You are aware, I hope, that prima facie impressions are as trustworthy as the assumptions that they're based on? In this case, that's not particularly trustworthy.
Let H = a single non-cyclical universe where the values of the cosmological constants are not set by any fundamental principles (i.e., the values of the constant could have been different).
Again, assumptions not in evidence. Could the values of the constants be different? Are they "set" by any fundamental principles? We actually
don't know.
Calculations and conclusions based on untrustworthy and unevidenced premises will themselves inherently be untrustworthy and unevidenced.
That's the argument. So if the universe is probably not "a single non-cyclical universe where the values of the cosmological constants are not set by any fundamental principles", what does that entail?
1. A universe where the values of the constants are "set" in some life-permitting way. The problem is, that doesn't appear to be the case.
Based on what criteria? Based on the information that we seem to actually have at present, neither the strong anthropic principle or a designer can be validly ruled out, both of which would count as things that could "set" things in some life-permitting way.
2. A universe where the values of the constants could have been different, but goes through cycles of Big Bang/Big Crunch. Again, that doesn't seem to be the case wrt our universe.
Is this with potential changes from cycle to cycle? That would be an uncommon, and seemingly unstable suggestion. If it's without potential changes, a cyclic universe would be no different than a single shot one when it comes to questioning why the constants are what they are. It would present an option for dealing with one of the more superficial related questions, but not deal with the core issues.
3. An ensemble of universes where the values of the constants could have been different and we happen to be in one of the universes where life is possible. This is partly confirmed by inflation theory, but the jury's out on the size of the set of universes other than this one. If that set even exists.
This, at least, seems to be reasonably worded.
4. A designer fine-tuned the universe so that life could exist.
And this is just 1 again. Either way, the underlying premises that you're using to get this set of options is problematic, which undermines your argument significantly.
It comes down to a choice between (3) and (4) and both require leaps of faith. Is there a designer? Are there other universes? How do we know? How do we test a theory that postulates the existence of vast numbers of universes that are causally disconnected from us?
There's still the honest "We don't have sufficient information at present to determine anything of value AND there's no good argument favoring rushing the conclusion on practical grounds, given the lack of relevance to actually making practical decisions on how to act." There's good arguments favoring trying to learn more, of course, but that's somewhat different.
Here's one of the best analogies I've come across:
"
Most famous is Leslie’s firing squad, in which a prisoner expects to be executed by a firing squad but, to his own surprise, finds himself alive after all the marksmen have fired and wonders whether they intended to miss. The firing squad scenario involves an observation selection effect because the prisoner cannot contemplate his post-execution situation unless he somehow survives the execution. His observations, in other words, are “biased” towards finding himself alive. Sober’s analysis, applied to the firing squad scenario, suggests that it would not be rational for the prisoner to suspect that the marksmen intended to miss (unless independent evidence suggests so) because that would mean overlooking the observation selection effect that he faces. But, as Leslie, Weisberg and Kotzen argue, this recommendation seems very implausible."
https://plato.stanford.edu/entries/fine-tuning/#ArguFineTuniForDesiUsinProb
It's still rather wanting as an analogy, either way, and, with respect to what's been put forward in this thread, a bit off. For the former consideration, substituting in things that actually are known and can be reasonably used to validly determine probabilities will obviously lead to different results than leaving in things that are entirely speculative and not based on actual evidence. For the latter, based on the points made in this thread, it would be entirely reasonable to
suspect that the marksman may well have intended to miss instant death areas, which mucks up the counterargument presented there anyways.
Our epistemic situation is exactly like that of the survivor of the firing squad.
Except that it's not, as has already been pointed out, repeatedly.
Great. Some one with who understands. I look forward to you developing this.
If you remove or skew the likelihood of potential options, the odds do tend to change away from a theoretical unskewed selection process. Otherwise, your claims fail, by the look of it. For example, it is true that a larger subset of the equally likely options in a set is more likely to be selected from than a smaller subset, but each of the options is, well, equally likely, and the relative chances of the options are what's in question, not the relative chances of the subsets.
