Is it?

[uruk]

Hey bri I'm going to conceed to the point because we are starting to go in circles and I 'm getting tired.

You can craft any hypothetical situation into forcing a point. You will admit that the hypotheical scenario you gave me was not a realitic one because of the imposed restrictions. And I still could have chosen not to say anything at all and it still would have saved the girl. Although that would technicaly be a lie of omission.

Things like stealing, killing, raping, murdering, destroying all have an intrinsic moral value assigned to it by the text book definition of those terms.
And I still believe that that intrinsic moral value does not go away just because of the moral value of the outcome. Why? because the moral value of the outcome is also dependent on circumstance. There is always some point of view where the moral value of the outcome does not alter the moral value of the act dependent upon the circumstance.

For instance the victim of the theft and the importance of the item that was stolen from him. What if the item stolen was necessary for his survival?

As far as the Christian definition of an omni-benevolent god, is a redefinition it self. And from a brief look on the internet the christian version of omnibenevolence you gave me doesn't coincide with alot of other definitions of omnibenevolence.

But it was alot of fun and I learned alot.
Thanks

 

[jond]

But that is not to the point. My point was that you cannot know that you are right since you cannot disprove me, so you are not "more right" than I am. How can you know your position is the right one without disproving the positions of others?

As I posted before, and you seem to have missed: You have no reason to believe it, and no right to inflict those beliefs on others.

(I've bolded the key phrase for you.)

I don't need to disprove you, you need to prove your claim. You're making a claim that your n/c being exists. It's up to you to prove that claim, not me to disprove it. It's not a question of being more right, it's a question of simple reasoning. If you have no reason (and you earlier stated that you don't) to belive that it exists and wants you to do something, then you cannot expect anyone to believe you. If you don't grasp that concept, then you're going to have a really hard time here in the real world.

 

[Bri]

You can craft any hypothetical situation into forcing a point. You will admit that the hypotheical scenario you gave me was not a realitic one because of the imposed restrictions. And I still could have chosen not to say anything at all and it still would have saved the girl. Although that would technicaly be a lie of omission.

Like I said, I can continue to add more and more details until it becomes a more realistic scenario where you only have two choices. For example, if you don't lie to him, he will find her anyway and kill her. So the choices are "lie" or "don't lie" -- the result is still the same, the more moral choice is to lie. I was just trying to avoid added complexity and show a simple example where "the ends don't justify the means" isn't valid.

Things like stealing, killing, raping, murdering, destroying all have an intrinsic moral value assigned to it by the text book definition of those terms.

I've shown that you are wrong. Killing, for example does not have intrinsic moral value. If it did, then the punishment for killing someone would always be the same. Justified killing isn't morally wrong at all. Unjustified killing (which we call "murder") may have different moral values depending on extenuating circumstances. So, no, the act of killing doesn't have a set moral value, but rather its moral value depends on the circumstances.

And I still believe that that intrinsic moral value does not go away just because of the moral value of the outcome. Why? because the moral value of the outcome is also dependent on circumstance. There is always some point of view where the moral value of the outcome does not alter the moral value of the act dependent upon the circumstance.

I don't understand what you mean by this. My argument is that the moral value of an act is based on it's forseeable outcome, not necessary the actual outcome. In some cases, unforseeable results can occur (either better or worse than the predicted outcome) which you wouldn't be responsible for since you're not omniscient.

God, however, IS omniscient and therefore would be responsible for the actual outcome, not just the forseeable outcome. This is why his moral responsibility seems to differ slightly from ours.

For instance the victim of the theft and the importance of the item that was stolen from him. What if the item stolen was necessary for his survival?

Again, you make my point for me. If stealing always has the same moral value, it wouldn't matter what was stolen. In this case, if the thing you are stealing is necessary for his survival, you would have to take that into account as a consequence of the action. That might of course make all the difference as to which choice was more moral.

As far as the Christian definition of an omni-benevolent god, is a redefinition it self. And from a brief look on the internet the christian version of omnibenevolence you gave me doesn't coincide with alot of other definitions of omnibenevolence.

Perhaps you could post some references. I believe that the idea that what God does is for the greater good is a Christian idea. You must think Christian theologians particularly dense if they think their God never performs acts such as killing, given that God smites people fairly regularly in the Bible.

But it was alot of fun and I learned alot.

Me too! Thanks for the discussion!

-Bri

 

[JetLeg]

As I posted before, and you seem to have missed: You have no reason to believe it, and no right to inflict those beliefs on others.

(I've bolded the key phrase for you.)

I don't need to disprove you, you need to prove your claim. You're making a claim that your n/c being exists. It's up to you to prove that claim, not me to disprove it. It's not a question of being more right, it's a question of simple reasoning. If you have no reason (and you earlier stated that you don't) to belive that it exists and wants you to do something, then you cannot expect anyone to believe you. If you don't grasp that concept, then you're going to have a really hard time here in the real world.

How do you prove that you need reasons for something?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't understand what you mean by this. My argument is that the moral value of an act is based on it's forseeable outcome, not necessary the actual outcome. In some cases, unforseeable results can occur (either better or worse than the predicted outcome) which you wouldn't be responsible for since you're not omniscient.

-Bri

It's the same discussion we had earlier. Kant's ethics would not admit consequences into distinctions of right and wrong. An action was "moral" if (in his first formulation) you could will that act to be a universal action or (in his second formulation) if you treat all people as an end and not merely as a means to an end. The consequences, forseen or otherwise, do not enter into the discussion. It is the intention of the action that is important.

The problems we always end with in ethics discussions is that we do seem to use two different paradigms to discuss moral action -- utilitarianism and deontology. A complete "duty based" system creates significant problems. If it is always a sin to lie, then is it really a sin to lie to that Nazi thug at the door asking about Jews I have hidden in the basement?

But the same is true of consequentialism. We see problems with it as a pure model for deciding all moral action -- if I intended to do good but bad occurs, am I really a bad person, or did a bad thing just happen? If the greatest good is the desired outcome, then scapegoating is justifiable? It really is OK for one person to suffer for the greater good of society?

Most Christians do not view God as a consequentialist. They seem to think of God as good by definition and what they seem to mean by that is that God works from a deontological perspective. They do, however, seem to make God a consequentialist when it helps with certain arguments, as in this thread.

Or here's another one. Say I'm a trucker. I don't check my break fluid one day. In scenario one a kid jumps out in front of me and I run him over because I just can't break quickly enough, but I could have if I had checked the break fluid levels. So you call me negligent. It just seems wrong to call a trucker who doesn't check his brake fluid levels and nothing happens negligent.

Sometimes we look at consequences and sometimes we don't.

 

[jond]

How do you prove that you need reasons for something?

Do you really believe that, or are you just playing games?

 

[JetLeg]

The problems we always end with in ethics discussions is that we do seem to use two different paradigms to discuss moral action -- utilitarianism and deontology.

There is also virtue ethics, which deals with what type of person you should be, what qualities you should possess.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

There is also virtue ethics, which deals with what type of person you should be, what qualities you should possess.

Yes, quite right. But most people do not frame God's character in terms of virtue ethics because God is supposed to be an absolute and virtues are means, not absolutes.

 

[Bri]

Ichneumonwasp,

I understand your point, and I'm not exactly arguing for utilitarianism so much as pointing out that deontology presents severe ethical problems in some instances. So I'm not saying that the ends always justify the means, but rather that the ends have to be taken into account.

I don't know what classification it falls under, but what I suggested was certainly not pure utilitarianism (perhaps it's a subset of it) since I'm not considering the actual end results, but only the forseeable (perhaps "reasonably predictable" is a better term) results. You wouldn't be responsible for a result that couldn't be predicted. And it goes both ways -- if you do something that would predictably lead to disaster but happens to not in one case, then it might still be a problem (reckless endangerment).

Now it is possible that pure utilitarianism actually does work for God, given that he's omniscient and can accurately predict all of the results of his actions. Were the trucker in your example omniscient, he would definitely be negligent because he would know for certain the results of his actions.

At any rate, my point was that I think uruk is being a little impractical by suggesting that a Christian must always follow a strict deontology model, particularly in relation to their God. Obviously that model in its pure form will lead to absurd results.

It seems quite clear that Christians do not believe their God to utilize a pure deontology model of morality when they describe him as "omni-benevolent" (if indeed they use that term to describe their God).

BTW, thank you for your insight and for clarifying what was becoming a murky discussion!

-Bri

 

[JetLeg]

Do you really believe that, or are you just playing games?

I don't know if I really believe it, I am a bit confused.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I understand your point, and I'm not exactly arguing for utilitarianism so much as pointing out that deontology presents severe ethical problems in some instances. So I'm not saying that the ends always justify the means, but rather that the ends have to be taken into account.

Oh, yes, quite right.

Though, there is a way for deontology to solve those ethical problems quite nicely, at least for humans. For instance -- say I am walking down the street and I see a guy raping a woman down a dark alley. Now, if I am supposed to treat everyone as a end in and of themselves and not as a means to an end, I find myslef in a paradoxical situation. I cannot treat both the rapist and rapee (is that a word?) both as ends. If I treat the woman as an end I do what she wants and stop the rape. But if I treat the rapist as an end, I have to allow the rape to continue. So, how to solve such a dilemma? If we view the natural state of affairs as everyone treating everyone else as an end, then I can solve the problem. One of these two has broken the normal state of affairs, the normal moral sphere -- namely, the rapist. So, to return the situation back to the moral sphere, since he is not treating the woman as an end but as a means to an end, I stop the rapist from doing what he is doing.

Same with the Nazis and the Jews I am hiding. I blithely lie to the bastards because that is what they are.

Deontology seems to be able to solve its paradoxes very nicely. But here's the kicker from what I can see...........how does anything gain a moral value in the first place? It seems to me that we assign moral value to actions in the first place because of the consequences those actions generally entail. We're all consequentialists.

Personally, I don't think we can escape either one of these perspectives. I think this shows just how messy the whole ethics thing is to begin with and why we argue about it so much. I think it also shows that the whole thing is probably more rationalization than rational.

And when it comes to speaking of God in these terms, it just gives me a headache.

BTW, thank you for your insight and for clarifying what was becoming a murky discussion!

-Bri

And the same to you.

 

[uruk]

Deontology seems to be able to solve its paradoxes very nicely. But here's the kicker from what I can see...........how does anything gain a moral value in the first place? It seems to me that we assign moral value to actions in the first place because of the consequences those actions generally entail. We're all consequentialists.

Personally, I don't think we can escape either one of these perspectives. I think this shows just how messy the whole ethics thing is to begin with and why we argue about it so much. I think it also shows that the whole thing is probably more rationalization than rational.

And when it comes to speaking of God in these terms, it just gives me a headache.




And the same to you.

Thanks for puting succinctly what my damaged little brain could not articulate.

 

[Bri]

Oh, yes, quite right.

Though, there is a way for deontology to solve those ethical problems quite nicely, at least for humans.

How does deontology resolve the hypothetical of someone having to steal something (say, a defibrillator from a medical supply store) to save the life of another person? Neither the person who will die without help nor the store owner have violated the normal state of affairs.

I admit that I don't really understand deontology, but I'll read up on it and also re-read what you wrote. Meanwhile, Wikipedia gives an example that it says cannot be adequately explained using deontological ethics:

The most pressing difficulty for deontologist philosophers is justifying constraints. Robert Nozick famously points out what has become known as the paradox of deontology. If we are truly concerned about rights (such as the right not to be harmed in certain ways expressed by Kamm's Principle of Permissible Harm) then it seems logical we should seek to minimize violations of these rights. However, deontological constraints themselves prohibit such action. For example, consider a case where someone has maliciously sent a trolley hurtling towards five innocent and immobile people at the end of a track. The only way to stop the trolley and save the five is to throw one innocent bystander in front of the trolley. If the five are killed, this would constitute five violations of the PPH. If the one is thrown in the way, this constitutes one violation of the PPH. However, the Principle of Permissible Harm clearly rules out throwing one in front of the trolley. Hence the paradox. In order to respect the rights of the five, deontologists tell us we must respect the rights of the one.

I'm not sure that what I was suggesting really falls entirely under either category but seems to be more closely related to utilitarianism. Perhaps it's not really a complete ethical system but is instead just a handwave that concedes that both are useful. Perhaps there are cases where it will yield the wrong result also. The idea is that the ethical action is not always the one that resulted in the most good (i.e. the ends justify the means), but rather the one that could have been reasonable predicted to produce the most good before the action took place.

ETA: According to the Wikipedia article here, the Principle of Permissible Harm states:

The Principle states that one may harm in order to save more if and only if the harm is an effect or an aspect of the greater good itself.

That sounds an awful lot like the "greater good" argument used by Christians (that evil is indeed an aspect of the greater good of free will). Perhaps it resolves your question about Christians being concerned that their God is a utilitarianist.

-Bri

 

[jond]

I don't know if I really believe it, I am a bit confused.

OK, try to step back and maybe rethink where you're trying to take all this. Try to put a little bit of reality into your thinking, and understand that just because there's some chance greater than zero of your entitiy being real, doesn't mean that it's a 50/50 proposition. If there's no evidence of something, the null hypothesis is that it doesn't exist. Not that there's zero chance, just that the likelihood is really REALLLY small.

Many years ago, I had an intro psychology class and the professor had a cute phrase that went something like this: A neurotic builds a dream house in the sky. A psychotic moves in. Seriously, Jetleg: I hope you haven't moved in. You seem like a good person looking for some answers, and the folks here have lots of good ones that are worth listening (?) to.

 

[Bri]

OK, try to step back and maybe rethink where you're trying to take all this. Try to put a little bit of reality into your thinking, and understand that just because there's some chance greater than zero of your entitiy being real, doesn't mean that it's a 50/50 proposition. If there's no evidence of something, the null hypothesis is that it doesn't exist. Not that there's zero chance, just that the likelihood is really REALLLY small.

Even if we were to concede that an inconsequential being exists and is by coincidence exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being, including the fact that it wants JetLeg to interfere with the rights of others exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being does. How does that give JetLeg the right to interfere with the rights of others? What authority does JetLeg feel that either his imaginary being or the coincidentally identical actual being can possibly have given that neither can in any way affect our world?

-Bri

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

How does deontology resolve the hypothetical of someone having to steal something (say, a defibrillator from a medical supply store) to save the life of another person? Neither the person who will die without help nor the store owner have violated the normal state of affairs.

It doesn't exactly resolve it. If people die from natural causes then they die. You could create a hypothetical in which stealing would be necessary to stop a crime, but stealing would still be wrong in that situation. It might be that you are willing to accept the sin because of the greater good, but it is still a sin according to Kant.

I'm not sure that what I was suggesting really falls entirely under either category but seems to be more closely related to utilitarianism. Perhaps it's not really a complete ethical system but is instead just a handwave that concedes that both are useful. Perhaps there are cases where it will yield the wrong result also. The idea is that the ethical action is not always the one that resulted in the most good (i.e. the ends justify the means), but rather the one that could have been reasonable predicted to produce the most good before the action took place.

ETA: According to the Wikipedia article here, the Principle of Permissible Harm states:

That sounds an awful lot like the "greater good" argument used by Christians (that evil is indeed an aspect of the greater good of free will). Perhaps it resolves your question about Christians being concerned that their God is a utilitarianist.

-Bri

That sums it up pretty well. It may just be me, but what I seem to see is that Christians, like all people, use utilitarianism when it suits and deontology when it suits.

It just seems strange to me to speak of God in those terms. God is supposed to be an absolute. Absolutely good by definition, which seems to fit with deontology.

But it may just be my peculiar way of looking at it.

ETA

And, yes, the trolley example is one that is easily solved by utilitarianism and not easily dealt with by deontology. The counter is to have a trolley with five people on it hurtling toward sudden death and a guy standing next to you. You are, for some weird reason, constrained so that you cannot throw yourself on the track, but you can push the guy onto the track and this will save the life of the five other people. Do you kill the one to save the five? That seems easy from a utilitarian persepctive -- it's the same calculation in terms of lives. But it is much more difficult to throw an innocent to his death than to flip a switch and decide between one and five people dying.

 

[jond]

Even if we were to concede that an inconsequential being exists and is by coincidence exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being, including the fact that it wants JetLeg to interfere with the rights of others exactly like JetLeg's imaginary being does. How does that give JetLeg the right to interfere with the rights of others? What authority does JetLeg feel that either his imaginary being or the coincidentally identical actual being can possibly have given that neither can in any way affect our world?

-Bri

As I have pointed out several times, it doesn't give him any right to interfere with anyone's rights. But I hope Jetleg is starting to see this. His admission that he is confused indicates some hope. Maybe he will learn to use reason and rational thought.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Bri,

You know what, this really was a useful discussion for me. I was hoping that you might help me think through these issues, and I think you have helped immensely.

I think I understand now why I find the idea of God as a utilitarian so strange. It seems as though ethics really does deal with two spheres that often overlap -- justice and harm.

Utilitarianism is excellent for dealing with issues concerning harm but isn't so good at some weird justice issues. Deontology is excellent for dealing with justice but not so good with some weird harm issues.

We, or at least I, tend to think of God in terms of justice. His acts are supposed to be always just. So I tend to see him from a deontological perspective. The things that we see as merely harmful -- like a trolley heading toward certain doom -- in God's hands are supposed to also be just if he is all-just and the author of the universe. I guess that's why I have trouble with natural evil. I guess it's just one of those things we run into when trying to analyze too closely -- values simply conflict, like equality and freedom. We can want pure freedom, but that creates great inequality. We can want equality, but that limits freedom.

Maybe we are only creating new insoluble paradoxes, like the definition of omnipotence, that show our limitations when discussing God.

Any way, thanks for the excellent discussion.

 

[jimlintott]

So you say that if a person has no evidence, you do not need to disprove his position?

I'd be wondering how they came to their position without evidence.

How about you disprove the need for evidence?

That seems to be your logic.

You didn't read those FiLCHeRS articles I linked to did you?

 

[Bri]

Ichneumonwasp,

Thank you, actually. I wasn't even aware of the terms "utilitarianism" and "deontology" until you pointed them out, although I didn't assume in the least that what I was talking about was anything new. Like you said, both systems seem to have their shortcomings, and perhaps justice and harm are two somewhat opposing spheres of ethics.

I had thought that what I was talking about was closer to utilitarianism, but with the addition of the "Principle of Permissible Harm" it may have been just as close to deontology.

So can you think of an example where a system of copnsidering the "reasonably predictable" consequences of an action doesn't work?

Also, my apologies to JetLeg for possibly derailing his thread.

-Bri