I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[Nonpareil]

Since everything we experience is necessarily "framed" by the act of experiencing, it is tempting, and it is also quite possible, to more or less adequately explain the universe using models in which the act of experiencing is the origin of everything experienced.The most parsimonious and self-consistent of such models is solipsism, but that fails to explain the apparent similarities between our own and others' experiences. So the most popular models of that type end up including a unifying entity, a universal mind or first experiencer. The partial subordination of our individual experiences to the unifying entity's explains their similarities to one another.

Those models, which I'll loosely equate with mysticism, are almost perfect inversions of the materialistic one, to the point where in many ways they're almost equivalent and lead to some of the same destinations, including certain ideas about the nature and boundaries of the self and the meaning of death. This is generally unappreciated, in large part because most materialists haven't gone far enough in following up the logical implications of the materialist model. That's something I have to write an essay about soon, though it's looking like a monumental task.

I don't agree about the explanatory or satisfactory (or even coherent) nature of idealist models, but I'd be interested to read the essay regardless. Let me know if it's ever finished.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

...

Do you know what? You are not wrong nor right unless you think and feel so. If you for some ways of understanding give up those 2 binary arbitrary designators and stop thinking that humans can be right or wrong, you might learn a new way of understanding. You don't have to and it is not certain that you can, but it is there.

With regards

 

[Belz...]

Do you know what? You are not wrong nor right unless you think and feel so.

Nonsense. If I say "two plus two equals five", I am wrong no matter what you or I feel about it.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

That's as may be, but what understanding of anything does experiencing the pen (except for the part about the pen) lead to?

What is the substance you are experiencing when you dream about a pen that is also a snake that rolls away from you when you drop it on a train and when you crouch down to look for it you realize you're surfing in the Grand Canyon?

What is the substance you are experiencing when you're not holding a banana but you wish you had one?

Since everything we experience is necessarily "framed" by the act of experiencing, it is tempting, and it is also quite possible, to more or less adequately explain the universe using models in which the act of experiencing is the origin of everything experienced. The most parsimonious and self-consistent of such models is solipsism, but that fails to explain the apparent similarities between our own and others' experiences. So the most popular models of that type end up including a unifying entity, a universal mind or first experiencer. The partial subordination of our individual experiences to the unifying entity's explains their similarities to one another.

Those models, which I'll loosely equate with mysticism, are almost perfect inversions of the materialistic one, to the point where in many ways they're almost equivalent and lead to some of the same destinations, including certain ideas about the nature and boundaries of the self and the meaning of death. This is generally unappreciated, in large part because most materialists haven't gone far enough in following up the logical implications of the materialist model. That's something I have to write an essay about soon, though it's looking like a monumental task.

Well, I don't know if this is relevant, but when you trace in practice some of the assumptions inherent in science you get across e.g.:

The cosmological principle is usually stated formally as 'Viewed on a sufficiently large scale, the properties of the Universe are the same for all observers.' This amounts to the strongly philosophical statement that the part of the Universe which we can see is a fair sample, and that the same physical laws apply throughout. In essence, this in a sense says that the Universe is knowable and is playing fair with scientists.
William C. Keel (2007). The Road to Galaxy Formation (2nd ed.). Springer-Praxis. ISBN 978-3-540-72534-3.. p. 2.

 

[Nonpareil]

Do you know what? You are not wrong nor right unless you think and feel so.

Wrong.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Nonsense. If I say "two plus two equals five", I am wrong no matter what you or I feel about it.

So all forms and categories of wrong are exactly the same?

• The moon is made of the dairy product green cheese
• 2+2=5
• Killing a newborn for the fun of it.

In effect you are saying there is a universal physical cause and effect which gives you the physical property of being wrong. How odd

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Wrong.

How does wrong look like in physics as a physical process in a body with a brain? What are the objective physical characteristics of wrong?

Everything is physical, so what is wrong physically?

 

[Nonpareil]

What are the objective physical characteristics of wrong?

Wrong is a descriptor.

You're just deliberately wasting time now.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Wrong is a descriptor.

You're just deliberately wasting time now.

No, all words are actual physical processes in a brain and can be described using natural science in the strong sense. So what is wrong is a physical sense? So using dualism, Nonpareil!!!

Now in practice PixyMisa won't come to get you, because you are one of "we...", but none the less you are engaging in functional dualism. I.e. there is a meaning to some words which can't described using physical terms.

 

[Tommy Jeppesen]

Wrong is a descriptor.

You're just deliberately wasting time now.

Then stop using it in a moral sense.

 

[Nonpareil]

No, all words are actual physical processes in a brain and can be described using natural science in the strong sense. So what is wrong is a physical sense? So using dualism, Nonpareil!!!

Your inability to understand concepts presented to you does not amount to dualism on my part.

Then stop using it in a moral sense.

I am using it as a descriptor applied to objectively untrue statements.

I have no idea what you are using it as, because you don't understand what you're saying, let alone what anyone else is.

 

[LarryS]

That's as may be, but what understanding of anything does experiencing the pen (except for the part about the pen) lead to?

What is the substance you are experiencing when you dream about a pen that is also a snake that rolls away from you when you drop it on a train and when you crouch down to look for it you realize you're surfing in the Grand Canyon?

What is the substance you are experiencing when you're not holding a banana but you wish you had one?

Since everything we experience is necessarily "framed" by the act of experiencing, it is tempting, and it is also quite possible, to more or less adequately explain the universe using models in which the act of experiencing is the origin of everything experienced. The most parsimonious and self-consistent of such models is solipsism, but that fails to explain the apparent similarities between our own and others' experiences. So the most popular models of that type end up including a unifying entity, a universal mind or first experiencer. The partial subordination of our individual experiences to the unifying entity's explains their similarities to one another.

Those models, which I'll loosely equate with mysticism, are almost perfect inversions of the materialistic one, to the point where in many ways they're almost equivalent and lead to some of the same destinations, including certain ideas about the nature and boundaries of the self and the meaning of death. This is generally unappreciated, in large part because most materialists haven't gone far enough in following up the logical implications of the materialist model. That's something I have to write an essay about soon, though it's looking like a monumental task.

At this point, I'm not really gunning for any "understanding", and I don't feel worthy of any inquiries into advanced topics as self or death, but I do like to conduct a completely honest appraisal of the present moment - and when I do, I find awareness and stuff in awareness. Whether this stuff is labeled material or consciousness is going to come down to how squirrelly it is - and so far, no matter what we think matter is, it turns out to be more than that.

 

[Belz...]

So all forms and categories of wrong are exactly the same?

Something is either true or not. The problem here is that you conflate "factually wrong" with "morally wrong". As I've told you earlier today, and that you probably ignored, you can convert one to the other once you establish your variables.

In effect you are saying there is a universal physical cause and effect which gives you the physical property of being wrong. How odd

No, that is not at all what I'm saying. Perhaps you should read posts more slowly before replying, and assume that you interpreted it wrong before you hit "submit".

 

[tsig]

So you as scientists can solve this one without feelings and subjectivity:
http://psycnet.apa.org/journals/psp/101/2/366/


You can in effect answer Harm/Care, Fairness/Reciprocity, Ingroup/Loyalty, Authority/Respect, and Purity/Sanctity without the use of any sort of feelings???
Please to refer to a peer reviewed study of how that is done?

The answer is part of the Cut/Cure, Heal/Hurt, Love/Lust, Disobedience/Obey and Real/Immaterial dichotomies of everyday existence.

 

[tsig]

Do you know what? You are not wrong nor right unless you think and feel so. If you for some ways of understanding give up those 2 binary arbitrary designators and stop thinking that humans can be right or wrong, you might learn a new way of understanding. You don't have to and it is not certain that you can, but it is there.

With regards

So if I think and feel I'm right while beheading an infidel I'm OK?

 

[marplots]

But that's not true either. Instantiations of concepts - which are material things - have material consequences.

Concepts in and of themselves don't exist and have no effect on anything.

But that's the rub, isn't it? An instantiation of something that doesn't exist is a bit of magic that turns the non-existent into some "thing."

Even if we say that all that exists (material and energy) is a fixed total, and differences we note are simply rearrangements of this sandbox, there's still a possibility for the immaterial. In this framing, the immaterial comes in when we ask about how the arrangement came to be this way instead of that, or whether the principles we've discovered about how things act are also material things. It's not hard to find meta levels.

 

[PixyMisa]

But that's the rub, isn't it? An instantiation of something that doesn't exist is a bit of magic that turns the non-existent into some "thing."

No.

Even if we say that all that exists (material and energy) is a fixed total, and differences we note are simply rearrangements of this sandbox, there's still a possibility for the immaterial.

No.

In this framing, the immaterial comes in when we ask about how the arrangement came to be this way instead of that, or whether the principles we've discovered about how things act are also material things.

No.

It's not hard to find meta levels.

It's particularly easy if you abandon any semblance of logic.

 

[Nonpareil]

But that's the rub, isn't it? An instantiation of something that doesn't exist is a bit of magic that turns the non-existent into some "thing."

Even if we say that all that exists (material and energy) is a fixed total, and differences we note are simply rearrangements of this sandbox, there's still a possibility for the immaterial. In this framing, the immaterial comes in when we ask about how the arrangement came to be this way instead of that, or whether the principles we've discovered about how things act are also material things. It's not hard to find meta levels.

Literally every sentence in this post is wrong. Except possibly the last, but that's mostly because "finding meta levels" could mean anything.

 

[Fudbucker]

Triangles are real entities. "Triangle" is a descriptor we give to a shape that fits a certain definition.

If a triangle can exist independent of the mind, who is there to give a "descriptor"?

Mathematical realism does not hold that there is some mystic "true circle" that exists independently of all other matter. It's just the rather straightforward position that mathematics is constant.

No, it's that mathematical concepts exist independent of the mind. http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Philosophy_of_mathematics#Mathematical_realism

Which means that there's a possible universe where the Pythagoream Theorem exists in a universe with no conscious beings. That begs the obvious question: How does the Pythagream Theorem (SP) exist in a mindless universe? What is the materialist explanation for that?

Which it is, because mathematics is a description of the real world, which is constant.

A necessary condition for description is someone to do the describing. In a universe without minds, the mathematical descriptions still exist, but there are no describers. What is the material explanation for that?

Abstract representations are not a problem for materialism.

If the representations exist independent of any minds, then it seems it's a rather large problem for materialism

 

[LarryS]

But that's the rub, isn't it? An instantiation of something that doesn't exist is a bit of magic that turns the non-existent into some "thing."

Even if we say that all that exists (material and energy) is a fixed total, and differences we note are simply rearrangements of this sandbox, there's still a possibility for the immaterial. In this framing, the immaterial comes in when we ask about how the arrangement came to be this way instead of that, or whether the principles we've discovered about how things act are also material things. It's not hard to find meta levels.

The terms 'material' and 'non material' are a problem semantically, more useful terms would be material=bound by time space or subject to modification and non material=unbounded and not subject to modification.

These terms would be employed 'in principle'

Then, if a concept, or arrangement or law of nature and etc are suggested, they can be shown to be material. For example, a geometric point, which occupies no space and only differentiates a location - is material. A law of nature, such as the speed of light, an arrangement, or a non existent unicorn - - are in principle subject to modification and or locatable in space/time and are therefore material. Ghosts, angels and any deity would also be material.

The only 'thing' that would be non material would be unbounded and changeless.

Otherwise we're doomed to a debate between gross material, and non material as whatever is currently too subtle to measure/know material.