Is Randmoness Possible?

[Iacchus]

Well, that didn't take long. So why don't you all have a nice little gamble on which particular way he dishonestly copped out was?

You've probably got 100% of guessing it though, so I won't be putting any "money" on it

"..." indicating, in the Iacchian mind it seems, emphasis. At least for today. He'll probably redefine it's use tomorrow...

Interesting ...

 

[Iacchus]

Hey, whatever happened to lifegazer? I haven't seen him around lately. Did you lose somebody to pick on?

 

[Mojo]

Really? I would just say, judging by your location and your avatar, you wish to present yourself as a dignified black man from the UK. This is what strikes me the most about it. Aside from that though (as far as I'm concerned), it's neither here nor there.

No, it's just a photo of one of my favourite singers. He's quoted in my sig, and fits with the name I'm using here. The name, though, is borrowed from my cat.

Are you implying that you wish to present yourself as two dolphins?

 

[Iacchus]

And how do you know I'm not a dolphin, who's learned to type at the keyboard?

 

[P.S.A.]

Hey, whatever happened to lifegazer? I haven't seen him around lately. Did you lose somebody to pick on?

Tut tut, it's no use trying to distract me, I know you've proven you don't have a shred of honesty irrespective of what else you say now.

Besides Iacchus, you really are both a shameful and forgetful liar; You've already tried this argument before... 2 different times in fact. And I pointed out to you both times that even when he was here, I wasn't focused solely on Lifegazer. Indeed, if I had been, you wouldn't have been able to claim the two times before now that it was supposedly "your turn", would you?

Silly, silly little childish mind.

 

[Mojo]

And how do you know I'm not a dolphin, who's learned to type at the keyboard?

You don't seem sufficiently preoccupied with fish.

 

[Tricky]

Silly, silly little childish mind.

Well, that might actually explain a lot. Though dolphins are incredibly smart, for animals, the smartest dolphins have the problem-solving abilities of the average seven-year-old human. Their vocabulary is similar in size too. Plus, many seven-year-olds have learned to type on a keyboard.

The only big problem with this scenario is what Mojo said:

You don't seem sufficiently preoccupied with fish.

Along these lines, to a dolphin, God would look like a dolphin.

Check out Rupert Brooke's Heaven

 

[stamenflicker]

Just wondered what you guys made of this in relation to the discussion on randomness:

Furthermore, as statistical science shows, random events follow certain laws, therefore even if an event is viewed as random, it cannot be completely divorced from a (statistical) law which is instrumental in causing the event in question. For example, recall the so called Galton board which is a device demonstrating the normal (Gaussian) distribution of chance events. In this device, hundreds of small balls are placed in a hopper which has an opening in its bottom. Pulled by gravitation, the balls fall down one by one. On their way down, the balls encounter a grid of hexagonal baffles. At each baffle, each ball has the same probability of 1/2 to pass the baffle either on the latter's left or its right side. After passing several rows of baffles, the balls fall into a row of bins. Which ball happens to get into which bin, is determined by chance. However, regardless of the absolute sizes of the device or of its parts, the overall result is always the same: when a sufficiently large number of balls fill the bins, their distribution between the bins meets the normal (Gaussian) distribution. In this case, the situation is in a sense opposite to the case of the tennis balls: while for the tennis balls chance operated through law, now the law (Gaussian distribution) operates through chance.

from: http://www.talkreason.org/articles/dembski.cfm

I realize as soon as some of you see "Dembski," you may form an opinion out of the gate, that's fine. I'm interested in the discussion for learning purposes, not to promote an ideology.

Flick

 

[Mercutio]

Just wondered what you guys made of this in relation to the discussion on randomness:

"Random" does not mean "unpredictable", at least in the aggregate. Statistics, of course, is built upon the premise (thus far, justified) that random events are predictable in the long run, and that we can compare[random + effect] to [random + no effect] to evaluate the likelihood of an effect. Just because an individual incident is unpredictable (or for Iacchus, absolutely unpredictable), that does not mean that a collection of incidents is likewise unpredictable.

This is true first for descriptive statistics, which simply describe the occurance of events, and then of inferential statistics, which allow prediction of future events (or evaluation of the probability of events) based on the likelihood of prior events.

Nice post, Flick.

 

[Bri]

I don't know if lacchus is sincere in his questions or not (I'm relatively new to the forum) but he has somewhat of a point. If I'm not mistaken, there is very little actual evidence for quantum theory. On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence for strict causation, which states that a certain cause will always have the same predictable effect. By "predictable" we don't mean that we necessarily have the ability currently to calculate all of the variables, just that if we did have that ability, we could accurately calculate the effects.

So, most people on this forum would argue that if there's no evidence of something, then there's no reason to believe it to be so, which would mean that most would assume strict causation (for which there is plenty of evidence) over quantum theory (which would allow for randomness, but for which there is little evidence). With strict causation, there is no such thing as randomeness, and anything that we might call "random" would only seem to be random (such as tossing dice, which seems to be random, but is completely within the laws of causational physics).

I also believe that lacchus is correct that there is such a thing as "truly random" distinct from "seemingly random." The latter is dependent on the perception of the viewer, whereas "truly random" wouldn't depend on whether or not a viewer thought an event was random or not. His original question is whether there is such thing as true randomness, which would not depend on whether or not the person viewing it thought it was random -- an event is either truly random or not. If you believe causation, nothing is truly random at all.

Here's where lacchus' logic seems to get fuzzy to me, but perhaps I am simply misunderstanding it. It sounds as though lacchus is using causation as some sort of an indication of the existance of God, which I don't quite follow. Generally, the existance of God would assume that we have free will, which cannot exist with causation. Although randomness such as is suggested by quantum theory can lead to un-predictable effects (meaning that we cannot predict the effect of a given cause with 100% accuracy even if we could know all the variables) it would be a poor substitute for free will (it would simply be "random will"), which also wouldn't be indicative of the existance of God. So far, there is little scientific evidence of free will at all, and also little evidence of God.

Lacchus, can you elaborate on your theory of how true randomness (or the lack thereof) would be evidence for or against the existance of God?

-Bri

 

[Mojo]

If I'm not mistaken, there is very little actual evidence for quantum theory.

I'm afraid you're mistaken.

 

[Ceritus]

I think what Iacchus is saying is that everything happens because of some reason or group of reasons. For example the coin flip.... If a coin is flipped and it can be heads or tails not loaded or anything its ending result is caused by the amount of tension in ones thumb to begin with the placement of the coin and the height at which it was tossed then the amount of drag that coin experianced on the way to the ground and eventually the surface in which it has landed. If all the information is known ahead of time then the output would not be random but it is the lack of knowledge for all the things effecting it at any given time makes it random.

This thought process could be applied to many things such as the formation of a snowflake and its ending result because it is effected by the size of the lithometer the condensation of water has gathered upon the amount of wind ect ect ect. However this does not prove a god or a designer to exist simply because everything follows very basic laws.

In a sense nothing is random but then how could a god exist randomly and decide to create this universe randomly? You could say that this being has free will but that does not make anything random either. If you were to say I will do something random and you flail your hands about then pick up a marker and throw it. Your action may seem random but if all the knowledge of every little thing that effected that decision was known then the outcome could be easily predicted. Such as me saying nothing was random you thought about doing something random and because you had to think quickly about it you picked the easiest thing you could think of and moved your hands. Then you could go as far back as the people creating the marker that you tossed and every hand it was in before it was placed on your desk and everything that lead up to this post ect ect.

But to me this does not mean there was a designer to me it means we need better ways of gathering data quicker!

 

[Gwyn ap Nudd]

Looking over this thread quickly, it seems that some of the posters are either confusing three things or ignoring two of the three: White randomness, Brown randomness and Chaos.

An example of (possible) White randomness (named for white noise) would be the appearance of new "stars" on the old "Starfield" screensaver. At random (or possibly pseudo-random) moments a new white point appears at any point on the screen. The location at which any point appears has (or seems to have) no relationship to the location of the previous point. (The disclaimers because computer-generated "random" numbers very seldom are truly random.)

This seems to be what Iacchus had in mind when he said"So, how else does randomness occur, except to say that things occur out of nowhere, and in effect proceed from nothing? "

An example of Brown randomness (named for Brownian motion) is a "drunken walk." Any given step involves several variables, i.e., the length of time "resting" after the previous step, the direction, speed and duration, all of which can be random, but the step always begins where the previous one ended.

There is a measure of predictability in Brown randomness. For example, in a "drunken walk," we can minimize the resting period, and maximize the speed and duration and predict the maximum distance from the origin that our drunken walker can have acheived by a certain time.

The very existence of Brown randomness refutes Iacchus' initial contention "Wouldn't it make sense to say that randomness is not evident -- if, due to the nature of cause-and-effect -- one thing clearly proceeds from another? Say the way one branch proceeds from another on a tree? There's clearly a connection there, right?" In the drunken walk, one step "clearly proceeds from another" and "there's clearly a connection there."

Chaos as a mathematical concept has come to mean non-random processes that are nonetheless unpredictable. This can be, among other reasons, because they require an order of precision greater than the accuracy of our measuring instruments, or (in the case of mathematical constructs such as Mandelbrot sets) functions whose solutions are intractable.

When Leif Roar says "Randomness just means that we can't predict the outcome of an event -- it doesn't mean that the event couldn't, in theory, be predicted; or that there is no cause for the event. It just means that prior to the event occuring, we don't know the outcome," he is confusing unpredictability (which may be a result of randomness, or may be a result of chaos, or may be due to other factors) with randomness. His confusion is evident in his loaded coin example: "The underlying event, the flipping of the coin, didn't change -- only your ability to predict its outcome. In the first case the outcome was, to you, random (to me it was predetermined,) and in the second case it was not random." The outcome of the rigged coin was never random; "you" just were unaware of a major determining factor*.

*In any of our scientific models of the universe, it is always possible that processes that appear to be random are not. But then it is also possible that other "facts" that we are sure of because of our model are false, because he model does not fit reality at some point. Newtonian physics is an extremely good model of the universe until you start examining the very fast (Relativistic effects) or the very small (Quantum effects). However, the mere possibility that any given process may turn out to be non-random does not discredit the whole concept of randomness.


I'll have to re-read the other posts a few more time before I am ready to comment further.

Edit: Changed "most" to "some" in the first sentence.

 

[jan]

If I'm not mistaken, there is very little actual evidence for quantum theory.

See the link Mojo provided. You are completely, utterly wrong about this point.

On the other hand, there is plenty of evidence for strict causation, which states that a certain cause will always have the same predictable effect.

I guess few people would want to claim that the universe is governed by absolute lawless, anarchic chaos completely lacking any trace of causation.

So, most people on this forum would argue that if there's no evidence of something, then there's no reason to believe it to be so, which would mean that most would assume strict causation (for which there is plenty of evidence) over quantum theory (which would allow for randomness, but for which there is little evidence). With strict causation, there is no such thing as randomeness, and anything that we might call "random" would only seem to be random (such as tossing dice, which seems to be random, but is completely within the laws of causational physics).

One problem with Iacchus is that he seldom claims something — he justs asks ironic little questions, like "Is Randmoness Possible?" (whatever "randmoness" may be...). But I assume that what Iacchus wants to claim is something to the effect that randomness is impossible. That means not only lack of evidence that randomness occurs, it means a positive claim that it is impossible. So the burden of proof is on his shoulders.

I also believe that lacchus is correct that there is such a thing as "truly random" distinct from "seemingly random." The latter is dependent on the perception of the viewer, whereas "truly random" wouldn't depend on whether or not a viewer thought an event was random or not.

I guess I understand your distinction. But bear in mind that "true randomness" is inevitably a metaphysical concept — it is always possible to claim that "God would knew the outcome, so it's not truly random". On the other hand, we have evidence that we mere mortals will never ever be able to predict the outcome of certain quantum experiments. You simply can't have it more random than that.

Here's where lacchus' logic seems to get fuzzy to me, but perhaps I am simply misunderstanding it. It sounds as though lacchus is using causation as some sort of an indication of the existance of God, which I don't quite follow.

I'm not certain, but maybe he just wants to play the "first cause = God" card. Maybe he wants to construct a dilemma: either God did it, or our universe would have pop into existence from nothing, which would be random, which is impossible, therefor the first horn of the dilemma must be true. Or something like this, it's hard to tell what Iacchus thinks, since he deliberately refuses to explain his ideas.

Generally, the existance of God would assume that we have free will, ...

How is this?

...which cannot exist with causation.

...and this?

 

[Bri]

I'm afraid you're mistaken.

I stand corrected (I think). I haven't read through the whole article yet (and as I said before I'm not well-versed on the subject). I do remember having read elsewhere that there has yet to be a single event reliably observed that wasn't causational, but I'll have to remember where I read that. If true, that would simply indicate that quantum theory better explains things that previously had no explanation, but doesn't really mean that there's strong evidence for it (yet). Isn't there still a lot of debate in the scientific community concerning quantum theory vs. determinism?

Of course, all that is getting a little off-topic because whether or not quantum theory is true or determinism is true isn't all that relevent to the question. Quantum theory substitutes cause/randomness/effect for cause/effect. I still don't see how either would be evidence of God, and seem to be quite the opposite since either would preclude free will.

-Bri

 

[jan]

Isn't there still a lot of debate in the scientific community concerning quantum theory vs. determinism?

As far as I know, there is occasionally a debate about the metaphysical consequences of quantum theory. For example, the Many-Worlds Interpretation allows you to still have determinism, since it says that the quantum randomness is not "true" randomness. It's doubtful though if this could be called a scientific debate.

 

[jan]

I think what Iacchus is saying is that everything happens because of some reason or group of reasons.

Indeed. Each time he sees a license plate, he thinks it's a special message for him.

 

[Bri]

See the link Mojo provided. You are completely, utterly wrong about this point.

I have commented on that (see my previous post). I haven't read the whole article yet, so I won't say one way or the other, but it so far doesn't mention any irrefutable evidence, which would indicate that the matter might still be up in the air. I don't think the whole scientific community has yet jumped on the quantum theory bandwagon yet, but I very well may have been corrected in my statement that a lack of evidence of quantum theory would preclude a skeptic from believing it. There may be more evidence than I was aware of, although I still haven't read anything yet that indicates more actual evidence than causation (rather than the fact that it might conveniently explain things that causation can't explain). At any rate, I will concede for the purposes of this discussion that quantum theory is equally valid to causation and my question of lacchus still remains -- what does that have to do with the existance of God, especially since either theory contradicts the existance of free will?

I guess few people would want to claim that the universe is governed by absolute lawless, anarchic chaos completely lacking any trace of causation.

I agree, which is why I used the term "strict causation" rather than just "causation" even though the term "causation" is generally accepted to mean "strict causation" (that a certain cause will always have the same predictable effect). Quantum theory doesn't mean that everything is completely chaotic (at least not from my understanding) but simply that it's based on probabilities rather than strict cause and effect. So although quantum theory doesn't eliminate cause and effect (but replaces it with cause/randomness/effect), it nonetheless opposes the theory of (strict) causation since a cause doesn't always produce the same effect.

One problem with Iacchus is that he seldom claims something — he justs asks ironic little questions, like "Is Randmoness Possible?" (whatever "randmoness" may be...). But I assume that what Iacchus wants to claim is something to the effect that randomness is impossible. That means not only lack of evidence that randomness occurs, it means a positive claim that it is impossible. So the burden of proof is on his shoulders.

That's what I gathered, but even supposing he is correct (that randomness is impossible) I still don't see how he jumps from that conclusion to the existance of God. Causation, which is the fallback theory if randomness is impossible, would still seem to be evidence against the existance of God.

I guess I understand your distinction. But bear in mind that "true randomness" is inevitably a metaphysical concept — it is always possible to claim that "God would knew the outcome, so it's not truly random". On the other hand, we have evidence that we mere mortals will never ever be able to predict the outcome of certain quantum experiments. You simply can't have it more random than that.

Yes, OK, but that would be circular logic. If you're using the argument that the lack of randomness is evidence of God, then you can't then say that God is evidence that there is no true randomness.

Quantum theory (if my understanding is correct) doesn't just state that mortals will never obtain the knowledge needed to predict the effect of a given cause, it states that effect is unpredictable (meaning not predictable with 100% accuracy, not meaning that we cannot predict the probability of something happening). In other words, quantum theory states that they are truly random.
In other words, a certain cause will always produce the same effect or it won't. Causation vs. quantum theory.

I'm not certain, but maybe he just wants to play the "first cause = God" card. Maybe he wants to construct a dilemma: either God did it, or our universe would have pop into existence from nothing, which would be random, which is impossible, therefor the first horn of the dilemma must be true. Or something like this, it's hard to tell what Iacchus thinks, since he deliberately refuses to explain his ideas.

Lacchus? Care to explain your ideas?

How is this?

...and this?

In my opinion, this discussion concerns three mutually exclusive theories: causation, quantum theory, and free will. Causation means cause/effect, quantum theory means cause/randomness/effect. Free will is different from either of these because it assumes that it is possible (at least for human beings) to choose an outcome that is completely independent of cause. Free will cannot exist unless there is some as of yet unknown mechanism or force by which our physical bodies (specifically our brains) can make a decision independent of external causes. Neither causation nor quantum theory can account for something that can actually make a choice (i.e. an effect) completely independent of external causes (quantum theory still has cause and effect, it's just that some randomness is introduced which make the effect unpredictable).

Dualist theories can explain free will, but have very little scientific evidence (other than the fact that we experience free will). Dualist theories state that we (specifically our brains) are made up of both the physical and ... something else that isn't physical. This non-physical object makes the decisions (independent of cause and effect) and controls our physical bodies by some as of yet unknown means. Mind you, there is almost no scientific evidence of the existance of such an object, nor is there any known mechanism by which it could control the physical body. But you can see why most dualist theories (although not all) are also theist. It could easily be argued that even the non-theist dualist theories are really theist depending on your defintion of "god."

-Bri

 

[P.S.A.]

Indeed. Each time he sees a license plate, he thinks it's a special message for him.

This is Iacchus in a nutshell, I salute you.

Take it one step further though... Iacchus also sees messages in his own internal understanding, which needless to say is the emotional basis of his own personage being his Religion. Thus when he asks these silly rhetorical questions, he gains a momentary sense of his own wisdom... and that must be a message for him too, a message that "Iacchus is Wise". That we can't hear that message is irrelevant... he knows the internal truth, thus he is wise.

He won't answer any question openly, objectively or honestly however, because that runs the risk of someone showing openly and objectively that "Iacchus is Not Wise". You basically don't exist for Iacchus, except as a foil to bounce his ideas off of, and so he can hear the echo of wisdom inside his own empty head.

Bri, you might be interested in reading his own Religious Book; he has it linked within his signature. You might find it very useful for supressing the urge to pay any real attention to Iacchus... he genuinely has no understanding of randomness at all, because he genuinely believes all things have a causal meaning for him. Numbers. People. Colors. It all is telling him he is Dionysus.

He just won't honestly say that somewhere he can't control the conversation, and thus try and force connections into his ideas. Hence why he didn't take even my simple test. Part of him, deep, deep down knows that people seldom act like he expects them too, and he's not confident enough of being able to guess whether I'd said Yes or No to risk the dread "Iacchus is Not Wise". So he doesn't.

I mean "So, maybe Iacchus won't? "

 

[jan]

I haven't read the whole article yet, so I won't say one way or the other, but it so far doesn't mention any irrefutable evidence, which would indicate that the matter might still be up in the air.

If there will ever be an irrefutable evidence, then it will refutate most of current theories of epistemology, I guess, which claim that nothing is irrefutable and everything is "still up in the air". Of course you are free to doubt quantum mechanics. Nevertheless, I hope you will do better than some other posters here who tend to argue "I don't know anything about a certain subject, but since there can't be an irrefutable proof in favor of it, it must be wrong" (well, who might I have in mind here?).

As far as I understand (and I am no expert in this field), it is quite undisputed that there are some areas of conflict between quantum mechanics and relativity, so an ultimate theory of everything will have to somehow resolve this conflict. Nevertheless, there is a well-known domain where quantum mechanics works and where it makes testable predictions. And within this domain, the evidence is quite overwhelming.

But of course still not irrefutable...

I don't think the whole scientific community has yet jumped on the quantum theory bandwagon yet, but I very well may have been corrected in my statement that a lack of evidence of quantum theory would preclude a skeptic from believing it.

As explained above, I would say that the whole relevant scientific community has jumped on the quantum theory bandwagon. But you are still allowed to doubt it. Such doubt would, of course, be more interesting if it could be supported by some kind of argument.

That's what I gathered, but even supposing he is correct (that randomness is impossible) I still don't see how he jumps from that conclusion to the existance of God. Causation, which is the fallback theory if randomness is impossible, would still seem to be evidence against the existance of God.

Of course it would be far better if Iacchus (by the way, it's "iacchus", not "Lacchus") would thoroughly explain his views, unfortunately, I doubt it will happen any time soon.

I guess — but bear in mind that this is only guesswork and produced out of rather thin air — that for Iacchus, there are only two camps: himself and the rest of the universe. We, the rest of the universe, are supposed to claim that something came from nothing, which is supposed to be absurd. And since that shows that we, the rest of the universe, got it wrong, it also shows that whatever Iacchus claims must be the truth.

Yes, OK, but that would be circular logic. If you're using the argument that the lack of randomness is evidence of God, then you can't then say that God is evidence that there is no true randomness.

Sorry, obviously I wasn't clear enough: in this case, I wasn't trying to reconstruct The Lost Theory Of Iacchus, but I was only trying to explain why "true randomness" is a metaphysical concept, so it can be argued that it's reasonable to define "randomness" different from "true randomness".

Quantum theory (if my understanding is correct) doesn't just state that mortals will never obtain the knowledge needed to predict the effect of a given cause, it states that effect is unpredictable (meaning not predictable with 100% accuracy, not meaning that we cannot predict the probability of something happening). In other words, quantum theory states that they are truly random.
In other words, a certain cause will always produce the same effect or it won't. Causation vs. quantum theory.

I am not certain if I understand you here. As I understand it, it is this way: there are certain situations where we can say that two possible outcomes are equal likely (the instable atom under observation will decay within the next half hour, or it wont), and we know that there is no way we can narrow that down any further.

In my opinion, this discussion concerns three mutually exclusive theories: causation, quantum theory, and free will.

Perhaps those terms are not very lucky; I would prefer "determinism", "random indeterminism" and "libertarian free will". As I mentioned, there are metaphysical interpretations of quantum physics out there which are completely deterministic. And there are concepts of free will that are compatible with determinism.

I don't see how free will (given the meaning you seem to use) is possible: any outcome is either completely determined by rigid laws, which would be determinism, or it isn't, which would be random indeterminism.

Assume you have an immortal, immaterial soul that somehow manages to operate the neurons in your brain. Fine. Now, this immaterial soul, does it follow deterministic laws? If yes, then determinism is true. If no, then once again random indeterminism is true. Dualism just shifts the problem a bit around, it doesn't solve it.

But you can see why most dualist theories (although not all) are also theist. It could easily be argued that even the non-theist dualist theories are really theist depending on your defintion of "god."

I agree. But the converse doesn't hold: you can be a theist without believing in (the ambitious version of) free will. Since the obsession with free will is a rather new one, compared with the ancient idea of supreme beings, I guess few theists ever worried about free will. And since you said "Generally, the existence of God would assume that we have free will", I wanted to know how this should work.