Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Belz...]

Iaca is postulating that a simulated consciousness might be possible, in order to prove that a simulated consciousness is possible.

No, that's not what Iaca was doing, as far as I can tell.

Here:

There's no real distinction. Just as you are not able to tell whether you're in a perfect simulation, the simulated consciousness would have no way either. As far as it's concerned, it's all real.

Why on Earth would I believe that there's anything there in the simulation to have a consciousness? That's a massive leap of faith.

So it doesn't go anywhere.

-- OF COURSE it does. In the simulation. Context, people. Haven't you ever heard of relativity, for instance ?

 

[westprog]

Most practical computers have clocks, so operating on a real-time model is not a problem.

So, is that your answer to what additional hardware is required to permit a suitably programmed computer to be conscious? A clock? Because that's no problem. Or is there something else?

Respectfully,
Myriad

I'm not talking about computers - I'm talking about the Turing Model of computing. It's the Turing model which has been claimed as sufficient to explain consciousness. The Turing model doesn't include any kind of real-time interaction with the environment.

I'm amazed that people deal with this issue without any clear understanding of what a scientific model is for. If a model is incomplete with regard to an explanation of a given phenomenon, then the correct approach is not to say "well, in real life there's other stuff which would make it work". The correct response is to formulate an appropriate model which does fit.

 

[westprog]

Haven't you ever heard of relativity, for instance ?

Please don't get RD back on relativity. The last time was bad enough.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Is it logically possible for a computer program feature to conjecture it's a computer program feature? I tend to doubt it.

No, it's not. Just as it's impossible for you to conjecture that you're in a simulation.

No, it's not... possible? As before, I am at a loss to understand what you are trying to say.

Impossible for you to conjecture that you're in a simulation? But that's exactly what you are doing.

If your post is intended to prove a conclusion you are merely begging the question.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Is it logically possible for a computer program feature to conjecture it's a computer program feature? I tend to doubt it.

Is it logically possible to conjecture what a computer program feature can and cannot do without a considerable amount of background knowledge in computing and mathematics?

I tend to doubt it.

That's OK rd. I didn't expect you to be able to

 

[Frank Newgent]

If your conclusion is valid then so is mine.

There is an external world. There is no Santa Claus. Any other questions?

 

[Myriad]

I'm not talking about computers - I'm talking about the Turing Model of computing. It's the Turing model which has been claimed as sufficient to explain consciousness. The Turing model doesn't include any kind of real-time interaction with the environment.

I'm amazed that people deal with this issue without any clear understanding of what a scientific model is for. If a model is incomplete with regard to an explanation of a given phenomenon, then the correct approach is not to say "well, in real life there's other stuff which would make it work". The correct response is to formulate an appropriate model which does fit.

Okay, but that doesn't seem to have anything to do with my question. I'm not talking about a model of computing, just as I'm not typing this post on a keyboard connected to a model of computing. I'm talking about computers -- you know, those boxes with circuit boards covered with chips inside, like the ones you can buy at Staples or the big fancy ones they build for special IBM projects like Watson.

It's been asserted repeatedly in this thread that a computer by itself, no matter how powerful its computing capabilities and no matter how it is programmed, is insufficient to generate consciousness, just as it is insufficient to permit the computer to really walk or control a real power plant or play music. But we know that a computer can do all of those things if it is sufficiently powerful, suitably programmed, and connected to the necessary additional equipment. So my question is, what additional equipment must be attached to a sufficiently powerful and suitably programmed computer to generate consciousness? And if the answer is that we do not or cannot know, then what rationale do we have for assuming that any additional equipment is needed?

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[PixyMisa]

Well, I'm trying to inquire about that.

A worthy, if somewhat doomed, endeavour.

What does that system need, besides a suitably programmed computer? So far we have: a clock. What else, or is that all?

Of course any Turing-equivalent machine can model data in the time domain whether it has a clock or not.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't understand this answer.

What claim is not valid to begin with?

Are you saying that the answer to the question, "What hardware needs to be added to a computer, to allow it to produce consciousness?" somehow depends on esoteric notions of the nature of time?

No, just that the assertion that a clock is required is, quite simply, false.

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't understand this answer.

What claim is not valid to begin with?

Westprog's claim, not yours.

The claim that because abstract models of real computers, like theoretical finite state machines, don't include a "clock" component they cannot account for "real time" events or anything to do with a "time domain."

Your argument is that even if it was correct it doesn't matter with regards to your question, my argument is that it isn't correct to begin with.

 

[rocketdodger]

Please don't get RD back on relativity. The last time was bad enough.

No, please do.

Can you explain what happens to your precious "real time" control and monitoring computers, that are so good at dealing with the "time domain," when relativity starts to creep in?

 

[Myriad]

Westprog's claim, not yours.

The claim that because abstract models of real computers, like theoretical finite state machines, don't include a "clock" component they cannot account for "real time" events or anything to do with a "time domain."

Your argument is that even if it was correct it doesn't matter with regards to your question, my argument is that it isn't correct to begin with.

Ah, fair enough. Thanks for explaining.

I actually have a few semesters of computing theory, and plenty of real world experience in practical computing including control systems, so yeah, let's just say I was (and am) trying not to get sidetracked into the "Turing model versus real time control" issue.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Nonpareil]

There is an external world. There is no Santa Claus. Any other questions?

What are we going to tell Virginia?

 

[blobru]

Not to ask for a brain in a vat for xmas.

 

[Piggy]

t might have something to do with the fact that you said it requires certain configuration and specific fuel.

One last post because I do need to clear this up....

Your conclusions are incorrect, because driving also requires an apparatus with a proper configuration of parts and the right fuel -- which was the analogy I was making -- but this does not make driving a substance.

Which should have been clear all along.

Adios, folks, time to start a biology-based thread and be done with the nonsense.

 

[Piggy]

I don't know, but Piggy think that minds generated one way magically have it, and minds generated another way magically don't.

He has not, so far, been able to explain this.

And this....

I have never said any such thing and in fact have maintained precisely the opposite from the get-go.

You're free to continue to claim otherwise, but this is precisely what makes meaningful participation in this thread impossible.

 

[bruto]

Not to ask for a brain in a vat for xmas.

If they put my vat close enough to hers could we at least exchange some fluids?

 

[Frank Newgent]

 

[Frank Newgent]

Reposting this from the bottom of the previous page for the benefit of rocketdodger.

The question of whether we are in a simulation or the external world necessarily acknowledges the external world. A priori knowledge having nothing to do with the senses.

Since we already know we might be in a simulation or we might be in the external world I ask you: what about that cup of coffee over there... computer program feature of the simulation or an external world cup of coffee?

If you call it a computer program feature you acknowledge that computer program feature within the external world and destroy your own argument. If you call it a cup of coffee you have no argument at all.

Both alternatives take place in the external world.

If you want to make your simulation argument successful it must be incompatible with real external-world propositions. Good luck with that.

 

[blobru]

If they put my vat close enough to hers could we at least exchange some fluids?

Well... just see that it doesn't get beyond the simulation stage.