I did one for advanced alien life. The hypothesis (H) is that "alien life exists". E is our evidence that there's life on Earth. Pr(E/H) is either through the roof (i.e., not surprising at all, and therefore not confirming) or, if looked at counterfactually, a number can't be assigned because we don't know the necessary conditions for which life is possible, and therefore don't know how surprising it would be for life to occur on Earth if we were looking at Earth 4 billion years ago, without the knowledge that life would eventually occur, and wondering how surprising it would be for life to occur. (counterfactuals get a little tricky, but you have to do something like that if the evidence is already known to exist (problem of old evidence*)).
More devastating to the calculus is that Pr(E) is either so high that no confirmation occurs, or, again, counterfactually impossible to assign.
So you have a case where there's either no confirmation, because the evidence is already known to exist, or unknown confirmation, because the surprisingness of the evidence can't be determined.
I didn't get a chance to do a Bayesian ESP calc. No one would agree my Bayesian one on alien life was correct (although it is).
*
http://fitelson.org/probability/eells_bpooe.pdf
*"
The problem first emerges when considering cases in which pr(E) is taken to have the extreme value of 1. In those circumstances, E is treated probabilistically just as if it were a tautology. It cannot confirm anything, since pr(H/E) will be equal to pr(H). Once one is absolutely certain about one’s evidence, it no longer is evidence
...
The most immediately appealing, and most widely criticized, direct approach to the synchronic problem relies on counterfactual degrees of belief. For an agent who knows E, this approach would analyze confirmation with the standard positive relevance definition; however, it would be applied not to the agent’s actual probabilities, but to what those probabilities would have
been in circumstances where the agent did not know E.
http://www.brown.edu/Departments/Philosophy/onlinepapers/christensen/MeasuringConfirmation.pdf