Merged Is Scientism Really Justified?

[Axxman300]

But I'm asking a slightly different epistemological question: is objective, scientifically testable evidence the only possible basis for rational justification?
For example, are logical, mathematical, philosophical, or first-person forms of evidence necessarily incapable of providing rational justification, simply because they aren't scientifically testable?

Your problem here is your examples do not hold equal value. Mathematics IS testable. The equation either adds up or it does not. Mathematics is often used to validate science. Logic and philosophy are usually drawn from the same intellectual well. Both are flexible as new information or perspectives are added.

First-Person will always be subjective, and prone to the many inaccuracies of individual perception.

I'm interested in cases such as subjective conscious experience, mathematical truths, logical truths, moral claims, and metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. My question is not whether these are true, but whether scientific evidence is necessarily the only kind of evidence that can rationally justify beliefs about them.

In my experience if your beliefs are not backed up by science you're a fool.

We have a conspiracy theory board where people who think they're being logical embrace questionable claims that at some point melt in the face of science. Morality changes with the wind these days.

As an old ghost hunter, metaphysical claims are my department, and they all fall apart when basic science is applied. If you wish to ignore science I guess that's your right, but if you're going to charge people for faith healing, or to purge a home of a demon then science will be used to beat you senseless.

For example, we don't establish mathematical truths through experiments in the same way we establish empirical claims.

Please give us a solid example one of these mathematical truths.

There is a reason they have spotters at the blackjack tables in every casino. There is a reason why you never see contests wherein people have to guess how many jellybeans are in a sealed container any more. The reason is mathematics.

Likewise, we have direct access to our own subjective experiences, but other people cannot independently observe those experiences in the same way they can observe a physical object. So I'm asking whether "not scientifically testable" necessarily entails "mere fantasy," or whether there are other standards of rational justification depending on the type of claim.

Again, it would be nice if you could be specific about the type pf subjective claim.

I'm not necessarily talking about supernatural entities

You sure about thaf?

 

[catsmate]

What about things that exist, but have no observable effects on the universe?

How do we know they exist?

 

[Dave Rogers]

How do we know they exist?

By means other than the scientific method, duh.

Dave

 

[Darat]

The issue always boils down to "but I don't like to feel I'm a bunch of chemicals reacting". Sorry but that is all we are - flimsy bags of mostly water reacting to our environment - the bunch of chemical is what creates your "I".

 

[JayUtah]

@Gubiosak, I can't seem to reconcile your renewed questions. You say you're asking,

...is objective, scientifically testable evidence the only possible basis for rational justification?

but we already answered that question.

I asked for specific counterexamples. You said,

For example, are logical, mathematical, philosophical, or first-person forms of evidence necessarily incapable of providing rational justification, simply because they aren't scientifically testable?

but we already discussed logic, mathematics, and moral philosophy as potential sources of knowledge, including whether it was even meaningful to ask whether they are "scientifically testable."

The problem I have is that you reopened the debate with:

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

I have a problem with your replayed examples as proper to "beliefs about realities." And I have a problem understanding what types of evidence you think should apply to them.

What evidence is even needed to validate statements in categorical logical? Categorical logic doesn't require evidence and its rules don't rely upon it. Rather, categorical logic is applied to evidence, and as such forms the backbone of the scientific method. We take it as read that categorical logic produces knowledge from combinations of propositions. It doesn't makes sense to ask what kind of evidence justifies belief in a categorical syllogism. Hence I don't think that's what you're really asking about.

What evidence is needed to validate beliefs about mathematics? Certainly basic arithmetic can be confirmed empirically. Under the common understanding of the symbols "2", "3", "5", "+", and "=" I can write 2 + 3 = 5, and confirm under that understanding that if I have two apples and acquire three more, I will have five apples.

But math includes such abstract questions as whether a set of vectors forms an orthonormal basis for a vector space. Justifying your belief that a certain set does requires nothing more than applying the contrived definitions. Knowledge in that case is merely consistency with contrived rules. Empirical verification is not possible. It makes no sense to ask what evidence supports abstract mathematics, so I don't think that's what you were asking about.

Again you have the cart before the horse. We don't use the scientific method to test propositions in mathematics. Instead we use mathematics in the scientific method. Most empirical studies that we design employ some kind of statistics model that helps us reason objectively about the likelihood of certain outcomes given the value of a variable. That helps us understand whether an effect follows a change in value. We take it as read that these models tell us what we want to know.

What evidence would justify a belief formed according to moral philosophy? Previously you gave us a toy example, but I countered with a more difficult one showing how we variously consider either mens rea or actus rea (alone, in the absence of the other) to variously establish moral blameworthiness—a manifest contradiction. And as such I argued that moral philosophy cannot ever produce anything more rigorous than belief, to which you had no rebuttal. I can show you empirical evidence of the belief being held by a group of people, but there is no evidence possible that the belief is true. That's because veridical truth is not something moral philosophy can attain. So no, I don't think that's what you were asking about.

And again moral philosophy applies to the practice of science in designing empirical experiences that have the potential to cause harm or be blameworthy in other ways. We don't use the scientific method to justify moral decisions, but we use moral philosophy to determine whether a desired application of the scientific method might have moral consequences.

In answering others, you added

I'm not necessarily talking about supernatural entities. I'm interested in cases such as subjective conscious experience, [...] and metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. My question is not whether these are true, but whether scientific evidence is necessarily the only kind of evidence that can rationally justify beliefs about them.

We already discussed "subjective conscious experience," and you were unable to convince anyone that the so-called hard problem of consciousness established anything that needed separate justification. If you want to ask other people what kind of evidence justifies a subjective perception as evidence of reality, you need to provide a better argument that there's an effect requiring an explanation beyond that already given.

You are coy about "metaphysical claims about the nature of reality." So no, vague handwaving doesn't entitle you to ask for what kind of evidence justifies any particular metaphysical belief.

And again you repeat the question you've received the same answer to many times: no, we do not believe that the scientific method is the only way to get knowledge.

So I'm asking whether "not scientifically testable" necessarily entails "mere fantasy," or whether there are other standards of rational justification depending on the type of claim.

We already answered that question in terms of the types of claims you raised previously. You don't acknowledge any of those answers so I don't think they were really what you were interested in.

That leaves the supernatural, which you say you're "not necessarily" interested in. You told us you believe that science has properly dismissed claims of the paranormal and supernatural. But you keep revisiting your epistemological handwaving using paranormal-coded language, whose previous categorical dismissal you seem to be walking back.

Paranormal claims are touted by their claimants as a different type of belief that requires different types of evidence. Hence your repeated asking for what kinds of evidence rationally would justify these beliefs that you insist lie outside scientific inquiry hits that nail precisely on the head. You ignore the discussion of all your ill-fitting decoy examples, so we have to keep reminding you that if your plan is to discussion the epistemology of supernatural claims, just say so and quit dancing around the issue.

 

[JayUtah]

The issue always boils down to "but I don't like to feel I'm a bunch of chemicals reacting". Sorry but that is all we are - flimsy bags of mostly water reacting to our environment - the bunch of chemical is what creates your "I".

Or it boils down to, "But paranormal claims are a different kind of claim that deserves special treatment." And sorry here too, but no—paranormal claims are not a different kind of claim that is somehow immune to investigation via the scientific method.

 

[Darat]

Or it boils down to, "But paranormal claims are a different kind of claim that deserves special treatment." And sorry here too, but no—paranormal claims are not a different kind of claim that is somehow immune to investigation via the scientific method.

And of course the reason we have investigated paranormal claims is because people claim macro-scale events happened to them, not in another dimension, not in another reality but in our shared reality.

 

[JayUtah]

And of course the reason we have investigated paranormal claims is because people claim macro-scale events happened to them, not in another dimension, not in another reality but in our shared reality.

That's very important. The observations we're trying to explain happen in the real world. UFOs happen here. Bumps in the night happen here. Prognostication and clairvoyance happen here. Therefore the well-developed means we employ for studying things that happen here are the thing to use until someone demonstrates something better.

"What's that thump in the kitchen?" asks my spouse. From experience I happen to know it's cans of soft drinks shifting in the fridge pack after one has been taken; there's often a delay. That's a real-world proposal to answer a real-world observation. But if the proposed explanation is, "That's a poltergeist making noise," you can't rationally say that's a different type of claim because it alludes to things that are declared to be outside the realm of current knowledge and therefore may invoke "metaphysical beliefs about the nature of reality." That's just textbook special pleading. You're attaching fanciful properties to your claim that you say means I can't investigate it normally, but you have no rational reason to believe those reasons exist and operate.

Shaming us away from dismissing such propositions as "fantasy" is just sour grapes. That's literally what a fantasy is: a proposition made from pure creative thought without regard for the limits of the real world. When you tell me your proposition is untestable because it involves properties outside the presently understood reality, you're literally stating a fantasy.

In my view the question of whether @Gubiosak is arguing for the paranormal remains open despite his assertion.

To offer a digest of my longer post above, it doesn't make sense to talk about "beliefs in realities" in terms of math, logic, and morals. It doesn't make sense to ask about what type of evidence "justifies" them when you have previously argued that these specific branches of thought produce knowledge without needing to test evidence. You don't talk that way unless you're planning to argue that some new kind of thing should be considered evidence. Math and logic are not about belief. They're about consistency with contrived rules, which can grow to be arbitrarily complex. Again, it's nonsense to ask for what non-empirical type of evidence justifies "beliefs in the reality" of, say, the normal distribution. It just is what we say it is and we use it consistently with that statement. You can empirically verify the Pythagorean Theorem for some number of triangles, but that's not how the proof of it goes.

And @Gubiosak is clearly uninterested in actually discussing any of these straw men. Despite the absurdity I outlined in the previous paragraph, we gave good answers to those examples, which he promptly ignored. They're not really what he's here to talk about.

 

[Carrot Flower King]

Fair enough. Let me make the question more concrete. I'm not necessarily talking about supernatural entities. I'm interested in cases such as subjective conscious experience, mathematical truths, logical truths, moral claims, and metaphysical claims about the nature of reality. My question is not whether these are true, but whether scientific evidence is necessarily the only kind of evidence that can rationally justify beliefs about them. For example, we don't establish mathematical truths through experiments in the same way we establish empirical claims. Likewise, we have direct access to our own subjective experiences, but other people cannot independently observe those experiences in the same way they can observe a physical object. So I'm asking whether "not scientifically testable" necessarily entails "mere fantasy," or whether there are other standards of rational justification depending on the type of claim.

That's a combination of things which are all human constructs: logic is a set of tools developed by humans to aid thinking; moral claims have no external basis, but are made up and changed regularly to suit human needs; metaphysics is a thin disguise for talking about religion and the paranormal, and is a human construct.

Find me any one of those in the wild...Outside a human brain. Please.

And you keep saying you don't want to discuss the paranormal, while going back to dog whistles for exactly that. Weird...

 

[Gubiosak]

That's a combination of things which are all human constructs: logic is a set of tools developed by humans to aid thinking; moral claims have no external basis, but are made up and changed regularly to suit human needs; metaphysics is a thin disguise for talking about religion and the paranormal, and is a human construct.

Find me any one of those in the wild...Outside a human brain. Please.

And you keep saying you don't want to discuss the paranormal, while going back to dog whistles for exactly that. Weird...

You’re demanding to "find logic or mathematics in the wild outside a human brain," but that is a category mistake. Abstract truths and formal systems are not physical objects you can stumble upon in the woods; asking to observe them physically to prove they are rational is already presupposing that physical observation is the only path to justification—which is the exact premise under debate.

Furthermore, if logic is merely an arbitrary human construct with no objective grounding, then your own critique of my argument loses any objective force. You'd be relying on a "mere human tool" to declare what is or isn't valid.

As for subjective experience (qualia): the fact that my experience of pain happens within my brain doesn't mean my belief that I am in pain lacks rational justification. I don't need a double-blind peer-reviewed study to rationally know I have a headache. First-person epistemic access is real, even if it isn't "publicly observable empirical data."

Lastly, please address the argument I’m actually making. Pointing out that epistemology, logic, and consciousness aren't empirical objects isn't a "dog whistle for the paranormal"—it's standard philosophy of mind and science.

 

[Carrot Flower King]

You’re demanding to "find logic or mathematics in the wild outside a human brain," but that is a category mistake. Abstract truths and formal systems are not physical objects you can stumble upon in the woods; asking to observe them physically to prove they are rational is already presupposing that physical observation is the only path to justification—which is the exact premise under debate.

Furthermore, if logic is merely an arbitrary human construct with no objective grounding, then your own critique of my argument loses any objective force. You'd be relying on a "mere human tool" to declare what is or isn't valid.

As for subjective experience (qualia): the fact that my experience of pain happens within my brain doesn't mean my belief that I am in pain lacks rational justification. I don't need a double-blind peer-reviewed study to rationally know I have a headache. First-person epistemic access is real, even if it isn't "publicly observable empirical data."

Lastly, please address the argument I’m actually making. Pointing out that epistemology, logic, and consciousness aren't empirical objects isn't a "dog whistle for the paranormal"—it's standard philosophy of mind and science.

I don't agree about "category mistake", which looks an awful lot, here, like "I don't want to talk about it" and does not alter them being human constructs, thus only existing in the human mind.

I'm happy with relying on "mere human tools" what with being a "mere human" and not feeling the need for any metaphysics or supernatural explanations for anything. My array of very sharp kitchen knives do the job for food prep; my music system does the job for playing music; my computer does the job for various things; etc.

I've already told you the low regard in which I hold much "epistemology"; and the dog whistling was more to do with use of terms like metaphysics and the constant refusal to be pinned down. If after several hundred years and thousands of text books and all philosophers haven't got "epistemology" at least coherently, consistently, meaningfully sorted, then why expect me to do so and why expect me to take much of that Ouroboros-creating, mulberry bush lapping, may pole circling particularly seriously?

And you haven't provided an "objective" argument about anything, so it would appear that I am addressing you in your chosen terms.

 

[Gubiosak]

@Gubiosak, I can't seem to reconcile your renewed questions. You say you're asking,

but we already answered that question.

I asked for specific counterexamples. You said,

but we already discussed logic, mathematics, and moral philosophy as potential sources of knowledge, including whether it was even meaningful to ask whether they are "scientifically testable."

The problem I have is that you reopened the debate with:

I have a problem with your replayed examples as proper to "beliefs about realities." And I have a problem understanding what types of evidence you think should apply to them.

What evidence is even needed to validate statements in categorical logical? Categorical logic doesn't require evidence and its rules don't rely upon it. Rather, categorical logic is applied to evidence, and as such forms the backbone of the scientific method. We take it as read that categorical logic produces knowledge from combinations of propositions. It doesn't makes sense to ask what kind of evidence justifies belief in a categorical syllogism. Hence I don't think that's what you're really asking about.

What evidence is needed to validate beliefs about mathematics? Certainly basic arithmetic can be confirmed empirically. Under the common understanding of the symbols "2", "3", "5", "+", and "=" I can write 2 + 3 = 5, and confirm under that understanding that if I have two apples and acquire three more, I will have five apples.

But math includes such abstract questions as whether a set of vectors forms an orthonormal basis for a vector space. Justifying your belief that a certain set does requires nothing more than applying the contrived definitions. Knowledge in that case is merely consistency with contrived rules. Empirical verification is not possible. It makes no sense to ask what evidence supports abstract mathematics, so I don't think that's what you were asking about.

Again you have the cart before the horse. We don't use the scientific method to test propositions in mathematics. Instead we use mathematics in the scientific method. Most empirical studies that we design employ some kind of statistics model that helps us reason objectively about the likelihood of certain outcomes given the value of a variable. That helps us understand whether an effect follows a change in value. We take it as read that these models tell us what we want to know.

What evidence would justify a belief formed according to moral philosophy? Previously you gave us a toy example, but I countered with a more difficult one showing how we variously consider either mens rea or actus rea (alone, in the absence of the other) to variously establish moral blameworthiness—a manifest contradiction. And as such I argued that moral philosophy cannot ever produce anything more rigorous than belief, to which you had no rebuttal. I can show you empirical evidence of the belief being held by a group of people, but there is no evidence possible that the belief is true. That's because veridical truth is not something moral philosophy can attain. So no, I don't think that's what you were asking about.

And again moral philosophy applies to the practice of science in designing empirical experiences that have the potential to cause harm or be blameworthy in other ways. We don't use the scientific method to justify moral decisions, but we use moral philosophy to determine whether a desired application of the scientific method might have moral consequences.

In answering others, you added

We already discussed "subjective conscious experience," and you were unable to convince anyone that the so-called hard problem of consciousness established anything that needed separate justification. If you want to ask other people what kind of evidence justifies a subjective perception as evidence of reality, you need to provide a better argument that there's an effect requiring an explanation beyond that already given.

You are coy about "metaphysical claims about the nature of reality." So no, vague handwaving doesn't entitle you to ask for what kind of evidence justifies any particular metaphysical belief.

And again you repeat the question you've received the same answer to many times: no, we do not believe that the scientific method is the only way to get knowledge.


We already answered that question in terms of the types of claims you raised previously. You don't acknowledge any of those answers so I don't think they were really what you were interested in.

That leaves the supernatural, which you say you're "not necessarily" interested in. You told us you believe that science has properly dismissed claims of the paranormal and supernatural. But you keep revisiting your epistemological handwaving using paranormal-coded language, whose previous categorical dismissal you seem to be walking back.

Paranormal claims are touted by their claimants as a different type of belief that requires different types of evidence. Hence your repeated asking for what kinds of evidence rationally would justify these beliefs that you insist lie outside scientific inquiry hits that nail precisely on the head. You ignore the discussion of all your ill-fitting decoy examples, so we have to keep reminding you that if your plan is to discussion the epistemology of supernatural claims, just say so and quit dancing around the issue.

@JayUtah, you are constructing a false dichotomy: either a claim is empirically testable by science, a mere human-made convention (like the rules of chess), or it is a "dog whistle for the supernatural."
That is precisely the core issue of scientism that I am raising.

1. Mathematics and Logic are not "merely human conventions": If logical principles (like the law of non-contradiction) or mathematical truths were merely arbitrary rules we "contrived," then reality would not be constrained by them. Science itself relies on the assumption that logical consistency reflects objective structural truths about reality. The belief that "a statement and its negation cannot both be true at the same time" is a rationally justified, non-empirical belief about reality, not just a game rule.
2. Epistemology of First-Person Experience: The claim "I am currently experiencing pain" is a belief about a real state of affairs (a real event in reality). It is rationally justified to the person experiencing it via direct acquaintance, not via empirical, third-person scientific measurements. Dismissing first-person epistemic justification simply because it isn't third-person empirical data is an epistemological choice, not a scientific discovery.
3. The Paranormal Accusation: Accusing me of "paranormal-coded language" every time I mention classical epistemology, philosophy of mind, or normative truths is a poison-the-well tactic. One can defend the existence of non-empirical rational justification (like foundational logic, consciousness, or abstract truths) without believing in ghosts, faith healing, or magic.

My question remains valid: If rational justification exists outside of empirical data (such as in logical axioms or direct conscious experience), then empirical evidence is not the only valid form of rational justification. Denying this requires reducing logic to mere human fiction—which ultimately undermines the rationality of science itself.

 

[Gubiosak]

I don't agree about "category mistake", which looks an awful lot, here, like "I don't want to talk about it" and does not alter them being human constructs, thus only existing in the human mind.

I'm happy with relying on "mere human tools" what with being a "mere human" and not feeling the need for any metaphysics or supernatural explanations for anything. My array of very sharp kitchen knives do the job for food prep; my music system does the job for playing music; my computer does the job for various things; etc.

I've already told you the low regard in which I hold much "epistemology"; and the dog whistling was more to do with use of terms like metaphysics and the constant refusal to be pinned down. If after several hundred years and thousands of text books and all philosophers haven't got "epistemology" at least coherently, consistently, meaningfully sorted, then why expect me to do so and why expect me to take much of that Ouroboros-creating, mulberry bush lapping, may pole circling particularly seriously?

And you haven't provided an "objective" argument about anything, so it would appear that I am addressing you in your chosen terms.

Dismissing centuries of epistemology as "Ouroboros" doesn't escape it; relying on computers and kitchen knives already presupposes the objective validity of logic and mathematics. If logical rules are merely arbitrary human inventions without objective grounding, your own critique is just a subjective preference, not a valid counterargument. Acknowledging that logic, math, and internal states (like pain) are non-empirical yet rationally justified isn't metaphysics or a dog whistle—it's the very foundation that allows your practical tools and science to function.

 

[Darat]

Dismissing centuries of epistemology as "Ouroboros" doesn't escape it; relying on computers and kitchen knives already presupposes the objective validity of logic and mathematics. If logical rules are merely arbitrary human inventions without objective grounding, your own critique is just a
subjective preference,not a valid counterargument. Acknowledging that logic, math, and internal states (like pain) are non-empirical yet rationally justified isn't metaphysics or a dog whistle—it's the very foundation that allows your practical tools and science to function.

Welcome to the real world!

 

[JayUtah]

@JayUtah, you are constructing a false dichotomy: either a claim is empirically testable by science, a mere human-made convention (like the rules of chess), or it is a "dog whistle for the supernatural."

No, I'm not.

And you just gave me a giant pile of obvious AI slop that does absolutely nothing to address my point.

My question remains valid: If rational justification exists outside of empirical data (such as in logical axioms or direct conscious experience), then empirical evidence is not the only valid form of rational justification.

Asked and answered. No one is claiming empirical evidence is the only valid form of rational justification. Thirty pages of the same straw man!

 

[catsmate]

You’re demanding to "find logic or mathematics in the wild outside a human brain," but that is a category mistake. Abstract truths and formal systems are not physical objects you can stumble upon in the woods; asking to observe them physically to prove they are rational is already presupposing that physical observation is the only path to justification—which is the exact premise under debate.

Furthermore, if logic is merely an arbitrary human construct with no objective grounding, then your own critique of my argument loses any objective force. You'd be relying on a "mere human tool" to declare what is or isn't valid.

As for subjective experience (qualia): the fact that my experience of pain happens within my brain doesn't mean my belief that I am in pain lacks rational justification. I don't need a double-blind peer-reviewed study to rationally know I have a headache. First-person epistemic access is real, even if it isn't "publicly observable empirical data."

Lastly, please address the argument I’m actually making. Pointing out that epistemology, logic, and consciousness aren't empirical objects isn't a "dog whistle for the paranormal"—it's standard philosophy of mind and science.

This is further nonsensical gibberish.

 

[JayUtah]

Let's try this again.

@Gubiosak, you wrote:

What types of evidence are appropriate to justify beliefs about realities that, by definition, may be beyond the reach of scientific methods?

I want to know what you mean by that.

By asking "what types of evidence," you suggest that a type of evidence exists such that someone can name it and thereby answer your question. In law, for example, we can categorize evidence using terms such as "circumstantial" or "eyewitness." Elsewhere we can talk about such categories as "direct" or "indirect" evidence. Without any way to know what taxonomy of evidence you might be thinking of, we can't answer your question.

You clarified that by "beliefs about realities that by definition may be beyond the reach of scientific methods" you meant your previously cited examples: math, logic, morals, subjective experience, and metaphysics. Those make no sense in the context of the question. We already agreed that they are not empirical sciences. We already agreed that empirical sciences are not the only source of knowledge. So it makes no sense for you to ask about evidence when those are the sciences you mean. Therefore we wonder if you really mean something else.

It would make sense only as a kind of awkward rhetorical question, like asking, "What kind of gasoline should I put in my electric vehicle?" The answer there would be, "None," as if to underscore that EVs don't require gasoline. Similarly we would underscore that no empirical evidence is required to make propositions in math or logic work. But we already gave you that answer—none. @theprestige gave it to you in post #521.

In my previous post—which you obviously did not read or understand—I made a special point to show how each of math, logic, and morals are not empirical sciences, not mere "beliefs" (except in the case of morality), and why it makes no sense to try justify them by evidence. Instead I identified them as foundational bodies of knowledge that empirical science implicitly considers correct and useful because it builds upon them.

Since it makes no sense to ask what evidence is appropriate for things like math and logic that we all agree are not based on evidence, I'm asking you to explain what you mean. Was it a rhetorical question? Are you asking us to consider a type of evidence that somehow exists and should be considered probative to math and logic, but is not empirically testable? Are you dancing around a topic you don't want to raise directly?

Since your argument seems to contradict itself, then we are naturally curious whether you are arguing in good faith. Our suspicion is founded upon your continued use of specific paranormal-coded language. "Scientism" as a concept doesn't exist outside the field of advocacy for the paranormal. "Beliefs that lie outside the reach of scientific methods" and "Metaphysics about the nature of reality" are the exact phraseology that paranormal advocacy uses to dress up its claims to make them sound more intellectual. If you don't want to be constantly suspected of indirectly advocating for paranormal claims, stop using their language.

Now since I'm asking you about your intent, no AI in the world can possibly give a correct answer. Kindly do not use AI in any way to respond to this post.

 

[Carrot Flower King]

Dismissing centuries of epistemology as "Ouroboros" doesn't escape it; relying on computers and kitchen knives already presupposes the objective validity of logic and mathematics. If logical rules are merely arbitrary human inventions without objective grounding, your own critique is just a subjective preference, not a valid counterargument. Acknowledging that logic, math, and internal states (like pain) are non-empirical yet rationally justified isn't metaphysics or a dog whistle—it's the very foundation that allows your practical tools and science to function.

Wake me up when epistemology has sorted out anything of any use, then, rather than going round in circles about what anything means. If it's actually defined anything that can be used, great, tell me about it; otherwise we are still going round and round and my "Ouroboros" characterisation still works.

Computers and kitchen knives will be working for me every day regardless: knives and that sort of technology pre-date logic and maths, stemming from Ug and his mates working out what a sharp edge was by cutting something - that pesky empirical knowledge thing. Forging of metals likewise.

I didn't say logic and maths were invalid, did I? I said, which you have not addressed sensibly, that they are human constructs and tools. They are valid in so much as they work in practice, which we ascertain empirically. So you are still not giving us anything to go on about non-empirical forms of evidence or knowledge

 

[theprestige]

As far as I can tell, here's the conversation, stripped down to its bare bones, with all the important bits front-loaded like they should be, and omitting as much nonsense as I can manage:

CLAIM: We accept claims of qualia (e.g., the pain of a toothache) without empirical confirmation. Therefore, empirical observation is not necessary for rational belief.

REBUTTAL: That's true. Depending on the context, we can base rational belief on things like logical observation (e.g., mathematical proofs) or practical inference (claims of toothache). But it's all the same basic process of reasoning through rules and evidence to a supported conclusion. Mathematicians take notice of results in their field, that support but do not necessarily prove a conjecture. Physicians screen for drug-seeking behavior, among patients reporting pain qualia.

RESPONSE: That's not what I'm talking about.

REBUTTAL: What else is there for you to be talking about?

RESPONSE: I'm just asking questions.

REBUTTAL: You're just having AI ask questions. Stop it.

RESPONSE: No.

REBUTTAL: Okay then.

RESPONSE: We accept claims of qualia (e.g., the pain of a toothache) without empirical confirmation. Therefore, empirical observation is not necessary for rational belief.

REBUTTAL: Already addressed.

RESPONSE: That's not what I'm talking about.

REBUTTAL: What else is there for you to be talking about?

RESPONSE: I'm just asking questions.

REBUTTAL: You're just having AI ask questions. Stop it.

RESPONSE: No.

REBUTTAL: Okay then.

RESPONSE: We accept claims of qualia (e.g., the pain of a toothache) without empirical confirmation. Therefore, empirical observation is not necessary for rational belief.

REBUTTAL: Already addressed.

---

It all starts off pretty reasonable, but then like the Collatz Conjecture it falls into the same operational loop with the same results at each step.

@Gubiosak 's actual question, such as it is, was well understood and well answered pages and pages and weeks ago. The only person who doesn't understand this is Gubiosak. Probably in large part because he's outsourced too much of his end of the conversation to a chatbot.

 

[W.D.Clinger]

Since your argument seems to contradict itself, then we are naturally curious whether you are arguing in good faith. Our suspicion is founded upon your continued use of specific paranormal-coded language.

I find myself wondering whether his use of paranormal-coded language might be an artifact of his reliance upon AI. When he feeds his own unique brand of gibberish to an AI, and the AI struggles to find any sense in it, the AI might well conclude the gibberish looks like it might have something to do with paranormal crackpottery, leading the AI to amplify that AI slop connection to the paranormal when the AI rephrases his gibberish.

Now since I'm asking you about your intent, no AI in the world can possibly give a correct answer. Kindly do not use AI in any way to respond to this post.