Please look up how to use the quote function I'm finding it hard to work out what you wish to me to respond to.
Yes, I was wrong. Transunion
Transocean
is the foreign company who did pay bonus on production. I mis- spoke also, that those were safety bonuses; they were production bonuses. The two have an inverse relation.
No. They have no relation to drilling a well.
Perhaps it is not done as often as before, but arguing that you would know practices of every outfit world wide seems a variety of arguing from ignorance. Unless you are omniscient.
Oh, please. Yours was purely conjecture on what these bonuses were, and what they were paid for - and was wrong. Arguing from ignorance indeed.
I merely commented, based on my experience working for an operator and having been involved with incentive schemes myself, that your conjectures were ill informed.
I favor meaningful bonuses paid for working safely, not for running with scissors.
Which many rig contractors have in place. I have seen some excellent one that have changed the mind-set of the rig personnel and ultimately reduced incidents.
I agree that people are the cause of accidents. One must design systems to account for that-making it easier and hopefully, rewarding, to do the safe thing. And pay well enough to get and keep employees who comply, as well as attract enough new talent to account for attrition. Ill considered regulation does not usually help .
You are conflating two totally different things. Regulations have nothing to do with individual contractors' work practices except to give them minimum requirements. Safety schemes are best practice driven by contractors, operators and service companies to protect their people, equipment and investment.
From the Plan Information form: No new or unusual technology will be used to conduct activities.(2.3). I submit that the cement may have been a factor.
The technology of foam cementing is not new, it's been around for years. Much is made of the fact that N2 was used, I think it's a red herring and poor practices, before, during and after the job are more important factors. See
Halliburton's site for more on foam cementing.
I'd hazard the PlugSeal™ system is the one used on this well
Treating new materials the same way as old, may cause problems. Any deviation in the mix may change the properties of the final product drastically. Perhaps the tests done were properly done, but WRT older cement types.
Each cement recipe comes with documented analysis and recommendations on it's strengths and setting times, it's not a matter of a couple of Good Ole Boys standing around a cement mixer and say, "I wonder what would happen if I added this?".
Agreed, it may not have been "the" key issue.
And after all this,
it may well have been the key to the problem.
We can only expect that to come out in the subsequent investigation that will have access to the cementing programme from the operator, the recipe and lab analysis from the cementer as well as assessments of the downhole conditions and the activity before, during and after the job.
Anything else is speculation - and pointless speculation, since we don't have any details of the job.
Same Document, Section 2.0: 2.7. No Blowout scenario required
So, the Plan, had NO Plan. I need not go further into details; the results speak for themselves. QED.
Again, you are wrong. Very wrong.
Here's that section quoted in full,
"A scenario for a potential blowout of the well from which BP would expect to have the highest volume of liquid hydrocarbons is not required for the operations proposed in this EP."
As you said before,
as well as a regional response plan, BP would need to submit a
well specific plan. Both complement each other and are not meant to be read in isolation.
Section 2.7 merely means that in the 2 well exploration plan, no further blow out plan is required for this particular operation as the scenario is covered in the regional plan. Appendix H to be precise.
Re site-specific plan: that exemption(Central Area) is one reason why I stated that there was a skate going on. MMS and oilcos are/have been in bed for a while. Look it up yourself.
We've been through that.
The lack of response and the lag time, indicates that the plan was largely whitewash. See results.
Response time was immediate - as soon as the rig caught fire an Emergency Response Plan kicked in.
A search and rescue effort had been operating for 48 hours before the rig sank. Dispersants were in place and an exclusion zone around the rig established and NOAA began issuing Marine Pollution Surveillance reports
2 days before the first oil slick was spotted on the water surface.
Your accusation of whitewash is just plain wrong.
Demonise BP as much as you wish - but at least get the facts right.
While the MMS has acted criminally,IMO, BP has acted worse, IMO, because they have a much better idea of what really is happening. And they will reap their reward. Many of us, if not all, will also pay for their lapses.
In an earlier post, you stated words to the effect that top hats , etc., were on standby all around the world. Maybe; just not here. Neither were the correct booms, for burning or containment. Look at the response and lag time.
I have and as indicated in the links I have provided, you are incorrect.
You say that burning it is bad for the environment; crude washing onto the wetlands, reefs,beaches, is better?
ALL options are assessed on the effectiveness and their affect on the environment.
That's the point of a Reponse Plan.
Section 19 addresses the in situ burn option and is only one of many response strategies.
ALL the options would be considered, not just by BP, but the relevant state and national bodies involved in the response.
So, back to the OP.
The more I think on it, the more I think that explosives might have been/be useful to shut down the well. Not nukes, but properly applied conventional explosives. To shear the riser and drill pipe.
That would merely remove the current obstructions to the flow and open the wellhead for full bore flow of oil. See earlier in the thread for that discussio.
Or kink them properly, not shear. I fear that the present kinked portion is subject to the abrasives sandblasting through the opening, weakening and enlarging the existing leak. Abrasive fluids can readily cut steel.
Thus the "top kill" option to reduce fluid flow at the weak points in the riser - as outlined previously in the thread.
