I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

It's not magic, it's emergence, and it happens all the time. When we reproduce, we make a fully self-conscious biological machine, while not being able to find which cell or membrane is actually conscious, only the whole thing is conscious. There's no ghost in the machine.

Look at your computer monitor - a bunch of electronics and illuminating pixels that performs a certain process magically resulting in an image, yet you won't find that image in any pixel, wire, or component.

Look at water - it's wet and it flows, yet you won't find wetness or flow in any water molecule, however close you look.

Right, however we can construct and evaluate theories on how a computer generates an image to a screen, and how water is wet and flows - but we can't generate a theory how a biological machine generates consciousness. We don't know if we can build a theory in principle . . . so we are left with - Well what else could it be but material process?
 
If a biological entity or machine can successfully mimic the behavior of self-consciousness, then one's behavioral requirements of self-consciousness are not rigorous enough.
or
one has to take the position that self-consciousness is not the function of material bodies or immaterial minds. And, awareness can not be a function of anything and is just what is is. Furthermore, one would have to take the position that no one has shown how anything material can be aware of anything, except to suggest that awareness is a behavior of material processes, without explaining how a process can be aware of anything.

The second, minds are an abstraction without a referent.
 
Right, however we can construct and evaluate theories on how a computer generates an image to a screen, and how water is wet and flows - but we can't generate a theory how a biological machine generates consciousness.

Yes, we can. Christof Koch, among others, is currently doing just this.

We don't know if we can build a theory in principle . . .

Yes, we do.

so we are left with - Well what else could it be but material process?

That is not what we are "left with". It is what we conclude.

You and punshhh both seem to have a problem differentiating between assumptions and conclusions on this front.
 
Right, however we can construct and evaluate theories on how a computer generates an image to a screen, and how water is wet and flows - but we can't generate a theory how a biological machine generates consciousness. We don't know if we can build a theory in principle . . . so we are left with - Well what else could it be but material process?
We haven't yet generated a theory (although there are plenty of hypotheses) because, for example, our technology to examine brain function is still fairly rudimentary, our experiments to test our hypotheses are limited by ethical considerations, our simulation technology is embryonic, and we've yet to reach consensus on precisely what to include in 'consciousness'.

We've made good progress towards elucidating the construction of the sense of self and some other features that seem relevant. I don't see any major obstacles in the medium to long term to making a full description of how consciousness is generated, in terms of brain architecture, connectivity, and functions of neural circuits, etc.

I suspect that the 'hard problem' of why it 'feels like' what it does to be conscious, will eventually resolve to acknowledging that an information processing system that has a particular sort of functionality will generate conscious behaviours, and being such a system means having subjective feelings and consciousness. But of course, I don't know.
 
Trust me.
It is really actual if two phenomenons have the same substance, and the same substance can't be but the simplest state of existence.

But in your case, you are not trust yourself (Belz...: "we can't be 100% sure of anything"), so your "trust me" has no basis what so ever.

Don't believe me ?
This is something that you first have to ask yourself, because you are doing so many "full gas in neutral" maneuvers in order to avoid any practice of techniques like TM, and the result is no direct awareness of the simplest state of existence.

So what is left for you? only blah blah blah matter's behavior.

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10447989&postcount=1643 is not in your scope.
 
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It is really actual if two phenomenons have the same substance, and the same substance can't be but the simplest state of existence.

But in your case, you are not trust yourself, so your "trust me" has no basis what so ever.

You don't know that. You haven't tried the effortless flying technique. You are thinking in groundish terms, which is why you cannot comprehend the simplest state of air travel.
 
You don't know that. You haven't tried the effortless flying technique.
Again, all your reasoning is tuned to indirectly aware of the simplest state of awareness (for example, air travel is a variant phenomenon, and no variant phenomenon enables to directly be aware of the simplest state of existence).

Moreover, ("Trust me.") AND ("we can't be 100% sure of anything") is logical contradiction.

Furthermore, you don't follow after your own standards, as clearly demonstrated in http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10444268&postcount=1532, http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10444401&postcount=1535 and http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showpost.php?p=10444465&postcount=1543.
 
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@Belz Notice how Doron employs every cultist tactic when cornered?

- Evasion
- Strawman
- Insult
- Reductio ad Absurdum
- ...

From that alone any halfway intelligent person could deduce that both Doron's claims and the whole mental midgetry of TM is absolute bogus.

Or, as Public Enemy once stated in their lyrics: "It might feel good, it might sound a little something, but **** the game if it ain't saying nothing".
 
ok.
In which case, it is self-conscious.
No it's not self-conscious, it's just replicating all the computational processes employed by self-conscious agents. It's no more conscious than a toaster. To say it is self-conscious is an assumption.

All you're saying is, put enough toasters together and it will, as if by magic, be self-conscious.

You really can't see it can you? Every computational process going on in the brain can be replicated, can be added together, is at no point self-conscious.

Think again of Data, every human mental capacity is replicated is it conscious? How do you know?

So you're not only committing the special pleading fallacy, you are cognizant of this fact and proud of it.
No it's not special pleading, it's the one thing we know independent of our mind. It is our primary knowledge enabling all secondary knowledge to be known.
Good for you.
Thankyou.

No, it isn't.
so it does fully replicate self-conscious behaviour?

Because it would be self-conscious.
(So is a toaster((sorry)). How do you know?


You keep trying to make some sort of differentiation there.

Define it.
I differentiate metabolic consciousness from intellectual self-awareness. So we have.
Consciousness = metabolic consciousness = experience of living, being.

Self-consciousness = the mind = fully self aware with intellectual thought.

The distinction is that consciousness does not require mental processing, making all your arguments obsolete.

Have you not worked it out yet?


Which doesn't change the fact that not all humans are self-conscious.
Irrelevant.
And that is entirely relevant. You even said why it is entirely relevant. Alter the brain, alter the computation, alter consciousness.
the person is conscious, just not self-conscious.


We've been over this.

Solipsism is not just a useless philosophy, it is an incoherent philosophy, because the universe acts exactly in every way as though it has objective existence. Thus, it has objective existence.
I'm happy to agree with you if the wording is altered to "thus it appears to have objective existence"

Remember the issue I pointed out with the word "is", it is presumptuous for a human to say something is such and such, it's the same with "it has" such and such in this context.
It is the same issue as the p-zombie problem. And, again, this is not a matter of what philosophies you do or do not embrace. It is a simple matter of definition.
I repeat self-consciousness can be mimicked by a synthetic consciousness equivalent.


Well, let's see.

This object reflects light with a wavelength of roughly four hundred and seventy five nanometers. It behaves exactly as though it is blue. Thus, it may be blue.

Technically a valid statement, but it doesn't really get you anywhere. You still have the same problem: the answer to your "may be" is "yes, it is, because that's what blue means".
Word games.

Yes. "X AND ~X" is an incoherent statement, and a p-zombie is an entity that is defined as "X AND ~X". Thus, it is incoherent. That is all.
I was well aware of this logic, but it is too simplistic as I pointed out. It goes like this,

Mimic(or appearance)of X AND ~X is coherent.
It boggles me that it has taken several pages to get this far.
You need to update your thinking subject to my definition of consciousness.


Or, hear me out on this, it's just possible that it might be self-conscious.
Agreed. you used the words "it might be", rather than "it is".
 
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punshhh, again :) How will you decide if an AI is self-conscious?

Let me explain, you are self-conscious, right?!! That is so independently of whether I claim that you are so or are not so. It is that same with an AI, it will be self-conscious regardless of you claiming it is so or it is not so. So the problem you face is this - regardless of how many words you "pile upon" each other they won't determine, whether an AI is self-conscious or not. So how do you decide whether an AI is self-conscious and not just decide beforehand in your mind whether an AI can be self-conscious or not?
 
punshhh, again :) How will you decide if an AI is self-conscious?
I don't know how it could be done. Other than to compare it to examples we already have of self-conscious beings.
Let me explain, you are self-conscious, right?!! That is so independently of whether I claim that you are so or are not so. It is that same with an AI, it will be self-conscious regardless of you claiming it is so or it is not so. So the problem you face is this - regardless of how many words you "pile upon" each other they won't determine, whether an AI is self-conscious or not. So how do you decide whether an AI is self-conscious and not just decide beforehand in your mind whether an AI can be self-conscious or not?
yes, I am not saying all AI are not self-conscious, I am saying that it is unlikely that they are self-conscious due to computation alone, because they will be mimics unless they are specifically designed to have experience. However it may not be possible to determine if AI which appear to be self-conscious, are or not. Or if that self-consciousness is the same as human self-consciousness.
 
Maybe, now ask yourself how you avoid speciesism including DNAism. :)
Any self-conscious thing which is equivalent to the degree of free self-conscious thought that is experienced by humans is equivalent whatever it's physical basis. Also I see no need for a hierarchy of importance, other than maintaining our species freedom, autonomy and security.

DNA-ism, well I find it hard to conceive of a better system, although I'm sure it's possible.
 
I don't know how it could be done. Other than to compare it to examples we already have of self-conscious beings.
Compare what - shape? material? structure? behaviour?

...I am saying that it is unlikely that they are self-conscious due to computation alone, because they will be mimics unless they are specifically designed to have experience.
Does this imply that humans are specifically designed to have experience, because we don't mimic it? or are we mimics that don't realise it?

If you saw two different AIs that behaved indistinguishably from a self-conscious human in all circumstances (without seeing each other), and you were told that one was specifically designed to have experience, but the other wasn't, would you say that one was more likely to be self-conscious than the other, despite their indistinguishable behaviour?

Do you feel that specific design for experience is necessary for an entity to have real experience and self-consciousness?
 

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