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Is "scientific materialism" scientific?

Despite claims to the contrary, there are but five axioms of science:


1. There is a real, external universe

2. This universe is rational; A is not equal to not-A.

3. Their are regularities in this universe.

4. The components and processes of this universe can be described by mathematics.

5. The components and processes of this universe can be isolated and profitably analyzed in isolation.

I would rephrase nr 1 in a form which to oppose also Kant's epistemological idealism and relativism:

'1.There is a real, external universe,independent of Mind we can perceive,understand and model,at least partially (the most general definition of Mind: of God,other people's minds,a Mind in a higher up reality and so on)'

.

Kant's epistemological idealism does not deny the existence of a real,'objective',external,universe,it only denies that we can acquire any knowledge about it,our minds being entirely responsible for the observed regularities by 'ordering' the external reality.Compressed in few words this amounts to saying that the external reality is incognoscible,we can never know the 'noumenon' in itself.

As about nr. 5,well it is debatable,I would argue that it is not a basic assumption of science,we do not really need it.Indeed seeing the situation in QM it is rather the 'holistic' view which has the edge (if we were to believe Chew this is the only valid approach),we have thus at least a 'hint' that from a certain point on the traditional method of partitioning the 'whole' reach its limits.
 
metacristi said:
As about nr. 5,well it is debatable,I would argue that it is not a basic assumption of science,we do not really need it.Indeed seeing the situation in QM it is rather the 'holistic' view which has the edge (if we were to believe Chew this is the only valid approach),we have thus at least a 'hint' that from a certain point on the traditional method of partitioning the 'whole' reach its limits.

That's not what Heisenberg says. We can't know both simultaneously. Contrariwise, you must still demonstrate an instance in which a whole has been profitably analyzed with no such analysis at the next layer down. I assume you have one in mind?
 
That's not what Heisenberg says. We can't know both simultaneously. Contrariwise, you must still demonstrate an instance in which a whole has been profitably analyzed with no such analysis at the next layer down. I assume you have one in mind?


I think we should first define very well our terms,it depends on what one take 'holism' to mean.One definition stems from Bohm's Interpretation of QM which see every local phenomenon as having also non local causes (via the instantaneous change of quantum potential all over space),the second is the usual definition that the whole is more than the mere sum of its parts.

I had in mind the first definition,the hidden variables theories are fully compatible with the standard formalism of QM too being equal,on empirical grounds,with other interpretations.This is why I said that QM give at least a 'hint' that at a certain level it might happen that we should necesarily take into account,if possible,these nonlocal conections if we want a good description of certain observed facts.

But Bohm's Interpretation is not holistic in the second approach since even nonlocality does not involve that the whole (the universe) is more than the sum of its parts.It is,surprisingly,quantum entanglement in the orthodox interpretation which is a good example of 'holism' in the latter definition.Indeed the observed correlation at distance between entangled particles could be seen as representing an emergent phenomenon,not dependent on the particular polarizations of the quantum particles (they do not exist prior to measurements) thus non describable based on the individual parameters.

Finally we must be open enough to recognize that emergentism is a very serious proposal,there is no good reason now to think that reductionism is the only reasonable alternative.And this not only due to the fact that consciousness could be an emergent property (of matter,I let aside property dualism or idealist approaches).
 

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