On the Iraq war however, I have been convinced for a long time that it has not been worth the price.
Any discussion of the Iraq war costs should mention potential benefits (which include avoided costs) because without weighing the costs against the benefits, choosing the right course of action is impossible. One problem with Bilmes and Stiglitz's analysis is that they have overlooked many benefits and avoided costs. I believe a good case can be made that the few trillion dollars we end up spending in Iraq now and over the lifetime of injured soldiers may well save us from paying costs far in excess of that amount during that same time period.
First, let's consider the ordinary costs of the no-invasion option.
The supplementals for operations in Iraq, Afghanistan and the global war on terror as of March 27 2003 totaled $75 Billion dollars of which 30 billion had already been spent or committed. As Rumsfeld noted at the time, "If the Iraqi regime had agreed to voluntarily disarm and prevent a war, the costs of sustaining that military pressure through the rest of the fiscal year would have been in excess of $40 billion. So even without a war, the costs of disarming Iraq would have been significant." Call it $50 billion that we will have to add on to the figures that follow.
Without an invasion, it would have been necessary to continue containment of Saddam ... even beef up that effort hoping to preclude the possibility of terrorists acquiring WMD from him or someone in his regime. Three economics professors from Chicago looked at this and concluded an annual containment cost of $19 billion might have been expected after the decision not to invade. Converting that to expected present value by discounting future expenditures at 2 percent per year, and by a 3 percent annual probability that the Iraqi regime would change character and no longer require containment, they estimated a 20 year cost of containment of $380 billion.
Furthermore, they estimated that if just one large terrorist attack (a non-WMD one) occurred over a 20 year time frame as a result of letting Saddam and his sons stay in power, those costs would rise to $430 billion in today's dollars. If leaving Saddam in place increased homeland security costs by only $10 billion a year (about 10% of current expenditures) in an effort to prevent such attacks, they calculated that the cost of the no invasion option would increase another $200 billion ... to $630 billion. And of course, assuming only one large terrorist attack would result from leaving Saddam in place may be looking at the world through rose colored glasses.
You can see where this is going.
Next, consider the fact that economists have calculated that 9/11 (a WMD-like attack) did nearly a trillion dollars in direct and indirect damages (not to mention killing 3000+ people) to the United States. Consider that we know Saddam was working on weapons of mass destruction, intent on rebuilding those arsenals, still considered himself at war with the US since 1991, was already training and funding terrorists before the invasion, was on speaking terms with the very terrorist group that attacked us on 9/11 and was discussing the possibility of 3rd party terrorist attacks on the US using WMD with his advisors. The probability of such an attack occurring if we left Saddam in power for much longer is far from negligible.
Even in the state that Iraq's weapons programs were in after the invasion, the inspector who led the ISG effort, David Kay, said that Iraq was more dangerous than anyone had thought prior to the invasion with regard to terrorists acquiring WMD materials and knowledge from it. And if we hadn't invaded, it was a virtual certainty that the sanctions that the ISG found had stymied Iraq's efforts to rebuild its WMD arsenal up to that point in time would soon be gone, although our containment costs probably wouldn't. And, ironically, many on the anti-war side were the people calling for eliminating the sanctions before the war.
With sanctions removed and limits on oil sales gone, Saddam would have begun rebuilding his WMD arsenal. The ISG concluded that was his intention. And Iraq wouldn't have taken long to do it. Countries like France, Germany and Russia were eager to sell Iraq arms and new equipment for making arms. The ISG said that at the time of the invasion, Iraq still had the means to reconstitute mustard gas munitions within 6 months and build nerve gas munitions within about a year ... if the sanctions were removed. So by now it's likely Iraq would have rearmed.
I submit that it wouldn't have been long before terrorists acquired Iraqi WMD or the knowledge to make them from Iraqis. Either Saddam would have sold or given them to terrorists (a possibility that based on recovered tapes was probably discussed internally), or some loose cannon in Iraq's munitions industry (that's what David Kay feared) would have done so ... for cash or ideology or because of threats to himself or loved ones. And if al-Qaeda had acquired WMD via this route, does anyone doubt they would eventually be used against the US or US interests?
So what would have been the cost of a WMD terrorist attack, if leaving Saddam in power resulted in even one? Another trillion dollars? Two trillion? And how many dead? Ten thousand? A hundred thousand? On this basis alone, I think it's fair to suggest the cost of invading Iraq might pale in comparison to cost of having left Saddam in power.
And after such an attack, assuming we learned of Iraq's involvement, there would be consequences. Costly ones. We might bomb Iraq. We might invade it. Either way, it would be much more costly to do that once Saddam rearmed. It's not inconceivable we might actually then face a WMD armed opponent who has already demonstrated a willingness to cross the WMD threshold in its wars. And the cost of such a war? Another trillion or two?
But there are still other avoided costs (i.e., benefits).
The professors mentioned above noted that "Since Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979, Iraqi income per person has fallen by at least 75 percent." They concluded that war and forcible regime change might raise Iraqi welfare by 50 percent compared to containment – "an enormous gain." In areas mostly free of al-Qaeda terrorism, like Kurdistan, Iraq's economy has indeed blossomed. I think the professors underestimated what Iraq will look like in 20 years if we just stay the course.
And then add in the cost in human lives of leaving Saddam in place. The professors stated that "all told, the current regime has killed or caused the deaths of well over half a million Iraqis since Saddam Hussein came to power in 1979. Under the policy of containment after the Gulf War, a reasonable estimate is that 200,000 or more Iraqis have died prematurely at the hands of the regime or as a direct consequence of its policies." They concluded that "if we discount future lost lives in the same way as future economic costs, and allowing for the same probability of peaceful regime change, then a policy of containment means another 200,000 to 600,000 dead Iraqis." And that's assuming that Saddam wouldn't get involved in yet another war of aggression where many hundred thousands of his people were killed along with considerable numbers of his adversary's people.
And here's some additional factors to consider.
Even without acquiring WMD from Iraq, allowing al-Qaeda to continue to use Iraq as a safe haven as they were before the invasion could have had very significant and bad consequences for us in the WOT. We invaded Afghanistan because al-Qaeda ran camps there where tens of thousands of would be terrorists learned and honed their murderous skills. Because 9/11 was planned and launched from it. Well, even before we invaded Iraq, al-Qaeda was already moving into Iraq and setting up the same sorts of camps. There are also some indications that al-Qaeda were being trained at Iraqi facilities. Helped by Iraqis. And that cooperation would likely have increased had not invaded when we did. Showing weakness would have embolded both Saddam and al-Qaeda.
Like it or not, Iraq was a safe haven for terrorists and al-Qaeda took advantage of that. In fact, before we ever invaded, al-Zarqawi met with al-Qaeda terrorists in Baghdad who he funded to carry out a chemical bomb mass casualty attack (that didn't apparently involve WMD of the sort used in munitions but would still have killed tens of thousands if successful). Had we not invaded, perhaps that plot would have been successful because then al-Zarqawi would have been able to continue oversight of the operation rather than spend his time running and hiding from Coalition forces. Perhaps one reason that plot failed is intelligence we gained during the hunt for al-Zarqawi (remember the captured notebook computer?). Had we not invaded, what makes anyone think that one plot would have been the only plot instigated by al-Qaeda operating out of Iraq against US interests or US citizens? And what would of been the cost in lives and dollars of that? Another trillion?
Then there is the fact that even if we hadn't invaded there would still have been the costs associated with fighting the WOT ... but now with some other locale as the battlefield. And perhaps that locale wouldn't be quite as advantageous as Iraq? Our invasion of Iraq made Iraq a focus for al-Qaeda, drawing their "soldiers" and using up their resources. What would have been the cost had those soldiers fought us elsewhere with those same resources?
And what about the benefits of establishing a western friendly, terrorists unfriendly, economic powerhouse in the region ... one with control of a sizable fraction of the world's oil. The problem with the anti-war movement and, indeed, the media is they never want to honestly examine the potential benefits of winning in Iraq and the costs of having done nothing about Saddam. Nor do they want to look at the costs of losing now that we are in Iraq. And those costs could also be substantially more than the cost of remaining. If we lose, al-Qaeda WILL gain strength and respect, and decide to use the same tactic in other locales. We may end up fighting suicide bomb fanatics in dozens of countries. And there would surely be costs ... substantial costs ... in fighting that sort of war.
So you can see it's not at all unreasonable that we might have spent many, many times the amount Stiglitz and Bilmes claim the invasion will cost over the next 20 to 30 years had we not invaded and left Saddam in power.
By the way, how does the cost of the war compare to other things we spend money on anyway? Let's consider pets. According to the ASPCA, sixty percent of all households in the US have a pet. There are about 60 million dogs and 75 million cats. The average cost of basic food, supplies, medical care and training for a dog or cat is $400 to $700 annually. Let's call it $500. So just dogs and cats cost Americans 135,000,000 * $500 = $67.5 BILLION a year. Assuming the same number of cats and dogs, and the same costs over the 20 or 30 years that Stiglitz presumably added in Iraq costs, the US will spend nearly 1.5 TRILLION dollars. Just on cats and dogs. Never mind fish, ferrets, horses, rabbits, and gerbils.
Now let's consider how many people will die due to Americans possessing those pets over the 20 year period. Pets do sometimes kill their owners. According to this site,
http://www.dogbitelaw.com/PAGES/statistics.html, almost 5 MILLION people get bitten by dogs EACH YEAR. 800,000 of them need medical treatment. 1000 need hospitalization, EVERY DAY. And between 15 and 20 DIE from those bites EACH year. Dog bite losses exceed $1 BILLION dollars a year. And turns out that 80% of the deaths occurred among CHILDREN.
How about horses? There are millions of households in the US which own horses. The American Veterinary Medical Association (AVMA) estimated that on a national level, about 40 percent of the horse-owning households owned one horse, about 35 percent owned two to three horses, and 25 percent owned four or more horses. A 2005 study commissioned by the American Horse Council found that there are about 9 million horses in the U.S. Of that amount, about 40 percent are primarily identified with recreational activities, 30 percent with showing and 12 percent with racing. In 2001, the American Veterinary Medical Association estimated 5 million horses were owned as pets. Ownership and operating costs of owning one horse for hobby was estimated at $2,000 a year in 1993. It's probably at least double that today. A recent study suggests that average levels of investment in racehorses is over $200,000 per horse.
Let's just look at the pets. If average costs are $4000 a year, that comes to $4000 * 5,000,000 = $20 BILLION a year. So in 20 years we are talking about another $400 BILLION dollars! Just on pet horses.
And how many people are injured or killed by these horse "pets"? In Colorado alone in the last decade almost 20 people associated with the livestock industy have been killed by horses. And those are people really experienced with being around horses. How about those who just have them as pets for recreational use? In fact, more people are killed or hurt by horses than any other "pet". Over 200 people in the US are killed by horses every year. So in 20 years, as many Americans will die from horses as have been killed in Iraq.
But of course, pets provide some benefits and avoided costs that I've overlooked. Just like Stiglitz did.
