Interceptor Missile Test Fails

[Crossbow]

Stop being snarky and answer the question. The reason I asked is that I know of several arguments that people have brought up, and am just wondering which of them you will use.

edit: Plus, I looked back at your previous entries and didn't find any mention of 99%. I need to know what you are specifically referring to.

If I may ...

Even if one can stop 99% of the incoming nuclear weapons,
Then that means that 1% of them will still get through.
Therefore, you will still end up with nuclear war.

 

[AWPrime]

I find that '99% under realistic conditions' would be an amazing preformance.

But they are nowhere near that.

 

[Keneke]

It can never be relied on to achieve anything useful. Only to reduce the disastrous.

Even if one can stop 99% of the incoming nuclear weapons,
Then that means that 1% of them will still get through.
Therefore, you will still end up with nuclear war.

I'll address these, assuming they refer to the same argument: namely, that a system not at 100% is worth nothing.

First: If the GMD (someday) has a 99% accuracy, do you think that out of 100 missiles, one actually WILL get through? That's a statistical fallacy. There is a 99% chance of stopping all 100 missiles. Besides, how do you know that 100+ missile will be fired? Maybe it will be a salvo of five missiles. Maybe it'll be one missile seized by a Fart East Terrorist group. (Al-Qaida operates there, don't they?) There are two problems here: one, you're playing with statistics, two, no one definitely knows how an attack will happen.

Also, there's no guarantee that if we were hit by one (or more) nuclear weapon, that we would fire nukes back. The fact that there is a chance of failure doesn't mean to not try.

Also, reducing the disastrous IS useful. Look at government's environmental policies. Can we eliminate greenhouse gas emission all at once? Is reducing the threat beneficial in missile defense? Indeed. Whether or not the launching of nukes against us creates retaliation from us in kind, the need for protection, ANY protection, is very important. Say North Korea launches nukes, then we obhliterate it, either with nuclear weapons or conventionally, and then the worst is over. Say we stop 35 out of 36 nukes. Say we lose 1 million people instead of 40 million. Isn't that better?

Now then, I will not argue for the availability of funds in the US government on this issue as compared to other means of attack. If there is a greater chance that a nuke will be shipped by boat, well, there's 3 times as much money in Homeland Security than there is in Missile Defense, and that gap widens every year. That's fine with me. As long as there's any concern for launched ICBMs, we should research this. Maybe more, maybe less. But wiping out the program (as well as heedlessly pouring money into it, granted) is overly simplistic thinking.

 

[Crossbow]

I'll address these, assuming they refer to the same argument: namely, that a system not at 100% is worth nothing.

First: If the GMD (someday) has a 99% accuracy, do you think that out of 100 missiles, one actually WILL get through? That's a statistical fallacy. There is a 99% chance of stopping all 100 missiles. Besides, how do you know that 100+ missile will be fired? Maybe it will be a salvo of five missiles. Maybe it'll be one missile seized by a Fart East Terrorist group. (Al-Qaida operates there, don't they?) There are two problems here: one, you're playing with statistics, two, no one definitely knows how an attack will happen.

Also, there's no guarantee that if we were hit by one (or more) nuclear weapon, that we would fire nukes back. The fact that there is a chance of failure doesn't mean to not try.

Also, reducing the disastrous IS useful. Look at government's environmental policies. Can we eliminate greenhouse gas emission all at once? Is reducing the threat beneficial in missile defense? Indeed. Whether or not the launching of nukes against us creates retaliation from us in kind, the need for protection, ANY protection, is very important. Say North Korea launches nukes, then we obhliterate it, either with nuclear weapons or conventionally, and then the worst is over. Say we stop 35 out of 36 nukes. Say we lose 1 million people instead of 40 million. Isn't that better?

Regardless of the presence or absence of a missile defense system, I doubt that anyone would use ICBMs against the USA since the USA would be able to tell from where such weapons were launched. We have already had that capability for about 30 years now and I expect that it will continue well into the future.

Also, it is quite unlikely that any loose knit, self-financied terrorist group would be able to develop, make, and deploy something like nuclear tipped ICBMs. Such things take a considerable national effort.

On the other hand, I would expect that if anyone really wanted to attack the USA with nuclear weapons, then they would smuggle them into the USA, place them, then detonate them. There are already thousands of tons of illegal drugs and thousands of illegal immigrants being smuggled into the USA every year, so I expect that it would not be terribly difficult to sneak at least a few nukes and several specialists in to the USA. Such activity would not be prevented by a missile defense system.

Now then, I will not argue for the availability of funds in the US government on this issue as compared to other means of attack. If there is a greater chance that a nuke will be shipped by boat, well, there's 3 times as much money in Homeland Security than there is in Missile Defense, and that gap widens every year. That's fine with me. As long as there's any concern for launched ICBMs, we should research this. Maybe more, maybe less. But wiping out the program (as well as heedlessly pouring money into it, granted) is overly simplistic thinking.

Sure it is better to lose 1 million as opposed to 40 million! And it would be better still to lose zero million as opposed to 1 million. Such a thing could be done with a comprehensive Test Ban treaty along with a good bit of disarmament. However, let us be real, after all, Iraq did not have anything to do with the 9/11 attacks and look at what happened to them. So if a million (instead of a few thousand) of Americans were suddenly killed with a nuclear weapon, then it is safe to say that they will almost certainly be attacked with nuclear weapons as well.

 

[Frank Newgent]

I was aware that the transponders were there to provided GPS data until some new phased array X-band radars could be built to figure out the whats-its once they'd been detected. Having some fun...

But from what I read the only new radars that have actually been built are ones for testing the system on Kwajalein Island. They're not meant to discriminate anything detected coming in from Asia.

So far (from what I've read) only an upgraded Shemya, Alaska, 1970's non X-band radar built originally to observe Soviet missile tests - with a fixed orientation and very marginal capability to observe missiles launched by North Korea against Hawaii or the West Coast, much less be able to discriminate a actual warhead from kim chee - will be part of the system being rushed into deployment.

Our tax dollars are paying for this as a replacement which Boeing says will be ready soon.

Or do I have it wrong?

Y'see, that's the problem with the politicians releasing it too early. The SBX's (we just call it Aegis, for the ship it will be on) are coming out soon, for multiple purposes. But did Bush wait on them? Noooooo. So people are saying that because these old GBR's (Ground Based Radars) are totally outdated, (though they work really well, and have a function similar to XBR and SBX) the entire system won't work.

For the record: The fixed position radars still have a broad swath they detect. Can't remember (or maybe even say?) the exact angle, but I remember it being an obtuse angle. There's enough coverage that we'd detect anything coming from SE Asia well before the apex of the flight.

Also, there are other radars in the tests. SBIRS (Space Based IR Sensor) is in play, for an early-warning lo-res detection. Occasionally we play with Hawaii too.

Okay. Are you saying that the new Aegis radars will work to help the land-based interceptors being deployed at Fort Greeley, Alaska, to acquire? For the record: the fixed-position radars in Shemya, Alaska, sure can't.

 

[a_unique_person]

I'll address these, assuming they refer to the same argument: namely, that a system not at 100% is worth nothing.

First: If the GMD (someday) has a 99% accuracy, do you think that out of 100 missiles, one actually WILL get through? That's a statistical fallacy. There is a 99% chance of stopping all 100 missiles. Besides, how do you know that 100+ missile will be fired? Maybe it will be a salvo of five missiles. Maybe it'll be one missile seized by a Fart East Terrorist group. (Al-Qaida operates there, don't they?) There are two problems here: one, you're playing with statistics, two, no one definitely knows how an attack will happen.

I would guess it will be a century before 50% is achieved. The current tests, implementations, etc, is all just a con, and waste of time and money, unless it is being developed now so that in two centuries time, it will work. But that is not what it is being sold as.

As you say, no one knows what will happen, so why the emphasis on what is known to be currently useless. It is just the military-industrial complex sucking ever more dollars into a vortex of waste, pork barrelling, inside deals, tax payers dollars, etc.

Also, there's no guarantee that if we were hit by one (or more) nuclear weapon, that we would fire nukes back. The fact that there is a chance of failure doesn't mean to not try.

Also, reducing the disastrous IS useful. Look at government's environmental policies. Can we eliminate greenhouse gas emission all at once? Is reducing the threat beneficial in missile defense? Indeed. Whether or not the launching of nukes against us creates retaliation from us in kind, the need for protection, ANY protection, is very important. Say North Korea launches nukes, then we obhliterate it, either with nuclear weapons or conventionally, and then the worst is over. Say we stop 35 out of 36 nukes. Say we lose 1 million people instead of 40 million. Isn't that better?

I think NK has made it clear it is quite happy to give it all up for a certain amount of blackmail. Not an easy thing to do, but if it costs umpteen billions of aid to NK, and a comprehensive test ban and inspections, it's a much more boring but overall better result. Look at what diplomacy has achieved in Libya, and aggression in Iraq. The military doesn't get to do it's grandstanding, the US hawks don't get to intimidate the world with the "shock and awe" that is really just a form of state terrorism.

Now then, I will not argue for the availability of funds in the US government on this issue as compared to other means of attack. If there is a greater chance that a nuke will be shipped by boat, well, there's 3 times as much money in Homeland Security than there is in Missile Defense, and that gap widens every year. That's fine with me. As long as there's any concern for launched ICBMs, we should research this. Maybe more, maybe less. But wiping out the program (as well as heedlessly pouring money into it, granted) is overly simplistic thinking.

I think the 'simplistic' is all in those pushing it. The most ample evidence of this is the pretence that there is a functioning system out there.

 

[a_unique_person]

So if a million (instead of a few thousand) of Americans were suddenly killed with a nuclear weapon, then it is safe to say that they will almost certainly be attacked with nuclear weapons as well.

That doesn't really work, either. That aggressor will be surrounded by innocent countries, who will have allies. You can't target one country with nukes and not expect a diplomatic 'fallout' of global proportions.

 

[aerocontrols]

This whole SDI, Brilliant Pebbles, ABM (or whatever they are calling it these days) is just another "Duck & Cover" drill.

Both systems have little real value, but it does serve to show the public that the government is trying to solve the problem while providing a hope of surviviabilty.

Ugh! At least "Duck & Cover" was alot cheaper.

"Duck & Cover" would have saved millions of lives under most probable nuclear war scenarios of the time.

If the bomb goes off above you, you are dead, and 'ducking and covering' has done you no harm.

The further from ground zero you are, the more likely 'duck and cover' is to save your life, and your eyesight.

Partial survivability is important - to the survivors.