JAK said:
Both. The complexity is astronomical. Yet, even if we could get a grip on the complexity, at the lowest level, our attempt to "get a grip on it" alters the structure, alters the system, and alters the outcome. By our own meddling, we change whatever "natural" behavior would occur.
The question was whether or not determinism precludes free will (I'm restating this for my own benefit).
If our "meddling" is deterministic, then the outcome is also predictable. Either way, determinism (that a certain cause will always have the same predictable effect) would preclude us from being able to make free choices because our actions are simply the outcome of prior causes.
Randomness would not be determinism (because a certain cause doesn't always produce the same predictable effect) but nonetheless doesn't offer anything in the way of free will (if our actions are random then they are still beyond our control). So, I still don't see how either determination or randomness can possibly allow for us to have free will.
In astronomy, there is the "two body problem", whereby the motion of two interacting celestial objects can be predicted. And there is the "three body problem" which has escaped modern mathematics in predictability. Even so, in both cases, the celestial bodies are moving according to known laws of physics. Thus, you have "determinism" in that a certain cause (known and predictable laws of physics) have the same predictable effect (on any isolated object). Yet, enough is unknown about physics to explain complex interactions. By escaping prediction, the interactions appear random to some degree.
Admittedly, determinism can be very complex and would preclude us from being able to predict the event in practice. But by its own defintion, determinism is predictable (meaning that it has a finite number of variables, and if we knew all of the variables and how they interacted we could predict the effects with 100% accuracy). And the very fact that it could be predicted means that there is only one single outcome possible, hence no free will.
If I implied that "free will" would cause you to fall apart, forgive me. That is not what I intended to convey.
I'm sure you didn't imply it, but that I misunderstood.
I meant to say that "free will" is the expression of each of us as unique systems. Yet, each of us has an internal system which, though guided by laws of nature, are too complex to understand. Our behaviors, thus, are an expression of our internal make-up. In fact, our internal make-up forces the choices we make.
I think we may be in agreement (if I'm not misunderstanding you), but perhaps differ in symantics. Yes, if everything is determined, we can still perceive that we have free will in the way that you describe. However, we don't actually have free will -- it is only an illusion. Yes, we might "call" it free will, but that doesn't make it so. Free will is an absolute, we either are able to make choices or we're not able to make choices. If the outcome is predictable (as determinism states it must be) then we are not free to choose between different outcomes.
Yes, the system is undoubtedly so complex that we don't
know that we don't have choices (otherwise we wouldn't be having this conversation -- unless free will really
did exist). But that doesn't change the reality that if determinism is correct, we don't have free will.
Because a multitude of events happen simutaneously within the organism, each event, though deterministic in itself, is only one of many, many influences upon a final decision.
All "influences" (more accurately "causes") are themselves determined, therefore the final outcome is (the effect of those causes) is determined. At no time is there the possibility of a different outcome given all of the causes that influenced that outcome (assuming no randomness). That's the very definition of determinism.
For example, the subconscious mind normally "filters" much infomation such as the feel of your pants against your leg or your hair upon your neck or your sleeves on your arms. This is called "habituation". Nevertheless, all of these points of contact create neural signals which the brain puts into the "soup" of thought along with sight, sounds, tastes, and smells. These myriad perceptions may not be part of a "choice", but they are part of the "soup". Anyone of them may interrupt the decision-making process at any moment. The sensation of movement on your arm may be a bug, and your thoughts are diverted. A sudden smell of natural gas may alert you to a gas leak. A phone may ring. All of your senses are constantly active, but the brain filters out what it considers to be of little importance. What is left goes into consciousness.
So far, I agree. All of these "causes" are internalized in some way in the brain, and "filtered" by the brain. The brain filters are also the results of prior causes and are therefore also determined, and therefore could not be configured in any other way.
Even so, the "filters" are choices made within you - a system. And these choices are not conscious. AND these choices are not made with a conscious act of "free will".
AND these "choices" aren't actually choices at all. They are simply determined by prior causes. Perhaps the problem is our definition of what a "choice" is. By my definition, a choice necessitates that an alternate outcome is possible. If you make the choice to buy gouda, you must also have had the ability to have chosen cheddar if you had wanted to. This is not possible in the scenario you describe, no matter how complex it is.
In essence, your brain pre-determines what is presented to your "free will". Thus, you have already made choices BEFORE your "free will" chooses. Further, if we knew which neural circuits would be involved in your decision, and knew their activation strengths, we could predict which one would eventually "win" the competition in the nRT. Your "free will", would be predictable - because it is systematic and deterministic due to laws of nature.
Your use of the term "free will" here is obviously different than mine, as is your definition of "choice." By most definitions, the "free will" isn't an object that makes choices, but rather an attribute or property of that object (presumably our brains). Free will is simply the ability to make choices that are not (entirely) determined by prior causes. If free will exists, then presumably, the brain (by some unknown mechanism) would be making the choices (i.e. exercizing its free will). If your brain "pre-determines" an outcome based entirely on prior causes, then that outcome isn't a choice at all because no other outcome was possible. Remember that whatever state your brain is in that causes the outcome is also the result of prior causes, therefore the outcome isn't a choice and no other outcome is possible regardless of the complexity of the process. That's precisely why it's considered predictable. But that's not free will.
People might use the term "choice" to say that a computer is "choosing" which branch of a program to follow based on the value of a variable, but that's technically incorrect. My definition of "choice" would require other possible outcomes. A computer following one branch rather than another one isn't making a choice unless the computer could have previously set that variable to some other value. As a computer programmer, I don't believe that my computer has free will, nor do I believe that it makes choices.
Yet, perhaps the strongest indication of determinism is conscious thought - the seat of free-will and decision-making (making choices). As G.A. Miller said, consciousness is the result of thinking - NOT the process of thinking. Within consciousness, visions dance and play. Words form sentences and ideas. But what "chooses" your sentence structure? What places the verbs and nouns in each of your sentences. If you think of a cat, is it sitting, walking, or sleeping? Is it black, mottled, tabby, or some other color? Did you specifically make those choices of how the "cat" will be displayed in your consciousness (free will)? Or were those choices made at some lower level of brain processes and presented into consciousness?? G.A. Miller suggests the latter. Bernard J. Baars suggests the latter. Experimental results suggest the latter. I suggest the latter. Consciousness is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking.
Consequently, conscious free will is the result of thinking, not the process of thinking.
I don't understand your argument here at all, or how it proves that we can have both free will and determinism. Please explain.
-Bri
