Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Philosaur]

I'm saying that "qualia" are what our experiences reduce to. However, instead of their defining properties being discrete magnitudes their essence lies in being distinct qualities [as per the dictionary definition of a 'quale' being "a sense-datum or feeling having some distinctive quality"]. These distinct qualities [e.g. distinct sensations, feelings, and other perceptions] are combined to form our experiences of any given moment. Its really that simple.

In which case, a single qualia (qualius? qualium) would be the total individual experience. That's fine. There's no rule to say that there's a one-to-one match between sensory input and subjective experience.

westprog, I think AMM is at least more consistent with common usage. The way you've analyzed qualia (sing. "quale"), it's perfectly fine to refer to my whole experience of sitting in a chair reading a book and sipping on a cup of coffee as a single quale. We already call this an "experience"--why multiply entities here? Why add another level to the analysis by referring to the "quale" of the "experience"?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

Does anyone know what the inner experiences of a 6-month-old baby are like?

Cuz I'm thinking that the rest of us have a view of inner experiences that have been polluted with post-theoretic introspection to the point where we really have no idea what our experiences are like.

Got qualia? Maybe.

~~ Paul

 

[rocketdodger]

Does anyone know what the inner experiences of a 6-month-old baby are like?

Cuz I'm thinking that the rest of us have a view of inner experiences that have been polluted with post-theoretic introspection to the point where we really have no idea what our experiences are like.

Got qualia? Maybe.

~~ Paul

Or how about what your own inner experiences are like, when you aren't paying attention to your inner experiences in order to introspect on them?

Seems to me that I can either focus on an experience to see what it is like, in which case it is already contaminated by the very act of focusing on it, or I can merely try to remember an experience I was not immediately aware of at the time, in which case I have access to nothing but a memory.

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

And focusing on the surface experience tells us nothing about what is actually going on. This analogy has been used many times:

What is going on with the image that I see on my monitor?

Well, it is composed of pixels. There are "red like a tomato" pixels, "green like a leaf" pixels, and "blue like the sky" pixels. Together they form the image.

What going on with pixels underneath their superficial color?

Huh?

~~ Paul

 

[Frank Newgent]

Seems self evident assuming one is using words and sentences. Or are you thinking of communication taking place mathematically?

Would logical axioms necessarily be interpreted the same everywhere?

For example, the computer running the simulation that you might be in could be totally haywire and spitting out random inconsistencies

Frank I am talking about the case of both you and I being in the same simulation. I thought that was clear -- was it not?

Obviously, if we are in different ones, or if I am and you are not, then everything I said doesn't apply.

So 夢工場 ドキドキパニック Yume Kōjō: Doki Doki Panikku isn't like Super Mario after all?

That aside, if you were in a simulation with no connection whatsoever to the external world where I happened to be... how could we carry on like this?

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm saying that "qualia" are what our experiences reduce to.

But we know what our experiences reduce to: Neural activity.

 

[PixyMisa]

As I thought: catastrophic analogy failure.

Problem 1: Matter does not reduce to quanta. A quantum is a "packet" of energy that effects physical interaction.

Well, it's a minimum amount of anything; an elementary packet of matter or energy. And we know this because we can actually observe and measure these packets.

Problem 2: Your notion of "distinct" qualities is incoherent. For instance, when I'm looking at a blue-green coffee mug, are there two qualia involved (one for blue, one for green) or just a single blue-green quale? Is my perception of the size of the mug a separate quale? Is the shape of the mug a distinct quale, or is it a set of component qualia? If I look at the mug over time, is there a sequence of identical qualia entering and exiting my mind, or is there a single quale sort of "hanging around"? Does the quale morph as I move around the mug?

Yeah. The question is, can he measure it? And the answer is no; all he has is a bad analogy.

 

[westprog]

Does anyone know what the inner experiences of a 6-month-old baby are like?

Cuz I'm thinking that the rest of us have a view of inner experiences that have been polluted with post-theoretic introspection to the point where we really have no idea what our experiences are like.

Got qualia? Maybe.

~~ Paul

What do we think our experiences are? What are they really?

I'm quite prepared to entertain the "our concept of subjective experience is all wrong" idea - though I'd prefer if the "wrong idea" was actually stated - but that doesn't mean that subjective experience doesn't exist at all.

 

[westprog]

westprog, I think AMM is at least more consistent with common usage. The way you've analyzed qualia (sing. "quale"), it's perfectly fine to refer to my whole experience of sitting in a chair reading a book and sipping on a cup of coffee as a single quale. We already call this an "experience"--why multiply entities here? Why add another level to the analysis by referring to the "quale" of the "experience"?

The only reason for the qualia term is to avoid confusion with non-subjective experience. I don't find it a help simply because it leads to digressions like this.

 

[Philosaur]

The only reason for the qualia term is to avoid confusion with non-subjective experience. I don't find it a help simply because it leads to digressions like this.

Ok, I'll bite: what's non-subjective experience?

 

[rocketdodger]

So 夢工場 ドキドキパニック Yume Kōjō: Doki Doki Panikku isn't like Super Mario after all?

That aside, if you were in a simulation with no connection whatsoever to the external world where I happened to be... how could we carry on like this?

Frank didn't you read my post -- I said if we were in different situations, or one of us in a simulation and the other not in a simulation, then nothing I said applies anymore.

We could obviously not carry on like this. We are both in the same frame, or at least in frames that have a connection.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I'm saying that "qualia" are what our experiences reduce to. However, instead of their defining properties being discrete magnitudes their essence lies in being distinct qualities [as per the dictionary definition of a 'quale' being "a sense-datum or feeling having some distinctive quality"]. These distinct qualities [e.g. distinct sensations, feelings, and other perceptions] are combined to form our experiences of any given moment. Its really that simple.

As I thought: catastrophic analogy failure.

Problem 1: Matter does not reduce to quanta. A quantum is a "packet" of energy that effects physical interaction.

Every physical entity is composed of discrete quanta of energy. From light (photons) to sound (phonons) to the elementary particles that make up atoms -- all of them are energy quanta. In anycase, are you really going to try and turn this into a red-herring for us to waste time on?

Problem 2: Your notion of "distinct" qualities is incoherent. For instance, when I'm looking at a blue-green coffee mug, are there two qualia involved (one for blue, one for green) or just a single blue-green quale? Is my perception of the size of the mug a separate quale? Is the shape of the mug a distinct quale, or is it a set of component qualia? If I look at the mug over time, is there a sequence of identical qualia entering and exiting my mind, or is there a single quale sort of "hanging around"? Does the quale morph as I move around the mug?

Maybe your subjective experience comes to you in distinct packets that you can identify as "qualia". Mine does not. It's as simple as that.

Hairsplitting aside, you can presumably distinguish between the subjective qualities you perceive, yes? Okay, so the mug, as presented by your senses, has a particular shape. How, in any way, does that change the fact that the form of your perception is composed of the experience of distinctive qualities? Why is this even a point of contention?

"Don't let that fool you"...? "It's not like qualia can be defined or tested for"...?

Genius, qualia are what make up all of your observations, they are the only things you directly perceive -- heck, they ARE your perceptions. Are you truly so utterly dense that after all this time you -still- can't comprehend what the word "qualia" refers to? Seriously, what the hell is wrong with you?

You can shout it, punctuate it with ad homs, act as incredulous as you like--it doesn't change the fact that what you see as being obvious is anything but.

I'm sorry but it is inexcusable that after all these years of discussion Belz is still crying incomprehension with regard to qualia -- it is not a complex concept to grasp. I can only conclude that hes either obscenely stupid, obnoxiously disingenuous, or both. Pointing this out is not an ad hominem argument as it does not form the basis of my position on the matter; it's merely an observation of the absurdity of his behavior.

I find the idea that my experiences can be reduced to component qualia ridiculous. I *do not* perceive the world as a bundle of qualia, regardless of how many times you want to scream and yell and insist that it is so. My experience of the world is a unified, ubiquitous presentation. I can mentally reduce the presentation into component parts, either by their edges, their locations, their logical structure, their emotional resonance, or any number of other criteria. But I find that no matter how hard I try, I can't decompose the presentation into component qualia. Can you?

A painting is a single unified work, and as such, can only truly be appreciated as a whole. Even so, a painting is composed of different colors and shades of paint whose distinctions give the painting it's depth and complexity. Likewise, our experiences of the world are a unified whole but those experiences are still composed of a wide spectra of subjective qualities which are organized in an infinitude of ways in the dynamic stream of our awareness. Its the "colors" and "shades" of our experiences that are referred to as qualia. In this sense, it can be said that our experiences are composed of qualia just as paintings are composed of various paints and mixtures of paint.

 

[westprog]

Ok, I'll bite: what's non-subjective experience?

When something happens to something inanimate, having some effect.

Would I call that "experience"? No, but sometimes people do.

Is all this worth bothering with? Probably not. The question of subjective experience is what's interesting - not what we call it.

 

[dlorde]

The actual example of what SRIP is supposed to be shows how shallow the concept is. There's simply no possible reason to suppose that a piece of C++ code such as that shown has anything whatsoever to do with consciousness. It's just endless assertion.

For what it's worth, I don't think the posted code does represent SRIP as discussed in this thread (or in any useful sense) - as I previously explained - although it could easily be part of a SRI Process.

 

[westprog]

For what it's worth, I don't think the posted code does represent SRIP as discussed in this thread (or in any useful sense) - as I previously explained.

I agree, but what does? How can we objectively establish when SRIP is taking place?

 

[tsig]

Does anyone know what the inner experiences of a 6-month-old baby are like?

Cuz I'm thinking that the rest of us have a view of inner experiences that have been polluted with post-theoretic introspection to the point where we really have no idea what our experiences are like.

Got qualia? Maybe.

~~ Paul

Yes, unless we clear our minds of everything we have learned and return to the primordial ooze we cannot understand the profundities of philosophy.

 

[tsig]

Every physical entity is composed of discrete quanta of energy. From light (photons) to sound (phonons) to the elementary particles that make up atoms -- all of them are energy quanta. In anycase, are you really going to try and turn this into a red-herring for us to waste time on?



Hairsplitting aside, you can presumably distinguish between the subjective qualities you perceive, yes? Okay, so the mug, as presented by your senses, has a particular shape. How, in any way, does that change the fact that the form of your perception is composed of the experience of distinctive qualities? Why is this even a point of contention?



I'm sorry but it is inexcusable that after all these years of discussion Belz is still crying incomprehension with regard to qualia -- it is not a complex concept to grasp. I can only conclude that hes either obscenely stupid, obnoxiously disingenuous, or both. Pointing this out is not an ad hominem argument as it does not form the basis of my position on the matter; it's merely an observation of the absurdity of his behavior.



A painting is a single unified work, and as such, can only truly be appreciated as a whole. Even so, a painting is composed of different colors and shades of paint whose distinctions give the painting it's depth and complexity. Likewise, our experiences of the world are a unified whole but those experiences are still composed of a wide spectra of subjective qualities which are organized in an infinitude of ways in the dynamic stream of our awareness. Its the "colors" and "shades" of our experiences that are referred to as qualia. In this sense, it can be said that our experiences are composed of qualia just as paintings are composed of various paints and mixtures of paint.

Qualia are little experience packets?

Funny I tend to experience the world as analog not digital.

 

[westprog]

[/HILITE]

Qualia are little experience packets?

Funny I tend to experience the world as analog not digital.

I experience my computer as analogue not digital as well. Go deep enough and everything is digital. Go deeper and it's analogue again.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I experience my computer as analogue not digital as well. Go deep enough and everything is digital. Go deeper and it's analogue again.

Wave-particle duality, perhaps?

 

[Paul C. Anagnostopoulos]

I'm quite prepared to entertain the "our concept of subjective experience is all wrong" idea - though I'd prefer if the "wrong idea" was actually stated - but that doesn't mean that subjective experience doesn't exist at all.

No, but it might be vastly different from what we talk about.

~~ Paul