Is human life much more valuable than other animals` life?

[Skeptical Greg]

Except that social contracts exclude the entire class of non-rational humans (infants, children, mentally handicapped, etc) who can neither tacitly consent nor understand what it is. Non-rational humans have no greater or lesser advantage over animals in any social contract.

They don't?

What planet are you living on?

 

[Dessi]

Except that social contracts exclude the entire class of non-rational humans (infants, children, mentally handicapped, etc) who can neither tacitly consent nor understand what it is. Non-rational humans have no greater or lesser advantage over animals in any social contract.

They don't?

What planet are you living on?

The one occupied by Hobbes, Locke, Rousseau, and Rawls whose social contract theories depend crucially on rationally informed consent (tacit or otherwise) to make contractual agreements binding and meaningful at all, I guess.

 

[Jekyll's Guest]

They don't?

What planet are you living on?

Planet Zoomania.

 

[Emily's Cat]

Wow. Seriously disturbing.

Not particularly. For most people, pets are part of our family, they are surrogate children of a sort, and we value them highly. Just as we value our own children more highly than the children of a stranger, we might also value our own pets much more highly than the pets of a stranger. It's also completely possible to value one's own pets more highly than one values the life of a human stranger.

You can get down off your high horse now. It's neither immoral nor irrational to form such attachments to one's family. Regardless of how you personally view it, the fact remains that many people do view their pets as family. It is both arrogant and insulting for you to assume the right to pass moral judgment on others in such a fashion.

 

[Jekyll's Guest]

Not particularly. For most people, pets are part of our family, they are surrogate children of a sort, and we value them highly. Just as we value our own children more highly than the children of a stranger, we might also value our own pets much more highly than the pets of a stranger. It's also completely possible to value one's own pets more highly than one values the life of a human stranger.

You can get down off your high horse now. It's neither immoral nor irrational to form such attachments to one's family. Regardless of how you personally view it, the fact remains that many people do view their pets as family. It is both arrogant and insulting for you to assume the right to pass moral judgment on others in such a fashion.

You just said you see nothing wrong with valuing the life of your cat over a human being who is not related to you, then finished up by tutting someone else for their morality?

If karma was a real thing, you'd be stuck in a burning building while firemen shrugged and walked past, and your cat jumped over you to save itself.

 

[Jekyll's Guest]

For most people, pets are part of our family, they are surrogate children of a sort, and we value them highly.

I'd also dispute the bolded contention.

 

[Kahalachan]

Kinship and social contract are two very different rules. In fact, it is quite trivial to introduce animals as moral patients through kinship, as many philosophers have done. Wait, no, it looks like you are using the term in the specific blood relation sense... Which again is different from the social contract, but is also very bad and I really don't see how you are using it to extend, rather than retract, the moral circle. I have no Latino kin and will not have Latino progeny (or any), therefore, I owe Latino children no moral obligations.

Here's what I mean.

I don't have Latino kids. I have, whatever mixed race my kids are. But I won't harm this person's mentally disabled Latino child because I don't want them to harm my child.

There's the social contract we have with the kin of non-rational humans.

What about orphans?

We set the social standard of "If I ever die I would want my kids to be taken care of" so we ideally do not treat orphans like animals to extend a direct social contract into a social standard.


I can do no such thing with a lion. A lion will eat our kids no matter how much we may try to bargain with it that we won't eat its cubs. An herbivore will gore our kids with its horns for the simple crime of a child unknowingly standing too close to it.

Animals and humans who behave like animals are exempt from a social contract. We lock our criminals up in cages and contain tigers in zoos or let them be in their habitat.

 

[Cainkane1]

You bring up an interesting point.

There are people here arguing that there is no moral imperative to protect fellow humans.

What moral imperative do we have to protect any other species? Why should we care if all that's left on the planet are humans, and enough breeding stock of delicious animals to keep us fed?

I'd really liek to see the reasoning behind any answer to this.

Preserving the lives of other animals makes the world a kinder gentler place not to mention more interesting.. You should have seen me loving my puppy when he was alive.

 

[Tsukasa Buddha]

Here's what I mean.

I don't have Latino kids. I have, whatever mixed race my kids are. But I won't harm this person's mentally disabled Latino child because I don't want them to harm my child.

There's the social contract we have with the kin of non-rational humans.

What about orphans?

We set the social standard of "If I ever die I would want my kids to be taken care of" so we ideally do not treat orphans like animals to extend a direct social contract into a social standard.

I see. This is problematic because you have made them merely instrumental to your moral patiency, not moral patients in and of themselves. Take an orphan when you yourself are childless (and will remain so in the future). Now that there is no instrumental good, what do you do?

I can do no such thing with a lion. A lion will eat our kids no matter how much we may try to bargain with it that we won't eat its cubs. An herbivore will gore our kids with its horns for the simple crime of a child unknowingly standing too close to it.

Animals and humans who behave like animals are exempt from a social contract. We lock our criminals up in cages and contain tigers in zoos or let them be in their habitat.

Okay, this reflects a horrible view of criminals, but I will try to stay focused .

 

[Dessi]

There's the social contract we have with the kin of non-rational humans.
I can do no such thing with a lion. A lion will eat our kids no matter how much we may try to bargain with it that we won't eat its cubs.

You can do no such thing with infant humans. They don't form contracts or agreements with anyone, they don't know what they are, don't know they are part of an agreement ir what that even means in principle. Mutual agreements are *mutual*, involving everyones informed consent effected by your agreement --- the type of consent infants cannot grant, no how much you try to bargain with them.

Your argument suggests that animals cannot "consent" by virtue of lacking the rationality to understand a contract, while simultaneously that non-rational humans claim membership in a social contract in spite of having the exact same rationality handicap as animals. These one-sided contracts have a name: special pleading.

I believe you are aware of this fact, which is why you suggest that you protect infants based on "kinship" (I don't know what you mean by this term, but I presume it has something to do with blood relation). Blood relation neither increases nor decreases an infants non-existent concept of a social contract, so the "contract" is one-sided and not based on mutual agreement in any manner. "Social contract" is the wrong word for what you're describing. Your view regarding kinship might be better framed as "rights" or "duty" based, in that your obligation to protect your kin is based on one's duty toward moral patient rather than some "contract" between them. That view is fine, but it opens up questions such as why blood relation to another person has anything to do with whether that person should be fed or allowed to suffer; if my action causes another to suffer, what difference would it make whether we share a blood relation or otherwise? If we have duties toward infants who we share no kinship with whatsoever, this duty would carry over to non-kin animals, how could this view avoid raising the status of animals to non-kin infants or lowering the status of non-kin infants to animals?

I don't have Latino kids. I have, whatever mixed race my kids are. But I won't harm this person's mentally disabled Latino child because I don't want them to harm my child.

But if you could hurt a child without consequence, or without caring about the consequence, then...

 

[Skeptical Greg]

You apparently think a contract, social or otherwise has to be agreed to by all parties to be valid..

Do you not realize there are contracts where two ( or more ) parties agree to take care of a third party who isn't aware ( in any rational way ) that the other parties even exist ?

 

[Charlie Wilkes]

You can do no such thing with infant humans. They don't form contracts or agreements with anyone, they don't know what they are, don't know they are part of an agreement ir what that even means in principle. Mutual agreements are *mutual*, involving everyones informed consent effected by your agreement --- the type of consent infants cannot grant, no how much you try to bargain with them.

On the one hand, you say animals cannot "consent" by virtue of lacking the rationality to understand a contract. On the other hand, non-rational humans claim memvership in social contract in spite of having the exact same rationality handicap as animals. These one-sided contracts have a name: special pleading.

It's easy to see how you could construct what seems to be an impregnable fortress of reason.

It's less easy to see what kind of practical policy could come of it. Incompetents don't claim membership in a social contract. Their guardians do that on their behalf, and the reason it works is because there aren't that many of them, or at least fewer than there are animals.

 

[Dessi]

It's easy to see how you could construct what seems to be an impregnable fortress of reason.

It's less easy to see what kind of practical policy could come of it.

Its a response to Kahalachan. He suggests our obligation to protect infants from harm does not carry over to animals because infants are members of a social contract -- which they are not. Infants have no advantage over animals in social contracts. I'm not drawing any policy from it, only showing that Kahalachan's argument doesn't support the view he claims it does.

Incompetents don't claim membership in a social contract. Their guardians do that on their behalf

No they don't. Infants have not made an agreement to allow another to act as their "guardian". They don't even tacitly consent to guardianship because, again, they have no greater or lesser understanding of this concept than animals.

If you feel that members of the social contract can simply declare their guardianship over others and make agreements for them, then I declare myself guardian of non-rational animals and choose to grant animals membership in the social contract on their behalf. Done. Animals are equal to humans.

Errrrm, maybe not. Neither I nor guardians can manifest someone's consent to the social contract by will alone. (Seriously, imagine the implications that would have. "Yes, judge, I admit to touching her there. And I also admit she was a child. But as a guardian, I 'consented' on her behalf." I don't think it would get very far.) Infants don't fit in social contract theories because they fail to meet the rationality prerequisite; no agreements exist between them and their guardians, much less the rest of society. But we still treat them humanely, why? Because they suffer.

 

[Cain]

It's easy to see how you could construct what seems to be an impregnable fortress of reason.

It's less easy to see what kind of practical policy could come of it. Incompetents don't claim membership in a social contract. Their guardians do that on their behalf, and the reason it works is because there aren't that many of them, or at least fewer than there are animals.

So on what grounds, if any, can the state legislate against animal cruelty (or, if you prefer, animal "cruelty")?

Contractarianism is undoubtedly a useful fiction. It's useful when it comes to creating any kind of fiction one wants.

 

[Jekyll's Guest]

So on what grounds, if any, can the state legislate against animal cruelty (or, if you prefer, animal "cruelty")?

It upsets people.

There's really no other rational reason.

Thankfully we have plenty of laws against things because they make people upset.

 

[Tsukasa Buddha]

I see. This is problematic because you have made them merely instrumental to your moral patiency, not moral patients in and of themselves. Take an orphan when you yourself are childless (and will remain so in the future). Now that there is no instrumental good, what do you do?



Okay, this reflects a horrible view of criminals, but I will try to stay focused .

To clarify what I mean by instrumental, you have given treating nonrational humans the same moral weight as another person's property.

Another problem with this is that it doesn't cover abusing "your own" property.

 

[Cain]

It upsets people.

There's really no other rational reason.

Thankfully we have plenty of laws against things because they make people upset.

I hope you're not implying that upsetting people is a rational reason. Flag burning upsets people, but I don't think even our Supreme Court would overturn laws against snuff films on first amendment grounds.

I can think of one reason to oppose cruelty: such abuse pointlessly inflicts pain upon a living, feeling being. There is a catastrophic problem with accepting this straight-forward reasoning: its consistent application will inconvenience a lot of people.

 

[Meed]

That's something we'll never agree on. In fact, if a few million people need to get bumped off to prevent a species from going extinct, them's the breaks.

Are you aware that thousands of species go extinct per year?

 

[Kahalachan]

Its a response to Kahalachan. He suggests our obligation to protect infants from harm does not carry over to animals because infants are members of a social contract -- which they are not. Infants have no advantage over animals in social contracts. I'm not drawing any policy from it, only showing that Kahalachan's argument doesn't support the view he claims it does.

In establishing that kids are off limits, we protect future rational adults that would be members of our social contract. So which dog is going to grow up to be a thinking human?

If such was never established to protect kids, the social contract would be absolutely pointless as it would be perfectly fine to cause our own extinction by killing each other's offspring.

There is a reason we include kin in our social contract as an extension of our being.

We protect the mentally disabled because it could've been us. It could've been someone we love. I couldn't have been a bear.

If we meet intelligent life, our social contract extends to them and we aren't entirely specist. We don't kill their infant bugs and they don't kill our babies. Or artificial intelligence. We don't unplug them and it doesn't create terminators.

Go on and find some bear that you can make this arrangement with.

We humans ought to be stewards to animals, but they are not our equals.

So on what grounds, if any, can the state legislate against animal cruelty (or, if you prefer, animal "cruelty")?

On the same basis a soldier can be shot but not tortured in a POW camp. Torture is purely malicious and yields no positive effects. And while wars do really suck, killing people is sometimes going to win wars.

I have no problem killing a rabid dog. I would never set one on fire for fun.

 

[Cain]

On the same basis a soldier can be shot but not tortured in a POW camp.

One of the first arguments marshaled out for respecting POW is reciprocity: we don't want our soldiers to suffer torture.

Torture is purely malicious and yields no positive effects.

Well, that's debatable, but I think it's interesting how you make no distinction between humans and animals in this case. It's not as though there's an underground network of dogs who will get back at us for torturing.

I have no problem killing a rabid dog. I would never set one on fire for fun.

Well, some people see no reason to buy an American flag, and then set it ablaze, but apart from free speech, there's the argument of "my property, my right." If I own the dog, then I should be able to dispose of it as I please.

One counter-argument, mentioned previously, is that it's wrong to force a being to suffer for no good reason (regardless of their gender, race or species), but weirdly people who see the end game will stubbornly refuse to accept that line. Instead they're reduced to the argument that animal torture is upsetting to humans, which sort of likens abuse to obscenity; it violates the good taste of community standards (or whatever). I think any fair-minded person will agree the first argument is much stronger, but again, it leads to unsavory conclusions.