Has consciousness been fully explained?

[AkuManiMani]

I've never made the "you just can't get consciousness from material" argument. My point is, and always has been, that we currently lack an understanding of what qualia/experience/consciousness is and how phenomenality relates to known physics. The fact that we can't only make introspective observations of phenomenality does not change the fact that it is real. The practical inconvenience of qualia/consciousness being "private", in some sense, does not change it's reality; it just means that we have to adapt our methodology of study.

Personally, I think it is possible to better understand how consciousness [i.e. qualia/experiences] figures into physics. However, this can't be done by trying to redefine it for convenience or turning to pacifying non-explanations like SRIPs. Regardless of whether one considers "qualia" to be a useful concept, the fact of the matter is that the word is a label for something we know to be real and, in fact, happens to be the very thing we're trying to understand.

As I see it your whole point is to use a mushy, ill defined word in order to sneak "The World Is More Mysterious Than We Can Know" thru the back door of physics.

That "ill defined word" just happens to refer to what you're experiencing this very moment: your own consciousness. Its a fact that we do not understand the physics of said phenomena, irregardless of whether you consider this gap in our understanding a "back door" -- whatever the hell thats supposed to mean.

[ETA: By the way, I'm still waiting for you to answer my earlier questions. A Nobel Prize awaits -- if you can manage it]

 

[PixyMisa]

Consciousness is what you're doing as you read this post.

And physics is how you do it.

 

[Belz...]

No. To the degree that it can only be studied by introspection, it's simply fictional.

The problem with qualia is that they don't actually explain anything. They're something that can, by definition, never be detected, and no matter how deep we get into our understanding of the brain and consciousness, their proponents can always ask for another, unknown layer where they supposedly exist.

But it's not as if those people can define what we're supposed to be looking for. Qualia are posited because they can't imagine how simple neurons can produce all the experiences they have. They need more to explain "blue". Personally I don't see why.

And in the end, qualia don't serve any purpose in explaining consciousness. Whether they exist or not has no bearing on the subject, because they don't tell us anything about consciousness at all. As such adding them to a discussion only serves to muddle the issue, which is precisely what philosophers like to do.

 

[westprog]

As I see it your whole point is to use a mushy, ill defined word in order to sneak "The World Is More Mysterious Than We Can Know" thru the back door of physics.

The "only physics is real, subjective experience is not physics, subjective experiences is not real" idea seems to be a belief system entirely divergent from reality. We know that subjective experience is real. It's via subjective experience that we derive our concept of physics.

Either subjective experience can be fully explained by physics in some way, or else it can't. Either way, we know that there is such a thing as subjective experience. Even the belief that subjective experience is not real is itself a subjective experience! To use our consistent experiences of the universe, collated and analysed together as physics, to prove that there is no such thing as subjective experience is clearly massively logically flawed.

If subjective experience is not capable of analysis by physics, that's a limitation of physics, which we are perforce compelled to accept as part of the way the universe works.

 

[westprog]

How, exactly, do you define this thing 'consciousness' and how, exactly, do you define this thing 'physics' that you insist it has no effect on?

And how does one derive physics without recourse to subjective experience?

 

[westprog]

Consciousness is what you're doing as you read this post.

Or, say, measure the acceleration due to gravity.

 

[Belz...]

The "only physics is real, subjective experience is not physics, subjective experiences is not real" idea seems to be a belief system entirely divergent from reality. We know that subjective experience is real. It's via subjective experience that we derive our concept of physics.

The problem is how subjective experience is defined. On the one hand you have people defining it as the "stuff" that observes reality, which almost implies that it's outside of reality or at least outside of testable reality; while on the other you have people defining it was something within reality, and strictly a result of physical processes.

One is philosophy, the other is science.

 

[Belz...]

And how does one derive physics without recourse to subjective experience?

I would say that a machine, without any form of consciousness, probably could do quite a lot without subjective experience.

 

[westprog]

The problem is how subjective experience is defined. On the one hand you have people defining it as the "stuff" that observes reality, which almost implies that it's outside of reality or at least outside of testable reality; while on the other you have people defining it was something within reality, and strictly a result of physical processes.

One is philosophy, the other is science.

Both are conjecture.

 

[westprog]

I would say that a machine, without any form of consciousness, probably could do quite a lot without subjective experience.

"do quite a lot" - yes. However, the only way we can derive physics is via subjective experience. That's the only way we know or believe anything.

 

[Philosaur]

The "only physics is real, subjective experience is not physics, subjective experiences is not real" idea seems to be a belief system entirely divergent from reality. We know that subjective experience is real. It's via subjective experience that we derive our concept of physics.

But you're just squishing the problem area around into a different word. When you say it's "real", do you mean it's real like the keyboard I'm typing this on is real (has material being in space-time), or is it real the way justice is real (as a concept which influences how people behave), or the way the space inside a beach ball is real (has physical boundaries but no material being)?

The way I understand "subjective experience is real" is that it must be real in some way different from the ways I've enumerated. The problem is then explaining what "real" means.

Presumably qualia do not have material properties like mass and volume, right?

Do qualia have non-material properties? Are those properties qualia themselves? Do we have infinite regress?

Either subjective experience can be fully explained by physics in some way, or else it can't. Either way, we know that there is such a thing as subjective experience. Even the belief that subjective experience is not real is itself a subjective experience! To use our consistent experiences of the universe, collated and analysed together as physics, to prove that there is no such thing as subjective experience is clearly massively logically flawed.

I can at least provisionally accept most of what you say, but I can't accept that beliefs should be part of "subjective experience", and thus, qualia. It makes more sense to me to say that belief is a stance we adopt toward certain assertions.

If subjective experience is not capable of analysis by physics, that's a limitation of physics, which we are perforce compelled to accept as part of the way the universe works.

Ok, but does that mean that we should look for non-scientific ways to gain knowledge about qualia? Or, by using "physics" are you implying there's a non-physical but still scientific way of analyzing qualia?

 

[Philosaur]

And how does one derive physics without recourse to subjective experience?

No part of physics depends on subjective experience. Well, possibly the outcome of certain quantum events, but even that's subject to interpretation.

Ick--I stepped in something recursive.

 

[rocketdodger]

We possess a basis from which it can be deduced whether we are in a simulation/vat or in an external world. Unlike (can't really say actual) simulations/brains in a vat.

No, we don't -- otherwise we could know the ultimate nature of reality. That is really what this comes down to. We have no idea where the behavior of the fundamental particles of our reality comes from. As soon as we do, then we don't know where that behavior comes from. Turtles all the way down?

To claim that this cannot be accomplished equates to denying external reality RD (I suspect you know this).

It equates to denying one can know the ultimate nature of external reality. Which, incidentally, is something I think most respected philosophers agree with (not that I care much about argument from authority ).

 

[AlBell]

No part of physics depends on subjective experience. Well, possibly the outcome of certain quantum events, but even that's subject to interpretation.

Ick--I stepped in something recursive.

Glad you noticed.

 

[westprog]

No part of physics depends on subjective experience. Well, possibly the outcome of certain quantum events, but even that's subject to interpretation.

Ick--I stepped in something recursive.

Can you give an example of a piece of scientific knowledge that you acquired outside the medium of a subjective experience?

 

[westprog]

But you're just squishing the problem area around into a different word. When you say it's "real", do you mean it's real like the keyboard I'm typing this on is real (has material being in space-time), or is it real the way justice is real (as a concept which influences how people behave), or the way the space inside a beach ball is real (has physical boundaries but no material being)?

The way I understand "subjective experience is real" is that it must be real in some way different from the ways I've enumerated. The problem is then explaining what "real" means.

Presumably qualia do not have material properties like mass and volume, right?

Do qualia have non-material properties? Are those properties qualia themselves? Do we have infinite regress?

The fact that questions exist doesn't mean that we have the answers. In fact, we certainly don't have the answers.

We don't know what subjective experience is. However, to use that as a reason to doubt its existence would be absurd.

When you say that something has material being in space-time, what does that mean? When it comes down to it, it means that you have a model, based on your subjective experiences of that thing, which grants it certain properties.

Your supposition that there is a real keyboard is based on your experience of touching it, seeing words appear on the screen, and so on. Any theory that discounts your experience of the keyboard has to logically abandon the real keyboard as well.

I can at least provisionally accept most of what you say, but I can't accept that beliefs should be part of "subjective experience", and thus, qualia. It makes more sense to me to say that belief is a stance we adopt toward certain assertions.



Ok, but does that mean that we should look for non-scientific ways to gain knowledge about qualia? Or, by using "physics" are you implying there's a non-physical but still scientific way of analyzing qualia?

Certainly there are non-scientific ways to learn about subjective experience. We can experience it. The purpose of art is to grant us access to the subjective experience of other people. Whether or not subjective experience is subject to scientific access, I don't know.

 

[Philosaur]

It's via subjective experience that we derive our concept of physics.

Your use of the highlighted phrase above is *very* idiosyncratic and possibly loaded.

Is your whole point that all of our information about the outside world comes to us as sense data? Ok, sure. So what?

If you mean something more, then you'll need to spell it out.

And how does one derive physics without recourse to subjective experience?

Ok, it's starting to sound like you mean something more. Here's a thought: physics and all of science is a way of overcoming the well-known limitations of subjective experience. Most, if not all, of science is put together to eliminate the influence of any single subjective experience and tease out the patterns that give rise to those experiences.

However, the only way we can derive physics is via subjective experience. That's the only way we know or believe anything.

It's perfectly and obviously conceivable to me that a computer program can "notice" regularities in sensor data and derive possible experiments and laws to account for those regularities. The program would effectively be doing science without any subjective experience (assuming we all agree that this particular computer program need not have subjective experience).

Can you give an example of a piece of scientific knowledge that you acquired outside the medium of a subjective experience?

Um, no. But this is like asking if you've ever eaten food without passing it through your mouth. And when someone says no, you conclude that food, metabolism, and cooking are all about your oral sphincter. Sure, it's a part of the process, but it doesn't have the center billing you want to give it. Similarly, if you are pointing at qualia as being somehow fundamental to physics or science, you are missing the point.

 

[Philosaur]

We don't know what subjective experience is. However, to use that as a reason to doubt its existence would be absurd.

Why do I have to keep repeating myself on this point? When I look at the sky I see blue. I'm not denying that I see blue. What I *am* saying is that it's not at all helpful to analyze this using the notion of qualia. It's like you're insisting that I repeat "I see blue in the sky" to myself in French so that I can somehow get more out of the proposition. No matter what language I use, whether it involves qualia or not, the analysis is the same.

When you say that something has material being in space-time, what does that mean? When it comes down to it, it means that you have a model, based on your subjective experiences of that thing, which grants it certain properties.

My model of reality is based on my understanding of logic and reality. I have learned that there are times to not trust my senses.

Your supposition that there is a real keyboard is based on your experience of touching it, seeing words appear on the screen, and so on. Any theory that discounts your experience of the keyboard has to logically abandon the real keyboard as well.

I'm not sure what you are trying to say here. My theory about the world includes the possibility of hallucination. How do I separate my sense impressions from my hallucinations? Obviously, I can't rely on my sense impressions...

Certainly there are non-scientific ways to learn about subjective experience. We can experience it. The purpose of art is to grant us access to the subjective experience of other people. Whether or not subjective experience is subject to scientific access, I don't know.

Just as there are non-scientific ways to learn about God. And non-scientific ways to learn about souls. And non-scientific ways to learn about prayer and miracles and psychics, right?

Art does *not* grant us access to the subjective experience of others. Your assertion makes me wonder if you really understand what the rest of us are talking about.

 

[Frank Newgent]

We possess a basis from which it can be deduced whether we are in a simulation/vat or in an external world. Unlike (can't really say actual) simulations/brains in a vat.

No, we don't -- otherwise we could know the ultimate nature of reality. That is really what this comes down to. We have no idea where the behavior of the fundamental particles of our reality comes from. As soon as we do, then we don't know where that behavior comes from. Turtles all the way down?

To claim that this cannot be accomplished equates to denying external reality RD (I suspect you know this).

It equates to denying one can know the ultimate nature of external reality. Which, incidentally, is something I think most respected philosophers agree with (not that I care much about argument from authority ).

Claiming that being able to logically deduce that one is not a brain in a vat is the same as being able to know the ultimate nature of reality doesn't parse to me. Sorry RD.


Here's the entirety of what I posted again.

Might a simulation/brain in a vat note evidence of being a simulation/brain in a vat leading it to reasonably state "I am a simulation/brain in a vat"?

The simulation/brain in a vat that made this statement would then exist in the real/external world and would not be a simulation/brain in a vat. Anymore.

Yes, correct.

And then, the question of whether it was a BIVIV must be addressed, and then once that is answered whether it is a BIVIVIV.

Which is all pointless, if you ask me.

The only reason the simulation hypothesis is even important is that it shows something about logical consistency -- since it is logically impossible to determine if you are in the *base* frame -- the frame that is not some kind of a nested simulation -- then any arguments must be valid (not necessarily correct) in both the case of us being in a simulation and the case of us being in the base frame.

Case in point -- westprog had argued that if we are in a simulation, then we are not really conscious, because real consciousness cannot exist in a simulation. I don't think this is logically valid, given any definition of consciousness. If it were, then since we know we are really conscious, we could prove we were in the base frame. An inconsistency.

The logically valid formulation of the idea westprog was getting at is to say that perhaps any simulations we make within this frame -- which would be a frame higher or lower than our own, depending on how you look at it -- wouldn't be able to support consciousness like our own frame can. This could be for any number of reasons, all of them reducing to the fundamental question of whether we can simulate every feature of our own frame. That is a valid question. This also implies that if we are in a simulation, perhaps there is stuff one frame out that cannot be part of "our" simulation for the same kinds of reasons. And in that case, it would also be valid to say that we are not really conscious in the same way that a being in that outer world might be conscious. But it is nonsense to say "if I am in a simulation, then I am not conscious."

westprog's arguments are his. In my last post these are the points I made (leaving in what you did not address in your post):

So 夢工場 ドキドキパニック Yume Kōjō: Doki Doki Panikku isn't like Super Mario after all?

That aside, if you were in a simulation with no connection whatsoever to the external world where I happened to be... how could we carry on like this?

Frank didn't you read my post -- I said if we were in different situations, or one of us in a simulation and the other not in a simulation, then nothing I said applies anymore.

We could obviously not carry on like this. We are both in the same frame, or at least in frames that have a connection.

And we both seem to be aware that we both might be, either, in a simulation/vat or in the real/external world.

So already knowing that any passing detail that we observe could be, either, a feature of simulation/vat programming or an actual detail on a sunny afternoon in the real/external world I wonder... how might a simulation/brain in a vat even start to confront the question of what is external and what is simulated concerning real brains and real vats?

With no difficulty whatsoever I have confronted the question of what is external and what is simulated concerning real brains and real vats.

Might a simulation/brain in a vat note evidence of being a simulation/brain in a vat leading it to reasonably state "I am a simulation/brain in a vat"?

The simulation/brain in a vat that made this statement would then exist in the real/external world and would not be a simulation/brain in a vat. Anymore.

You might try denying the external world to make your simulation/brain in a vat argument more consistent.

I agree the example of a simulation/brain in a vat referring to its simulated/vat existence doesn't really make much sense. Simulations and brains in a vat exist in the external objective world and not in a simulated/vat world.

But rather than this being the convoluted example of a simulation/brain in a vat appearing to not be that same simulation/brain in a vat due entirely to advanced vat programming - as I think you suggested - it'd be more straightforward to acknowledge that simply knowing either possibilty exists (our experiences are features of a simulated/vat programming or they are experiences in an external world) is simply knowing that either possibility exists.

We possess a basis from which it can be deduced whether we are in a simulation/vat or in an external world. Unlike (can't really say actual) simulations/brains in a vat.

To claim that this cannot be accomplished equates to denying external reality RD (I suspect you know this).

Referring to what I've bolded in my original quote... again I am referring to us being able to deduce whether we exist in a simulation/vat. Or not.

Do you believe advanced vat programming prevents such a possibility?

 

[HatRack]

Art does *not* grant us access to the subjective experience of others.

Art, and any form of communication in general, may not grant us direct access to the subjective experiences of others, but it certainly grants us indirect access. It's the reason us humans attempt to communicate with each other in the first place. People write books and create paintings to attempt to communicate their mix of emotions and ideas about a particular subject. This mix of emotions and ideas is the subjective experience of the author.

I'd like to think that the same or a very similar subjective experience as the author's can be felt by careful readers of a book, or by careful admirers of a painting. Of course, this doesn't happen in everyday communication, because we are too caught up in our own personal biases to really try and take in what another is communicating.

Nevertheless, I do believe subjective experience can be exchanged in this fashion. How perfect the recovery of a subjective experience through different forms of communication such as art and literature really is is just something we can't measure right now. Perhaps if we find ways to more precisely correlate neural activity with certain subjective experiences in the future, we will be able to measure how well an idea or an emotion or any subjective experience in general flows from one mind through a communication medium and into another mind.

I do believe this is along the lines of what westprog was referring to when he said "grant us access to the subjective experience of other people".

Your assertion makes me wonder if you really understand what the rest of us are talking about.

Or, maybe you don't understand what he is talking about

Whether or not subjective experience is subject to scientific access, I don't know.

I'd like to think this is possible, in principle, through correlation of brain states with certain subjective experiences. Although this correlation cannot be completely precise as it would rely on test subjects to describe what they are experiencing, I doubt that will stop experimenters from running such tests anyway.

However, I've yet to see a compelling explanation as to how the physical world gives rise to subjective experience, and I have my doubts as to whether such an explanation can be given, at least with our current understanding of the physical world.