OK, well I do stand corrected on that one, that non-causational events have indeed been reliably observed.
So there is at least one interpretation that is in complete sync with causation and may not require randomness. Interesting.
If I got it right. See my reply to Upchurch's post.
I'm using definition (2), which simply means the ability to make choices.
No. I think you are indeed using definition (2) (the one I would call "ambitious"), but "the ability to make choices" is definition (1). At least if you don't define "choice" as "something that requires free will<sup>(2)</sup>".
Exactly, the computer doesn't have free will if it is deterministic. Didn't you just prove my point instead of yours (that free will can exist in a deterministic system)?
I agree that the computer doesn't have free will<sup>(2)</sup>. Therefor, it is unable to make choices<sup>(2)</sup>. What I was trying to explain (and in retrospect, I think I failed miserable, I doubt my post was
that thought-trough) that "choice" can have different meanings. The computer does make choices<sup>(1)</sup>.
The idea is this: the ability of making choices is a matter of degree. The chess computer is, in this regard, very limited. We are higher up on the scale. But there is no difference in principle. Daniel Dennett has the example of a vending machine that tries to decide whether or not a coin is genuine or not. That is, the vending machine makes a decision, it has a choice. Admitted, that machine is pretty low on the scale, it's hard to imagine how you can be any lower in the ability of making intelligent choices. But the claim is that there is a smooth transition from the vending machine to the chess computer to a more sophisticated computer to insects, apes and human beings.
By the way, does a chimp have a free will? Descartes would have said no, I guess. But Descartes had no idea how related chimps and humans are. Does a bee have a free will? A virus? If there is a smooth transition from abiogenesis to homo sapiens, I would expect a smooth increase of free will<sup>(1)</sup>. Free will<sup>(2)</sup>, on the other hand, is a binary property: you either have it, or you don't.
Everyone feels as though they have free will.
I doubt this very much. But since you seem to concede that this is irrelevant for the question whether we have free will<sup>(2)</sup>, maybe we can postpone this.
However, to answer your question, I would prefer to have true free will rather than free will be an illusion (wouldn't you?)
This might sound annoying (sorry if it is), but since I still don't get what the difference would be, I am not very interested in having free will<sup>(2)</sup>.
As a computer programmer, I would never say that a computer makes decisions. A computer clearly doesn't make decisions, it simply follows a program.
Admitted, I used unnecessarily fuzzy language.
That said, there are several reasons why we should look further at our own ability to make choices. One is simple curiosity. Another is that the feeling that we can make choices is so engrained in our psyches that it's difficult for some to father that we might not have it, which might explain certain prejudices people might have against atheists and even scientists.
I agree. The topic is well worth further investigations. The experiments you mentioned seem to do just that, and I hope that more like them will follow, and our knowledge about these processes will increase.
Still another has to do with how we react and interact with those around us. For example, if you truly believed that nobody has free will, why would you get mad at someone for hurting you (they didn't have a choice) and why would you try to punish or reward anyone for "bad" or "good" behavior when there is no such thing?
Getting mad and wanting punishment are two different topics.
I might get mad because I am a human being and tend to have emotional reactions, which is often a good thing. But "getting mad" is not one of them, I would say. I think some people should be punished to alter their brain states. I don't want them to be punished because I think they are guilty.
If I would be God, I wouldn't condemn anybody to hell. I don't see the point. As far as I am concerned, may all beings enjoy heaven, guilty or innocent. Is this just? I wouldn't care.
For that matter, why should one who doesn't believe in free will obey a legal system that is based on free will and (if free will doesn't exist) contradicts itself by punishing people that it says shouldn't be punished?
I don't know anybody who obeys the legal system. Even my God-fearing, devout Christian father-in-law doesn't hesitate to use bootleg copies of computer software.
So why don't I start stealing, killing and raping? I don't think I would be very gifted for such a career. And I don't like the prospect.
And it's true that we will very likely never know the answer to these questions, but they're still worth thinking about in my opinion.
I wholeheartly agree. Even if a question is metaphysical, that doesn't mean that it is meaningless.
Yes, but we try not to jail people who don't deserve it.
Since you conceded that we don't know whether or not free will<sup>(2)</sup> exists or not, the accuseds should be given the benefit of doubt, that is, we would have to assume that they don't have free will<sup>(2)</sup>. According to you, that would mean that they are innocent. Therefor, nobody should be ever punished.
Your original premise for this was that ancient people didn't believe in free will. Even if Helen ONLY had the ability to choose whether to use her blue toothbrush or her red one that morning, the ability to make just that one choice demonstrates that Helen has free will and that free will exists.
No, I don't claim that
all ancient people didn't believe in free will. It's obvious that I claimed that Euripides believed in free will (though it's difficult to decide whether or not he believed in free will<sup>(2)</sup>, since he had no ideas of eighteenth century clockwork universe ideas). Euripides is trying to reconstruct what he thinks Homer's theory was, and he is having a hard time, since Homer's world is so much different than his own. He, indeed, says that Helen's argument is that she only has free will with regard to minor decisions. That doesn't mean that his reconstruction of Homer's thinking is accurate.
Nevertheless, I concede that you could make a case that there are some occasions were Homer has a hero acting free. For example, the decision of Achill not to engage in combat seems not to be caused by any god. So maybe Achill has, according to Homer, a free will with regard to a very important decision (and the freedom to act in accord with his decision). On the other hand, Homer speaks about Achill's anger as if it is some kind of independent being. Difficult to decide.
On the other hand, it seems that causation may actually disprove the existance of God, especially the type of God that a lot of people believe in nowadays, such as a God who granted Adam and Eve free will in the Garden of Eden.
I guess there will always be some loopholes where you can smuggle free will in. And perhaps
only Adam and Eve had free will?
Just because it doesn't obey any laws that we know about or can currently comprehend doesn't mean that it doesn't obey laws.
That's not the problem. Maybe the soul obeys some laws we don't know anything about. Nevertheless, it would obey those laws. Sounds like determinism to me.
The soul shows some behavior. Does this behavior follow any laws, regardless whether or not we know does laws? Or are there occasions where the behavior of the soul doesn't strictly follow those laws?
We don't know much about basic forces such as gravity or magnetism. In fact, we cannot observe them directly, only their effects. What if free will is simply an unknown fundamental force like gravity or magnetism, and the only observable effects of this force is our free will?
I don't think this analogy works. Free will is not some substance you can add or take away from the soul as it pleases you, like you can magnetize a piece of iron without changing it's weight. Instead, it would have to be some way how the immaterial gears of the immaterial soul spin. But do those immaterial gears follow laws, or do they sometimes behave unlawful?
All of your arguments here assume free will. If you have no ability to decide whatsoever (as is the reality if there is no free will) then can you actually be responsible for anything you do?
I think that free will<sup>(1)</sup> is a matter of degree. Therefor, you can be more or less responsible<sup>(1)</sup>. Therefor, it is reasonable to punish you with the full sentence law describes, or none at all, or some minor sentence, depending on your amount of responsibility<sup>(1)</sup.