Has consciousness been fully explained?

[PixyMisa]

So is it:

(SRIP (Consciousness))

or

(Consciousness (SRIP))

or

(Consciousnes=SRIP)?

My position is the last of the three, but I could be persuaded that the first is more appropriate to the way the term consciousness is used. (Assuming that these represent Venn diagrams, i.e. that the first means that self-referential information processing is a broader category than consciousness.)

That's the semantic issue that's been mentioned a few times.

 

[PixyMisa]

The SRIP claim is very similar:

A process is conscious iff that process is SRIP.

You do realise that this is a different statement? You are now using my definition to identify a process as conscious, not addressing the definition itself. In this case, though it's a mess grammatically, it's semantically valid.

But it is not the same statement as before.

Also, if SRIP is logically equivalent to consciousness, as Pixy claims, then SRIP iff conciousness.

No, that's incorrect:

Logical equivalence is different from material equivalence. The material equivalence of p and q (often written p↔q) is itself another statement in same object language as p and q, which expresses the idea "p if and only if q". In particular, the truth value of p↔q can change from one model to another. The claim that two formulas are logically equivalent is a statement in the metalanguage, expressing a relationship between two statements p and q. The claim that p and q are semantically equivalent does not depend on any particular model; it says that in every possible model, p will have the same truth value as q. The claim that p and q are syntactically equivalent does not depend on models at all; it states that there is a deduction of q from p and a deduction of p from q.

Which means SRIP is a necessary and sufficient condition for consciousness.

That would follow if your previous statement were sound, but it's not, so it doesn't.

There is no condition here. That's inaccurate and potentially very misleading. You don't have a P and a Q to form a bidirectional connective between. You just have a P.

 

[AkuManiMani]

My position is the last of the three, but I could be persuaded that the first is more appropriate to the way the term consciousness is used. (Assuming that these represent Venn diagrams, i.e. that the first means that self-referential information processing is a broader category than consciousness.)

That's the semantic issue that's been mentioned a few times.

So, consciousness is a SRIP, but a SRIP is not necessarily conscious -- as in consciousness is a subclass of SRIP?

 

[PixyMisa]

So, consciousness is a SRIP, but a SRIP is not necessarily conscious -- as in consciousness is a subclass of SRIP?

That's not my position, but the difference between the two is one of semantics and usage, not mechanism. That is, we might say that consciousness is goal-directed self-referential information processing. Or not; there are some problems with that example. There seem to be problems with most of the ways we might extend the definition, which is why I don't.

 

[AkuManiMani]

That's not my position, but the difference between the two is one of semantics and usage, not mechanism. That is, we might say that consciousness is goal-directed self-referential information processing. Or not; there are some problems with that example. There seem to be problems with most of the ways we might extend the definition, which is why I don't.

Theres actually a problem that you're overlooking... Simply defining consciousness as SRIP does not give us a workable scientific theory of consciousness; its gives us a useless tautology.

 

[Orbini]

Theres actually a problem that you're overlooking... Simply defining consciousness as SRIP does not give us a workable scientific theory of consciousness; its gives us a useless tautology.

The problem is that nothing else gives us a workable scientific theory either.

 

[piojunbabia]

I guess our awareness of our existence is the mere proof that we are conscious. Deeper explaination? uhmmm... next question please...

 

[PixyMisa]

Theres actually a problem that you're overlooking... Simply defining consciousness as SRIP does not give us a workable scientific theory of consciousness; its gives us a useless tautology.

Nothing could be further from the truth.

Well, okay, there's Penrose's Orch-OR, that's further from the truth.

Few things could be further from the truth.

Self-referential information processing is not just a collection of words. It's a well-defined mechanism. That's the critical difference between my definition and yours.

With my definition, we can take things apart and test to see whether this is in fact what is happening. In other words, if you have something real - a system, a behaviour - that you already identify with consciousness, we can confirm first, whether or not self-referential information processing is taking place there, and second, whether or not that can account for what we observe, or if there needs to be something else as well.

In other words, we can use it as a scientific hypothesis - albeit a very broad one.

 

[Clive]

The problem is that nothing else gives us a workable scientific theory either.

I guess that's why this thread is not in the science forum.

Science is only a tool and we need to be wary of the "if your only tool is a hammer then every problem looks like a nail" trap. There isn't any law that I'm aware of that says every truth about our "reality" is necessarily something that can be explained by a scientific theory. It would be nice if that was true, but it quite possibly isn't (and maybe there's even some kind of Godelian argument that proves it). That's not to say that science can't handle this job, but perhaps we need to think a bit longer before rushing to decree that (modern) washing machines must necessarily be having some kind of subjective experience just because they have some form of SRIP embedded in them. Hah!

How about "consciousness is subjective experience" as a definition? In any case, the definition needs to at least include "subjective experience" as an unexplained aspect of consciousness because that's what it still is.

PixyMisa and Rocketdodger's "explanation" of subjective experience basically boils down to just saying "it happens". It's explanation by pretending it doesn't happen (or something like that). There's absolutely no reason to adopt "Consciousness is SRIP" unless you're willing to make a huge leap of faith when it comes to subjective experience. It may eventually turn out that subjective experience (in some form) is always present when "SRIP" (in some form) is part of the system but that's no more than wild conjecture right now.

Conjectures are okay, but they aren't suitable as definitions. And before you tell me for a third time Pixy, I have read GEB and I told you that the first time you suggested it. In fact I suspect I was reading it when you were still in nappies. So I think I know where you're coming from - I've played around with those kinds of ideas also - but it seems to me you've been sucking from the same teat for too long. Let it go, suck in some oxygen instead and try to at least loosen the mindset that I think you're currently locked in (probably without even knowing it).

 

[PixyMisa]

I guess that's why this thread is not in the science forum.

Science is only a tool and we need to be wary of the "if your only tool is a hammer then every problem looks like a nail" trap. There isn't any law that I'm aware of that says every truth about our "reality" is necessarily something that can be explained by a scientific theory.

No, there's no such law. It is, however, an entirely reasonable inference.

It would be nice if that was true, but it quite possibly isn't (and maybe there's even some kind of Godelian argument that proves it). That's not to say that science can't handle this job, but perhaps we need to think a bit longer before rushing to decree that (modern) washing machines must necessarily be having some kind of subjective experience just because they have some form of SRIP embedded in them.

No. Nobody is rushing to decree anything. This insight stems from decades of work in neuroscience and computer science.

How about "consciousness is subjective experience" as a definition?

It's useless. All it does is add a level of obfuscation while ignoring other behaviours we class as conscious.

PixyMisa and Rocketdodger's "explanation" of subjective experience basically boils down to just saying "it happens".

No. What we are saying is that it is self-referential information processing.

It's explanation by pretending it doesn't happen (or something like that).

No. That's obvious nonsense. We agree that subjective experiences are real, and we provide a mechanism for them.

There's absolutely no reason to adopt "Consciousness is SRIP" unless you're willing to make a huge leap of faith when it comes to subjective experience.

What leap of faith is that, and why do you believe it is required?

It may eventually turn out that subjective experience (in some form) is always present when "SRIP" (in some form) is part of the system but that's no more than wild conjecture right now.

No, that's completely wrong. We build self-referential information processing systems right now, and they have subjective experiences.

Conjectures are okay, but they aren't suitable as definitions. And before you tell me for a third time Pixy, I have read GEB and I told you that the first time you suggested it. In fact I suspect I was reading it when you were still in nappies. So I think I know where you're coming from - I've played around with those kinds of ideas also - but it seems to me you've been sucking from the same teat for too long. Let it go, suck in some oxygen instead and try to at least loosen the mindset that I think you're currently locked in (probably without even knowing it).

Try to actually respond to the argument.

 

[Orbini]

Science is only a tool and we need to be wary of the "if your only tool is a hammer then every problem looks like a nail" trap. There isn't any law that I'm aware of that says every truth about our "reality" is necessarily something that can be explained by a scientific theory.

If there's a better tool, then there must be an improvement we can make to the scientific method. Do you have any suggestions ?

Science is useful, because it helps us predict things. A lot of non-scientific folk have created ideas that pretend to "understand" stuff, but without any predictive power. While potentially satisfying, they offer nothing of value.

 

[!Kaggen]

If there's a better tool, then there must be an improvement we can make to the scientific method. Do you have any suggestions ?

Yes, become skeptical of those that claim that science is not affected by humans with false belief's and assumptions.

 

[Orbini]

Yes, become skeptical of those that claim that science is not affected by humans with false belief's and assumptions.

That skepticism is already part of the scientific method. That's why we aim to objectively verify its predictions.

 

[!Kaggen]

That skepticism is already part of the scientific method. That's why we aim to objectively verify its predictions.

You sure about that

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=196214

 

[Orbini]

You sure about that

http://www.internationalskeptics.com/forums/showthread.php?t=196214

Yes. Your article shows self-correction in progress. It may not always go as quickly as you'd like, but there's nothing wrong with the method itself.

 

[!Kaggen]

Yes. Your article shows self-correction in progress. It may not always go as quickly as you'd like, but there's nothing wrong with the method itself.

Wrong, there is no "self-correcting science".

Science is not a "self" and it is not "correcting".

Any self involves humans and any correcting involves humans.

Yes there is something wrong, the scientific method assumes human beliefs are excluded from its results. As the article points out this is not the case.
Human beliefs ARE always there and the best we can do is make them explicit.

 

[Orbini]

Yes there is something wrong, the scientific method assumes human beliefs are excluded from its results. As the article points out this is not the case.
Human beliefs ARE always there and the best we can do is make them explicit.

Please provide a concrete suggestion how the rules of the scientific method should be changed to improve the quality of the results.

 

[Belz...]

I am once again dazzled by the depths of your insight and argumentative skills. My mind cannot fathom an intellect of your magnitude.

We know, we know.

 

[Belz...]

We have a room full of people talking about water, which is wet, and sometimes it's blue, and sometimes it's greenish, and you can sail boats on it...

And I say H₂O, and half the room looks at me as if I've grown a third eye, and they say, no, water, the stuff that comes out of a tap. And the other half of the room looks at them and says, yeah, that's H₂O. And the first half says something like but hydrogen isn't wet, so water can't be made of hydrogen, and the second half make a rush for the bar all at once.

Bwahahaha. You made me chuckle. Good post.

 

[Belz...]

Wrong, there is no "self-correcting science".

Science is not a "self" and it is not "correcting".

Any self involves humans and any correcting involves humans.

Yes there is something wrong, the scientific method assumes human beliefs are excluded from its results. As the article points out this is not the case.
Human beliefs ARE always there and the best we can do is make them explicit.

I think there's some solipsism left on that statement. I can smell it from here. You might want to wash that off before it goes bad.