Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

[JayUtah]

The first five minutes seem almost tailor-made to address Gubiosak's concerns.

Schuller is a legend. I wish he had been around when I was struggling to learn that stuff.

I'll note, perhaps a little snidely, that while the lecturer is clearly not a native English speaker, they seem quite capable of formulating their arguments without the use of AI.

Getting a degree from Cambridge helps.

 

[JayUtah]

Okay, so we've dispensed with quantum mechanics as a proposition for dualism. It simply isn't and can't be. Information as quantum mechanics defines the term must be a property of matter. It's meaningless to discuss those properties independently of the matter that exhibits them.

We looked at the "natural law" argument as a fundamental equivocation. The philosophy of independent, self-existing natural principles that actively govern the behavior of matter can rise above the inherent-behavior argument only by requiring some other form of inherent property of matter (obedience). Parsimony says, "No, thank you."

I sort of did a lot of handwaving around the OP's mathematics proposition. Here it is again.

Mathematical structures: Are equations and mathematical truths just human constructs, or do they exist independently without being physical matter?

It's hard to address because it's so badly stated.

Mathematical structures such as equations are not physical matter. Technically (i.e., pedantically) this particular example of an equation—

E = mc²​

—exists as a particular configuration of matter inside your computer display that results in an emission of photons going from your screen to your eyeballs. But that's just silly.

The question aligns better with the existing philosophical debate if we rephrase it as, "...or do they exist independently without depending on physical matter." Having thus put new words in the OP's mouth, I shall now proceed with what might be an elaborate straw man.

Our discussion has focused on mathematics as a tool for describing understanding the physical world. That makes sense given the OP's context. But it doesn't have to. If you want to talk about "mathematical structures" then you can also talk about them in the pure abstract way that Dr. Schuller does. Don't stop at T-plus five minutes in the video. Go until about eight or nine minutes in, where he lays out the abstract foundation of mathematics (i.e., logic) and from that goes up through differentiable manifolds. You don't need all that to do basic math; Schuller is laying a foundation for high-end physics.

The point is that it's abstraction at every building block he draws a rectangle around. Hilbert would probably agree—It's all axioms, logic, and propositions comprising a set of rules and sentences conforming to those rules. You can say

1 + 1 = 2​

only for certain values of "1" and "2" in the appropriate well-behaved number spaces. (Whitehead and Russell famously took 360 pages to get to that point.)

Okay, but the concept we represent with the numeral 2 existed before our brains developed the ability to count and invented the squiggle that represents counting two objects. The geometrical relationship expressed by the Pythagorean Theorem existed before Pythagorus was born. We properly say that these relationships are discovered, not created. That's one school of thought.

In the post that blue-screened the OP's AI, I alluded to the abstraction of real numbers as a field over which the operations of addition and multiplication are defined. With those, you can do anything. But why does it work? If I have a quantity of water, and I add it to another quantity of water, the resulting quantity of water is the arithmetic sum. If I reverse the order of addition, it still works. Thus the simple equations,

a + b = c​

and

a + b = b + a = c,​

express something we can observe in the real world. How does the water "know" how to do that? Addition seems to reflect an inherent property of matter, as does its commutative property.

Ditto multiplication. I have a see-saw with an equal weight equidistant from the fulcrum such that balance is achieved. If I move one weight twice the distance from the fulcrum, I need to add twice the weight to the other side to balance it. Or if I double the weight, I need to move the other weight a distance described by the same factor. The relationship between weight and distance from the fulcrum is an arithmetic product. How do these planks and weights "know" how to do multiplication? Again,

ab = ba = c​

expresses (or rather, discovers) an inherent property of the real world. Why does putting some water in with some other water produce addition instead of multiplication? Vice versa with the weights on the see-saw. How does the physical word "know" the difference between + and ×? Another school of thought says that mathematics merely describes behavior we can observe in matter, and thus muchly depends on matter. Another interpretation (the "Governists") says that + and × denote some independent, fundamental influences of the universe that govern matter (even if there weren't any) and compel water and see-saws to do the right thing. We showed how that doesn't answer any questions.

Saying that these behaviors existed before we discovered them makes sense when we want to argue that the things we describe with math exist separately from the language of the description and the need for a brain to do the observing, inventing, and describing. But in asking whether mathematical structures are a human contrivance versus an independent existence regardless of matter sort of leaves a hole. Does it mean anything to say "two" without the ability to say, "two of what?" The OP's is really trying to ask whether mathematics poses a challenge for physicalism by proposing self-existent entities that exist independently of mind and independently of matter. Do mathematical structures exist not as a human construct and not as a property of matter?

It's becoming harder and harder to imagine how they could.

You can argue that a purely logical proof exists of the Pythagorean theorem because it follows from Euclid's axioms. Since logic is the foundation of, well, everything, then this should seem to prove the self-existing nature of Pythagorus' discovery. The problem I have with that is that Euclid's axioms tacitly pay homage to the physical world. Thus the question of whether "mathematical relationships" exist independently of a physical reality cannot really be answered with such things as measurement. The axioms upon which the math is based that give rise to the examples in this thread are idealized versions of practical experience observing the natural world. (Cue @W.D.Clinger to explain better than I can how better axioms vindicate Pythagorus.)

Why does mathematics do such a good job of describing the natural world? My preferred answer is because it was clearly invented to do so. To me the notion that the formalisms of description are purely inventions of the mind doesn't bear on the notion of whether mathematics exists separately from the physical world (i.e., that it could refute physicalism). The invention is a human contrivance. The need for the invention is the requirement to predict the behavior of the physical world.

The notion that the success of science validates the mathematics being used is not just a pragmatic crutch. It is a seriously held philosophical position in the philosophy of science. Physics exactly tries to describe the behavior of the natural world as we experience it empirically. Mathematics works so very well to make physics do that—so much so that you can't seriously study the latter without first mastering the former, as Dr. Schuller explains so well.

It's just really hard to dissociate mathematics entirely from the physical world. Even Chalmers admits that the best (if not the only) way to test the existence of a separate quale would be the ruthlessly empirical science of neuroscience. We simply have no better way at this point to test the natural world and determine what is veridically real. And science simply doesn't exist without mathematics. Therefore it must work. The observation of a predicted truth validates everything that participated in that prediction.

As a nuts-and-bolts pragmatist, I can opt to turn my nose up at the sole rea mentis explanations as coffeehouse twaddle if I wish. We can refine our understanding of geometries from different approaches and vindicate Euclid, Pythagorus, and all those other hifalutin' Greeks. But if they show that math exists solely as a "thing of the mind," then this answers the OP. Math certainly can be just a human contrivance. But the other prong of the OP's question asks whether it can exist independently of the physical world. I don't think so. If it's not a thing of the mind (prong 1), it's a thing of buckets of water and see-saws. It describes the behavior of the natural world (prong 2).

Thus physicalism is not refuted. Quod erat demonstrandum.

 

[theprestige]

It's a little more of a commitment than a 1 1/2 hour lecture on YouTube, but I learned everything I know about propositional logic from the book Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid by Douglas Hofstedter (1979). Highly recommended, if you can make it all the way through.

Most of the lecture is irrelevant here. It's just the first five minutes that are surprisingly on point.

 

[Mojo]

Does Gubiosak Struggle to Explain Math and Natural Laws?​

 

[mumblethrax]

Okay, but the concept we represent with the numeral 2 existed before our brains developed the ability to count and invented the squiggle that represents counting two objects. The abstract relationship expressed by the Pythagorean theorem existed before Pythagorus was born. We properly say that these relationships are discovered, not created. That's one school of thought.

This is mathematical platonism (realism)--it holds that mathematical objects are abstract, non-spatial, non-temporal, non-physical, and non-mental.

You can argue that a purely logical proof exists of the Pythagorean theorem because it follows from Euclid's axioms. Since logic is the foundation of, well, everything, then this should seem to prove the self-existing nature of Pythagorus' discovery. The problem I have with that is that Euclid's axioms tacitly pay homage to the physical world. Thus the question of whether "mathematical relationships" exist independently of a physical reality cannot really be answered with such things as measurement. The axioms upon which the math is based that give rise to the examples in this thread are idealized versions of practical experience observing the natural world. (Cue @W.D.Clinger to explain better than I can how better axioms vindicate Pythagorus.)

This seems to be immanent realism. The view that mathematical objects only exist insofar as they can be instantiated in the physical. It's a minority view for a few reasons, one of which is the we can't have the kind of precision we want for mathematics. We can't actually have exactly one bucketful of water, we can only have a messy approximation.

But in asking whether mathematical structures are a human contrivance versus an independent existence regardless of matter sort of leaves a hole. Does it mean anything to say "two" without the ability to say, "two of what?"

This is basically a nominalist (anti-realist) objection. "Two" doesn't exist, but "two sticks" does.

The notion that the success of science validates the mathematics being used is not just a pragmatic crutch. It is a seriously held philosophical position in the philosophy of science. Physics exactly tries to describe the behavior of the natural world as we experience it empirically. Mathematics works so very well to make physics do that—so much so that you can't seriously study the latter without first mastering the former, as Dr. Schuller explains so well.

This is the Quine-Putnam indispensability argument, or something close to it. The thing is...if this argument succeeds, it's a knock-out blow for both nominalism and immanent realism. Nominalism because it implies that the objects of mathematics need to exist (so any kind of anti-realism is out), and immanent realism because some of the objects necessary for science can't actually be physically instantiated (infinitesimals, for example). We need them to be ontologically real, but they aren't.

Which leaves platonism as pretty much the last man standing (there are a few other views with relatively minor support that aren't really worth talking about here).

I don't think this is a huge problem for physicalism, though. One possible way to reconcile platonism and physicalism is to note that mathematical truths are necessarily true. This would imply that they supervene on any possible world, and so the "the physical, or depending on physical" requirement is preserved. This kind of feels like cheating to me, but it might work.

Another is to bite the bullet and say, sure, ok, this kind of non-physical thing exists. But it doesn't really matter, because the abstract objects of mathematical platonism are causally inert. In the same way that epiphenomenalism is technically property dualist, but nobody really worries about that, because it's roach motel dualism--on that account, physical processes cause mental states, but mental states have no causal impact on the physical. Causal closure is maintained for both.

The kind of dualism that people usually want to argue for requires causally efficacious mind-stuff. That's just a different ball of wax.

 

[Gubiosak]

I would like to raise a question entirely within the debate about materialism/physicalism, without appealing to spiritualism or any alternative metaphysics.

Science has been extraordinarily successful in explaining physical phenomena. But does this success justify the stronger philosophical conclusion that:

“Everything that exists is ultimately physical.”

It seems important to distinguish between methodological physicalism and metaphysical physicalism.

Science investigates reality through empirical methods focused on physical phenomena. But how do we move from:

“Physical explanations are extremely successful”

to:

“Nothing beyond the physical can exist”?

If a materialist says that only physical evidence is admissible because only physical things exist, wouldn't that risk becoming circular?

So my question is simple:

What is the strongest non-circular argument for moving from the success of physical science to the metaphysical claim that physical reality is all that exists?

If this final step depends on philosophical premises rather than empirical evidence, perhaps physicalism should be understood not as a scientific discovery, but as a metaphysical interpretation of science.

What would be the strongest materialist response?

---

Note on AI use:

Yes, I use AI as a tool for learning and translation. English is not my native language; therefore, it helps me understand philosophical arguments, check my reasoning, and express my ideas clearly in English.

However, I do not want AI to debate on my behalf. I want to understand the arguments myself and respond in my own words. If you think I have misinterpreted an argument, please point it out—I am here to discuss ideas, not to hide behind AI.

 

[Carrot Flower King]

Why do you need the metaphysics?

Seems to be adding an unnecessary step.

And we still have that implication of something beyond the physical, which is not named, merely hinted at...

 

[JayUtah]

Perhaps you should first ask whether anyone actually believes the statement, "Nothing beyond the physical can exist," and is willing to argue in favor of it.

The skeptic's baseline answer will be, "Nothing beyond the physical is known to exist," and will be open about what kind of evidence would convince them otherwise.

 

[The Great Zaganza]

let me know when chip makers make use of metaphysics for their designs.

 

[catsmate]

Oh good grief, more circular, self-referential bollocks.

 

[catsmate]

let me know when chip makers make use of metaphysics for their designs.

 

[Darat]

Do like the classics!

 

[Jack by the hedge]

The proposition "everything that exists is ultimately physical" sounds like one of those questions which answers itself if you define its terms.

What does "exists" mean here?

 

[Darat]

I would like to raise a question entirely within the debate about materialism/physicalism, without appealing to spiritualism or any alternative metaphysics.

Science has been extraordinarily successful in explaining physical phenomena. But does this success justify the stronger philosophical conclusion that:


It seems important to distinguish between methodological physicalism and metaphysical physicalism.

Science investigates reality through empirical methods focused on physical phenomena. But how do we move from:


to:


If a materialist says that only physical evidence is admissible because only physical things exist, wouldn't that risk becoming circular?

So my question is simple:


If this final step depends on philosophical premises rather than empirical evidence, perhaps physicalism should be understood not as a scientific discovery, but as a metaphysical interpretation of science.

What would be the strongest materialist response?

Show me the evidence for the metaphysical being different to everything else we've got evidence for.

---

Note on AI use:

Yes, I use AI as a tool for learning and translation. English is not my native language; therefore, it helps me understand philosophical arguments, check my reasoning, and express my ideas clearly in English.

However, I do not want AI to debate on my behalf. I want to understand the arguments myself and respond in my own words. If you think I have misinterpreted an argument, please point it out—I am here to discuss ideas, not to hide behind AI.

Please.

 

[P.J. Denyer]

We invented a language that helps us model reality.

This, this thread seems to me like amazement that the map bears so striking a resemblance to the layout of the country.

 

[mumblethrax]

So my question is simple:

What is the strongest non-circular argument for moving from the success of physical science to the metaphysical claim that physical reality is all that exists?

What would be the strongest materialist response?

The short version: parsimony. Why would you posit the existence of something that you don't need to explain the world?

 

[steenkh]

“Nothing beyond the physical can exist”?

What does "beyond the physical" mean? We can only experience the physical. Even our imagination is physical interactions in the brain. If anything exists beyond the physical, we'll never know.

 

[mumblethrax]

This, this thread seems to me like amazement that the map bears so striking a resemblance to the layout of the country.

I don't think so. Math really does seem unreasonably effective to me, because the earliest counting systems weren't an attempt to model the world. They just wanted to count stuff. They hit it out of the park without even realizing that they were in a park. Or that the pitch had been thrown. Or that they were playing baseball at all.

 

[arthwollipot]

If it exists, then there should be physical evidence of it. If there is no physical evidence, how can it be said to exist?

 

[P.J. Denyer]

I don't think so. Math really does seem unreasonably effective to me, because the earliest counting systems weren't an attempt to model the world. They just wanted to count stuff. They hit it out of the park without even realizing that they were in a park. Or that the pitch had been thrown. Or that they were playing baseball at all.

Just counting stuff is modeling the world.