How does the neural correlate = qualia ?

[davidsmith73]

I'm starting this thread because I am trying to pin down, more specifically, materialistic interpretations I have read here about conscious experience in terms of physical processes.

I am not interested in the specifics of the neural processes involved, but by all means refer to them if they are needed.

I am more interested in the meaning of the suggestion than qualia are in some way the same thing as a specific physical process as described by mathematical principles.

I am aware that some "anti-materialists" have been accused of applying vague terminology to this topic but I bet this thread may produce its fair share of ambiguity from the other side

Edited:

Just a word of warning to start. This is the opening statement of a recent article by (probably materialists, I haven't asked them in person) Francis Crick and Cristophe Koch entitled "a framework for consciousness" :

"The most difficult aspect of consciousness is the so-called "hard problem" of qualia - the redness of red, the painfullness of pain and so on. No one has produced any plausable explanation as to how the experience of the redness of red could arise from the actions of the brain. It appears fruitless to address this problem head on. Instead, we are attempting to find the neural correlates of consciousness (NCC) in the hope that when we can explain the NCC in causal terms, this will make the problem of qualia clearer."

nature neuroscience, vol 6 no. 2, 119-126

 

[MRC_Hans]

I have participated in a couple of these discussions and I am still at a loss here. I am simply unable to see the problem. What makes qualia something special and mystical?

I see it simply as a form of pattern recognition. We might use that literally, like "roundness" (a qualia in itself?): My brain is trained to recognize shapes with a certain approximation to circle shape as round. When I percieve a shape, my brain compares it to some template in my memory and decides whether it qualifies as "round".

Perhaps I fail to understand the concept of qualia.

Hans

 

[davidsmith73]

I have participated in a couple of these discussions and I am still at a loss here. I am simply unable to see the problem. What makes qualia something special and mystical?

I see it simply as a form of pattern recognition. We might use that literally, like "roundness" (a qualia in itself?): My brain is trained to recognize shapes with a certain approximation to circle shape as round. When I percieve a shape, my brain compares it to some template in my memory and decides whether it qualifies as "round".

Perhaps I fail to understand the concept of qualia.

Hans

What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.


Whether or not the brain recognises a best fit to a learned template, I do not think is relevant. After all, the original template in your memory had to manifest as qualia at some point. So here you are just moving the problem back in time to a previous point in brain development.

So, how do you equate the original neuronal template with the feeling of fear that it correlates with ?

 

[Janus]

I too dont understand what it is with quala. The way people use the word, it seems as if quala is just a particular type of information and experience is just a particular type of information processing.

As for the redness of red, by the time the signals have passed from the retina, passed the visual processing layers of the brain, the redness factor has been distilled and encoded in a useful Manor, along side other information such as shape, distance, etc. After this all that remains is interpretation.

A minimal complement of states and triggers must be built in. From these higher level behaviours can be extrapolated. [I would like to make this clearer, but I lack the time]

edit: ok that last paragraph is very bad. What I mean is that motivators such as fear, hunger, happieness would need to be built in. These are then extended through experiance.

 

[MRC_Hans]

What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.

I can easily describe the feeling of fear (beating heart, queasy stomack, sweaty hands, etc.). You can also describe the condition pathologically (increased blood pressure, contraction of small blood vessels, release of adrenalin, etc.). These are outside references, of course, but can you describe anything without outside references?

Whether or not the brain recognises a best fit to a learned template, I do not think is relevant. After all, the original template in your memory had to manifest as qualia at some point. So here you are just moving the problem back in time to a previous point in brain development.

I don't see the problem. The template is created by learning. As an infant, I am taught what round means. First time you tell an infant that "this is round", it won't know that "round" is a qualia, but later as it is presented to many different objects and patterns and is told that they are "round", it understands that "round" is an abstract property that can apply to many things, so it gets stored under abstract templates.

Pain. I feel pain and react to it; later I learn the word for it, so if somebody tells me "don't walk barefoot on a sunny beach, you will burn your feet", I will be able to imagine what it feels like, even if I never tried it: The template has been established.

So, how do you equate the original neuronal template with the feeling of fear that it correlates with ?

I don't understand the question.

Hans

 

[Interesting Ian]

I have participated in a couple of these discussions and I am still at a loss here. I am simply unable to see the problem. What makes qualia something special and mystical?

If we have A and B with thier states being correlated with each other, but which appear to be utterly characteristically different from each other, then why would A be something special and mystical by supposing that it is distinct (albeit perhaps dependent) on B?

 

[hammegk]

IMO, the redness of red is more apt than emotions with their very strong tie to the perceived *me*.

Red? I know it's "red" by training, and so do you. The question I think is "are the colors we experience the same?" That is, my perception of red -- if you could see it -- might look like the color color I'd call "green". Of course when we look at an object that the world has named "red" that's what we each call the color we actually experience, its qualia to each of us.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I too dont understand what it is with quala. The way people use the word, it seems as if quala is just a particular type of information

Then they're not using it in the correct sense! Who are these people?

As for the redness of red, by the time the signals have passed from the retina, passed the visual processing layers of the brain, the redness factor has been distilled and encoded in a useful Manor, along side other information such as shape, distance, etc. After this all that remains is interpretation.

A minimal complement of states and triggers must be built in. From these higher level behaviours can be extrapolated. [I would like to make this clearer, but I lack the time]

edit: ok that last paragraph is very bad. What I mean is that motivators such as fear, hunger, happieness would need to be built in. These are then extended through experiance. [/B]

How does any of this make the redness of red the very same thing as a physical process??

 

[Interesting Ian]

I can easily describe the feeling of fear (beating heart, queasy stomack, sweaty hands, etc.).

They are not the feeling of fear. That's the outward manifestation of fear.

 

[Interesting Ian]

I don't see the problem. The template is created by learning. As an infant, I am taught what round means. First time you tell an infant that "this is round", it won't know that "round" is a qualia, but later as it is presented to many different objects and patterns and is told that they are "round", it understands that "round" is an abstract property that can apply to many things, so it gets stored under abstract templates.

Just to say here that there's 2 different types of roundness which you appear to be conflating. There's roundness as experienced, or the qualia, which certainly isn't an abstract property. Then there is the mathematical roundness. It's the same with all other things in the world eg redness as experienced and the physical definition of redness etc.

 

[PixyMisa]

What does fear feel like? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.

It is perfectly possibly to describe fear from an objective viewpoint. The description looks different from a description from a subjective viewpoint, but describes the same thing.

Qualia are a fiction.

 

[Interesting Ian]

It is perfectly possibly to describe fear from an objective viewpoint. The description looks different from a description from a subjective viewpoint, but describes the same thing.

Qualia are a fiction.

No, the physical world is a fiction.

 

[synaesthesia]

I just want everyone to be clear on one philosophical point derivative of Wittgenstein's private language argument.

Nobody has ever 'correlated' intrinsic, ineffable, infallible qualia with anything. There can be no complaint that we have merely correlated qualia to physical brain states because the epistemic divide posited by the question is itself incoherent.

 

[synaesthesia]

What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference... This is what makes them special.

David, you have not argued for your notion that human experience cannot - in principle- be described.

I agree that by definition qualia cannot be described with reference to the outside world, but I do not agree that there is any such thing. Moreover, by it's definition, if we did have them, we would be totally unable to talk about them. That you are sitting here describing your experience means that it can be described.

Yes, some systems are more difficult to capture in natural language. For instance, describing a tear in cardboard is virtually impossible without reference to the piece from which it was taken. On a more germaine note, describing a neural network (psst, the kind between our ears) is exceedingly difficult without the use of specialized scientific language.

The mere fact that natural language is inadequate is beside the point. The best descriptions of many features of perception (Movement, angle, depth, sleep, time sensetive memory) comes from neurobiology, not natural language.

 

[synaesthesia]

What does fear feel like ? If you actually try to answer this question to me I think you will understand how it is not possible to fully describe qualia in terms outside of a direct reference. In other words fear feels like fear. This is what makes them special.

Qualia, by definition, cannot be described. If humans did have them, we would be undable to describe our experiences. Obviously human cognition is difficult to describe, for very prosaic and un-spiritual reasons, but that is no argument in principle.

I would say that thought is a lot like torn cardboard. Exceedingly difficult to describe without reference to it's corresponding piece, it remains aminable to scientific description given sufficient time and energies.

 

[MRC_Hans]

If we have A and B with thier states being correlated with each other, but which appear to be utterly characteristically different from each other, then why would A be something special and mystical by supposing that it is distinct (albeit perhaps dependent) on B?

I don't know, you tell me. But what has this to do with qualia?

They are not the feeling of fear. That's the outward manifestation of fear.

They are certainly also the feeling. Let us not bicker about details; are you seriously saying you can not describe how you feel when you feel fear??

Just to say here that there's 2 different types of roundness which you appear to be conflating. There's roundness as experienced, or the qualia, which certainly isn't an abstract property. Then there is the mathematical roundness. It's the same with all other things in the world eg redness as experienced and the physical definition of redness etc.

Sorry, but I don't see your point. Mathematical roundness can be experienced, described, learnt, like subjective roundness. Where is the special property? It is all just different levels of abstraction.

No, the physical world is a fiction.

Hit youself on the head with a hard object and say that again. (if you're still not convinced, let ME hit you on the head )

... pretty strong fiction, I'd say.

Hans

 

[Yahzi]

Qualia are a fiction.

Just like temperature. Put your hand on the stove and it burns. But each little molecule is utterly innocent: no heat there.

 

[synaesthesia]

Just like temperature. Put your hand on the stove and it burns. But each little molecule is utterly innocent: no heat there.

But remember that common definitions of qualia involve characteristics which cannot be so reduced, which serve no possible scientific use.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I haven't read these yet, but they look like interesting papers about qualia.

http://www.lucs.lu.se/ftp/pub/LUCS_Studies/LUCS58.pdf

http://humanities.ucsc.edu/NEH/loar2.htm

http://ase.tufts.edu/cogstud/papers/quinqual.htm

~~ Paul

 

[Peskanov]

Synaethesia,

----
quote:
But remember that common definitions of qualia involve characteristics which cannot be so reduced, which serve no possible scientific use.
----

I find this very interesting.
I feel different types of qualia (sound,color, temperature) simultaneously.
For me this is a indication of a possible reduction, or that maybe I am putting the same name (qualia) to different phenomena.
Not only that; if we look closely the qualia related only to image, for example, we perceive differerent sensations at will (call these sub-qualia if you want). I mean, we have several sub-qualias (light, movement, shape, color) and we can usually amplify some of them at the cost of the rest (feeling the colors instead of shapes for example).
What are the arguements agains reduction?