Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

[JayUtah]

Can @Gubiosak actually formulate an interesting philosophical question? Or does @Gubiosak just assume any question that pops into @Gubiosak's head is worthy of serious consideration?

They're not even his questions. The circularity of empiricism was Kuhn's bugbear. The hard problem of consciousness is Chalmers' bugbear. The Governing model of natural law (which means something different to philosophers than it does to physicists) is Maudlin's bugbear. None of these ideas are/were ultimately well received. Our OP simply repeats them without addressing the very good arguments against them that result in them being disfavored by the mainstream.

Inquiring minds don't see a reason to want to know.

Especially when his answers mostly reduce to, "Not giving me the answer I wanted is a fallacy."

Transcendental resonance supersedes the empirical boundary, such that hidden wholes mirror the quantum structure of absolute subjective experience.

"42."

 

[ahhell]

Those are all emergent properties of thinking, which occurs physically in the brain. No, there is no such thing as math without a brain to work it. No, the laws of nature do not dictate how nature behaves; when we observe nature to behave differently, we change the law. No, contemplating that information may exist at the quantum level does not make it something independent from matter.

No, you're not the smartest guy in the room.

Doesn't math exist without a brain to ponder it? pi*D is the relationship between the diameter and circumference whether or not a mind is there to appreciate it?

Granted there are some maths don't seem to relate to the physical world so clearly, in which case maybe they don't exist without a brain.

 

[JayUtah]

Doesn't math exist without a brain to ponder it? pi*D is the relationship between the diameter and circumference whether or not a mind is there to appreciate it?

Yes, facts exist without a brain to "appreciate" them. But the concept of a ratio of circumference to diameter is an example of converting facts into math. Ratios such as that designated by π are the result of operators on sets invented by humans as part of a mathematical structure to help describe the relationship between quantitative facts. Even simple math needs a brain.

 

[ahhell]

Yes, facts exist without a brain to "appreciate" them. But the concept of a ratio of circumference to diameter is an example of converting facts into math. Ratios such as that designated by π are the result of operators on sets invented by humans as part of a mathematical structure to help describe the relationship between quantitative facts. Even simple math needs a brain.

Hmm, I will consider this, I'm not sure I buy it yet though, it is close getting me to change my mind.

Might engineers bias, I use math to eventually influence physical reality daily.

 

[Steve]

Hmm, I will consider this, I'm not sure I buy it yet though, it is close getting me to change my mind.

Might engineers bias, I use math to eventually influence physical reality daily.

"eventually"? Math....something....something... physical reality. You fill in the gaps.

 

[JayUtah]

Hmm, I will consider this, I'm not sure I buy it yet though, it is close getting me to change my mind.

Philosophy is interesting for people who are interested in philosophy, and generally for few others.

Here's some more to ponder. The relationship C = π⋅d is, of course, a sentence in a mathematical structure in which concepts like the field ℝ and the operations + and ⋅ are defined, complete, and consistent. Especially in the 20th century, people burned a lot of neurons coming up with a foundation for mathematics that makes this possible.

But consider what it's trying to say. The sentence is true for all circles. But what do we mean by "circle?" It's the set of all points in a plane that are equidistant from a fixed point. What's a point? What's a plane? What is a distance? What does it mean to measure a distance and thereby assign it values that we represent with C and d? Why do we get to measure diameter one way and circumference another way? Do circles that fit this description actually exist in the real world or are they purely objects in the mind? Yes, there are circular objects, but what does it mean for the sentence to hold for those objects?

Before we can assure ourselves that C = π⋅d is a deductively reliable sentence, the brain has to invent a lot of things to hang some simple facts on.

Might engineers bias, I use math to eventually influence physical reality daily.

I sympathize. I am also an engineer, which I described to prospective students as, "Weaponized calculus." In another thread on quantum mechanics I said I generally don't become interested in something until it's big enough to hit with a hammer.

My biggest problem with circles was to properly position holes along the circumference of something that's 144 ± 0.004 inches in diameter and the holes have to line up to a tolerance of ±0.001 inch. Oh, and if you get it wrong, people might die. And—in fact—did.

 

[mumblethrax]

Not sure what this "ontological physicalism" is, or whether it's a straw man position or not.

It's just physicalism. "Ontological" is implied by physicalism, so presumably it's there to lend the imprimatur of seriousness.

None of these ideas are/were ultimately well received.

I'd dispute that the hard problem isn't well received. 62% of philosophers accept that there is a hard problem of consciousness.

https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5042

(It should probably be noted that Chalmers is one of the designers of the PhilPapers survey, but I don't see much reason to believe it's been improperly biased.)

 

[Gubiosak]

If a ratio like $\pi$ or the geometry of a circle is merely a human set of rules invented by the brain to organize facts, why does the physical universe conform to these precise relational structures long before any brain evolved to formalize them? Confusing the notation (the language we invent) with the underlying structural relation (the objective property of the universe) seems to be the exact point where physicalism substitutes an ontology with a convenience.

 

[Gubiosak]

@ahhell — That distinction you raised gets right to the heart of it. Engineers use math because it predicts and maps physical reality with absolute precision. If math were purely an internal brain construct, its uncanny efficiency in describing the physical world—before we even run the experiments—would be a complete miracle. It suggests the universe has an inherent structural logic that we discover, rather than merely invent.

 

[Gubiosak]

A short reflection on the responses so far. The thread has provided a fascinating look into how ontological questions about physicalism are framed and handled here. When asking whether physicalism can ground abstract foundations like mathematics or natural laws, the majority of reactions split into two distinct patterns. On one hand, there is a clear defensive heuristic that dismisses the question not on its philosophical merits, but on assumptions about the motives behind it—treating genuine inquiry as a hidden attempt to "smuggle something in". On the other hand, there is a recurring tendency to conflate notation with reality by arguing that mathematics is merely an emergent operational set of rules created by the human brain.
While humans certainly invented symbols, set operators, and geometric definitions to describe relationships, the physical universe was already conforming to those precise, non-arbitrary relational patterns billions of years before any biological brain existed to formalize them. To claim that mathematical truths exist only inside the brain reduces physics to a cognitive illusion, leaving the uncanny predictive power of mathematics over the objective physical world as an inexplicable mystery. Stating that physicalism "doesn't have to explain" these mechanisms simply substitutes an ontological explanation with an assumption of convenience. Ultimately, the contrast between a genuine inquiry into the foundations of reality and the instinct to protect a dogma speaks for itself.

 

[Tristan Chi]

Dawn of a light lying between the silence and sold sources
Chased amid fusions of wonder
In moments hardly seen forgotten
Coloured in pastures of chance, dancing leaves cast spells of challenge
Amused but real in thought
We fled from the sea
Whole

Dawn of thought transferred through moments of days under-searching earth, revealing corridors of time provoking memories
Disjointed but with purpose
Craving penetrations offer links with the self instructor's sharp and tender love
As we took to the air
A picture of distance

 

[W.D.Clinger]

W.D. Clinger’s argument is technically sophisticated, but it presents an important epistemological limitation: it confounds the instrumental effectiveness of mathematics with a foundation of its validity.

I am perfectly willing to admit that @Gubiosak's AI recognizes the technical sophistication of my argument, and is doing its very best to come up with something that could be mistaken for a counter-argument.

Clinger, argues that we trust mathematics because it has demonstrated extraordinary success within empirical science. However, this argument does not provide an independent justification for mathematics, because modern science itself relies on mathematical and logical structures to formulate hypotheses, construct models, interpret data, and evaluate predictions.
The problem is not simply a logical circularity in the formal sense, but an epistemological circularity: the method used to confirm the reliability of mathematics already presupposes the mathematical and logical tools whose reliability is being evaluated.
The empirical success of science demonstrates that certain mathematical structures are extremely effective for representing aspects of the physical world, but it does not, by itself, demonstrate that mathematical axioms are true, that mathematical objects exist, or that mathematics possesses necessary validity independent of experience.
Therefore, Clinger’s argument may justify a pragmatic trust in mathematics — that is, the belief that mathematics is an extraordinarily effective tool — but it does not provide an ultimate epistemological

I am perfectly willing to admit that, in the process of copy/pasting the AI's best effort to present a counter-argument, @Gubiosak omitted the final period of the AI slop he or she was copy/pasting.

 

[Joe Random]

A short reflection on the responses so far. The thread has provided a fascinating look into how ontological questions about physicalism are framed and handled here. When asking whether physicalism can ground abstract foundations like mathematics or natural laws, the majority of reactions split into two distinct patterns. On one hand, there is a clear defensive heuristic that dismisses the question not on its philosophical merits, but on assumptions about the motives behind it—treating genuine inquiry as a hidden attempt to "smuggle something in". On the other hand, there is a recurring tendency to conflate notation with reality by arguing that mathematics is merely an emergent operational set of rules created by the human brain.
While humans certainly invented symbols, set operators, and geometric definitions to describe relationships, the physical universe was already conforming to those precise, non-arbitrary relational patterns billions of years before any biological brain existed to formalize them. To claim that mathematical truths exist only inside the brain reduces physics to a cognitive illusion, leaving the uncanny predictive power of mathematics over the objective physical world as an inexplicable mystery. Stating that physicalism "doesn't have to explain" these mechanisms simply substitutes an ontological explanation with an assumption of convenience. Ultimately, the contrast between a genuine inquiry into the foundations of reality and the instinct to protect a dogma speaks for itself.

I honestly thought it was a forum rule when copy/pasting from an LLM that the poster declares that an LLM was in use, and what the input prompt was. Is that not the case? The above is clearly not a simple translation of the poster's own thoughts from their native language.

(mods, feel free to move this to FM if that's where it belongs)

 

[JayUtah]

If a ratio like $\pi$ or the geometry of a circle is merely a human set of rules invented by the brain to organize facts, why does the physical universe conform to these precise relational structures...

"Precise relationship structures" is a brain thing.

 

[JayUtah]

A short reflection on the responses so far.

"A short dump from my AI..."

 

[JayUtah]

It suggests the universe has an inherent structural logic that we discover, rather than merely invent.

Maudlin couldn't make that notion stick either. The universe has inherent behavior. We invent constructs like diameter, circumference, and measurement with which to attempt to impose a sense of order and consistency, even on such pedestrian "structural logic" as "Has a length." Why do we get to measure diameter one way and circumference another way?

 

[arthwollipot]

The issue is not whether foundational validity is practically necessary. Mathematics clearly works, and science clearly benefits from it. The issue is whether empirical success justifies mathematics itself or merely demonstrates its usefulness.

Its usefulness is its justification.

That seems like it came from Douglas Adams but I can't quite place it.

"But don't you understand that people live or die on your word?"

The ruler of the Universe waited for as long as he could. When he heard the faint sound of the ship's engines starting he spoke to cover it.

"It's nothing to do with me," he said, "I am not involved with people. The Lord knows I am not a cruel man."

"Ah!" barked Zarniwoop, "you say 'The Lord'. You believe in something!"

"My cat," said the man benignly, picking it up and stroking it, "I call him The Lord. I am kind to him."

 

[Little 10 Toes]

Hi everyone,

Putting aside consciousness for a moment, I want to ask about the limits of ontological physicalism from a purely physics and philosophy of science perspective.

If physicalism claims that everything that exists is strictly physical (matter/energy), how does it account for:

1. Mathematical structures: Are equations and mathematical truths just human constructs, or do they exist independently without being physical matter?
2. Laws of Nature: Are laws merely descriptive summaries of how matter behaves, or do they have causal power? If they govern matter, wouldn't that make them non-physical entities?
3. Information: With quantum information theory treating "information" as fundamental, how can something substrate-independent be reduced purely to physical matter?

Can physicalism actually ground the abstract foundations that physics relies on, or is it an assumption we just take for granted?

Please provide your answers to your questions first. I know I would like to know what your opinion is first.

Define “physicalism”. Give examples.

Define “laws”. Give examples.

I asked this next question in a different thread and you never answered it from what I can tell, and since you put quotes around it, I want to know how you define it.

Define “information”. Give examples.

 

[JayUtah]

If a ratio like $\pi$ or...

Also AI. The delimiter pair $...$ is how Google embeds LaTeX (markup for mathematical notation) in its AI-generated summaries. On the screen you see π. But when you copy the text, it pastes as its LaTex representation \pi delimited by the pair of $s that identify inline LaTeX to Google's browser output code.

@Gubiosak, you are clearly copypasting AI-generated responses from Google without identifying them as such and without apparently writing the answers yourself. And no, that's not the translator generating it. The translator properly just copies the Greek letter, not its LaTeX representation. Please stick to your promise to write your own posts instead of delegating your thinking to AI.

 

[JayUtah]

I'd dispute that the hard problem isn't well received. 62% of philosophers accept that there is a hard problem of consciousness.

https://survey2020.philpeople.org/survey/results/5042

Or "lean toward." Fair enough, I withdraw the claim that the hard problem of consciousness isn't well received.

(It should probably be noted that Chalmers is one of the designers of the PhilPapers survey, but I don't see much reason to believe it's been improperly biased.)

Nor do I. The survey's method is transparently presented.