I challenge you: your best alternate to materialism

[MRC_Hans]

I was only taking your statement "Our consciousness makes what we are, but we are not it. Basically, consciousness is a property of humans, not the other way around." and building an analogy around that.
If the analogy doesn't make sense, then perhaps, nor does your statement.

... etc.

No, none of that is what I was saying.

Hans

 

[Navigator]

... etc.

No, none of that is what I was saying.

Hans

Okay.

So are you saying that a human is just a human body and consciousness has nothing to do with what makes a human a human?

Is it the whole body which you regard is human, or the fleshy parts only? Do you regard the skeleton as being human or as being the property of a human?

In relation to the body, which parts if any, do you regard as being human and which parts do you regard (like you regard consciousness) as being 'the property of the human'?

Actually - I am not sure that any of this is on topic. Perhaps another thread would be best...

 

[MRC_Hans]

Okay.

So are you saying that a human is just a human body and consciousness has nothing to do with what makes a human a human?

Is it the whole body which you regard is human, or the fleshy parts only? Do you regard the skeleton as being human or as being the property of a human?

In relation to the body, which parts if any, do you regard as being human and which parts do you regard (like you regard consciousness) as being 'the property of the human'?

Actually - I am not sure that any of this is on topic. Perhaps another thread would be best...

No comments.

Hans

 

[Hlafordlaes]

Yes, qualia is physical, even reliving memories is physical. The brain is not simulating these physical processes in computation and likewise a computer like a brain would not be simulating these processes either.
I like your phrase "fire chemical body responses". A chemical reaction is in a sense a burning, fire, combustion. Electricity is another kind of burning, or fire.
The cell utilises both in its metabolism. Both are physical.

In light of this, an very interesting condition, mirror tough synesthesia, which came up - cough - in a TV series I recently watched, seems to at least lend some credence to this view. Fascinating; had never heard of this, and was surprised it appears not to be fictional, as I feared.

 

[punshhh]

In light of this, an very interesting condition, mirror tough synesthesia, which came up - cough - in a TV series I recently watched, seems to at least lend some credence to this view. Fascinating; had never heard of this, and was surprised it appears not to be fictional, as I feared.

Yes I have experienced this. As I see it the nervous system and brain are reflecting a behaviour and qualia due to subjective stimulus (among others). I would expect that the behaviour in question is a hardwired, or well used nervous pathway, hense easily triggered.

 

[punshhh]

It is no more consciousness than a single NAND-gate is a computer.

Hans

is the NAND gate in this analogy external to the cell, ie at the synapse. Or does it occur aswell inside the cell?

 

[punshhh]

Wrong, the brain does not directly experience qualia, it generates them.

The perceptions which are mistakenly labeled as qualia are made up by the brain. You may not like it but it is true, the brain makes up the perceptions from the sensations and it fabricates them wholesale from limited data.

So the beloved qualia are exactly simulations, they are made up models derived from the limited data of the sensations.

For example, the perceptual area of color vision, the fovea covers a small area of your visual field, smaller that the width or your thumb at arms length .

it provides two things visual acuity and color vision. So guess what almost all those colors that you see, especially in that beautiful sunset, your brain takes that very little area where it gets color sensations and makes up the rest.

Now granted due to the random jiggling of your eye that area moves somewhat but it is still a very small portion of your visual field. So where do all those lovely colors come from?

They aren't sensed. they are made up. Just like what you see where your blind spot is.

Thanks for your input DD, yes there is simulation going on here. Indeed there is a lot of simulation going on in the brain.

The processes involved in the experience of a sunset are complex. What you point out and the simulation of stimulus are all part of the computation going on external to the cell and as such not in dispute by me. I am simply drawing the distinction between metabolism(internal to the cell) and the computation going on external to the cell in the nervous system. The origin of the being, the experiencer of the sunset is not necessarily through the computation in the brain. Although it is its vehicle of experience, it's origin may be in the living processes of the organism. Processes other than than any nervous processing.

I am happy to agree that all the processes involved here can be processed by a synthetic computer, even the metabolism*, but in the absence of a living piece of hardware, it may be entirely unconscious, like a toaster or an abacus.

*There is another problem here which goes back to my referrence to consciousness being a physical process. One could in theory simulate with great clarity, a metabolic process, such as what goes on in a cell. But without having physical atoms present in the apparatus as in a living cell, you fail to generate consciousness. Or basically you require physical atoms, rather than simulations of atoms, to generate consciousness.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

is the NAND gate in this analogy external to the cell, ie at the synapse. Or does it occur aswell inside the cell?

Definitely inside the cell. Cf. bacteria.

I can't make any claims about what std neurosci says (yet), but I imagine we have to deal with signalling, storage, and network effects. I wonder, woo-ish of me, if knowledge is molecular (and thought electro-chemical), and if those molecules could be traced as having common use in a class (mammals, birds).

Just to put the woo out there, what if (arbitrarily derived, as in all evolution), we can find that a certain molecule always 'means' or refers to a similar semantic primitive, at least in that evolutionary line? I really wonder how this actually plays out in the brain.

 

[MRC_Hans]

is the NAND gate in this analogy external to the cell, ie at the synapse. Or does it occur aswell inside the cell?

Basically inside the cell. The synapse is more like the wiring, although in the biological system, the functional borders are not nearly as sharp.

Various attempts have been made to figure out the number of "gate-equivalents" in a brain, but it is not easily done.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

Definitely inside the cell. Cf. bacteria.

I can't make any claims about what std neurosci says (yet), but I imagine we have to deal with signalling, storage, and network effects. I wonder, woo-ish of me, if knowledge is molecular (and thought electro-chemical), and if those molecules could be traced as having common use in a class (mammals, birds).

Just to put the woo out there, what if (arbitrarily derived, as in all evolution), we can find that a certain molecule always 'means' or refers to a similar semantic primitive, at least in that evolutionary line? I really wonder how this actually plays out in the brain.

I don't see where the woo is, but if we attempt (very coarsely and imprecisely) to compare the brain with a computer, then there will be some machine level code, some high level code, some ROM firmware, and some program memory.

The machine level code is things like pain, hunger, and sex. They are hard-wired into whole classes of life-forms.

The high level code is something we learn; from experience, from our parents, from our surroundings, in the form of culture, norms, prejudices, beliefs.

The ROM firmware is instincts. We are born with a dislike of spiders (most of us), the newborn baby knows how to find the tit and how to suck it, etc.

The program memory is where we put our education, our upbringing, out life experience, out self-formed opinions.

If we are to look for self-consciousness, it seems that it is found in such creatures that have a sufficient amount of program memory.

Hans

 

[MRC_Hans]

But without having physical atoms present in the apparatus as in a living cell, you fail to generate consciousness. Or basically you require physical atoms, rather than simulations of atoms, to generate consciousness.

You seem to want very dearly to believe this. However, there is no base for it. Granted, a computer is also made from atoms, but there is no reason to assume that the biological atoms could not be simulated by software functions, i.e. basically numbers.

Hans

 

[Hlafordlaes]

I don't see where the woo is, but if we attempt (very coarsely and imprecisely) to compare the brain with a computer, then there will be some machine level code, some high level code, some ROM firmware, and some program memory.

The machine level code is things like pain, hunger, and sex. They are hard-wired into whole classes of life-forms.

The high level code is something we learn; from experience, from our parents, from our surroundings, in the form of culture, norms, prejudices, beliefs.

The ROM firmware is instincts. We are born with a dislike of spiders (most of us), the newborn baby knows how to find the tit and how to suck it, etc.

The program memory is where we put our education, our upbringing, out life experience, out self-formed opinions.

If we are to look for self-consciousness, it seems that it is found in such creatures that have a sufficient amount of program memory.

Hans

I love the metaphors and agree with the general view. The brass tacks of how this really works is what I wish I could describe in plain physical terms. The 'inevitable' Moore's-law driven vision of Kurzweil in the advance of computing ignores this. (It is a mathematical model that can forget it needs to be circumscribed to physical/biological realities.) But somehow I have to make that brain-dump stuff happen soon, or I miss out.... forever. Boo-hoo.

 

[Dancing David]

*There is another problem here which goes back to my referrence to consciousness being a physical process. One could in theory simulate with great clarity, a metabolic process, such as what goes on in a cell. But without having physical atoms present in the apparatus as in a living cell, you fail to generate consciousness. Or basically you require physical atoms, rather than simulations of atoms, to generate consciousness.

This seems to be a fallacy of construction? An assumption that consciousness has to be biological and is inherent in the metabolism of the cell?

 

[Dancing David]

Definitely inside the cell. Cf. bacteria.

I can't make any claims about what std neurosci says (yet), but I imagine we have to deal with signalling, storage, and network effects. I wonder, woo-ish of me, if knowledge is molecular (and thought electro-chemical), and if those molecules could be traced as having common use in a class (mammals, birds).

Just to put the woo out there, what if (arbitrarily derived, as in all evolution), we can find that a certain molecule always 'means' or refers to a similar semantic primitive, at least in that evolutionary line? I really wonder how this actually plays out in the brain.

neural cell response to a synaptic or direct input is based upon a process of conditioned attentuation/potentiation.

If an input is associated with with firing it becomes potentiated, if it is associated with not firing it becomes attenuated.

So each cell in the neural net has an aggregate score of firing that is also poteniated and attenuated, very probability fuzzy kind of gating.

 

[punshhh]

You don't understand a single thing I've said to you.

I have pruned this down a little as we have begun to repeat the same points.

I understand your entire argument, which you have repeated at least once, while not presenting any additional points. Also I can't see how your position can be expanded (I am aware of integrated information theory etc), you have covered all bases and it all makes perfect sense.

However I must say that you appear to have retreated into a world of intellect and language and tend to ignore anything outside the human mind. Also you tend to deny any considerations which "do not compute" in this world of intellect and language. Indeed that it is folly to address things which may exist externally to this world.

I can't see any way forward from here. Remember the first time we discussed something, I said, we would not lock horns well, in debate, well here we are.

Because it is both very, very silly and very, very wrong.

A definition is as offered, it is neither right nor wrong.

By which you apparently mean attempting to argue for the existence of nonsensical, unsupported entities that have been long since discarded as the purest fantasy.

All I have argued for is a bit of open mindedness to what reality may entail and that for humanity to presume to understand it is intellectual idolatry.

 

[Nonpareil]

I am simply drawing the distinction between metabolism(internal to the cell) and the computation going on external to the cell in the nervous system.

That which takes place inside the cell is also part of the computation.

Once again, you are attempting to crowbar in a distinction where none exists.

The origin of the being, the experiencer of the sunset is not necessarily through the computation in the brain.

You have absolutely no reason to believe this.

I am happy to agree that all the processes involved here can be processed by a synthetic computer, even the metabolism*, but in the absence of a living piece of hardware, it may be entirely unconscious, like a toaster or an abacus.

You have even less reason to believe this.

*There is another problem here which goes back to my referrence to consciousness being a physical process. One could in theory simulate with great clarity, a metabolic process, such as what goes on in a cell. But without having physical atoms present in the apparatus as in a living cell, you fail to generate consciousness. Or basically you require physical atoms, rather than simulations of atoms, to generate consciousness.

And ditto the above. It is true that a computer simulation of an entity will not necessarily possess all of its physical properties (which is what makes it a simulation; if it did possess all of those properties, it would be the thing it was simulating), but again, consciousness is computational. There are no physical properties that it is missing.

And no, saying "it has to be biological" with no supporting evidence does not change this.

 

[Nonpareil]

I understand your entire argument, which you have repeated at least once, while not presenting any additional points. Also I can't see how your position can be expanded (I am aware of integrated information theory etc), you have covered all bases and it all makes perfect sense.

Wonderful. Now-

However I must say that you appear to have retreated into a world of intellect and language and tend to ignore anything outside the human mind.

Sigh.

So. It makes perfect sense and addresses all the issues, but you don't like it, so you continue to argue in favor of nonsensical, incoherent guesswork because it makes you feel better. And you consistently retreat into meaningless straw men like "a world of intellect and language" and "ignoring anything outside the human mind", neither of which are true.

Why, exactly?

Also you tend to deny any considerations which "do not compute" in this world of intellect and language.

Yes, I do brush aside things that are incoherent and undefined, because they are incoherent and undefined. There is nothing to consider.

Word salad is not a substitute for an actual argument.

Indeed that it is folly to address things which may exist externally to this world.

Without any evidence of them, yes.

A definition is as offered, it is neither right nor wrong.

This is not Tumblr. You do not get to make up your own meanings for words.

 

[Hlafordlaes]

neural cell response to a synaptic or direct input is based upon a process of conditioned attentuation/potentiation.

If an input is associated with with firing it becomes potentiated, if it is associated with not firing it becomes attenuated.

So each cell in the neural net has an aggregate score of firing that is also poteniated and attenuated, very probability fuzzy kind of gating.

Fascinating stuff. Can't wait until I get into those fun details. I'm using Kandel's hernia-inducing textbook, but have detoured into other topics (info theory) and am going back soon. Idea is to keep both in mind and try to understand what the widely varying definitions of computational neurology mean, and then retreat back to the relative safety of linguistics.

So tired of 'consciousness' threads and TED talks that I've decided enough is enough. Time to listen to science and tune out the woo.

 

[punshhh]

Basically inside the cell. The synapse is more like the wiring, although in the biological system, the functional borders are not nearly as sharp.

Yes, I see this, so each cell is a bit? Well I know it may perform more than one task and the distinctions are not as sharp. But one neuron is one bit and the neurons around it are other bits in the computation?

Various attempts have been made to figure out the number of "gate-equivalents" in a brain, but it is not easily done.

Presumably this would not include the actions of the mitochondria, or the nucleus?

 

[punshhh]

This seems to be a fallacy of construction? An assumption that consciousness has to be biological and is inherent in the metabolism of the cell?

I'm simply presenting an alternative explanation to the established "consciousness is just computation in the brain" view. A view which may be overly reductionist and certainly presumes consciousness in AI.

Folk can repeat these mantras as much as they like, but the reality on the ground may be different and should not be ignored.