 or similar drawing; i.e., one ticket per five drawings, (s)he may rarely if ever buy a lotto ticket for the same day's Fantasy 5 drawing.

Using your figures: 23,750,000,000,000 / 3.5 = 6,785,715,000,000 to 1 double-lottery player.
Assuming 25,000,000 double-lottery players per draw,
6,785,715 / 25 = 271428.6 draws.
There are on average 104.357 double-draws per year,
271428.6 / 104.357 = ~ 2601 years.
Factor in combinatorial deviation estimate:
2601 / 1.25 = 2080.8 years.
Factor in "spiking" (I calculated this at 1250, but will use only 20% of that, guessing that only one in 5 drawings has significant spiking):
2080 / 250 = ~8.33 years between two Americans winning two lotteries on the same day. Hmmm... those odds ain't too bad; think I'll go buy me a coupla them lotto ticketz! ;)
Again, while spiking occurs when there is a big lotto jackpot, it's unclear whether that increases or decreases the chance of a double jackpot winner on the same day.
 
Hey Rodney.

I think we're going to need some more clear details on US lotteries to proceed much further.
As we've seen, highball and lowball guesses and unexamined averages make a BIG difference.

Here's one more simple illustration: a multiple lotto player buys 50 tickets say. He might split them --
a] two ways, 49 x 1 = 49 combos; b] 25 x 25 = 625; c] three ways, (17 x 17) + (17 x 16)x2 = 833; d] four ways, (10x10) + (15x15) + (10x15)x4 = 925; e] five ways, (10 x 10) x 10 = 1000; and so on.
e] 1000 / a] 49 = 20.4 -- quite a variance. Just via those assumptions alone, a period of 204 years based on a] is only 10 years based on e].

Same with every other assumption we're making: each under- or over-estimate, each neglected combination or deviation, has a huge impact on the final odds.

I'll give it some thought because it's an interesting challenge: two winning lotto tickets is bleepin' amazing! no doubt about that... but exactly how amazing will depend on better stats and analysis. :book:
 
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If the PEAR claims were true, the casinos would go bankrupt.
How so? The PEAR results show an influence on machine output of about 1 part in 10,000, which is much lower than the house take for even the highest-payout casino games.
 
Hey Rodney.

I think we're going to need some more clear details on US lotteries to proceed much further.
As we've seen, highball and lowball guesses and unexamined averages make a BIG difference.

Here's one more simple illustration: a multiple lotto player buys 50 tickets say. He might split them --
a] two ways, 49 x 1 = 49 combos; b] 25 x 25 = 625; c] three ways, (17 x 17) + (17 x 16)x2 = 833; d] four ways, (10x10) + (15x15) + (10x15)x4 = 925; e] five ways, (10 x 10) x 10 = 1000; and so on.
e] 1000 / a] 49 = 20.4 -- quite a variance. Just via those assumptions alone, a period of 204 years based on a] is only 10 years based on e].

Same with every other assumption we're making: each under- or over-estimate, each neglected combination or deviation, has a huge impact on the final odds.

I'll give it some thought because it's an interesting challenge: two winning lotto tickets is bleepin' amazing! no doubt about that... but exactly how amazing will depend on better stats and analysis. :book:
I agree that we need better data, which will permit better analysis, and I'll see what I can find as well. By the way, Gallina is not the only double jackpot lottery winner, although to my knowledge he is the only person to have won twice on the same day. For the time being, I'll focus only on the probability of that happening.
 
The claimed differences are large - relative increases on the order of 1.5 to 3 times chance. Although the numbers become smaller when opportunities for bias are reduced - more like 1.2 to 1.5.
Really? Could you give me some cites for those experiments? Because the ones I've read about have success rates more along the lines of .28 when .25 was what was expected. That's an improvment of approximately 1.1 times chance. And that was allowing the subject to concentrate in a place relatively free of distractions.
The allowed time varies and is sometimes short (e.g. within a second or two in some precog experiments).
Yes, I think there have been some like that, but I'm not aware of those experiments showing such high success rates. Could you provide some links to those experiments?
I can concede that some may find the environment distracting, but even if it reduces the ability, it takes very little (as previously illustrated) to tip the odds in your favour.
May I recommend a wonderful non-fiction book called "The Eudymonic Pie" Sigh. I probably spelled that wrong. It's been a good ten years since I read it. Anyway, it's about a bunch of physicists who tried to develop a real-time prediction algorithm for roulette based on previous spins and other data. Fairly interesting. They were successful in tipping the odds to be in their favor. They were not successful in breaking the bank at any casinos. Turns out it's a bit harder to pull it off than you might think when the increase in your odds is only a slight improvement.
And we're not talking about a few special individuals, but rather everyone who is playing. I understand the desire to find excuses, but at some point, if everyday conditions can eliminate these effects, you have to ask why anyone can claim to notice these things in the first place.

Excuse me, but I don't know of anyone who's claimed to have noticed such abilities at work in casinos. The argument is that because no one has noticed them, they must not exist. Certainly, I agree, for some levels of abilities - like predicting roulette wheel results with consistency and accuracy time after time - you have a point. Such abilities don't seem to exist.

I think that's part of the problem (and why Randi started the MDC). Since the characteristics of claimed paranormal abilities aren't constrained, any argument against them can be made invalid through careful selection of which characteristics one is willing to concede.

Linda

Certain it's a big problem in attempting to evaluate the evidence for and against such abilities. I try to constrain the charactoristics based on what I have seen, read, heard about, and experienced that seems reasonable to me. Others will have different ideas. The environment of casinos seems quite inappropriate for such endeavors to me, so I don't find it a convincing argument against them.
 
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I think it would because by choosing the other card the subject would win (on average) 2 times in 3 attempts. An even-odds payout would be very much in the subjects favour.

You're right--if they change the choice they're playing 2:3 odds.

In my original description, though, you aren't allowed to change your choice, just invited to make a new bet at odds that favor the house.
 
How so? The PEAR results show an influence on machine output of about 1 part in 10,000, which is much lower than the house take for even the highest-payout casino games.
I think you're confusing the confidence interval with probabilities of the random event generator.

If the random event is, for example, a coin toss (so the chance of heads is 1:2), they're claiming by thinking hard about it, you can change that to something like 1.2 in 2. In a casino, changing the real odds of a game that much could give you an advantage, depending on the game.
 
I think you're confusing the confidence interval with probabilities of the random event generator.

If the random event is, for example, a coin toss (so the chance of heads is 1:2), they're claiming by thinking hard about it, you can change that to something like 1.2 in 2. In a casino, changing the real odds of a game that much could give you an advantage, depending on the game.
According to -- http://www.princeton.edu/~pear/human_machine.html --
"The observed effects are usually quite small, of the order of a few parts in ten thousand on average, but they compound to highly significant statistical deviations from chance expectation."
 
Really? Could you give me some cites for those experiments? Because the ones I've read about have success rates more along the lines of .28 when .25 was what was expected. That's an improvment of approximately 1.1 times chance. And that was allowing the subject to concentrate in a place relatively free of distractions.

Yes, I think there have been some like that, but I'm not aware of those experiments showing such high success rates. Could you provide some links to those experiments?

These are the kind of studies I am referring to (with reference to individual studies (or individuals) with larger effect sizes).

http://64.233.179.104/scholar?hl=en...t?+Replicable+evidence+for+an+anomalous+..."+
http://www.boundary.org/articles/presentiment99.pdf
http://www.sheldrake.org/papers/Telepathy/experiment_tests.pdf

May I recommend a wonderful non-fiction book called "The Eudymonic Pie" Sigh. I probably spelled that wrong. It's been a good ten years since I read it. Anyway, it's about a bunch of physicists who tried to develop a real-time prediction algorithm for roulette based on previous spins and other data. Fairly interesting. They were successful in tipping the odds to be in their favor. They were not successful in breaking the bank at any casinos. Turns out it's a bit harder to pull it off than you might think when the increase in your odds is only a slight improvement.

I haven’t read the book, but it was my understanding that they did win money before they had to stop because the device broke? I found stories of other players who managed to win big using similar strategies (narrowing the possibilities and therefore improving their odds - sometimes only slightly).

Excuse me, but I don't know of anyone who's claimed to have noticed such abilities at work in casinos. The argument is that because no one has noticed them, they must not exist. Certainly, I agree, for some levels of abilities - like predicting roulette wheel results with consistency and accuracy time after time - you have a point. Such abilities don't seem to exist.

Certain it's a big problem in attempting to evaluate the evidence for and against such abilities. I try to constrain the charactoristics based on what I have seen, read, heard about, and experienced that seems reasonable to me. Others will have different ideas. The environment of casinos seems quite inappropriate for such endeavors to me, so I don't find it a convincing argument against them.

Putting aside the issue of environment for the moment (the environment isn’t always detrimental – online gaming can be done in the quiet of your own home), why wouldn’t the claimed abilities be useful in a casino setting? The Ganzfeld studies claim that a person can know which of several pictures was chosen by another. Would that not allow for someone to know whether the person sitting next to them saw an eight or a jack when looking at their hidden card in Blackjack, and so give an advantage? Wouldn’t knowing several seconds beforehand what colour was coming up next be an advantage in roulette? The kinds of abilities that are claimed are those that would be useful in a casino setting, if they were real. So one has to ask why it isn’t a common claim. These abilities would also apply to things like picking winning lottery numbers and online gambling, or in other areas like finding missing children or prisoner interrogation. Even if these things only occasionally worked in these situations, they would still provide a tremendous advantage.

The reason we have researchers asking these questions is because these events are “apparent to the naked eye”. They are driven by people noticing within themselves a particular skill – “I know who is calling before I pick up the phone”, “I had a premonition the plane would crash and cancelled my flight”, “I can control the direction of a candle flame”. This already implies effect sizes that are at least medium, more likely large. Using Cohen, for things like the Ganzfeld studies, small, medium and large effect sizes translates to differences of about 9, 20 and 35 percent (or 1.36 to 2.56 times chance). The use of casinos as an example is just an indication of the larger problem. If these effects are obvious to the naked eye, by those who have experienced them – i.e. these effects are large – why do they not show up in situations with the power to detect even tiny effects? Why do they not show up whenever the existence of such an ability (even if sporadic or slight) would provide a tremendous benefit?

Maybe we can’t expect believers to find the lack of a casino effect convincing, but if you’re sincere shouldn't you at least be asking, “why can’t we see an effect at the casino?” “Am I satisfied with my excuses?”

Linda
 

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