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How Can they Stop the Oil Spill?
- Thread starter Unabogie
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TraneWreck
Philosopher
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Ah, I see. The valve on the seabed floor could be triggered by multiple devices, but the hydraulics needed to close the valve failed.
Fair enough.
No, I don't want to live in the Roman empire - dunno where you get that idea from!
Your argument appears to be that only the celibate may legitimately make comments about promiscuity.
lomiller
Penultimate Amazing
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- Jul 31, 2007
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- 13,208
I’d say the BOP rather then the valve. The BOP is meant as an emergency shutoff in case all the other valves and controls fail and it probably can’t overcome the oil pressure without hydraulics. If the well were functioning properly this pressure probably wouldn’t be an issue because the oil would be contained further up. I'm certianly no expert though.
trvlr2
Muse
Something to consider-
-MMS regulations are made with the consent/consultation of the companies . These regulations are minimum regulations, not maximum, WRT safety.
-A MODU rig is subject to USCG regulations, as well as MMS regs. I can guarantee that USCG regs were made to cater to the oil business, by companies directly supporting the oil business.
-For instance, the manning requirements are less for vessels engaged in oil support missions. 6 men vs. 9 men, because it was considered too expensive to keep the extra crew. Which means that during situations, some of the crew gets no rest, and the hands do not exist to handle some situations safely. A 12 hour shift is worked. No overtime is paid.
-Also, the numbers and types of safety equipment is minimum; more may be carried, but it must be kept in good working order. Hence, only the minimums are met. Any equipment above minimum are simply considered too expensive to keep. At a certain level, we are expendable.
MODUs are not excepted.
-Safety Is Our Most Important Product-Yes, corporations may be individuals but they are composed of other individuals. Some of the latter are paid bonuses for corner cutting. For instance, a "Company Man" (OILCO Rep) may get a whomping bonus for bringing in a well under the time allotted. This may be shared among the crew, as well. If rules were bent, well, it worked!
A "Port Captain" may get his bonus based on the amount not spent annually, which was budgeted for vessel upkeep. You didn't sink, yet, didja?
-So, while overall a company may broadcast an interest in safety, some components of the company may be rewarded for non-compliance. A hero you are, unless it goes South; in which case, they run you off, and you may be prosecuted. Or, you get dead, or kill others.
My spidey sense is telling me that something like this is the reason for the blowout. A party?(Maybe to celebrate a bonus?) Why else would the mud be removed? Why would the cement discrepancies be overlooked?( Cement cures fully in 20 hours?) Why else would the BOP be modified?(So we could watch very expensive video of an ROV trying to activate a ram rendered inoperable) How long had the BOP battery been dead?
Curious minds want to know.
-Back to the OP. Only way to stop the well, is the side well.
The top hat may ease things, once the methane hydrates are dealt with. Why not let the hydrates clog the top hat? Is it that the hat can't be bolted to the BOP?
I was thinking that a very large fabric dome could be lowered over the upwelling, above the hydrate flash zone, to capture the spill. It could be anchored to the seabed and the gas and oil pumped out, same as the top hat. Large enough, it could just be on the surface, with ballast skirts around the edges, same effect. The oil rises up into the dome, the gas on top of the oil, all of it above the sea level. Just sayin'. We make domes for stadiums, don't we?
Injecting junk probably won't work, but might.
I hope that this incident will result in better plans made by all parties. For instance, BOPs which can actually shear pipe, with redundant systems, inspected and warranteed by the manufacturer at all deployments. Runaway shutdowns on all rig machinery, flame arrestors, too, on all equipment. Top hats ready to use, on standby. Or equivalent.
Maybe some work could be done to make the oil partially polymerize but still float, which would make spill recovery much easier, and makes containment booms more effective.
And maybe, change the corporate culture on how bonuses are earned.
Drill, we will. Immediately, and for the next few years, we've no choice.
-MMS regulations are made with the consent/consultation of the companies . These regulations are minimum regulations, not maximum, WRT safety.
-A MODU rig is subject to USCG regulations, as well as MMS regs. I can guarantee that USCG regs were made to cater to the oil business, by companies directly supporting the oil business.
-For instance, the manning requirements are less for vessels engaged in oil support missions. 6 men vs. 9 men, because it was considered too expensive to keep the extra crew. Which means that during situations, some of the crew gets no rest, and the hands do not exist to handle some situations safely. A 12 hour shift is worked. No overtime is paid.
-Also, the numbers and types of safety equipment is minimum; more may be carried, but it must be kept in good working order. Hence, only the minimums are met. Any equipment above minimum are simply considered too expensive to keep. At a certain level, we are expendable.
MODUs are not excepted.
-Safety Is Our Most Important Product-Yes, corporations may be individuals but they are composed of other individuals. Some of the latter are paid bonuses for corner cutting. For instance, a "Company Man" (OILCO Rep) may get a whomping bonus for bringing in a well under the time allotted. This may be shared among the crew, as well. If rules were bent, well, it worked!
A "Port Captain" may get his bonus based on the amount not spent annually, which was budgeted for vessel upkeep. You didn't sink, yet, didja?
-So, while overall a company may broadcast an interest in safety, some components of the company may be rewarded for non-compliance. A hero you are, unless it goes South; in which case, they run you off, and you may be prosecuted. Or, you get dead, or kill others.
My spidey sense is telling me that something like this is the reason for the blowout. A party?(Maybe to celebrate a bonus?) Why else would the mud be removed? Why would the cement discrepancies be overlooked?( Cement cures fully in 20 hours?) Why else would the BOP be modified?(So we could watch very expensive video of an ROV trying to activate a ram rendered inoperable) How long had the BOP battery been dead?
Curious minds want to know.
-Back to the OP. Only way to stop the well, is the side well.
The top hat may ease things, once the methane hydrates are dealt with. Why not let the hydrates clog the top hat? Is it that the hat can't be bolted to the BOP?
I was thinking that a very large fabric dome could be lowered over the upwelling, above the hydrate flash zone, to capture the spill. It could be anchored to the seabed and the gas and oil pumped out, same as the top hat. Large enough, it could just be on the surface, with ballast skirts around the edges, same effect. The oil rises up into the dome, the gas on top of the oil, all of it above the sea level. Just sayin'. We make domes for stadiums, don't we?
Injecting junk probably won't work, but might.
I hope that this incident will result in better plans made by all parties. For instance, BOPs which can actually shear pipe, with redundant systems, inspected and warranteed by the manufacturer at all deployments. Runaway shutdowns on all rig machinery, flame arrestors, too, on all equipment. Top hats ready to use, on standby. Or equivalent.
Maybe some work could be done to make the oil partially polymerize but still float, which would make spill recovery much easier, and makes containment booms more effective.
And maybe, change the corporate culture on how bonuses are earned.
Drill, we will. Immediately, and for the next few years, we've no choice.
macdoc
Philosopher
Good post... 
- I am better informed as a result.
- I am better informed as a result.Travis
Misanthrope of the Mountains
- Joined
- Mar 31, 2007
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- 24,133
California and Florida are also building high speed rail systems. Los Angeles is also constructing $40 billion worth of public transportation and will have the 2nd largest public transport system in North America in about ten years when it is completed.
trvlr2
Muse
Sure. We do have a choice. That choice seems to be entirely unacceptable. Please show the economic impact of other choices. Then, we might be able to make an informed choice.
Travis- the Florida mass-transit is designed only to get tourists to Dizzy Whirl. Other than that, I think it's a boondoggle of the first order, not fixing the every day traffic problems.
We need to face the impact of declining global oil production as soon as possible. Deep sea drilling is simply a short-term fudge.
We also need to be honest about the economic impact of the environmental changes caused by burning the stuff in addition to the economic impact of the disastrous oil leaks that result from ever more desperate, expensive and risky attempts to sustain our unsustainable oil-based lifestyles and economic models.
~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~~
There's at least 10 times as much oil spilling into the Gulf of Mexico than official estimates suggest, according to an exclusive NPR analysis.
Travis
Misanthrope of the Mountains
- Joined
- Mar 31, 2007
- Messages
- 24,133
Not true. It will eventually connect Tampa to Miami and high speed rail isn't supposed to solve every day local traffic problems, there's light rail and metros for that, it's to get planes out of the air and cars off the road making intercity trips.
I'm a huge supporter of High Speed Rail and I think it should be implemented anywhere it can be.
“You simply are not allowed to conclude that the drilling will have an impact,” said one scientist who has worked for the minerals agency for more than a decade. “If you find the risks of a spill are high or you conclude that a certain species will be affected, your report gets disappeared in a desk drawer and they find another scientist to redo it or they rewrite it for you.”
U.S. Said to Allow Drilling Without Needed Permits
Size of Oil Spill Underestimated, Scientists Say
U.S. Said to Allow Drilling Without Needed Permits
Size of Oil Spill Underestimated, Scientists Say
EHocking
Penultimate Amazing
Given what little we know of what happened prior to the blow out, the followoing is speculation
Or.
Displacing the riser to seawater too early may have cause a catastrophic breakdown of the cement's integrity - at the moment we don't know the cause of it's failure.
A BOP Stack is just that, a stack of different types and numbers of rams and annulars. The configuration of which can be changed to suit the type of well or well conditions that might be expected. It is not unusual.
Normally the configuration of the stack would have been outlined by BP's engineers and Transocean would have constructed the stack to their specifications.
Reading between the lines, BP is saying that the configuration of the BOP stack that Transocean reported to them was not in fact what was run.
Thus we had ROV attempts to activate the "wrong" rams.
That said - the Deepwater Horizon has been on contract in the GoM with BP for over 3 years, so the above argument by BP that Transocean is fully to blame, IMO, isn't valid.
There are two subsea control "pods" on a BOP. Only one of them had a dead battery - so the BOP should have been able to be activated by the other pod.
Again, we do not know the status of the pods prior to the accident.
Again, we can only speculate.
Thing is, each of the components in each of the system needs to be operational.
Warrantees are only useful for insurance claims.
The best practice is to make sure you don't need to use them...
Again, prevention, is key.
That said, I learned the industry in different countries and have a markedly different work ethos to some I've encountered on US run MODUs.
ETA: The above is not meant to defend the oil industry in the wake of this disaster, only an attempt to clarify some of the points in trvlr2's previous post.
Probably human error. A poor engineering decision by someone.
It is quite possible for cement to cure in 20 hours - what we don't know is whether the cement job was a good one in the first place. If it's integrity was compromised during the job, it was not going to hold the influx.
Or.
Displacing the riser to seawater too early may have cause a catastrophic breakdown of the cement's integrity - at the moment we don't know the cause of it's failure.
Numerous newspaper and blogs are confusing the point by using the word "modification". They should be using "configuration".
A BOP Stack is just that, a stack of different types and numbers of rams and annulars. The configuration of which can be changed to suit the type of well or well conditions that might be expected. It is not unusual.
Normally the configuration of the stack would have been outlined by BP's engineers and Transocean would have constructed the stack to their specifications.
Reading between the lines, BP is saying that the configuration of the BOP stack that Transocean reported to them was not in fact what was run.
Thus we had ROV attempts to activate the "wrong" rams.
That said - the Deepwater Horizon has been on contract in the GoM with BP for over 3 years, so the above argument by BP that Transocean is fully to blame, IMO, isn't valid.
The question that needs to be asked is why, during BOP tests, was the this not picked up and if it was, why wasn't it rectified.
There are two subsea control "pods" on a BOP. Only one of them had a dead battery - so the BOP should have been able to be activated by the other pod.
Again, we do not know the status of the pods prior to the accident.
The idea of the "top hat" was to act as a funnel over the top of the BOP and funnel the hydrocarbons escaping the well, up pipe to the surface and into a tanker - thus preventing further water pollution. The hydrates clogged the pipe to the surface - that's why the idea failed.
That would require a HUGE dome/funnel. There is no specific "hydrate flash zone", gas hydrate formation is dependent on a certain conditions, mainly temperature and pressure, but the calculations to determine the triggering of hydrate formation in pipeline is not simple.
I've heard of the Mile High Stadium, but in this case you would, literally, need a dome that is a mile high...
Cement and other junk from the flowing wellbore into the BOP cavities during the accident may well be the cause of the rams not closing.
Again, we can only speculate.
These exist, what is needed is evidence presented in a drilling programme or a safety bridging document between operator and contractor, that the BOP configuration is capable of performing its job on the tools being run into the well.
Subsea BOPs have a redundancy system - dual actuation pods.
Thing is, each of the components in each of the system needs to be operational.
Inspections are supposed to be regularly performed on not just consumable equipment, but the entire rig and it's plant.
Warrantees are only useful for insurance claims.
Deadman/emergency shutdown switches exist on most equipment. Sometimes they fail - a warrantee won't guarantee that they won't.
I think you would be surprised at the safety systems on board a MODU. It is obvious that you do not (no slight intended). Frankly no one would step on board one of these rigs if ignition points were not baffled and fuel sources for fire were not monitored and/or controlled.
These are. Worldwide.
The best practice is to make sure you don't need to use them...
When the oil slick is in the order of 2,500 square miles I doubt there is enough containment boom existing in the world to do the job. One report I read was that 160 miles of boom has been deployed. Rough calculation by me is that you'd need nearly 10 times that to contain the current slick. And as soon as the water turns rough (wave height of +3ft), the booms are rendered useless.
Again, prevention, is key.
You'd be surprised how little your bonus scenario exists outside of the US. I have not encountered the sorts of incentive schemes you outlined for many many years.
That said, I learned the industry in different countries and have a markedly different work ethos to some I've encountered on US run MODUs.
ETA: The above is not meant to defend the oil industry in the wake of this disaster, only an attempt to clarify some of the points in trvlr2's previous post.
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trvlr2
Muse
Travis, we are derailing here. I like the high speed rail, light rail, metro ideas, too. We just disagree on how to go about the implementation.
How does a TPA/ MCO link get planes out of the sky? Exactly who would take this route? How about MCO/MIA?
Just because you are a huge supporter of the concept, does not make it the correct solution.
bit_pattern
Unregistered
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- Apr 22, 2010
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- 7,406
Stuff it with pork, shrimp and cheese, then wait for the Jewish-Islamists to nuke it!
ferd burfle
Graduate Poster
From http://www.npr.org/templates/story/story.php?storyId=126827880:
There's the little matter that oil and water are not miscible (much), so comparing the volumes is not useful. Are oil company executives this ignorant or is this just another attempt at spin control? I realize these choices are not mutually exclusive.
And my thanks to Tricky, Soapy and others for the good technical background and balanced perspective on the industry.
ferd
BP CEO Tony Hayward told Britain's The Guardian newspaper that the spill was small in proportion to the Gulf.
"The Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water volume," Hayward said.
"The Gulf of Mexico is a very big ocean. The amount of volume of oil and dispersant we are putting into it is tiny in relation to the total water volume," Hayward said.
There's the little matter that oil and water are not miscible (much), so comparing the volumes is not useful. Are oil company executives this ignorant or is this just another attempt at spin control? I realize these choices are not mutually exclusive.
And my thanks to Tricky, Soapy and others for the good technical background and balanced perspective on the industry.
ferd
barrymore
Critical Thinker
- Joined
- Jan 26, 2010
- Messages
- 267
They clearly know what's going on. It would be like a baseball player not knowing that a bat is made out of wood.
However, they are counting on the public a.) not knowing and/or b.) not putting enough thought into his statement to correct it.
ferd burfle
Graduate Poster
Thanks, Barrymore, i agree and I should have been more direct and included that IMO the guy is full of it. That said, can anyone say if the top execs in the oil industry are any more or less tech savvy than any other tech industry? Do the top guys tend to come from the operations side or not?
Thanks,
ferd
manofthesea
2wu4u
- Joined
- Sep 16, 2007
- Messages
- 1,668
"It's like the Clampetts are running BP" Anderson Cooper tonight on 360. He was responding to the latest plan of using golf balls and tires to plug the leak.
Meanwhile, a Purdue University expert declared the leak to be approximately 2.8 million gallons per day. He used a program designed to estimate volume flow that he has used for 20 years. He was quickly backed up by Mr. Nye, the science guy who happened to be an ex oil industry scientist, who previously agreed with BP's earlier estimate of 200,000 gallons.
Meanwhile, a Purdue University expert declared the leak to be approximately 2.8 million gallons per day. He used a program designed to estimate volume flow that he has used for 20 years. He was quickly backed up by Mr. Nye, the science guy who happened to be an ex oil industry scientist, who previously agreed with BP's earlier estimate of 200,000 gallons.
trvlr2
Muse
Ehocking -Thanks for the comments. Maybe I did not explain well.
Yes, I did speculate a bit.
-Cement may cure well enough in 20 hours. I realize that the cement used is not paving material, is specially formulated. I doubt that it would be completely cured in 20 hours. I could be wrong.
-The BOP was modified, according to reports, to make it easier to test the function. And no actual shear tests are performed,AFAIK. Redundancy means at least two separate but equal systems. Does this exist on BOPs now? If both pods must be operational to work the valve, it's not redundant.
Oddly, the DP supply ships have triple redundancy systems., or they cannot work a rig like the TU. That means two systems can go down, operation normal aboard.(engineers scuttling around madly, though.)
-How long the battery had been dead implies that the crew would have addressed that item, had guidelines been followed.
-If the top hat could have been bolted to the BOP, the hydrates would be their own junk shot. I guess the drill pipe extending from the BOP would have to have been trimmed. It is a challenge to get the hat on, over the flow. Just as it will be hard to get a pipe with a plug on it into the BOP, as is planned. If the well is blowing by the casing, it won't stop the flow completely, might make it worse.
-I have been on MODUs. Wouldn't want to work on one. Just visiting for crew change. Yes, there are safeties. Minimums.Apparently, not sufficient. Or, not maintained. The description by witnesses of the rig's engines running away, tearing themselves from the platform, means that there were insufficient safeties. Diesels will run away with methane atmospheres, or any other flammable gas. The absolute best way to stop them is compression release. I have 20$ US, says those engines did not have that feature.
Most all those safeties cut off the fuel-which can't be done with flammable atmosphere. The air could be cut off-but I have seen engines run on the leakage by the shutoff plate.
- Re the notion of a large "parachute". Yes , it would be very large. Had it been deployed early on, it damn sure wouldn't have had to be so big. The rising oil would fill the body, the methane either flashes, or not. Still would be better than what we have now. And the booms don't work offshore because they float on the surface, not much below. Ballast bags would make these more effective. Same reason we have them on life rafts.
-And if there were a plan, why did it take so long to have the top hat built? What about the BP assurances that they could cover the worst case scenario, and a safety plan was in place? I call BS. Needs improvement.
-Others do have worst case plans. This particular incident did not. A serious lapse of government and industry.
-I am working on my 5th license issue Salt Water Maggot, and know a little bit of the oil patch from servicing the rigs. My opinions are based on observation. Doesn't make the conclusions correct, though. Just more likely.
Yes, I did speculate a bit.
-Cement may cure well enough in 20 hours. I realize that the cement used is not paving material, is specially formulated. I doubt that it would be completely cured in 20 hours. I could be wrong.
-The BOP was modified, according to reports, to make it easier to test the function. And no actual shear tests are performed,AFAIK. Redundancy means at least two separate but equal systems. Does this exist on BOPs now? If both pods must be operational to work the valve, it's not redundant.
Oddly, the DP supply ships have triple redundancy systems., or they cannot work a rig like the TU. That means two systems can go down, operation normal aboard.(engineers scuttling around madly, though.)
-How long the battery had been dead implies that the crew would have addressed that item, had guidelines been followed.
-If the top hat could have been bolted to the BOP, the hydrates would be their own junk shot. I guess the drill pipe extending from the BOP would have to have been trimmed. It is a challenge to get the hat on, over the flow. Just as it will be hard to get a pipe with a plug on it into the BOP, as is planned. If the well is blowing by the casing, it won't stop the flow completely, might make it worse.
-I have been on MODUs. Wouldn't want to work on one. Just visiting for crew change. Yes, there are safeties. Minimums.Apparently, not sufficient. Or, not maintained. The description by witnesses of the rig's engines running away, tearing themselves from the platform, means that there were insufficient safeties. Diesels will run away with methane atmospheres, or any other flammable gas. The absolute best way to stop them is compression release. I have 20$ US, says those engines did not have that feature.
Most all those safeties cut off the fuel-which can't be done with flammable atmosphere. The air could be cut off-but I have seen engines run on the leakage by the shutoff plate.
- Re the notion of a large "parachute". Yes , it would be very large. Had it been deployed early on, it damn sure wouldn't have had to be so big. The rising oil would fill the body, the methane either flashes, or not. Still would be better than what we have now. And the booms don't work offshore because they float on the surface, not much below. Ballast bags would make these more effective. Same reason we have them on life rafts.
-And if there were a plan, why did it take so long to have the top hat built? What about the BP assurances that they could cover the worst case scenario, and a safety plan was in place? I call BS. Needs improvement.
-Others do have worst case plans. This particular incident did not. A serious lapse of government and industry.
-I am working on my 5th license issue Salt Water Maggot, and know a little bit of the oil patch from servicing the rigs. My opinions are based on observation. Doesn't make the conclusions correct, though. Just more likely.