Independence. The same reason China make its own GPS system and the EU also do it.
This.
I'm not a big fan of Iranian foreign policy, but something deemed too important to forego can reasonably be too important to depend on others. I can see how fuel assurance for important infrastructure [power grid] for such a long-term committment [power plant implementation, life, and replacement time] could fall in that category.
so you would have no problem breaking a treaty?
Treaties are like roses and young girls: They last while they last. The tricky part is making sure the other side honors the treaty or keeping your affairs in order if they don't. A treaty might not be a good deal for a party that can't do at least one of those. To put it another way, the better question is how much problem which side will have if either side breaks the treaty.
Suppose Iran agrees to forego its own enrichment in return for foreign fuel supply agreements. If they commit a major part of their power infrastructure to that fuel supply, they're vulnerable to disruption (legal or not) for as long as it takes them to replace those facilities (it'll take a while), establish their own fuel supplies (claimed as the issue at hand), or restore supply agreement compliance (legally or forcibly). If they don't commit a major part of their power infrastructure to that fuel supply, they don't get whatever benefits it offers.
Considered in that light, that fuel supply agreement starts to sound like a PR exercise. Sure, everybody's happy
if both sides honor the treaty. If Iran doesn't honor such a treaty, the other side just stops sending fuel and nobody's worse off than without the treaty. If Iran honors the treaty and the other side doesn't, Iran's hosed -- their nuclear power generation infrastructure is worth less. That doesn't seem like a great treaty from Iran's perspective, unless they've got some way to compel the other side to comply (hint: yet another piece of paper probably won't make the grade).
Suppose Iran agrees to enrich its own fuel under conditions of inspection to verify it's not for weaponry. The other side wants Iran's compliance ensured (e.g. satisfactory inspections) or enforced (boom?).
Considered in that light, Iran allowing anything less than unfettered access to inspectors under such agreement starts to sound like a PR exercise. Again, everybody's happy
if both sides honor the treaty. If Iran honors the treaty and the other side doesn't, nobody's worse off than without the treaty. If the other side honors the treaty but Iran doesn't, the other side's hosed -- Iran enriches weapons-grade fuel. That wouldn't seem like a great treaty from the other side's perspective, unless they've got some ways to compel Iran to comply (oh, wait...)
