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Huge WW2 Japanese Submarine I-400 Class Found Off Hawaii

After considering I think the seaplanes were a neat idea, and maybe had some use, but the IJN would have been far better off developing higher performance, smaller subs for use against allied convoys. Something they did far too little of. How many "type VII" equivalent subs could they have built with the resources needed to go into these huge subs. Furthermore the bigger a sub the easier it is to detect and sink, and the longer it takes to dive. Operational type I-201 subs would have been far more useful than the type I-400.
 
Here´s an interesting (and in my opinion, very well-written) alternate history timeline based on the use of the I-400 subs to attack the continental US: http://www.alternatehistory.com/discussion/showthread.php?t=280585
I've read that. Excellent stuff, few people understand the likely use of CBW in WW2.

After considering I think the seaplanes were a neat idea, and maybe had some use, but the IJN would have been far better off developing higher performance, smaller subs for use against allied convoys. Something they did far too little of. How many "type VII" equivalent subs could they have built with the resources needed to go into these huge subs. Furthermore the bigger a sub the easier it is to detect and sink, and the longer it takes to dive. Operational type I-201 subs would have been far more useful than the type I-400.
Oh hell yes, the huge subs were a waste of resources, like the Yamato battleships.
However IJN sub doctrine sucked, they ignored merchant shipping and went after warships.
 
Very. There was a lot of interest in the idea back then, both to scout for the sub in it's anti-shipping role (e.g. the Surcouf or M2) and as a strike capability in their own right. Wells' The Shape of Things to Come discusses the idea, with several countries having aircraft-carrying subs armed with chemical or biological weapon.

The I-400 class carried three small seaplanes, launched by catapult on the surface, each able to carry about 800kg of bombs.
The proposed Panama Canal lock attack (on Gatun in '45) was interesting; it would have used ten aircraft launched from four subs, either a bomb/torpedo attack or a Kamikaze attack, but was canceled after Okinawa fell.

These subs are something of a trope in alternate histories either attacking the canal early in the war or attacking California with biological weapons.

Today there are no submarines capable of carrying crewed aircraft (though the idea of using them for SOF delivery with helicopters is brought up occasionally) but some subs (e.g. the German 212's) can operate UAVs.
One of the problems with drones is the inability to push a conventional radio signal through salt water, so a relay buoy is needed.
IIRC, there was a proposal to rebuild some of the Soviet/Russian Typhoons to operate helicopters a few years ago, but like the submarine transport idea, it went nowhere.


I'd have thought it might be good for finding and attacking poorly-defended targets, but that it would be bad for attacking convoys, or well-defended targets.

The aircraft would increase the scouting range of the submarine, but would also be detectable on radar. The submarine design would have to have been a compromise to enable it to carry the aircraft*, whilst the aircraft would have been more of a compromise than even a normal carrier-borne aircraft.

As far as I can see, the advantage over a small surface-carrier is that it would be better at slipping past a blockade (for example the situation that the Tirpitz was in) but once in the open ocean I'd have thought a small surface-carrier could have been hard to find and have a better range or speed as well as having better aircraft.

*Wiki confirms this:
The I-400 class subs were unwieldy and relatively difficult to maneuver while surfaced owing to their small rudders.[20] The large superstructure also caused the sub to veer off course during any strong wind.[20] The maximum safe diving depth of the U-400 class submarine was only 82% of its overall length, which presented problems if the submarine was dived at too steep an angle in an emergency.[20] Because of their large aircraft hangars and conning tower, all I-400 class boats had significant radar signatures on the surface, and could be detected by aircraft relatively easily. Dive time was 56 seconds, nearly double that of U.S. fleet subs, which made the boats easier to destroy from the air when caught on the surface.[20]
 
Exactly. Had the Japanese expected US carriers in battle, they wouldn't commit many (most? any?) of the grave errors they eventually made.


It all started with a highly complicated and rigid plan that didn't allow for contingencies.

The Japanese did expect the US carriers to show up, just not as soon as they did.
 
How useful is a plane on a submarine? in 1940something? And now?

In 1940,Long Range Reconnaisaince. For situations where the Japanese did not want to risk a aircraft carrier.
The submarine planes were actually quite useful for that purpose. But as a strike weapon, they were of nuisance value at best.
 
Strange how they never suspected their secret code had been deciphered despite Midway and other defeats.
 
Strange how they never suspected their secret code had been deciphered despite Midway and other defeats.

One of my professors in college described the Japanese in WW2 as "not fighting on planet earth." This helps explain many things about the Pacific war.
 
Strange how they never suspected their secret code had been deciphered despite Midway and other defeats.
One of the reasons Magic and Ultra ( the code-breaking efforts and the utilization of the information obtained by the Allies) worked so well and for so long is that they went to EXTREME lengths to make sure there were plausible "other" sources and to NOT act on certain information even when it might have been to their advantage. EXCEPT for the occasional honker, like jumping Yamamoto's plane.

The book by Fred Winterbottom The Ultra Secret gives a few interesting details. One that comes to mind was when one of the field units that handled Ultra material got hold of an intercept that told them there would be an air raid at their headquarters that day. The members of the field unit showed up that day with their tin hats, and it was remarked AFTER the raid just how prescient they were, leading to speculation. The order came down from high that from then on, even if they KNEW something was about to happen, they couldn't be visibly prepared. It had to be "business as usual."

In the Mediterranean, even though the Allies knew exactly where an Axis convoy would be routed, they always arranged for a scout aircraft to just "happen" across it on patrol before pasting the crap out of it.

I'm sure there were similar incidents in the Pacific.

It's not surprising the Japanese (and Germans) didn't suspect their codes were being read. Mathematically, the Enigma and Purple codes are staggeringly secure when used correctly. It was operational blunders that left the door MOSTLY unlocked. Even then, it took a considerable amount of effort to do the final decode. When daily keys changed, there was a mad scramble by the cryptanalysts to find what they were -- they just knew where NOT to look for a solution, which reduced the scope of where they needed to search to something manageable.

Based on the math, it would seem more likely that there was a loose set of lips among the recipients, rather than the other side being able to read your mail.

Beanbag
 
In 1940,Long Range Reconnaisaince. For situations where the Japanese did not want to risk a aircraft carrier.
The submarine planes were actually quite useful for that purpose. But as a strike weapon, they were of nuisance value at best.


I-25 launched two raids in 1942 in an unsuccessful attempt to start a forest fire in Oregon.
 
One of the reasons Magic and Ultra ( the code-breaking efforts and the utilization of the information obtained by the Allies) worked so well and for so long is that they went to EXTREME lengths to make sure there were plausible "other" sources and to NOT act on certain information even when it might have been to their advantage. EXCEPT for the occasional honker, like jumping Yamamoto's plane.

The book by Fred Winterbottom The Ultra Secret gives a few interesting details. One that comes to mind was when one of the field units that handled Ultra material got hold of an intercept that told them there would be an air raid at their headquarters that day. The members of the field unit showed up that day with their tin hats, and it was remarked AFTER the raid just how prescient they were, leading to speculation. The order came down from high that from then on, even if they KNEW something was about to happen, they couldn't be visibly prepared. It had to be "business as usual."

In the Mediterranean, even though the Allies knew exactly where an Axis convoy would be routed, they always arranged for a scout aircraft to just "happen" across it on patrol before pasting the crap out of it.

I'm sure there were similar incidents in the Pacific.

It's not surprising the Japanese (and Germans) didn't suspect their codes were being read. Mathematically, the Enigma and Purple codes are staggeringly secure when used correctly. It was operational blunders that left the door MOSTLY unlocked. Even then, it took a considerable amount of effort to do the final decode. When daily keys changed, there was a mad scramble by the cryptanalysts to find what they were -- they just knew where NOT to look for a solution, which reduced the scope of where they needed to search to something manageable.

Based on the math, it would seem more likely that there was a loose set of lips among the recipients, rather than the other side being able to read your mail.

Beanbag
There was technical arrogance.

Often they signed the codes off with the same forms of words, "Heil Hitler" being one, apparently. They also used the same codes for more routine messages (I recall reading that this included met reports). The RAF sometimes dropped mines at particular locations and if they were reported, the message content was almost known beforehand.
 
Probably the biggest "crib" for cracking an Enigma message was concentrating on the first six characters. Why? Well, the first six characters were the initial rotor settings for the following message (three letters, repeated TWICE), encoded using the daily code setting. The reason they repeated the three-character setting was in case it somehow got garbled during transmission. The person on the receiving end set their machine to the daily code setting, decoded the first six characters, and if the two three-letter groups matched, then set the machine using the three-letter group, which had been used to encode the REST of the message. If the two three-letter groups didn't match, they'd try the first group, and if that didn't work, they'd try the second. Odds are, ONE of them was correct. If neither worked, you requested a retransmission.

Once the Allies knew this, all they had to do was work on the first six characters, and when they found a solution that gave two identical sets of three characters, they had the daily key, and the whole ball of wax (for that day's messages).

The mathematical permutations for the "standard" Enigma number 3EE114, or the number 3 followed by 114 zeros (roughly). Based on this raw number, the security for Enigma (and the Japanese Purple machine) should be impossible to break on a realistic time scale. It was these little blunders in the implementation that brought the solution down to something that could be handled by the electromechanical and vacuum-tube computers of the period.

Beanbag
 
Ah yes Beanbag, more technical arrogance.

Wiki has quite a lot on it.

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Cryptanalysis_of_the_Enigma#Crib-based_decryption

Cribs were fundamental to the British approach to breaking Enigma, but guessing the plaintext for a message was a highly skilled business. So in 1940 Stuart Milner-Barry set up a special Crib Room in Hut 8.[99][100]

Foremost amongst the knowledge needed for identifying cribs was the text of previous decrypts. Bletchley Park maintained detailed indexes[101] of message preambles, of every person, of every ship, of every unit, of every weapon, of every technical term and of repeated phrases such as forms of address and other German military jargon.[102] For each message the traffic analysis recorded the radio frequency, the date and time of intercept, and the preamble—which contained the network-identifying discriminant, the time of origin of the message, the callsign of the originating and receiving stations, and the indicator setting. This allowed cross referencing of a new message with a previous one.[103] Thus, as Derek Taunt, another Cambridge mathematician-cryptanalyst wrote, the truism that "nothing succeeds like success" is particularly apposite here.[90]

Stereotypical messages included Keine besonderen Ereignisse (literally, "no special occurrences"—perhaps better translated as "nothing to report"),[104] An die Gruppe ("to the group") [105] and a number that came from weather stations such as weub null seqs null null ("weather survey 0600"). This was actually rendered as WEUBYYNULLSEQSNULLNULL. The word WEUB being short for wetteruebersicht, YY was used as a separator and SEQS was common abbreviation of sechs ("six").[106] Field Marshal Erwin Rommel's Quartermaster started all of his messages to his commander with the same formal introduction.

A fruitful source of cribs was re-encipherments of messages that had previously been decrypted either from a lower-level manual cipher or from another Enigma network.[110] This was called a kiss and happened particularly with German naval messages being sent in the dockyard cipher and repeated verbatim in an Enigma cipher. One German agent in Britain, code named Treasure, who had been turned to work for the Allies, was very verbose in her messages back to Germany, which were then re-transmitted on the Abwehr Enigma network. She was kept going by MI5 because this provided long cribs, not because of her usefulness as an agent to feed incorrect information to the Abwehr.[111]

Occasionally, when there was a particularly urgent need to break German naval Enigma, such as when an Arctic convoy was about to depart, mines would be laid by the RAF in a defined position, whose grid reference in the German naval system did not contain any of the words (such as sechs or sieben) for which abbreviations or alternatives were sometimes used.[112] The warning message about the mines and then the "all clear" message, would be transmitted both using the dockyard cipher and the U-boat Enigma network. This process of planting a crib was called gardening.[113]

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Known-plaintext_attack
In the case of Enigma, the German High Command was very meticulous about the overall security of the Enigma system and understood the possible problem of cribs. The day-to-day trench operators, on the other hand, were less careful. The Bletchley Park team would guess some of the plaintext based upon when the message was sent. For instance, a daily weather report was transmitted by the Germans, at the same time every day. Due to the regimented style of military reports, it would contain the word Wetter (German for "weather") at the same location in every message and knowing the local weather conditions helped Bletchley Park guess other parts of the plaintext as well. Another example was an officer in the Africa Corps who helped greatly by constantly sending, "Nothing to report." Other operators too would send standard salutations or introductions.[citation needed]
 

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