Is it possible to perceive a world which is external to our perceptions?

[UndercoverElephant]

Sorry, Earthborn - the confusion was my fault. Let's start again. What do you think of the following statements?

1) We percieve objects (tables, chairs, etc....). We will call these "the objects of perception"

2) There is a world, external to humans (it existed before we evolved, it exists when we aren't looking), which is made of things like tables and chairs. Even with a materialistic definition of "mind", this would still be true, since there are no tables and chairs inside our skulls.

3) Presumably, the tables and chairs we perceive and the tables and chairs in the external world are the same tables and chairs.

At this point, no ontological assumption have been made by me.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Just in case some of you are new to this Geoffesque thread, it is the same as the other Geoffesque thread.

~~ Paul

Not yet it isn't.

Are you going to give me a reaction to my three statements? Nobody seems to want to answer, except Upchurch - who didn't have a problem with it and just agreed to the first two and rejected the third (with some degree of confidence I might add...). They look like simple enough statements to me.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

That's a little fuzzy.

Does "objects of perception" refer to the actual objects in the world, or to my perceptual image of them?

I wouldn't use the word "same" when contrasting our perceptual image of a table with the actual table.

And you certainly are making ontological assumptions, such as the idea that there is a world external to humans.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

That's a little fuzzy.

Does "objects of perception" refer to the actual objects in the world, or to my perceptual image of them?

Are these different things? If so, you are probably going to end up disagreeing with statement 3, like upchurch did.

I wouldn't use the word "same" when contrasting our perceptual image of a table with the actual table.

So you'd use "different"?

And you certainly are making ontological assumptions, such as the idea that there is a world external to humans.

There must be a world external to humans. Once upon a time there weren't any humans. Presumably there was a world.

Geoff

 

[chriswl]

What extra thing?

Your scheme:
1) real objects in the world
2) perceptions of the real objects
3) someone who perceives 2)

My scheme:
1) real objects in the world
2) someone who perceives 1)

Subject-object, not subject-intermediary-object.

What's this got to do with my three statements?

I'm taking issue with statement number 3.

Fine, but I am talking about the objects of perception and the objects in the world external to humans. Those are another of things, right?

Absolutely not. The world I experience does not exist inside my head.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Your scheme:
1) real objects in the world
2) perceptions of the real objects
3) someone who perceives 2)

My scheme:
1) real objects in the world
2) someone who perceives 1)

Subject-object, not subject-intermediary-object.

OK, that means you want to end up defending direct realism. But you cannot just define direct realism to be true, because that is one of the most difficult philosophical positions I can think of to defend. Many have tried.

I need you to tell me exactly what is wrong with the questions, though.

I'm taking issue with statement number 3.

So you disagree with statement 3? Or do you somehow think it is an invalid question?

Absolutely not. The world I experience does not exist inside my head.

So that is a clear decision that statement 3 is wrong? The objects of perception and the objects of the external world are not the same objects?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

So you'd use "different"?

I'm not sure what word I would use, but I would not use same.

There must be a world external to humans. Once upon a time there weren't any humans. Presumably there was a world.

If we're talking metaphysics, that sounds like an ontological presumption to me.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'm not sure what word I would use, but I would not use same.

That sounds like you want them to be different and the same simultaneously?

As an aside, does that remind you of my Zero?

If we're talking metaphysics, that sounds like an ontological presumption to me.

Even if we are talking metaphysics, it's a safe assumption. Even a berkeleyan biblical literalist believes there was once a world with no humans in it. Even if it was only for 4 days.

 

[chriswl]

So that is a clear decision that statement 3 is wrong? The objects of perception and the objects of the external world are not the same objects?

There are no "objects of perception", just the real objects out there that we perceive and our perceptions (which are not objects). At best you could talk of the implied objects of perception, but they are not in any sense real objects.

The problem with your scheme is that perception happens twice. We have to perceive the real world to create the objects of perception and then we perceive these objects.

 

[sir drinks-a-lot]

That's a little fuzzy.

Does "objects of perception" refer to the actual objects in the world, or to my perceptual image of them?

I wouldn't use the word "same" when contrasting our perceptual image of a table with the actual table.

Are these different things?

I keep thinking of St. Augustine's example of a chilliagon, or an 'octagon' with 1000 sides. he said we could concieve of one, but we could not percieve of one, or have a percept of one.

But, in either case, I think your three statements are reasonable enough to tentatively proceed.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I keep thinking of St. Augustine's example of a chilliagon, or an 'octagon' with 1000 sides. he said we could concieve of
one, but we could not percieve of one, or have a percept of one.

I can't even concieve of one.

But, in either case, I think your three statements are reasonable enough to tentatively proceed.

Super. You're agreeing with all three, yes? That means I've got Upchurch signed up for Yes,Yes,No and you signed up for Yes,Yes,Yes.

I'll proceed with the argument tomorrow - I want to see how other people react to the statements first.

Geoff

 

[Mercutio]

Sorry, Earthborn - the confusion was my fault. Let's start again. What do you think of the following statements?

1) We percieve objects (tables, chairs, etc....). We will call these "the objects of perception"

2) There is a world, external to humans (it existed before we evolved, it exists when we aren't looking), which is made of things like tables and chairs. Even with a materialistic definition of "mind", this would still be true, since there are no tables and chairs inside our skulls.

3) Presumably, the tables and chairs we perceive and the tables and chairs in the external world are the same tables and chairs.

At this point, no ontological assumption have been made by me.

Thus far, I have agreed with everything Earthborn has said, so I won't repeat it all. But for this set of three questions (Earthborn was only replying to the original set of 2) I would say that 1 appears to be true, although it is not precise. One could argue at least 2 different meanings for it, from my brief perusal. So I give a tentative "agreed" to that one, with the proviso that if there are hidden definitions I can challenge them later. 2, on the other hand, I cannot agree to. I can assume it to be true, but I cannot know it. That makes 3 irrelevant.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

There are no "objects of perception"....

So you are disagreeing with statement 1?


Currently declared:

Upchurch: Yes, Yes, No
Sir-Drinks-alot: Yes, Yes, Yes
chriswl: No, ?, ?
Paul: Yes, Yes, ?
Mercutio: ?, No, -

 

[UndercoverElephant]

I'd say close enough for starters. It depends on where you are going with this.

The only on that seems kinda fishy is the first one about us perceiving a table or a chair. I'd say we perceive "percepts" just as we concieve of concepts. We can concieve of things we cannot percieve.

Also, the Kantian terminology of noumena and phenomena might help clarify here. (Or not)

I'd agree it would help, but nobody would agree to use it. I'm kind of trying to bypass it. We'll get nowhere if I start talking about noumena.

 

[UndercoverElephant]

This is why this is going to get out of hand. We are going to be asked to describe exactly how the brain works down to every detail, how that engenders consciousness, qualia, etc. It's a profoundly complicated system, and we admitadly dont' know a lot about it yet.

The assumption is that the brain works in the same way a thermometer senses the room temp, only in a much more complicated and sophisticated manner.

So what are your answers if you make this assumptions?

That's why I want to know if Geoff and us agree about how a thermometer works.

I know how a thermometer works. I'm not going to agree that minds are like thermometers, though.

Because if we can't agree with that, we surely can't agree about how humans perceive stuff when using all of this loosey goosey dualistic language.

Which dualistic language? "Perception" is dualistic?

 

[UndercoverElephant]

So there is no contradiction if one affects the other. Is this right?

Didn;t understand the question. What affects what?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Paul: Yes, Yes, ?

Hold on. I still don't know what "objects of perception" are.

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

Hold on. I still don't know what "object of perception" are.

~~ Paul

See that keyboard in front of you?

That's an object of perception. The keyboard you are perceiving. THAT keyboard. Or are there two of them?

[size=-2]
1) We percieve objects (tables, chairs, etc....). We will call these "the objects of perception"

2) There is a world, external to humans (it existed before we evolved, it exists when we aren't looking), which is made of things like tables and chairs.

3) Presumably, the tables and chairs we perceive and the tables and chairs in the external world are the same tables and chairs.

Currently declared:

Upchurch: Yes, Yes, No
Sir-Drinks-alot: Yes, Yes, Yes
chriswl: No, ?, ?
Paul: ?, Yes, ?
Mercutio: ?, No, -
[/size]

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

The actual keyboard, or the image in my mind?

Does the BIV have objects of perception?

~~ Paul

 

[UndercoverElephant]

The actual keyboard, or the image in my mind?

Your question clearly implies indirect realism. Indirect realists say that the objects of perception are "sense data" or "representations in their minds" of real objects.

Indirect realists are people who answer (Yes, Yes, No)

Does the BIV have objects of perception?

~~ Paul

That is the best question anybody has asked me in the last two weeks. It is the question A.D.Smith's book claims to answer. He wishes to avoid the conclusion that the objects of perception during hallucination are "non-normal objects".

You might like this:

http://claytonlittlejohn.blogspot.com/2003/12/smith-on-hallucination-ive-been.html