Iran Test-Fires Sub-To-Surface Missile

New submarines are being built too, the Virginia class.

More advanced than the USS Honolulu, which will be decommisioned according to the article, are 31 688 class and 23 688I-class subs. Add three Seawolfs and probably already a few Virginia's, and the total comes to 57 submarines plus the Virginia's already in service. I guess roughly 60 modern subs are in service today, which doesn't seem too shabby.
Rather than guess, you can go to www.navy.mil and see all the subs currently in commission. They tend to keep it pretty up to date.

DR

EDIT: looks as though they only update it every six or seven months.
 
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Since the US military's budget is about equal to the sum of all other nation's combined, I find the complaint about not receiving enough money rather laughable.
Ah, but that's the cream of the joke. You look at the size of the pile of money and assume it buys you perfection. No one can afford a zero defects military, since no one is willing to pay the costs of training, time and materiel required for that. The R & D cycle eats money like no one's business. Why? Building complex tools for a complex job. Expensive equipment eats up immense piles of dough, then go obsolete, and the cycle continues. Oh, and everyone gets a share.

When you build a force intended to underwrite security around the globe, and fight the odd war here and there, which the US military has been doing since 1945; and when you build a force intended to go forth and do things beyond your borders; when you build a force reliant on volunteers (more expensive than conscripts); when you build a force intended to fight and win in modern warfare (not just show up and bleed); you soon find there isn't enough money for zero defects. But you and the landlubber want to believe that because it is very expensive, it must perform perfectly? Right, and Jaguars never break down. :rolleyes:

Attempting to equate the size of the dollar pile with zero defects overlooks the "marginal returns" problem inherent in war, and in military pursuits, and any human activity of most kinds.

What is the marginal cost of incremental improvement in human performance to the point of perfection? Maybe you see, after this comment, the seductive allure of finding the Silver Bullet that the Atom bomb at one point seemed to represent. That Holy Grail, the silver bullet that removes chance from war, error from military endeavors, and provides 100% situational awareness on the battlefield hasn't been made, and ain't ever gonna be made.

It's a myth, but some folks in suits think it can be found. That's part of where your money goes.

DR
 
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I can, however, provide evidence that the US Navy has at times difficulty defeating diesel-electric subs: http://www.knightsbridgeuniversity.com/documents/is the us. navy overrated.pdf Appendix A, page 85 lists US Navy ships 'sunk' during international exercises. The table is based on publicly availably sources, which obviously are only a subset of all 'sinkings' during exercises.

As for corruption, I think it's safe to assume that wherever politicians and large defensecontractors meet, the interests of those two parties (money, jobs, profit) will take precedence over those of the nation (an effective, cost-efficient military). Unless you believe politicians have the best interest of the country at heart, instead of their own re-election.
Not to mention the historical fact of competition between members of the armed forces for an as large as possible piece of the Defensive spending-pie by generals and admirals.
Yes, the diesel electic sub is a sonofagun to find and defeat when he is in the defensive role and you are projecting force into his defensive zone. No question, it's a real hard problem to solve. (Classic case was the Argentine San Luis versus the RN during Falklands/Malvinas war) A good sub skipper, any graduate of the Brit Perisher Course, can do some real damage if his crew is well trained.

Knowing that, I leave as an exercise to the reader how one mitigates the sub's advantages when not playing war games. Loose lips sink ships, still.

As for corruption, I think it's safe to assume that wherever politicians and large defensecontractors meet, the interests of those two parties (money, jobs, profit) will take precedence over those of the nation (an effective, cost-efficient military). Unless you believe politicians have the best interest of the country at heart, instead of their own re-election.
Not to mention the historical fact of competition between members of the armed forces for an as large as possible piece of the Defensive spending-pie by generals and admirals.
The process is designed much as the Constitution was: to be ineffecient deliberately, with an eye toward preventing just the sort of back room deals and graft that you mention. If you want to see where some wasted billions have gone, look into the BRAC process: the original and the recent, to see what it costs to "save" money by closing bases in someone's district. *roolseyes*

DR
 
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I see no mention of submarines on that site... :confused:

Anyways, I imagine that Iranian subs are pretty noisy and have limited abilities underwater (probably can't stay down very long) so the US Navy can probably track them prety well.

I'd be willing to bet all Iranian subs (sub?) are tracked continuously anyway. Were it to launch something in an actual war, the sub wouldn't survive another few hours, much like anti-aircraft missle batteries are quickly destroyed as soon as they turn on their radars.
 
No, landlubber, the public should understand that the Navy keeps track of subs all over the world 24/7. It is part of their job.

Er, no. The Navy wants to keep track of subs all over the world 24/7. It is indeed part of their mission -- but the question at hand is one of whether it's really part of their "job," in the sense that it's the sort of thing that they can be assumed to do.

As you yourself pointed out :
Yes, the diesel electic sub is a sonofagun to find and defeat when he is in the defensive role and you are projecting force into his defensive zone. No question, it's a real hard problem to solve. (Classic case was the Argentine San Luis versus the RN during Falklands/Malvinas war) A good sub skipper, any graduate of the Brit Perisher Course, can do some real damage if his crew is well trained.

If you acknowledge that subs generally are "a real hard problem to solve," then it's certainly reasonable to speculate about the Navy's capacity to solve this particular problem. If the Navy doesn't have the capacity to solve the particular problem of Iranian subs, then this problem just got much more serious and more important -- possibly enough more serious that someone's Congressman should be told about it and more resources devoted to the problem.

As you point out, the American public doesn't pay for a zero-defects mililtary. But they can usually be persuaded to pay for a zero-important-defects one.
 
The Navy wants to keep track of subs all over the world 24/7. It is indeed part of their mission -- but the question at hand is one of whether it's really part of their "job," in the sense that it's the sort of thing that they can be assumed to do.

If you acknowledge that subs generally are "a real hard problem to solve," then it's certainly reasonable to speculate about the Navy's capacity to solve this particular problem. If the Navy doesn't have the capacity to solve the particular problem of Iranian subs, then this problem just got much more serious and more important -- possibly enough more serious that someone's Congressman should be told about it and more resources devoted to the problem.

As you point out, the American public doesn't pay for a zero-defects mililtary. But they can usually be persuaded to pay for a zero-important-defects one.
Hi

The Navy's mission is to keep track of those subs 24/7: know where they are. When one drops off the tracker, it then needs to be found, same as during the Cold War. That hasn't changed a bit, only the emphasis on shallow water versus deep water operating areas. The situation is dynamic, not static, and the "enemy" or "country of interest" does not sit about and make the job easy. Put in military jargon, the enemy gets a vote. See Osama Bin Laden and friends, USS Cole, for a fine example,

My statement remains exactly where it started, and the fact that the task is difficult hardly matters. The mission continues, 24/7, and the Navy does it, 24/7, with such tools, time and people as are at hand.

*insert Orwell quote here*

As to which mission areas get more attention than others, you are invited to follow the money trail in defense appropriation since 1989, when the peace dividend maroons got hold of defense planning and wished away all threats when one big one went away. Following the programming and budgeting will give you a sense of what is or isn't deemed important within the FINITE (albeit large) amount of money allocated for research, acquisition, administration, and operations. Following so simple a program progression as the C-17 is enough to make one want to scream in frustration at how the rational process of requirements - mission - means logic gets perverted in the budgeting and planning process -- in whose district this month?

By all means, dearest furball regurgitating doctor, write to your Congressman and insist on a greater share of the finite money pie being invested in Anti Mine and Anti Submarine warfare. Plenty of folks inside the box have preceded you, for decades. I am sure anyone "not contaminated with having been too close to the problem" will do a far better job than anyone in the Pentagon.

Meanwhile, in the Fifth Fleet, they get on with it, 24/7.

DR
 
As to which mission areas get more attention than others, you are invited to follow the money trail in defense appropriation since 1989, when the peace dividend maroons got hold of defense planning and wished away all threats when one big one went away. Following the programming and budgeting will give you a sense of what is or isn't deemed important within the FINITE (albeit large) amount of money allocated for research, acquisition, administration, and operations. [...]

That's kind of my point.

Should more money be invested in ASW? As you point out, it's a finite pie. Did the Iranian missile test just raise the stakes in ASW? Or should one be more worried about ballistic missile defense with the new long-range missile tests coming out of NK? Or our are missile defense systems sufficiently good that the real need now is in civilian anti-cyberterrorist infrastructure?

I'm afraid that your jingoistic statements that "the Navy does it, 24/7, with such tools, time and people as are at hand" don't inspire confidence. Either you're sufficiently out of touch that you believe that the Navy really can make bricks without straw, or you're even more seriously out of touch in that you believe that at current funding levels, the Navy can do anything that doesn't involve kryptonite.

A person from a smarter branch of the armed forces might recognize that even the US Navy has limits on what it can do.....
 
That's kind of my point.

I'm afraid that your jingoistic statements that "the Navy does it, 24/7, with such tools, time and people as are at hand" don't inspire confidence. Either you're sufficiently out of touch that you believe that the Navy really can make bricks without straw, or you're even more seriously out of touch in that you believe that at current funding levels, the Navy can do anything that doesn't involve kryptonite.

A person from a smarter branch of the armed forces might recognize that even the US Navy has limits on what it can do . . .
Where did I say the Navy was unlimited in capability? Nowhere, stop with trying to put words in my mouth. Your experience in real worls ASW is what? As to "the smarter armed service," there isn't such an animal.

The Iranian launch of that missile hardly raises the stakes. The Charlie II's launch of SSN-3's raised the stakes, about 30+ years ago. Iran's acquisition of Kilo submarines raised the stakes.

ASCM's are a different problem for a flotilla of ships than are torpedoes and mines, and a problem of lesser magnitude. For the layman, I'll explain it in terms you can understand: It is easier to sink a ship by letting the water in from the bottom than by trying to let the air out from the top. Mines and torpedoes are the more difficult hazard posed in the littoral ASW environment. The ASCM is a lesser included case of the already present Air Defense problem for the fleet. The only real "this is new and horrifying" prospect is a missile that is invisible to radar. Now THAT would raise the stakes.

But what was I thinking? True Smart People(TM) know better than people who've actuallly done ASW as a mission. *raspberry*

DR
 

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