What I do know, is linked more to my subconscious. This is where my ideas congeal, and gives rise to what I referred to in the other thread as The Spirit. Basically I've learned how to examine these things, and allow them to express themselves, and not get too tangled up in them ... while admittedly, some of this does occur. I have heard others express this as a process of incubation. Cowardly? I can't even begin to defend myself on this one. Yet it is necessary to stand aside, in order to allow these things to express themselves, otherwise I wouldn't know. So yes, what others might think and say about it, has to take the back seat. Hence, when I sign off, this is where I wind up going ... and quite often only to return with a new piece of the puzzle.
They are not untrue.P.S.A. said:
There is a lot to digest in each moment, notwithstanding all the random text (i.e., the appearance thereof
) which may appear on one's screen.And, might I suggest that you may in fact be dealing with an imaginery person? You really think you have me all figured out, don't you?
Upchurch
Papa Funkosophy
I'd call it a pretty fair assessment that he has, yes.Iacchus said:
Iacchus said:
If it just involved you and your own issues, we happily would ignore you. However, you persist in demanding the right to explore your own prejudices about other people, including ourselves here, without feedback from the concerned person? You have a right to believe in whatever the voices tell you, but you don't have the right to lie about other people to their faces without being challenged.
This is what inflames the "sensationalism" you talk of. You insult people, and expect them to just be able to walk away from it as easily as you've given up on all consistency and logic. The world does not work like that, however.
jan said:
Please forgive me for not replying sooner. I became busy, and I wanted to give your post the consideration it deserved.
I don't think Dennett's position is that free will occurs in degrees. Instead, he simply redefines free will. His position seems to be that any object for which it is "useful" to consider an "intentional creature" should be considered to have free will. Basically, he ignores the definitions of "free will" that have been proposed, and along with it he ignores any lines that are commonly drawn between things that have free will and things that don't. In effect, he is saying that we should be allowed to say that anything we want has "free will" if it is useful to define it that way.
I don't see anywhere where Dennett claims that some things have more free will than others.
Incidentally, Dennett's logic could easily be used to justify the existance of God. According to Dennett's logic, as long as whatever definition of "God" you're using is "useful" then it is valid.
OK, well unless I am misunderstanding, you are following Dennett's idea of simply redefining free will, but justifying this position by saying that your definition is just as useful as any other definition. If that's what you're saying, then you're conceding that Webster's definition of free will (what we're calling "libertarian free will") isn't compatible with determinism, but that some other (presumably equally useful) definition of free will might be. So, for the record, are you conceding my original proposition, that "libertarian free will" is incompatible with determinism?
I don't follow your logic here, or how you have shown my position to be in trouble, since it is my position that my definition of free will (libertarian free will) is incompatible with determinism, and your position is that there are other (presumably equally "useful") definitions of "free will" that are compatible with determinism. These two positions seem to be in agreement, actually, as long as your position can be proven to be true.
That said, you and Dennett may actually have a point. Whether one is justified in calling a different concept "free will" is debatable, but for the sake of argument, let's say that IF you can come up with a definition of free will that is equally useful to the notion of "libertarian free will" in a particular context (for instance, ethics), then for that context you are justified in calling it "free will." To prove that another definition of free will is just as useful as the "forking paths" and "source" models of free will is quite a burden to overcome. On top of that, you need to show that your new definition is also compatible with determinism.
Whether or not your definition of free will is more "common" than "libertarian free will" is in no way an argument as to which is more useful, nor does it make your definition compatible with determinism. There are many "common" ideas that aren't very useful, and some that are downright wrong. That said, I don't think that your definition of free will is at all "common." I would say that the "forked path" and "source" definitions are far more common and are based on thousands of years of debate on the matter (Dennett's ideas are relatively recent). Not to mention that libertarian free will forms the basis for Webster's definition of free will. In fact, the word "libertarian" means "one who believes in free will" according to Webster. More importantly, the common notion of "free will" is closely tied with the concepts of "could have done otherwise" and "ultimate source of one's actions."
The article refers to the definitions of free will and intent that Dennett uses as "folk psychological notions in the explanation of intentional action." I disagree with this characterization, because it seems to me that the "folk" notion of free will and intent are very different than Dennett's. For example, Dennett seems to argue that it is valid to consider a thermostat to literally "desire" the room to be a certain temperature, and to intentionally changes its own behavior to achieve its desired result. That a thermostat actually desires or intends anything seems a little silly to me, and I wouldn't say that it is a "folk" notion to consider an inanimate object to have free will (unless by "folk" you mean "silly").
We certainly don't hold thermostats ethically responsible if they fail to keep the room a comfortable temperature. A thermostat certainly violates both the "forking paths" and the "source" models for free will, and I'm not sure what model Dennett is offering as a substitute in order to provide a basis for a system of ethics, and in order to distinguish between the type of "free will" exhibited by a thermostat and "free will" exhibited by people who are morally responsible for their actions.
If you still hold the opinion that some things can possess "more" free will than others, please give an example and a more concrete definition of what you mean by "free will" in that context. Also please explain why you consider that definition to be as "useful" as the common models of free will, and how you would use your definition of free will to distinguish between circumstances when we commonly hold a person responsible for their actions and those when we don't hold the person responsible.
Computers receive input, process that input based on wiring and programming, and then produce some kind of output. There are no choices involved at all. Given the same wiring and programming (neither of which the computer is the "ultimate source" of) the same input (causes) will produce the same results (effects).
The interaction is very simple in fact, and the setup can be seen at the top of the page that was previously referenced. Interaction was done through a row of monitors, each showing a variation generated by the computer. The user would then stand next to the monitor of the picture she liked best, and the computer would generate more pictures based on variations of the program that was used to generate the picture the user liked. Bigger pictures are here (see section 5). If you haven't already, check out the Evolving Creatures movie here which is based on a similar premise of computer-based evolution, but is much cooler.
You can't tell if someone is exercising free will only from their actions. Like I said, I don't know that our system of ethics is even equipped to consider the possibility that there is no libertarian free will, and therefore assumes that there is. It then uses this assumption of free will to determine guilt. It is impossible to determine if someone is behaving in an ethical manner only from their actions. You have to consider their intent as well. In order to be guilty of a crime, you had to have control over your actions (you could have done otherwise) and you have to be the ultimate source of your actions (you are responsible for the crime). In other words, you had to have committed the crime intentionally -- as an exercize of your own free will.
Good question. There are only two reasons I can think of that we wouldn't be able to create artificially intelligent computers: that artificial intelligence simply requires too much complexity, and that there is something about the human brain that is more than the sum of its parts and cannot be duplicated. It's unlikely that the first reason will hold because if nothing else, computers are very good at dealing with (and helping to create) complexity. The second reason is pretty much dualism in a nutshell, although there may be variations on the theme. I don't know if this version of dualism is "metaphysical" or not, but I'm not sure I can think of any theories that couldn't be considered dualistic that would distinguish the human brain from the microchip inside your toaster that keeps your bread from burning.
If our brains are dualistic in some way, that doesn't mean that the exact nature of this dualism can't someday be explained by science. However, as you pointed out, the scientific evidence for your brain being more than the sum of its parts is currently underwhelming to say the least. Perhaps there are other "loopholes" that might explain free will, but they would probably currently have equally little scientific evidence.
Well, even a "tiny, tiny little bit of intent" is intent. It seems to me that you either have the capacity to form intent or you don't, and you're saying that a thermostat does. Therefore, a thermostat possesses free will by your definition of free will. If that's true, the burden of proof would be on you to demonstrate how this view is "useful" and thereby justifies calling it "free will." You would also have to show it to be compatible with determinism. In order to prove it useful, you would have to examine why we hold that people are capable of forming intent, but not thermostats, and provide a meaningful alternative that fits within both your definition of free will and a "real world" view of ethics. For your definition to be compatible with determinism, you would have to show that your definitions hold true even in a deterministic world where "could have done otherwise" and "ultimate source" are both nonexistent.
Robots might be easy to "punish," especially if your definition of "punishment" is simply to change their behavior. We could simply change their programming. We could also change other robot's programming to prevent other robots from behaving the same way. Of course, this is different than how we punish human beings, because this sort of thing would be akin to a frontal labotomy, and would be inethical. Also, punishing other people for the crime of one person would also be inethical.
If you're talking about punishing robots in the same way that we punish human beings (which I believe you are talking about), it would likely have no affect at all unless the robots possessed true artificial intelligence (and we're not sure what that means exactly). I would argue that putting a robot in jail would have no affect on its behavior once released than putting your microwave oven in jail. Nor would jailing a robot affect the behavior of other identical robots any more than destroying a defective car would convince other identical cars not to exhibit the same defect.
Oh, that's right, "you people" like mayonnaise on your french fries. Yuck! Obviously, if you had any free will you would have ordered ketchup instead!
OK, so in that one instance you felt as though you regretted your decision, but that doesn't mean that you weren't free to answer the waitress differently. Did you feel that you couldn't then decide to call the waitress over and explain that you changed your mind? I suppose you also felt this morning that whether you first put on your right shoe or the left one was decided for you millions of years ago too.
Again, that fear prevented you from making certain decisions in this instance doesn't mean that you don't feel that you have the ability to choose in other instances. Are you really saying that there is no instance in your entire life when you felt that you actually had the ability to choose between two actions?
Most people would agree that it wasn't your fault, and that you're not morally or ethically responsible for doing something (or in this case not doing something) when you were prevented by fear. In other words, in that circumstance, you didn't have the freedom to choose (your choices were limited by fear). But that argument assumes that under other circumstances (where you do have a choice) you would be morally responsible for your actions. For example, in a similar situation in which there was no chance that you would have been hurt, but you chose to not act and simply watched a person harmed because you didn't feel like helping, your choice not to act might not be considered moral or ethical.
If determinism is true, you couldn't have acted any other way in either circumstance, and therefore your action (the only one you could possibly have taken) should never be considered either moral or immoral. The fact that people's actions are deemed moral and immoral based on their ability to act indicates that people do believe in free will.
So you do you think that if you hadn't been afraid of dogs or if it wasn't a dog but something that you're not afraid of, you would have been able to have done otherwise? If you don't feel that you can ever choose your actions, then your feeling of shame at not having helped the woman is completely irrational. I would argue that the fact that people feel shame at choosing what they consider to be an improper action, and don't consider it irrational, is evidence that people feel as though they have free will. If they felt that their actions were determined millions of years before they were born and that they couldn't have acted any other way, then it would be unlikely that they would feel shame because of it.
That's a flawed argument. Granted, there is no choice involved in determining one's own nationality, heritage, etc., yet people do describe being "proud" or "ashamed" of these things. But that is only because you identify with your ancestors, and you are ashamed or proud of the actions you feel they chose to do! If you didn't feel that your ancestors had any choice but to act exactly as they did, then you wouldn't feel shame or pride over it!
The conversation to which I was responding was:
You stated that you would be angry at a person and expect them to be jailed only if the person had a choice to do otherwise, but you wouldn't be angry at a person or expect them to be jailed if the person didn't have a choice to do otherwise (due to being hypnotized, drugged, abducted by aliens, etc.). The action that the person took is the same in both cases; the only difference is the person's ability to do otherwise. Therefore, you hold the person who has a choice to do otherwise accountable, while you hold the person who doesn't have a choice to do otherwise unaccountable. The person who cannot do otherwise isn't responsible for their actions. Whether or not you get angry at someone and whether or not you feel that they deserve to be punished, is entirely dependent on whether or not they could have done otherwise, which is one definition of libertarian free will (the "garden paths" model).
Your argument fails miserably in a deterministic world though, because neither of the people could have done otherwise. You don't explain what the actual difference is between the person who is drugged and the person who is a slave to their neurons.
There, see? I was right!
Your concept of accountability as you described it in the above exchange is completely based on libertarian free will (in fact, it's the "could have done otherwise" argument exactly). Your argument had nothing at all to do with whether or not the person had "more" or "less" free will (you still haven't explained what you mean by that). Furthermore, you don't hold the person who was hypnotized or drugged accountable at all for their actions, even though the actions are exactly the same as the person who isn't hypnotized or drugged. You also don't explain how your argument is compatible with determinism because with determinism neither person could have done otherwise.
You have not even come close to explaining what your definition of free will actually is, how it differs from libertarian free will, how it is as "useful" as libertarian free will, how it relates to ethics, or how it is compatible with determinism.
It seems as though your example is simply an example of libertarian free will, and your example demonstrates that without libertarian free will you cannot distinguish from an ethics standpoint between the person who is hypnotized or drugged and the person who is simply acting in the only way they can possibly act due to determinism. If determinism is true, neither of them could have done otherwise, and you never explain the actual difference between the two people that would justify treating them differently.
Actually, you said it boiled down to "had they had a choice to do otherwise." With determinism, a person never, ever has the choice to do otherwise. There is also no evidence of "degrees" of free will in your argument at all. Neither of the people could have done otherwise, and neither have free will. Even if your argument did take into account what determined their behavior (I don't think it does at all), you don't explain why you would treat behavior determined by drugs differently than behavior determined by the firing of neurons, except to say that in one case the person "could have done otherwise." Show me how, in a deterministic world, the person whose behavior is determined by the firing of neurons could have done otherwise.
I don't think you justified being mad at one person and not at the other, and you never showed how either case is different in any way.
That's an interesting take on it. I don't think our judicial system does maximize happiness. Killing anyone who is convicted of a crime might maximize happiness because there would be far less crime. Sure, a few people who might be put to death by mistake (and their families) might not be too happy, but everyone else would be far happier.
OK, so what if science has determined by a proponderance of evidence that one thing or another would make a person happy. Should we then force that person to do that thing to make them happier? For that matter, should we only be concerned about the happiness of the majority at the expense of the happiness of the few? And while we are maximizing happiness, why not just eliminate the most unhappy segment of the population?
This doesn't sound like maximizing happiness to me.
Not at all. I don't know whether free will exists or not. If it doesn't, then yes we are punishing a lot of people who have absolultely no control over their actions, which most ethics systems deem inethical.
Explain what you mean by this.
I disagree. I think that if science were to prove tomorrow that we have no free will, a lot of things would change. For one thing, every criminal would have an air-tight defense and there would be little that anyone could do about it according to the law. I can't think of how the law would be patched in order to provide a distinction between a crime and an unintended act.
Predeterminated. I like that word!
Whether it tells us something about the truth of the theory of evolution depends on whether we are determined to believe that evolution is true or false. The truth of the argument of the machines would have no affect on our actions one way or the other since those actions are completely determined.
Well, worse than that. Many skeptics believe that if something is unfalsifiable, then it's not to be believed. If determinism is unfalsifiable, then you shouldn't believe it, even if it seems to fit reality and there is no example of anything that doesn't fit it.
Take God for example. If you believe that God created the natural universe, and that science only deals with the natural universe, then science itself wouldn't even pertain to God, and there is no possibility of scientific evidence against God. This theory fits perfectly within current scientific knowledge, and in fact there has never been an example of anything that doesn't fit this theory. Even things that cannot currently be explained by science can be explained by God. Even those things that might never be able to explain by science can be explained by God.
If determinism is also unfalsifiable, it should also be rejected.
Or you could simply program the computer to avoid certain actions. No different. Pain doesn't factor into it, nor does hell.
My comment about some people not "sinning" because they feel they are going to hell was simply in response to this question by you:
No, your free will doesn't keep you from doing anything. In fact, just the opposite. It makes you responsible for your actions. Someone who doesn't have free will can't be responsible, and therefore someone who doesn't believe they have free will would have no real reason not to do bad things if they knew they wouldn't get caught. Even if they beleive in God, they could argue that God couldn't possibly hold them accountable for something that is beyond their control. Someone who does believe in free will generally believes that they are responsible for their actions.
Perhaps because of a feeling of having responsibility for one's actions. Perhaps because they have a desire for others to also choose to be good, and know that others have a desire for them to choose to be good. Perhaps because they believe in God.
The science quoted indicates that we have no free will. Even a little free will would be free will, and there is no scientific evidence of any free will whatsoever.
I don't think those findings are a threat to your argument, but not because of your concept of free will as a matter of degree. Those findings are simply evidence that people think they have free will whether or not they actually do.
My understanding is that the story of Adam and Eve is all about humans receiving free will. That's what the Tree of Knowledge was (the knowledge of good and evil). The implication is that after eating from the tree, Adam and Eve "knew" about good and evil, and therefore could choose between them.
If I knew the nature of what "it" is that might give us free will, then I would be able to prove that we have free will. I don't, and I can't. But perhaps "it" is a part of us. So, yes, I suppose that would make it "us," in the same sense that your mind is "you." I think the analogy that I used before might be a good one, that our brain is more than the sum of its parts. In other words, if you believe we have a physical "brain" but something undefined which is our "mind" or "soul" then that "mind" or "soul" might very well be what allows us to have free will. That part of us simply might not follow the laws of physics as we currently understand it.
With the above definition, I think it easily meets the "ultimate source" standard. I see what you're getting at though.
I suppose it wouldn't be.
My apologies. I should have stated that a little differently. I meant that this is why the criminal trial in this country (United States) is broken into two parts. I didn't mean to say that this is how it is everywhere. I would still say that in most judicial systems (probably yours as well) there is no notion of "degrees" guilt, but rather mitigating factors which might affect the punishment. If you're not fully guilty of the crime for which you're being charged, then you're being charged with the wrong crime and you should be innocent of that crime. Of course, you people like mayonnaise on your fries, so who knows what sort of deviant system of justice you have!
[QUOTE
Once again, the language that seems to be your native one confuses manslaughter and "involuntary manslaughter". In my country, "murder" ("Mord") does entail a "mean motive" (interlinear translation, don't know what the correct term is) and a minimal amount of planning. If those traits are lacking, it is considered to be "manslaughter" ("Totschlag"). If it happens per accident, it would be "involuntary manslaughter" ("fahrlässige Tötung").[/QUOTE]
We also distinguish between voluntary and involuntary manslaughter. My point was that the difference between "murder" and either type of "manslaughter" is largely one of intent (motive and planning both indicate malicious intent). I was making this point to show that action by itself isn't enough to determine the crime committed or the appropriate punishment.
There are mitigating circumstances, yes. But at least in the United States, if a person is able to know the difference between right and wrong, if the person knew that they were committing a crime, and if the person had the ability to choose not to commit the crime, they are considered fully guilty, even if they are mentally handicapped in some way. Mitigating circumstances can be used to determine the appropriate punishment for the crime, but that doesn't make the person any more of less guilty. Your country might be different though.
You're absolutely right. you have fully convinced me that it's not a "different sort of crime." I believe the thought process is the same as described above. If there are mitigating factors (in this case, the fact that the brain chyemistry of a young person often prevent them from considering the consequences of their actions) then the punishment for the crime might be different than for an adult. That doesn't make the person less guilty though, nor does it change the crime of which the person is guilty.
-Bri
Bri, now I have to apologize for a delay. I promised you per pm to answer today, but you posed some tough questions and point to some rather large gaps in my ideas. I am more than halfway through with my answer, but would like to give it at least another night. So I postpone my answer to Thursday or Friday.
I am done with the reply, but would wish to polish it a bit. Unfortunately, I got a cold; an annoying uncle threatened to visit me; I have some posts from Everything dangling; my connection is so slow...
But give me some more days or decades, and I will show up with the perfect and irrefutable concept of free will.
Seems my avatar has a cold too
But give me some more days or decades, and I will show up with the perfect and irrefutable concept of free will.
Seems my avatar has a cold too
Bri, I would appreciate you posting smaller posts. Theres no way to follow a conversation when you make such a huge number of points. Its impossible to reply without making the post equally huge or omitting a response.
I mean look. Its massive. The whole post is about the definition of a word. Its a language issue, not a philosophical one. I'm not going to give another example because you'll reply with 200 paragraphs.
I mean look. Its massive. The whole post is about the definition of a word. Its a language issue, not a philosophical one. I'm not going to give another example because you'll reply with 200 paragraphs.
Mojo
Mostly harmless
No, it's because time travel is not possible. It's probably escaped your attention, but "things that we have done" are inevitably in the past. You can't go back there.Iacchus said:
Mojo
Mostly harmless
Ah, but try going there today!
Mojo
Mostly harmless
In fact, we could just as easily propose that the first horn of the dilemma (that either the universe or whatever entity is purported to have created the universe has existed forever) is absurd.jan said:
DavoMan said:
I agree. Why do you think my posts are so huge? Jan and I have been replying back and forth, commenting on each point, and it's gotten quite large. After she posts again, I am going to try to break it up into smaller posts based on each point.
I'm not sure if you're referring to the original post or to the conversation as it has evolved, but the discussion is not just about definitions. The original post might have been about the definition of the word "randomness" but not really. The current discussion is about whether it is possible to have meaningful free will if determinism is true, and about the ethical implications of that.
-Bri