How does the neural correlate = qualia ?

[davidsmith73]

David, you have not argued for your notion that human experience cannot - in principle- be described.

I agree that by definition qualia cannot be described with reference to the outside world, but I do not agree that there is any such thing.

I'm saying that qualia cannot be fully described - just as we cannot fully describe reality in terms of physical theories. Do you not find it compelling that a true reality we ascribe to being ineffable with respect to physical theory is also the case with qualia ?

Yet we know what qualia feel like

To me, this places qualia above the level of physical description in terms of the true nature of reality and relegates the physical world, not the mental, to the league of fiction.

Moreover, by it's definition, if we did have them, we would be totally unable to talk about them. That you are sitting here describing your experience means that it can be described.

I'm not denying that they can be described. But a description is not the actual thing it refers to and can only take you so far. Think again of a physical theory - it is a mathematical description but it is not the actual reality. Similarly, a description of redness is not the actual raw feeling itself.

The mere fact that natural language is inadequate is beside the point. The best descriptions of many features of perception (Movement, angle, depth, sleep, time sensetive memory) comes from neurobiology, not natural language.

ANY language is inadequate. The true nature of redness cannot be described.

 

[davidsmith73]

Ian: No, the physical world is a fiction.

Hans: Hit youself on the head with a hard object and say that again. (if you're still not convinced, let ME hit you on the head )

... pretty strong fiction, I'd say.

Hans, how does does this hammer manifest itself ? When you hit yourself, you see the hammer lower onto your head and you feel the pain. All qualia.

 

[davidsmith73]

But all the time you are "experiencing" your brain is busily sending neural impulses, writing to memory, and doing all sorts of things which may (someday) be quantified. Yeah, I know it removes the romance, but it is certainly going on. Don't get me wrong, though. I love the experience, but I don't feel cheated if it comes down to "chemicals". I am not picky about the particulars.

So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?

I'm not sure either. They seem like a human construct to describe something indescribable. I mean, how could you ever describe "redness" without comparing it to something else red? Why do we need to assume that redness is anything other than our perception of something compared to something else. Everything is correlation.

To most:
I think a lot of people are missing the point of my question. I don't want to try to provide a definition of qualia. I can certainly give you examples of qualia like redness or fear and if you don't know what I am refering to then there is no point in carrying on the discussion. I want to know how a materialist can equate a physical process with qualia and what they really mean when they say this.

 

[jasonmccoy]

Just like temperature. Put your hand on the stove and it burns. But each little molecule is utterly innocent: no heat there.

Moreover, place your hand around two conduits (one with warm running water, the other with cold). While neither stimulus will elicit the perception of "hot" much less "pain" individually, you will find it difficult if not impossible to grasp them simaltaneously for very long! The neural correlate here relates to the fact that the simaltaneous activation of hot and cold somatosensory receptors
(nerve ending beneath our hand) is interpreted and perceived by the cortex as "discomfort" at minimum. Where exactly this "discomfort" as it were is registered eludes us and where exactly the feeling of knowing the sensation of pain (qualia) is occuring is equally elusive! Right?

 

[jasonmccoy]

So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?



To most:
I think a lot of people are missing the point of my question. I don't want to try to provide a definition of qualia. I can certainly give you examples of qualia like redness or fear and if you don't know what I am refering to then there is no point in carrying on the discussion. I want to know how a materialist can equate a physical process with qualia and what they really mean when they say this.

Have you read any of Antonio Damasio's three books? Perhaps this will help.

 

[jasonmccoy]

So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?



To most:
I think a lot of people are missing the point of my question. I don't want to try to provide a definition of qualia. I can certainly give you examples of qualia like redness or fear and if you don't know what I am refering to then there is no point in carrying on the discussion. I want to know how a materialist can equate a physical process with qualia and what they really mean when they say this.

Let me try to put your question differently. Are you in fact asking if it is possible that a person be made to experience qualia (redness) without looking at an object she has already learned is supposed to be red? In other words, can a scientist, using some type of electro or chemical stimulus create a qualia in another?


Just trying to ensure I understand your question.

 

[Dancing David]

So can you go any way to answering my question as to in what respect is "redness" equivalent to the physical process supposedly responsible for it ?
<><><><><><><><><><>
A. There is a wavelength of light that can be labeled red, if humans had never labeled it it would just be a wavelegth of an electromagetic photon.

B. There are descritions of redness, it's name, it's wavelegth, etc..

C. There is the physical process that leads to the perception of the color red. In Short: certain receptors respond to the wavelength of light while others don't, these signals are parly processed at the retinal level, then passed onto the visual cortex for processing, where they are interpreted 'projected' for the frontal cortex.

D. The decriptions which we use to describe red are taught to us.

E. Our brainjs actually have to go through a learning process in percieving color. In the Mary and B/W room, I suggested that she will not percieve the redness of red the first time she is presented with the color red. Assuming that the neural pathways for color perception don't atrophy she will not percieve the red as red, she will at first percieve it as grey or black. Until her brain has time to adjust to the new sensation, her perception will not be of red.


Peace

 

[billydkid]

I'm starting this thread because I am trying to pin down, more specifically, materialistic interpretations I have read here about conscious experience in terms of physical processes.

I am not interested in the specifics of the neural processes involved, but by all means refer to them if they are needed.

I am more interested in the meaning of the suggestion than qualia are in some way the same thing as a specific physical process as described by mathematical principles.

I am aware that some "anti-materialists" have been accused of applying vague terminology to this topic but I bet this thread may produce its fair share of ambiguity from the other side

Edited:

Just a word of warning to start. This is the opening statement of a recent article by (probably materialists, I haven't asked them in person) Francis Crick and Cristophe Koch entitled "a framework for consciousness" :

"The most difficult aspect of consciousness is the so-called "hard problem" of qualia - the redness of red, the painfullness of pain and so on. No one has produced any plausable explanation as to how the experience of the redness of red could arise from the actions of the brain. It appears fruitless to address this problem head on. Instead, we are attempting to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the hope that when we can explain the NCC in causal terms, this will make the problem of qualia clearer."

nature neuroscience, vol 6 no. 2, 119-126

This is my basic problem with the "qualia are unique" bunch. If you except the premise of cause and effect then everything must have a cause. If the experience of qualia are not attributable to the underlying neural mechanisms which invariably occur coincidentally with the qualia, then to what mechanism do you attribute the experience?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

People often ask "How can our experience of redness be a product of our brains?" If we agree that we don't have a complete understanding of neurophysiology yet, then we can't answer that question. It does not seem like a good idea, however, to jump to the conclusion that redness cannot be a product of the brain.

All the hand-wringing about how it just doesn't seem possible that we can get redness from brain function is worthless. To be convinced of the miracle of qualia, we need a logical argument that qualia cannot be a product of the brain. I think we've stomped on the Knowledge Argument, so we need another one. Is there one?

If so, the first step in discussing it will be to define quale. I predict we'll be mired in that step for awhile.

~~ Paul

 

[synaesthesia]

If so, the first step in discussing it will be to define quale. I predict we'll be mired in that step for awhile.

I agree. The whole concept of qualia seems to have evolved as a way of disguising some extraneous metaphysical theories as common intuitions about consciousness. Look at Interesting Ian, after all this time he can't even comprehend the notion that anyone could have different concepts about the nature of experience.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't fully understand your distinction between an objective description and a subjective one. Furthermore, the "same thing" these descriptions of fear refer to seems to me to be the actual feeling of fear itself - the qualia. How you can then go on to state that qualia are a fiction escapes me. Could you explain your reasoning further ?

Sure.

"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists. What does exist is the brain and the processes occurring in the brain. When you have fully described this you have described all that is real, and the need for "Qualia" goes away.

You give fear as an example. But it's clear that fear is a biochemical process involving not just the brain but other body functions as well. Fear can only be experienced by virtue of a brain processing the feedback from itself and the rest of the body. There is no isolatable Qualia of fear, only a general and infinitely varied and ongoing and physical process.

 

[Q-Source]

Sure.

"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists. What does exist is the brain and the processes occurring in the brain. When you have fully described this you have described all that is real, and the need for "Qualia" goes away.

You changed your mind Pixy?

I remember your exchange with UndercoverElephant about qualia and it was like you had accepted that qualia existed but at the same time did not exist.

So, when you have fully described the process occurring in your brain (lets say of "fear"), then there is not need to say that fear is a subjective experience (qualia); which means that the subjective is really objective...

I wonder if you or any Scientist have been capable of fully describing how this process is generated and even better how we could replicate such process in the brain.

Q-S

 

[PixyMisa]

You changed your mind Pixy?

I remember your exchange with UndercoverElephant about qualia and it was like you had accepted that qualia existed but at the same time did not exist.

No, that was UCE deliberately misquoting me. I got very annoyed with him for that.

So, when you have fully described the process occurring in your brain (lets say of "fear"), then there is not need to say that fear is a subjective experience (qualia); which means that the subjective is really objective...

The subjective is just the objective viewed from a different angle. The subjective viewpoint is notoriously useless in discussion, because it is, well, subjective. Taking the single axiom of materialism - that the universe is what exists - it is clear that any subjective experience can also be fully described in objective terms.

I wonder if you or any Scientist have been capable of fully describing how this process is generated and even better how we could replicate such process in the brain.

No. We haven't. It's complicated.

There's a lot of work going on in this field, and it's turning up a lot of interesting results, but our understanding is far from complete. There is no reason whatsoever to think that we can't understand it, though.

 

[PixyMisa]

By the way, I use the terms "we" and "our" in the "I'm just a computer programmer who happened to take a course in cognitive science at University and have no actual qualifications in this field" sense.

 

[Argo Nimbus]

"Qualia" is the name you give to the subjective experience of the outcome of a particular physical process. Qualia do not actually exist any more than the number 2 exists. What does exist is the brain and the processes occurring in the brain. When you have fully described this you have described all that is real, and the need for "Qualia" goes away.

So, are you saying:

[question]

(1) Physical processes are real.

(2) Subjective experiences are not real.

(3) What is real exists, but what is not real does not exist.

(4) Once everyone understands that subjective experiences are not real and therefore do not exist, the whole problem goes away.

[/question]?

It seems to me that subjective experiences are real, even if they do not exist in the same way physcial objects exist (which of course is why they're referred to as "subjective").

--- Argo

 

[PixyMisa]

Subjective experience is misunderstood objective reality. When you experience something subjectively, there is something real going on, but it's not what the subjective experience tells you it is.

Your question regards the nature of reality. Subjective experiences are patterns. Are patterns real?

 

[Dancing David]

Subjective expeiences are the interaction of our frontal lobes and the rest of our brains, the qualia re the interpretation that our frontal lobes place upon the sensory perceptions. Wethere they are color or emotions are immaterial, they are based in the biophysical process in our brains.

It seems to me that this is very somilat to the argument of Plato's that there are things like 'beauty' which are trans substantial because they are qualities that cross time and form.

I'd say we have a pig in a prom dress here.

By the way you immaterialists, the sensory pathways are fairly well understood, there is no major debate in neuropsychology about the way perception works.

Can't wait to see your responses.

Peace

 

[Q-Source]

The subjective is just the objective viewed from a different angle.

Umm, talking about logic somewhere else...

I would say something is logically impossible if it can be shown to be impossible using only the rules of logic. Example: an object that is simultaneously blue and not blue.

Example: something which is subjective and objective at the same time.

The subjective viewpoint is notoriously useless in discussion, because it is, well, subjective. Taking the single axiom of materialism - that the universe is what exists - it is clear that any subjective experience can also be fully described in objective terms.

In order for you to say that qualia are really objective processes you have to fully describe (as you said before) such processes. Noone has done that with human beings, so why do you use a materialistic assumption to reach a conclusion?

No. We haven't. It's complicated.

If we haven't, then how can you assert that qualia are objective processes?

There's a lot of work going on in this field, and it's turning up a lot of interesting results, but our understanding is far from complete. There is no reason whatsoever to think that we can't understand it, though.

Of course there is no reason to think that we cannot describe how qualia work, in the mean time, we should be careful to assert something which we still do not understand.

Q-S

 

[PixyMisa]

Umm, talking about logic somewhere else...

Example: something which is subjective but objective at the same time.

A subjective experience is an objective event. It just looks different. This is necessarily so unless you subscribe to some form of mysticism.

In order for you to say that qualia are really objective processes you have to fully describe (as you said before) such processes. Noone has done that with human beings, so why do you use a materialistic assumption to reach a conclusion?

We have a vast body of evidence which tells us (by inductive reasoning) that the mind, consciousness, "Qualia", what have you, are the result of brain processes. There is no reliable evidence to the contrary. That the mind is a brain function is more certain than the Theory of Relativity,

If we haven't, then how can you assert that qualia are objective processes?

Evidence?

I don't need to understand the process to point out the correlation.

Of course there is no reason to think that we cannot describe how qualia work, in the mean time, we should be careful to assert something which we still do not understand.

I'm not asserting that we understand how subjective experience arises from physical processes, but given the nature of the evidence there is no reason not to point out that they do.

 

[Dancing David]

Excuse me Q-source but where have you shown that qualia are not objective eperiences, please use mary and the color red.

Peace