I still think that this is the crux of the issue. The whole concept of "predictable" implies "human" and/or "using a tool made by humans" (like a computer). Thus, "determinism" and "randomness" ultimately relate to a human capability, the ability to predict - not an ultimate universal law of nature. Both "determinism" and "randomness" can be expressed upon a scale of predictability. One end (determinism) is more predictable, and the other (random) is less predictable. Yet, whether or not we are able to predict an event does not mean it can or cannot be predicted. Our assignment of "determinism" or "randomness" is a reflection of our abilities, and not necesssarily a reflection of reality.Bri said:
Next, if "determinism" is a "nature versus nurture" issue, and it adheres strictly to nature (our genetic make-up), then it is unsupportable for explaining human thought which is dynamic and alterable by experience and environmental interactions (Hebb's Law and other research). If determinism requires adherence to the "nature" position, then it will not bring us closer to an understanding of "free will." It is too far out of touch with reality.
I will go read your links. In the meantime, I suggest you go a-Googling for "Heisenberg Uncertainty Principle" as well as "sensitivity to initial conditions and Chaos Theory".
JAK said:
As it has been used in this discussion, "predictable" is a well-defined scientific term. It simply means that the number of variables are finite (even though they are often quite large) and that if we could know all of the variables and how they interact with one another, then we could predict the result with 100% accuracy.
In the case of a pool ball striking another pool ball, the effect is predictable. There are a limited number of variables (diameter of the balls, velocity of the balls at impact, friction of the surface, gravity, etc.), and we know how they interact, and can therefore accurately predict the results. A more complex system would be much more difficult to predict, but would rely on the same rules of physics. The more complex system is still considered "predictable" even though you or I cannot predict it using the current state of technology.
Essentially, "predictable" means that there is only one possible outcome from any given set of causes. Only one future for any given past.
Determinism holds that this is true for everything, including the human brain.
If my understanding is correct, QM holds that this is not true, that things are not predictable, and that there is not only one future for a given past. QM holds that for a given past, there is a certain chance for a particular future. In QM, this possibility for variance is the result of randomness. However, as far as free will goes, randomness isn't much of an improvement over determinism.
Determinism definitely does require adherence to the laws of nature. Whether it is out of touch with reality or whether it is reality is a matter of opinion, although science currently indicates that determinism (or something very close to it) is reality.
-Bri
Tricky said:
Did I mention that in German, it's "Äpfel mit Birnen vergleichen", that is, "comparing apples to pears"?
Also, the Surrealists had a game, "l'un dans l'autre", where you had to describe one item in terms of the other item. Comparing an apple with a frog sounds like a typical exercise of l'un dans l'autre.
Bri said:
Indeed, a very nice article, thanks a lot! It's a bit like reading the solution of an exercise before even trying it for yourself, since it contains far more ideas than I would expect we could come up in this thread. I just read it once, I guess I will have to chew a bit on this. I knew a bit about Dennett, but Fischer's theory is completely new to me, sounds very interesting.
And it's the same with us: we can't do anything other than what we will, according to the laws of physics, do. And the ultimate source of our actions is not within ourself. At least that's what I think. Therefor, if I am trying to save compatibilism, I have to make plausible why even the computer (sorry, the program: I imagined a chess computer where you, the user, are unable to change the program, so the distinction is rather irrelevant, not a desktop computer with a chess program running) has some kind of free will, even if it is diluted beyond recognition.
Try to imagine how the program that governs the computer becomes more and more complicated, and therefor its behavior more and more unpredictable ("unpredictability" here understood as the amount of labor one would have to undertake to be able to make a prediction), until the output of the program is, with regard to complexity and unpredictability, on par with a human being (so it could, perhaps, pass a Turing test, but that is not necessary — maybe its behavior shows the same amount of unpredictability and creativity, but besides that, it is completely different, so that the program would not pass a Turing test). Would you still claim that the program lacks free will? Would you still claim this if we put the computer inside an android body and this android would be completely indistinguishable from a human being? How do you know that other people have free will?
It also seems to me that you refused to answer at which point of evolution you think free will kicked in. To remind you:
(not that I am implying here that bees are our ancestors...)
Neither. I don't know how it would feel to feel that my decisions were determined millions of years beforehand. But if I try to see my free will at work, I have troubles. Usually, I try to avoid making decisions. But if I am making some, it seems they are just emerging. It doesn't feel like I am making them. They appear.
Are feelings rational? A tricky question. Would my feelings be justified?
For me, it boils down to: had they had a choice to do otherwise in a rather modest interpretation. That is, I would ask if they had been hypnotized, drugged, enslaved by aliens, or something along those lines. If I would find out that they hadn't had a choice to act different because the neurons firing in their heads according to the laws of physics forced them to act like they acted, I would still be angry.
I could argue that way, if I wanted to reduce crime, but that's not my aim. If I wanted to reduce crime, I should try to kill everybody, not only those that already have committed crimes.
The justice system can't believe anything. Only people might do that. There may be people out there who believe that there is evidence for a libertarian free will, and take this as the basis for their ethics and laws. But according to you, those people are in error: even if libertarian free will exists, there is no evidence for it, so those people are wrong, and they punish people who should have been given the benefit of doubt.
I don't see how this follows. Assume you have libertarian free will. So what? Why don't you start stealing, raping and killing? What holds you back? Your free will? But why does your free will decide not to engage in those actions? Why shouldn't your free will decide to do them, if you can be sure not to get caught?
But that's even worse! If neither Adam nor Eve had free will before eating the apple, how can they be held accountable?
No. If it is "some force" outside ourself, it doesn't allows us to make choices with the ultimate source of this choice being within ourself. The ultimate source of our choice is this "force". It doesn't help to call this force "free will". It isn't free will, it's an outside force.
Assume person A commits a murder after concluding that she would benefit from the murder and that the chances of being caught are negligible. That would mean a few decades in jail, I would say.
Now assume person C kills a person because some voices in her head told her to do it. Sounds like schizophrenia, I would say, and should be cured in a mental institution, if possible (unfortunately, it usually isn't).
And now we have person B. Person B doesn't hear voices in her head, but she has nevertheless severe psychological problems, like a retarded personality. The court comes to the conclusion that she has some responsibility, but that her responsibility is also somehow restricted. She is sentenced to a light penalty, but is also obliged to seek medical consultation.
Once again, there is no strict border between sane and insane, therefor, someone can be only partly responsible, and therefor the term "partly guilty" makes sense.
By the way, most systems of law differentiate between crimes committed by adults and crimes commited by adolescent.
I'm a "Compatibilism-If-I-Can-Have-It-At-Discount-Price-Otherwise-Incompatible-Determinism-For-Me-Please"-ist.
Although I believe in QM, I don't think it's important for the problem of free will; therefor, for the discussion of free will, it might be possible to ignore QM (couldn't I have said this before we had to discuss for four pages about "randmoness"?).
jan said:
A compatibilist wouldn't necessarily believe that a thermostat has free will (although one compatibilist argument assumed that we treat it as though there was no distinction).
Most compatibilists would agree that a thermostat probably can't possibly make choices. Depending on the temperature (which is outside of it) it must either turn on or off. We can change the conditions at which a thermostat turns on or off, but those conditions are also being caused externally (by us). Therefore, a thermostat probably doesn't have free will even according to most compatibilists, and more importantly cannot be held responsible for its actions in any meaningful way (punishing thermostats seldom works anyway).
However, a compatibilist would attempt to prove that a human being (or perhaps a human hypothalamus) does have free will. Therefore, the trick is to find a distinction between the hypothalamus and a thermostat assuming determinism that allows one to make choices and be the ultimate source of those choices. That's no easy feat.
A deterministic incompatibilist would say that neither a thermostat or a hypothalamus have free will. According to the article, the burden of proof is on the compatibilists.
-Bri
jan said:
I had not seen or read the article before I posted the links. I was actually surprised at how many of these ideas we had already touched on.
I'd say that would make you an incompatibilist then.
I haven't read anything that would indicate that free will occurs in degrees (that some things are more free than others). In fact, I would argue that even if you could find only one single case where anything met the two models of free will within a deterministic environment, you will have proven compatibilism.
The type of computer wouldn't make any difference (all computers are controlled completely by their wiring and programming, all of which is an effect of causes that originate outside of the computer. If you cannot change a computer's programming, it doesn't matter because the programming was set when the computer was created. If determinism is true, then the person who built and programmed the computer originally is the cause of its behavior (but not the ultimate cause, because all of the builder's actions were the result of causes that were external to him or her).
There are computer programs that can alter their own programming by substituting functions for other functions, either randomely or based on some criteria. A guy at MIT named Karl Sims made some of the coolest a few years ago:
http://www.genarts.com/karl/
One that I particularly like is written in scheme, and produces pretty pictures. It was actually written to simulate natural selection by randomely changing "parent" code to produce several different variations. The user can then keep the variation s/he likes best, and the program will continue with that one, randomely modifying its code to produce more variations.
The end result can become very "unpredictable" very quickly, and after just a few generations some stunning images can be created. The programmer could look at the code and wouldn't recognize the program at all.
http://www.genarts.com/karl/genetic-images.html
However, the program isn't truly unpredictable according to either definition, because running it again with the same random seed would produce the same result as long as the user selected the same images each time. Therefore the results can be predicted with perfect accuracy by using an identical computer, both in theory and in practice.
Another variation of this program by the same programmer simulated a 3D environment where simple "creatures" made of blocks connected with "muscles" were created. It started out with two parent creatures. Offspring were selected by certain criteria, such as their ability to move or to follow a moving point (food) around. The best of the offspring were then "bred" to produce more and more complex offspring that were more and more capable of whatever the task was. It produced some really amazing creatures (people who don't believe in evolution would have a hard time denying the possibility after seeing these things move). You have to view the movies to really get a sense of how amazing this is (the creatures don't look that impressive, but the ways their muscles developed to allow them to move is nothing short of breathtaking), but I think they have been removed from the site. I have a copy of the movie if anyone has an FTP site I can drop it on. Stills can be seen here, but you won't be impressed until you see the creatures move:
http://www.biota.org/ksims/blockies/index.html
Yes, the programs still lack free will, for the reasons given above. If you run them again under the same conditions, they always produce the exact same result, amazing as that result is. There is no circumstance where a computer can actually decide anything on its own.
You give it the Voight-Kampff test, of course!
Until artificial intelligence becomes a reality, a computer is simply obeying commands, wiring, and programming. It's no different than a blender or a microwave oven. It can be as complex as you want it to be, and it's still not going to have free will, even if humans do have free will. However, with enough complexity, it might become very difficult to tell it from a real person simply from its actions. But free will, even from an ethics standpoint, is a lot more than just actions.
Can the robot form intent? Can the robot be responsible for its actions, or is the programmer responsible? Answer: that depends. If the robot is "defective" then it's the programmer's responsibility (just like if the head of a hammer flies off because it wasn't attached correctly and hits someone on the head). If the robot is "misused" it is the user's responsibility (like a hammer swung at another person's head on purpose). It is never the hammer's responsibility.
Without some sort of true artificial intelligence (which many doubt is even possible), punishing the robot wouldn't do any good (it would do the same thing again under the same circumstances). It also wouldn't prevent other identical robots from doing the exact same thing under the same circumstances.
The answer is that I don't know. Do we know where such concepts as "consciousness" kick in? Does a bee, a cimpanzee, or a dog possess consciousness? I just don't know.
Oh, you are way over-thinking this! When the lady behind the counter asks if you want to "super-size" your fries, do you feel as though you are free to answer either way?
Ahhh...but you are acting as though they have free will then. All of those factors (hypnosis, drugs, enslavement by aliens) are things that might take away a person's free will in a given instance. In other words, the person no longer has a choice between multiple actions. So you don't hold them accountable.
But with determinism, the person has no choice between multiple actions ever. There is only one possible action that they could take, regardless of the circumstances. So in "real life" you don't consider other people as though their actions are determined.
Let me ask you this. If you wrong someone else (and let's say it's not due to aliens or drugs or hypnosis) would they be justified in being mad at you? Let's say you stole your best friend's watch that her grandmother gave her on her deathbed, and your friend found out. From your previous answer I'm going to assume that if you would be mad at your friend for doing the same to you, so you might reasonably expect your friend to be mad at you for stealing the watch.
I think you may have inadvertently answered the previous question about whether you subjectively "feel" as though you have free will. If you don't feel that you have free will, then you wouldn't expect your friend to be mad at you when you stole her watch, because the choice wasn't yours -- it was made for you well before you were born.
I like that answer! But what exactly is your aim then, if it's not to punish the guilty and it's not to prevent crime?
I'm sorry, you're correct -- I misused my terms here. Our laws (which are part of our system of justice and ethics) assume that free will exists.
Now, wait! I never said anyone was in error. Just because there is no scientific evidence of it doesn't mean it's necessarily wrong either. If science assumed that it knows all there is to know, there would be no reason to discuss things that are currently unknown, and try to seek out answers to questions.
But it is possible that those people are in errorif they don't believe in free will. This is where problems of ethics might occur if someone doesn't believe in free will, at least subjectively (oddly, it probably doesn't really matter what the reality is, as long as people believe the illusion of free will, or at least act as though they do.
If the majority of people thought too hard about it and came to just the conclusion that there is no free will, our justice system might be in trouble. Or at least the idea that we can't punish people who aren't ultimately responsible for their crimes might have to be rethought. I personally hope that the compatibilists are right, or that determinism is wrong. Or that we never find out the truth.
Of course, my hopes don't affect reality.
I read somewhere an idea that determinism by its own definition cannot ever be logically proven (although that doesn't mean it isn't true). I can't remember the exact argument, but I'll try to find a reference. I think the argument went something like this: if everything is determined, then the truth of an argument has no bearing on a person's arguments. Nor does the truth of an argument have any bearing on whether or not a person believes an argument. The results of any discussions are themselves determined, so even if we came to the "correct" conclusion that determinism was true, that conclusion wouldn't actually be due to the fact that it really was true, but only that it was determined that we would come to that conclusion.
If you buy that argument (and I'm still pondering it), you're kind of stuck between a rock and a hard place philosophically as to what you believe.
Some people who believe in free will don't do those things because they believe they are going to hell. Others do it because they believe they have a choice between good and bad, and they would rather be good.
Some would argue that even people who claim to not believe in free will actually do believe in free will (which is also supported by the scientific evidence that we are "hardwired" to believe in free will).
Good question! I don't know! Like I said, I'm not a Bible scholar. I also don't understand why Eve was punished for original sin, and then rewarded with free will for it at the same time. Nonetheless, my understanding is that the Bible is pretty clear about us humans having free will.
The force might come from within us. Perhaps it is even a part of us. Maybe we're a part of it. Or perhaps the outside force provides us the ability to make the choices ourselves (but the choices themselves originate from us). Or maybe part of us exists in some other dimension where free will exists.
Generally, the court makes a determination about the nature of the crime after considering whether the person is guilty or not. The nature of crime, not whether the person is "partially guilty," determines the punishment. That's why criminal cases are broken into two parts: establishing guilt, and sentencing.
Yes, there can be extranious circumstances that would be the difference between, say, a homicide and manslaughter. Those arguments are nearly always based on intent, which requires a person to have control of his or her actions. If a person killed someone by "accident" then it is manslaughter. If the person could have prevented the accident by making the choice to do something they should have done, then it is "negligent manslaughter." Without choice, there is no distinction.
A person who is insane is unable to form intent may be deemed "innocent by reason of insanity," and isn't punished for the crime (but is often "helped" by putting them in a mental facility where they can be treated, and then generally released if and when they are cured). Strictly speaking, that person didn't have a choice as to whether or not to commit the crime in that circumstance (in effect, had no free will).
Yes, and that is often controversial. I'm not a criminal scientist, so I'm not sure what the thought process is behind that. I believe that not having the life experience to know right from wrong is considered a mitigating factor, but I don't think it makes the child any "less guilty" but rather just guilty of a different sort of crime.
Well, great. Now this discussion is officially off-topic. Thanks a lot!
Actually, I agree that QM really doesn't affect the discussion much since QM and determinism both have very similar problems as far as free will is concerned. We were just pretending so that Iacchus wouldn't complain that we were derailing his thread.
-Bri
Upchurch
Papa Funkosophy
Despite his other failings, the boy can at least add numbers.Iacchus said:And I bet your next post is 666!
For those interested, the Karl Sims "Evolving Creatures" video can be found here:
http://alife.ccp14.ac.uk/ftp-mirror/alife/zooland/pub/research/ci/Alife/karl-sims/creatures-demo.mpg
His paper describing how the amazing creatures "evolved" can be found here:
http://www.genarts.com/karl/papers/siggraph94.pdf
Note that these creatures, nor the computer that created them, have free will.
-Bri
http://alife.ccp14.ac.uk/ftp-mirror/alife/zooland/pub/research/ci/Alife/karl-sims/creatures-demo.mpg
His paper describing how the amazing creatures "evolved" can be found here:
http://www.genarts.com/karl/papers/siggraph94.pdf
Note that these creatures, nor the computer that created them, have free will.
-Bri
Who, Prak? Perhaps some other character in a book of fiction?Iacchus said:
For the benefit of those persons who have spent the past 20 years actively avoiding libraries, Prak is a character in Douglas Adams' "Hitchiker's Guide to the Galaxy", who is given an accidental overdose of truth serum and asked in a court of law to tell "the truth, the whole truth, and nothing but the truth". Which he proceeds to do.
Mojo
Mostly harmless
No. 667 is across the road. The Neighbours of the Beast are at 664 and 668.P.S.A. said:
See, goes to show there's no such thing as randomness after all ... Except perhaps on the James Rand-moness board!Upchurch said:
If it's impossible for something to come from nothing, via the route of randomness, then what does that tell us? ... Indeed, that everything has always existed, at least potentially ... i.e., in the way a tree exists potentially within a seed. And how else can this potential for all things to exist be maintained, except through omniscience.Mercutio said:
Didn't Reagan have his house number in California officially changed when it was supposed to have been 666? Or is that urban legend? And the way I heard it, it was switched to 667, which (I agree with you) should be on the other side of the road!Mojo said:
snopes makes no mention...
Iacchus, you really must stop all this "something coming from nothing" tripe. You are the only one making claims about the possibility or impossibility of your strawman.Iacchus said:
Secondly, you are once again employing circular reasoning. You really ought to do something about that, too. The only evidence you have for "potential" is obtained after the fact; it has been explained to you over and over again that this makes it a meaningless term (as you use it, anyway). Your arguments fall apart logically, and have never had any empirical evidence. Now you tell us (in the community thread) that you don't remember from one day to the next what it is you have said...Do yourself and us a favor--re-format your computer before you go to bed tonight. With any luck, by tomorrow you will have forgotten this forum ever existed. You'll be happier, we'll be happier...
Or was the claim about forgetting from day to day just a lie, a convenient excuse for your making the same claims and using the same logical fallacies and not demonstrating any learning from your interactions here?