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Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

Oh good grief, do you (or your dubious AI) even understand what the term mean?
Probably not. I've seen other examples of LLM-assisted argumentation where the LLM insists that the merits of a submitter's claim should be respected even when the merits are misaligned to the question such as in the manner of a straw-man argument. The LLM's semantic horizon doesn't seem broad enough to recognize the critics' identification of a debate-level failure. Further, the engagement bias we know exists in LLMs favors flattering the submitter. So no, I doubt his AI can properly identify a straw man and reformulate the argument to avoid it. It's spitting out a formulaic response that simply tries to redirect to the substance of the argument regardless of its relevance.

Further, the scientism thread shows just how incapable the OP is of understanding how his arguments comprise a straw man. This appears to be a blind spot. It's becoming clear that the OP is not really apprised of how his AI is prosecuting the debate.
 
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Probably not. I've seen other examples of LLM-assisted argumentation where the LLM insists that the merits of a submitter's claim should be respected even when the merits are misaligned to the question such as in the manner of a straw-man argument.
Which is indicative of lack of human involvement, and lack of the human posters understanding of the term.
The LLM's semantic horizon doesn't seem broad enough to recognize the critics' identification of a debate-level failure.
Agreed. Also indicative of poor design of the LLMs.
Further, the engagement bias we know exists in LLMs favors flattering the submitter.
Also true, which tends to reinforce the Dunning-Kruger spiral.
So no, I doubt his AI can properly identify a straw man and reformulate the argument to avoid it. It's spitting out a formulaic response that simply tries to redirect to the substance of the argument regardless of its relevance.
Agreed.
Further, the scientism thread shows just how incapable the OP is of understanding how his arguments comprise a straw man. This appears to be a blind spot. It's becoming clear that the OP is not really apprised of how his AI is prosecuting the debate.
Very true. I have, I believe, pointed this out in three threads. Yet @Gubiosak keeps repeating the same mistaken nonsense, over and over again.
 
calling an ontological distinction a straw man just to dismiss it still avoids the core question: do geometric relationships exist independently of human brains, or not?
Some geometric relationships are understood by monkey brains and by pigeon brains, so I'm inclined to believe those relationships exist independently of human brains.

Whether ontological distinctions exist independently of human brains is a different question. But the more interesting question, I think, is the epistemological question of why we should believe ontological distinctions exist even within the LLMs that speak for human brains.
 
Further, the scientism thread shows just how incapable the OP is of understanding how his arguments comprise a straw man. This appears to be a blind spot. It's becoming clear that the OP is not really apprised of how his AI is prosecuting the debate.

I think I suggested the same thing a while back in that thread. I strongly suspect that the same is happening in the other direction too, and that in effect Gubiosak is neither aware of what his AI is actually saying in English, nor of what we are saying in reply before the AI "translates" it into Portuguese. What he sees as an aid to communication is therefore in fact an insurmountable barrier to it in both directions.

Dave
 
What about actual scientists? Especially those in relevant fields.
I'm not sure what work "actual" is doing there--the hard problem is a philosophical problem, not a scientific one, and philosophers aren't pretending to science when they talk about it.

I'm not aware of any polling data among relevant scientists, but I expect most of them hope that a physicalist approach will eventually account for subjective experience, if they think about it at all. I can point to a few prominent scientists (like Christof Koch) who do take it seriously.
 
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I did find some survey data for philosophical commitments among neuroscientists that touches on the hard problem.


The question: "Neuroscience is already capable, or will be in the future, of explaining the existence of subjective experience, a topic often referred to in philosophy as the “hard problem of consciousness” (David Chalmers)"

The result: "Finally, regarding the hard problem of consciousness, opinions were mixed (38.18% agreed that it would be resolved by neuroscience)."
 
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Those are all emergent properties of thinking, which occurs physically in the brain. No, there is no such thing as math without a brain to work it.
I don't know. E would equal mc2 whether or not any intelligent being ever observed or derived the relationship. Or, to put it another way, the relation E=mc2 is a property of the universe. Or more generally, mathematics—at least some mathematics—is a property of the universe.
 
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I don't know. E would equal mc2 whether or not any intelligent being ever observed or derived the relationship. Or, to put it another way, the relation E=mc2 is a property of the universe. Or more generally, mathematics—at least some mathematics—is a property of the universe.
Nope - the maths is a human description, maths is a human language. We use it because it happens to be much better than say English for describing i.e. modeling reality. Goes back to the earlier great comment, how does water know to exactly fill in the puddle? We could describe that using english or maths, but the water didn't use our English or our maths to fit itself into the puddle.
 
Nope - the maths is a human description, maths is a human language. We use it because it happens to be much better than say English for describing i.e. modeling reality. Goes back to the earlier great comment, how does water know to exactly fill in the puddle? We could describe that using english or maths, but the water didn't use our English or our maths to fit itself into the puddle.
Mathematics, like logic, is a process for deducing consequences. Mathematics goes well beyond logic by defining and exploring the consequences of mathematical ideas that may or may not turn out to have any application to reality.

Logic is the bare bones of mathematics. Mathematics imagines all sorts of ways to form skeletons from those bones, and to put flesh on those skeletons.
 
Maths are good for describing quantitative relationships. So, we use it to describe the world in terms of quantitative relationships.

Is the world really made up of quantitative relationships? That's the kind of question we give to philosophers, to keep them distracted while we get on with things.

Is maths the right tool for trying to figure out if the world really is made of quantitative relationships? That's the kind of question we give to crackpots, for much the same reason. Only it doesn't seem to be working. Or else we're not really getting on with things around here anyway. Por que no los dos?
 
The OP asks whether "mathematical structures" like equations exist outside the brain. I say no. Mathematics and logic are systems we invented to help us (i.e., the brain) reason about properties and quantities we can observe. The fact that those things we observe and "measure" (itself a nontrivial concept) exist on their own does not mean our frameworks of reasoning about them exist on their own. Those systems let us deduce what we would observe and measure. That's eminently a brain activity. That's still a big topic, but probably wants to wait for its own post.

It's important to remember that philosophers define "natural law" differently than physicists.

We deduced that the thing we call matter and the thing we call energy are actually two forms of—something. We made some machines that let observe them change from one form to another.

We observe that an attractive force exists between two chunks of the stuff we call matter: the bigger the chunks and the closer they are together, the more force.

We observe that some funky bits of matter exhibit attractive and repulsive forces, and that breaking one of them in half gives us two examples of the funk, not half the funk in each half.

In our special language, we down these observations respectively as E = mc2, F ∝ m1m2/r2[, and ∇⋅B = 0.

In physics, natural law simply describes what can be observed. We initially observe that two chunks of matter move toward each other as if some attractive force were present. As we observe more carefully, we can describe our measurement of the quantities involved in terms of something we call multiplication. It accurately describes what happens but it doesn't try to guess why it happens.

As expected, philosophy wonders if that "why" means something more than physicists care about. The OP asks whether natural law "governs" the behavior of the universe. A physicist interprets "govern" here to mean "describe." We don't make natural law; we discover it. Once discovered, that law describes what we think about how nature will behave. It lets us accurately describe things that haven't yet happened without worrying about why they're going to happen that way.

Some philosophers interpret "govern" here to mean "causes." Two chunks of matter wander toward each other because some separate, higher manifestation of reality made them do it. It implies a causation that isn't formulated as just some inherent property of matter. This poses a problem for philosophical "physicalists." Physicalists say every behavior in the universe depends on matter. This is the basis of saying that the hard problem of consciousness will eventually be solved by looking harder at how matter (especially brain matter) works.

But if there are rules that create behavior in matter, then those rules must therefore exist (in some way) separately from matter. If not everything depends on matter, then physicalism is wrong. The "govern means causation" camp defines natural law as some active influence that makes matter do what it we see it do.

Naturally, as in all philosophy, there are problems with this view.

There's a self-existing law that prevents cars from going faster than 25 mph down my street. Cars do it all the time, meaning that the law has no actual power to compel cars to go that speed. The law is not an elementary or emergent property of a car. The law exists by itself as a separate thing whether there are cars on my street or not. It has an effect on cars only insofar as intelligent drivers of those cars fear being punished for disobedience.

So what property of matter compels it to obey these supposedly self-existing laws instead of just doing whatever it wants? If natural law exists separately from matter, by what mechanism does it affect matter and force matter to do its bidding? What property of matter allows it to be manipulated in this way? Where and how do these laws exist?

So much for mathematics and natural law. What about information and quantum mechanics?

Philosophers are stuck here because if you want to hide dualism inside of quantum mechanics, you need to use the definition of "information" as it occurs in quantum mechanics. The basic element of information in QM is inherently a property of matter. The spin of an electron is information. It's largely navel-gazing twaddle to talk about spin as something separate from an electron. The abstract notion of electron spin can be discussed as a res mentis, but there's no actual information unless there's an actual electron to spin "up" or "down." The polarization of a photon is information. But while the abstract notion of photon polarization exists separately from an individual photon as a "thing of the mind," the information is present only when a photon is present. Information in QM is the absolute manifestation of physicalism.
 
The question: "Neuroscience is already capable, or will be in the future, of explaining the existence of subjective experience, a topic often referred to in philosophy as the “hard problem of consciousness” (David Chalmers)"
But how can empiricism test the hypotheses of philosophy until philosophy has validated empiricism? Oh, the circularity!
 
Nope - the maths is a human description, maths is a human language. We use it because it happens to be much better than say English for describing i.e. modeling reality. Goes back to the earlier great comment, how does water know to exactly fill in the puddle? We could describe that using english or maths, but the water didn't use our English or our maths to fit itself into the puddle.
That doesn’t address my argument that it would still be true that E=mc^2 even if there were no life in universe. We did not invent this property; we discovered it.
 
That doesn’t address my argument that it would still be true that E=mc^2 even if there were no life in universe. We did not invent this property; we discovered it.
The formula does not exist without humans to create it in order to explain the relationship to themselves. Likewise the meaning of the word true. The relationship between energy and matter existed before Einstein and continues to exist in the complete absence of the formula, or of any human concept of truth.
 
The formula does not exist without humans to create it in order to explain the relationship to themselves. Likewise the meaning of the word true. The relationship between energy and matter existed before Einstein and continues to exist in the complete absence of the formula, or of any human concept of truth.
The quantitative relationship between energy and the product of mass with the square of the speed of light in a vacuum?

That relationship? That's what exists even without humans to describe it?



Honestly the whole topic drives me to coin a new term: Rabbit-bunghole. It's like a rabbit hole, but not only does it not lead anywhere, it smells like farts.

You're basically at the point where using words to describe a physical fact immediately means you're no longer talking about the physical fact, but only about the words to describe it. Which is a conclusion that might give a philosopher some kind of smug philosophical thought-gasm, but is pretty useless to anyone actually tryhing to get anything done.
 
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That doesn’t address my argument that it would still be true that E=mc^2 even if there were no life in universe. We did not invent this property; we discovered it.
The sun undergoes fusion, we describe what the sun does with mathematics, the sun requires no knowledge of maths to do what the sun does.
 
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