Iran: Anti-Government Protests

Goodness me, that is a bizarre belief.

I don't even know where to start. Maybe I'll give it a go tomorrow.

So let me be clear then: I'm not denying that there are many highly educated people in Iran, who are "modern" in some meaningful sense. What I am denying is that the experience among the urban elite in Teheran before the revolution would meaningfully represent "modern Iranians", or that they represented a significant part of the population back then.
 
So let me be clear then: I'm not denying that there are many highly educated people in Iran, who are "modern" in some meaningful sense. What I am denying is that the experience among the urban elite in Teheran before the revolution would meaningfully represent "modern Iranians", or that they represented a significant part of the population back then.
I understood your issue, it's wrong, IMO, but it will take more time than I have tonight to address.
 
I was just thinking about that, plus, a lot of pro-Shah Iranians left when he fell. Others left as the theocracy rose. There probably aren't a lot of people left who really remember pre-Revolution days.
Indeed, and the educated liberal progressive people really only had a year they could breath, in between the deposing of the Shah and when Khomeini firmly took the reins.

Around the last election, a New Yorker reporter found herself detained and grilled about her expenses. She was very afraid for some of her sources, but the thing the officials seemed really touchy about conversations she had with ordinary people about the price of chicken. They ended up keeping all of her receipts while seeming unconcerned about interviews with political dissidents.
I'm not surprised. Nothing motivates the people like letting them go hungry. Just ask Louis XVI of France or Nicholas II of Russia for the outcome.
 
This needs to be qualified. What you're talking about under the Shah (who was a massive twerp) was a tiny urban elite mostly in Teheran often benefitting directly from his rule. Tertiary education rates were VERY low, and are in fact much higher today.

Mohammad Reza, like all CIA-installed dictators, had a tiny sliver of cronies and "outward examples" that benefitted from his rule. And then a massive population that he ignored. He laid the ground for the revolution by stomping down hard on left-wing antimonarchist movements while giving religious authorities a great deal of autonomy in the many regions.

And, in general, by being a clueless twerp.

Goodness me, that is a bizarre belief.

I don't even know where to start. Maybe I'll give it a go tomorrow.
I'd like to see Tubba flesh out the highlighted part - not because I don't believe him but because I'm curious about it.

In any case, it's a matter of fact that the religious opposition against the Shah's regime could freely organize itself under the guise of mosques and religious freedom, while the Shah did crack down on the secular, liberal opposition.

That's a pattern you see time and again. In Israel/Palestine, Hamas managed to organize itself and become a main competitor of Fatah (and oust them in Gaza) because they did so under the guise of religion. In the GDR, a significant part of the opposition against the regime organized itself under the guise of church meetings (and fortunately, there it didn't turn into theocratic extremism).
 
I'd like to see Tubba flesh out the highlighted part - not because I don't believe him but because I'm curious about it.

In any case, it's a matter of fact that the religious opposition against the Shah's regime could freely organize itself under the guise of mosques and religious freedom, while the Shah did crack down on the secular, liberal opposition.

I wish I had the means to give it the treatment it deserves. I have Kinzer's "All The Shah's Men" lying around, but I haven't gotten around to reading it. As you note, a significant issue was that the (warranted) secular critique could be harshly stamped out in the name of anti-Communism. Not so much for the religious opposition.

The Shah operated in a complicated environment. He tried to style himself as a "secular modernizer". He had two big issues - one, "secular modernizers" in the Muslim world that were succesful in some way or other (most notably Ataturk, also Nasser and maybe you could count Saddam Hussein as well, depending on your level of cynicism) defined themselves in defiance of the West. Whereas the Shah had been installed by the West, indeed replacing the "secular modernizer" who had a public mandate, Mohammed Mossadegh.

The second issue comes with the complicated issue of the Iranian identity. The sense of a continuous Iranian "nation" going back the way to Cyrus the Great can be traced at least to the Ilkhanate of the 14th century. The successors of Hulegu, looking to legitimize themselves, sponsored cultural works that painted an image of a land ruled by a succession of conquerors, starting with Cyrus and ending with Genghis Khan. The sheer destructiveness of the Mongol invasion probably created a bit of a cultural vacuum that could be filled this way. So this persisted to some degree and could be seized upon in the 19th and 20th centuries.

But really, much more tangibly, the modern Iranian state can be traced back to the 16th century, where Shah Isma'il conquered Greater Iran, and was perceived at least in hindsight as a native ruler liberating Iran from the oppressive Turkmen (the Timurids, that is). Isma'il forcibly imposed Shia Islam, and what we find emerging is a national-religious idenitity that exists in opposition to the Ottomans. That's also the origin of the modern Sunni-Shia split.

Of course some of the "succession of conqueror" mentality is also carried through this, culminating with Nader Shah, the "Last Great Asiatic Conqueror", who brought down the Mughal Empire. But what you end up with is very much a dual national culture, carrying both a strong Twelver Shia identity, and an ethnonationalist identity that celebrates its (supposed; the continuity is a bit shaky) pre-Islamic origins.

This leaves a minefield for any modern leader to navigate, and it seems to have forced Mohammad Reza, lacking genuine populist legitimacy, to make a lot of concessions in the rural parts of the country. I think it's ultimately dangerous to think of the Islamic Revolution as coming from "a bunch of nutters". Khomeini, having been heavily influenced by nationalist movements in Europe, seems to have been the one who managed to successfully unify the ethno-national and religious characters of Iran. It really cannot be overstated how much he created a "new direction" for much of the Muslim world, that became even more relevant in the post-Soviet era.

It's very much a land of paradoxes, as the current political situation should make abundantly clear. And that's not even getting into the complicated place of Azerbaijani Turks and "Turko-Persian/Persianate" society...
 
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I think people tend to underestimate the influence of the Iranian president. The name of the country, "Islamic Republic of..." is chosen well, it is a republic as is the USA, just with the Quran instead of the Constitution. Inside the spectrum allowed by that overwriting ideology (as interpreted by the Ayatollahs), there is more than enough room for politics to make the normal citizens feel the difference. And the terms used to describe the actors are often misleading, like calling Rouhani a "reformer" and Ahmadinedjad a "hardliner". These are first of all economic terms from a western perspective. After all, Rouhani is a cleric, while Ahmadinedjad is a civil engineer. And Ahmadinedjad was giving money to the poor as if thrown from a helicopter, bordering on what we know as unconditional basic income. While Rouhani made some reforms rolling these benefits back, whose effects are now reaching the poor.
 
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And the terms used to describe the actors are often misleading, like calling Rouhani a "reformer" and Ahmadinedjad a "hardliner". These are first of all economic terms from a western perspective.
I don't know what those terms would mean in economic terms. For popular consumption a "hardliner" will be someone belligerent toward the U.S. while "moderate" or "reformist" would have a more conciliatory view. The politicians have influence, maybe not quite the same thing as "power."

How any of this translates into domestic policy, I don't know. Executions are up under Rouhani, but whether he has a role is hard to tell.
 
I don't know what those terms would mean in economic terms. For popular consumption a "hardliner" will be someone belligerent toward the U.S. while "moderate" or "reformist" would have a more conciliatory view. The politicians have influence, maybe not quite the same thing as "power."

How any of this translates into domestic policy, I don't know. Executions are up under Rouhani, but whether he has a role is hard to tell.

I mean, Rouhani is a senior cleric, so I suspect he has a better chance at reform than most others.
 
It's true that President and Parliament have more real influence than many in the West allow, and that they get elected in competitive elections, which are not totally rigged.

But both are still controlled by non-republican power institutions: the revolutionary leader, the clergy, and notably the Revolutionary Guards. All candidates are vetted by the non-democratic players. "Reform" is about whether there can be a sustained changed in constitutional power where the people can pick candidates actually oppesed to clergy and military.
 
Social media is overflowing with deceptive use of imagery. German prime time news fell for 2009 footage and had to apologize. Here four other examples from three twitter activists and ... no, make that four twitter activists including the HRW propagandist Kenneth Roth, who posted images of the pro-government rallies.
 
I mean, Rouhani is a senior cleric, so I suspect he has a better chance at reform than most others.
A New Yorker article said something like, Iran has 18 political parties - all to the right of Newt Gingrich.

Every now and then leaders lighten up some, allow fashions to get a little bolder, allow a bit of dissent around the edges, but if things get too critical of the regime the hammer falls.
 
A New Yorker article said something like, Iran has 18 political parties - all to the right of Newt Gingrich.

Every now and then leaders lighten up some, allow fashions to get a little bolder, allow a bit of dissent around the edges, but if things get too critical of the regime the hammer falls.

It's true that President and Parliament have more real influence than many in the West allow, and that they get elected in competitive elections, which are not totally rigged.

But both are still controlled by non-republican power institutions: the revolutionary leader, the clergy, and notably the Revolutionary Guards. All candidates are vetted by the non-democratic players. "Reform" is about whether there can be a sustained changed in constitutional power where the people can pick candidates actually oppesed to clergy and military.

Yep. I don't see a foundational change happening without some serious unrest and a good deal of political violence. Even though I suspect power will slip from the office of Supreme Leader following Khamenei's likely not-too-distant death, the Revolutionary Guard will not go so easily.
 
Indeed, and the educated liberal progressive people really only had a year they could breath, in between the deposing of the Shah and when Khomeini firmly took the reins.


I'm not surprised. Nothing motivates the people like letting them go hungry. Just ask Louis XVI of France or Nicholas II of Russia for the outcome.

Isn't there some theory that you can predict the chances of a revolution by calculating the price of bread as a percentage of per-capita income?

Iranians are a lot more urban, a lot more educated and have a lot more access to media than in 1979, but if they can't get housing or a decently priced club-sandwich that might be a major catalyst.

I also suspect that Iran's external ambitions in Yemen, Lebanon, Syria and possibly Iraq are an expensive hobby.
 
The accusations against the US are now quite specific: Iran public prosecutor unveils plots behind street unrests

IRNA said:
[...] He said that the main mastermind of the plan was an American national named Michael Andrea who was a former CIA member in charge of combatting terrorism that formed the group to create unrest in the Islamic Republic of Iran.

"Michael Andrea along with an officer affiliated to Mossad spy agency where in charge of masterminding the plot while Saudi Arabia paid for all the expenses," he said.

Montazeri said that the plot dubbed as 'Consequential Convergence Doctrine' was designed based on the data gathered throughout years, adding that they conducted various scenarios such as protesting the high cost of living, high pay of bills and financial demands of the retired people.

They had offered two models named Tunisia and Libya and finally chose the latter which was to create waves of unrest from outside to the center, he added.

They had prepared two operation rooms in Ebril of Iraq and Herat in Afghanistan to create riots in Iran, he said. [...]


The "mastermind"'s real name is Michael D'AndreaWP and he isn't "former" CIA at all, but was appointed to head the agencies "Iran Mission Center" just half a year ago. His nickname is "Ayatollah Mike". :rolleyes:

The Iranians have also arrested three armed cells in the border region to Iraqi Kurdistan, likely (IMO) MEK freaks, and one near Azerbaijan.
 
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The accusations against the US are now quite specific: Iran public prosecutor unveils plots behind street unrests




The "mastermind"'s real name is Michael D'AndreaWP and he isn't "former" CIA at all, but was appointed to head the agencies "Iran Mission Center" just half a year ago. His nickname is "Ayatollah Mike". :rolleyes:

The Iranians have also arrested three armed cells in the border region to Iraqi Kurdistan, likely (IMO) MEK freaks, and one near Azerbaijan.

CIA or no CIA. If a government dictates what can be said and shown in movies, arrests teenagers for dancing and then borks the economy, there's political change on the way. One way or another.
 
There's an interesting exchange going on between a World Socialist Web Site author and the Paris correspondent of PressTV:

I learned a thing or two.

Study will certainly help to sharpen your revolutionary credentials, Eddie. ;)
 
There's an interesting exchange going on between a World Socialist Web Site author and the Paris correspondent of PressTV:

I learned a thing or two.

Study will certainly help to sharpen your revolutionary credentials, Eddie. ;)

I'll check it out later.

From what I've read elsewhere, Iran now has beef with both the liberal social-media savvy kids who are sick of theocracy and with the religious working class who want to buy some damned eggs at a reasonable price.

The protests seem to be under control now, but the underlying discontent remains.
 

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