BeAChooser
Banned
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- Jun 20, 2007
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- 11,716
This is quite Rumsfeldian.
I proclaim you master of one-liners ... and not much else.
This is quite Rumsfeldian.
YOu have not proved that in this thread.No, you don't know that, as I've proven in this thread.
It was the original reason.But Iraq having wmd was but one reason for the war.
Your point?Might it be said to be accomplished now?
So they felt the need to do the surge because everything was working so well?That's your opinion. One not shared by the military, by the way.
It doesn't invalidate the Iraq war. It demonstrates that it was misshandled from 2003-2006. THat was what Darth Rotor stated, and history supports his claim.What's embarrassing is thinking that invalidates in any way the premise for invading Iraq.
If that is the best you have to offer, your position is less substantive than I had given it credit for.What is embarrassing is your not acknowledging what Abu Ghraib was like under Saddam. We can thank Bush for ending THAT embarrassment too.
Tell you what, DR.
Why don't you address the OP?
What do you think Iraq and the world would now look like had the US not invaded in 2003?
Noone can really say with any certainty what would have happened had the Bush administration taken a different approach in 2003-2006.
YOu have not proved that in this thread.
It was the original reason.
Your point?
That doesn't change that things were done poorly from 2003-2006.
So they felt the need to do the surge because everything was working so well?
It demonstrates that it was misshandled from 2003-2006.
What is embarrassing is your not acknowledging what Abu Ghraib was like under Saddam. We can thank Bush for ending THAT embarrassment too.
If that is the best you have to offer, your position is less substantive than I had given it credit for.
How can anyone take you seriously when you are unable to remain consistent in your views.
So your proof of WMD is as solid as the proof of the paranormal.Yes, I think I have, given that none of you can answer the 6 questions I asked and the ISG stated that they couldn't be sure if WMD were moved to Syria.
And some were outright wrong. But my point stands, the WMD was a bad reason.No, Bush outlined the reasons for invading Iraq in his 2003 SOU speech. And before that even democrat leaders were stating all the reasons Bush gave in that speech as a reason to topple Saddam.
Your emoticon doesn't answer my question.
Dems aren't "My Side".Maybe. Maybe not. Maybe doing what your side suggested … nothing? … would have been even poorer in the scope of things. That is, afterall, the point of the OP.![]()
abu ghraib was NEVER appropriate and the torture wasn't just a few soldiers.Just because what they were doing wasn't working, doesn't mean what they did was "unfocused" or "inappropriate". It just means it didn't work. Isn't it a military maxim that no plan survives contact with the enemy?
It is certainly better than your obvious contradiction in posts. So Yes, It does seem to be your best argument. The rest is mere unsupported speculation.LOL! After reading this thread, do you really think that's the best I can offer? LOL!
As you said:LOL!
joobz, I haven't claimed *certainty* about either possibility. I've explained why it is LIKELY that had Bush not invaded, things would now be much worse in Iraq and in the war on terror. And why it is LIKELY, that had we tried Obama's and the left's approach to the war, once the war was on, things would now be much worse than they are.
I'm not a leftist. Why do you feel the need to lob labels as insults?That's the problem with you leftists
Seeing the world in shades of gray and making up wild speculations are not synonymous.... you only want to deal in certainties and that's just not possible. You wanted certainty before we invaded and certainty after we invaded. You seem incapable of seeing the world in the shades of grey that it really is. You seem incapable of understanding and dealing with probabilities. But then the ability to do that is a wisdom that comes only with time and experience.![]()
You are welcome to ignore me.LOL! I think it's time I go back to ignoring most of what you post, joobz.![]()
LOL! Wikipedia is not exactly an unbiased source, FG.
Perhaps not an "operational" relationship, but many portions of the intelligence community did indeed note friendly meetings between the two occurred. And it is very clear that even if Saddam didn't provide al-Qaeda with money (we isn't something that can be said with any certainty), he looked the other way as al-Qaeda operated within his country. Documents discovered in Iraq after the invasion prove this. In fact, those documents suggest even more. For example,
http://www.nysun.com/pf.php?id=29746
And let me quote wikipedia, if that's the source you insist on, regarding a 2008 Pentagon report:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Saddam_Hussein_and_al-Qaeda#2007_Pentagon_Inspector_General_Report
The study "found no 'smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda."
![]()
Nonsense. Bush went out of his way to get one. He delayed action far longer than was advisable, militarily, to get one.
Let me just quote what Rumsfeld noted:
That's not a claim I ever made. So it doesn't affect my "little world".![]()
Noone can really say with any certainty what would have happened had the Bush administration taken a different approach in 2003-2006. But what we can say with certainty is that Bush was correct in authorizing the surge despite half of America (the Obama half) being against it.
History proves that was the right thing to do. And we can also say that Obama was Stuck On Stupid when he said at a time when the success of the surge was apparent to all, even him, that had he known back in 2007 that the surge would work he still would have been against it. THAT should be the dumbest thing you've heard, DR.
[...]
Didn't you just say?
[...]
I quoted a bit: the 911 commission,
"There are indications that [by 2001] the Iraqi regime tolerated and may even have helped Ansar al Islam against the common Kurdish enemy.”
Bin Ladin was also willing to explore possibilities for cooperation with Iraq, even though Iraq's dictator, Saddam Hussein, had never had an Islamist agenda -- save for his opportunistic pose as a defender of the faithful against "Crusaders" during the Gulf War of 1991. Moreover, Bin Ladin had in fact been sponsoring anti-Saddam Islamists in Iraqi Kurdistan, and sought to attract them into his Islamic army. … snip … With the Sudanese regime acting as intermediary, Bin Ladin himself met with a senior Iraqi intelligence officer in Khartoum in late 1994 or early 1995. Bin Ladin is said to have asked for space to establish training camps, as well as assistance in procuring weapons, but there is no evidence that Iraq responded to this request. As described below, the ensuing years saw additional efforts to establish connections. … snip … There is also evidence that around this time [1997] Bin Ladin sent out a number of feelers to the Iraqi regime, offering some cooperation. None are reported to have received a significant response. … snip … In mid-1998, the situation reversed; it was Iraq that reportedly took the initiative. in March 1998, after Bin Ladin's public fatwa against the United States, two al-Qaeda members reportedly went to Iraq to meet iwth Irai intelligence. In July, an Iraqi delegation traveled to Afghanistan to meet first with the Taliban and then with Bin Ladin. Sources reported that one, or perhaps both, of these meetings was apparently arranged through Bin Ladin's Egyptian deputy, Zawahiri, who had ties of his own to the Iraqis. … snip … Similar meeting between Iraqi officials and Bin Ladin or his aides may have occurred in 1999 during a period of some reported strains with the Taliban. According to the reporting, Iraqi officials offered Bin Ladin a safe haven in Iraq. Bin Ladin declined, apparently judging that his circumstances in Afghanistan remained more favorable than the Iraqi alternative. The reports describe friendly contacts and indicate some common themes in both sides' hatred of the United States. But to date we have seen no evidence that these or the earlier contacts ever developed into a collaborative operational relationship.
the Senate Select Committee on Intelligence.
rather than attempt to improve our efforts to combat terrorism and make our country safer, the results of this investigation were calculated to promote a partisan agenda
Simply stated, this second series of reports is designed to point fingers in Washington and at the Administratin. The conclusions in the reports were crafterd with more partisan bias than we have witnessed in a long time in Congress. The "Phase II" investigatin has turned the Senate Intelligence Committee, a committee initially designed to be the most bipartisan committee in the Senate, into a political playground stripped of its bipartisan power, and this fact has not gone unnoticed in the Intelligence Community.
"We joined the Senate Intelligence Committee to conduct oversight, not to perform witch hunts;
There are other references.
The presence of al-Qa'ida militants on Iraqi soil poses many questions. We are uncertain to what extent Baghdad is actively complicit in this use of its territory by al-Qa'ida operatives for safehaven and transit. Given the pervasive presence of Iraq's security apparatus, it would be difficult for al-Qa'ida operatives to maintain an active, long-term presence in Iraq without alerting the authorities or without at least their acquiescence.
According to a May 2003 debriefing of a senior Iraqi intelligence officer, Iraqi intelligence established a highly secretive relationship with Egyptian Islamic Jihad, and later with al Qaeda. The first meeting in 1992 between the Iraqi Intelligence Service (IIS) and al Qaeda was brokered by al-Turabi. Former IIS deputy director Faruq Hijazi and senior al Qaeda leader [Ayman al] Zawahiri were at the meeting--the first of several between 1992 and 1995 in Sudan. Additional meetings between Iraqi intelligence and al Qaeda were held in Pakistan. Members of al Qaeda would sometimes visit Baghdad where they would meet the Iraqi intelligence chief in a safe house. The report claimed that Saddam insisted the relationship with al Qaeda be kept secret. After 9-11, the source said Saddam made a personnel change in the IIS for fear the relationship would come under scrutiny from foreign probes.
A CIA report from a contact with good access, some of whose reporting has been corroborated, said that certain elements in the "Islamic Army" of bin Laden were against the secular regime of Saddam. Overriding the internal factional strife that was developing, bin Laden came to an "understanding" with Saddam that the Islamic Army would no longer support anti-Saddam activities. According to sensitive reporting released in U.S. court documents during the African Embassy trial, in 1993 bin Laden reached an "understanding" with Saddam under which he (bin Laden) forbade al Qaeda operations to be mounted against the Iraqi leader.
Reporting from a well placed source disclosed that bin Laden was receiving training on bomb making from the IIS's [Iraqi Intelligence Service] principal technical expert on making sophisticated explosives, Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed. Brigadier Salim was observed at bin Laden's farm in Khartoum in Sept.-Oct. 1995 and again in July 1996, in the company of the Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti.
The Director of Iraqi Intelligence, Mani abd-al-Rashid al-Tikriti, met privately with bin Laden at his farm in Sudan in July 1996. Tikriti used an Iraqi delegation traveling to Khartoum to discuss bilateral cooperation as his "cover" for his own entry into Sudan to meet with bin Laden and Hassan al-Turabi. The Iraqi intelligence chief and two other IIS officers met at bin Laden's farm and discussed bin Laden's request for IIS technical assistance in: a) making letter and parcel bombs; b) making bombs which could be placed on aircraft and detonated by changes in barometric pressure; and c) making false passport [sic]. Bin Laden specifically requested that [Brigadier Salim al-Ahmed], Iraqi intelligence's premier explosives maker--especially skilled in making car bombs--remain with him in Sudan. The Iraqi intelligence chief instructed Salim to remain in Sudan with bin Laden as long as required.
According to a sensitive reporting [from] a "regular and reliable source," [Ayman al] Zawahiri, a senior al Qaeda operative, visited Baghdad and met with the Iraqi Vice President on 3 February 1998. The goal of the visit was to arrange for coordination between Iraq and bin Laden and establish camps in an-Nasiriyah and Iraqi Kurdistan under the leadership of Abdul Aziz.
According to sensitive reporting, a Malaysia-based Iraqi national (Shakir) facilitated the arrival of one of the Sept 11 hijackers for an operational meeting in Kuala Lumpur (Jan 2000). Sensitive reporting indicates Shakir's travel and contacts link him to a worldwide network of terrorists, including al Qaeda. Shakir worked at the Kuala Lumpur airport--a job he claimed to have obtained through an Iraqi embassy employee.
The Czech counterintelligence service reported that the Sept. 11 hijacker [Mohamed] Atta met with the former Iraqi intelligence chief in Prague, [Ahmed Khalil Ibrahim Samir] al Ani, on several occasions. During one of these meetings, al Ani ordered the IIS finance officer to issue Atta funds from IIS financial holdings in the Prague office.
… snip …
CIA can confirm two Atta visits to Prague--in Dec. 1994 and in June 2000; data surrounding the other two--on 26 Oct 1999 and 9 April 2001--is complicated and sometimes contradictory and CIA and FBI cannot confirm Atta met with the IIS. Czech Interior Minister Stanislav Gross continues to stand by his information.
al Qaeda and Iraq reached a secret agreement whereby Iraq would provide safe haven to al Qaeda members and provide them with money and weapons. The agreement reportedly prompted a large number of al Qaeda members to head to Iraq. The report also said that al Qaeda members involved in a fraudulent passport network for al Qaeda had been directed to procure 90 Iraqi and Syrian passports for al Qaeda personnel.
… snip …
References to procurement of false passports from Iraq and offers of safe haven previously have surfaced in CIA source reporting considered reliable. Intelligence reports to date have maintained that Iraqi support for al Qaeda usually involved providing training, obtaining passports, and offers of refuge. This report adds to that list by including weapons and money. This assistance would make sense in the aftermath of 9-11.
Sensitive reporting indicates senior terrorist planner and close al Qaeda associate al Zarqawi has had an operational alliance with Iraqi officials. As of Oct. 2002, al Zarqawi maintained contacts with the IIS to procure weapons and explosives, including surface-to-air missiles from an IIS officer in Baghdad. According to sensitive reporting, al Zarqawi was setting up sleeper cells in Baghdad to be activated in case of a U.S. occupation of the city, suggesting his operational cooperation with the Iraqis may have deepened in recent months. Such cooperation could include IIS provision of a secure operating bases [sic] and steady access to arms and explosives in preparation for a possible U.S. invasion. Al Zarqawi's procurements from the Iraqis also could support al Qaeda operations against the U.S. or its allies elsewhere.
Quote:
The study "found no 'smoking gun' (i.e., direct connection) between Saddam's Iraq and al Qaeda."
Did you miss that bit?
When the US intelligence community is willing to commit itself to the allegation that al-Qaeda and Saddam worked together
Civil wars don't go on for ever. The one in Iraq may well have ended without the surge.
here we go again...
Not necessarily. Why do you think we'd not have had to fight al-Qaeda somewhere had we not fought it in Iraq?
Long before the invasion in Iraq, al-Qaeda had tens of thousand of would be terrorists and supporters moving through it's camps in Afghanistan. Iraq simply acted as fly paper.
If those terrorists hadn't gone there to die, they'd have gone somewhere else, where we'd have had to fight them.
Let's remember that the entirety of BAC's arguments and counterarguments are going to take the following form.here we go again...
What do you think Iraq and the world would now look like had the US not invaded in 2003?
What do you think it's relationship with terrorists would now be?
What would it's relationship with neighboring countries be?
What would now be our and the world's response to Iraq's behavior?
Address the points I made above about those things.
Think you can do that? In the interest of non-stupidity?![]()
Noone can really say with any certainty what would have happened had the Bush administration taken a different approach in 2003-2006.