Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Beth]

Yes Beth but at some point a reasonable person (there is that word again -- reason ) should say "well we had a hypothesis, it turned out to be way off, lets stop barking up this tree."

I wasn't discussing whether or not their hypothesis was correct or even just reasonable. The claim was that it was impossible for quantum properties to be a part of the process of consciousness. Until it's been proven false, their hypothesis refutes that claim.

 

[PixyMisa]

You keep saying that. But saying it doesn’t make it true. We don’t yet understand how consciousness works or how to reproduce it artificially.

Yes we do.

Yes. It’s because I don’t know that those things are impossible.

You should by now.

Actually, according to the Wikipedia article RD linked to above

These proposed alternative processes have the advantage of taking place within Tegmark's time to decoherence.

Yes. However, they did this by invoking magic.

Again, I’m not claiming that this hypothesis is correct. I’m merely pointing out that there are hypotheses that propose that consciousness relies on quantum processes.

These hypotheses have been proven to be false and impossible.

Again you are using the emotional ploy of equating unknown possible physical causes to magic.

No.

I'm noting that your insistence on impossible causes is equivalent to magic.

I’m not ignoring your reasons.

Yes you are.

I find them unconvincing and frequently irrelevant. You say that if chaos theory had an impact on the workings of the mind, we'd all be dead.

I said nothing of the sort. I said that chaos theory doesn't give you anexcuse to invoke undetectably tiny effects and claim them as the origins of consciousness.

And I explained why, which you have ignored.

I’ve read that. Tegmark’s argument works well against the original proposal, but not against the more general concept.

Magic again.

The Wiki argument cited above states that alternative processes have been proposed that do not have that flaw.

Did you bother to actually read that article?

It was supposed that the interiors of neurons could alternate between liquid and gel states.

They have no evidence for any such thing. They just made it up.

In the gel state, it was further hypothesized that the water electrical dipoles are orientated in the same direction, along the outer edge of the microtubule tubulin subunits.

They have no evidence for any such thing. They just made it up.

Hameroff et al. proposed that this ordered water could screen any quantum coherence within the tubulin of the microtubules from the environment of the rest of the brain.

They have no evidence for any such thing. They just made it up.

Each tubulin also has a tail extending out from the microtubules, which is negatively charged, and therefore attracts positively charged ions. It is suggested that this could provide further screening.

They have no evidence for any such thing. They just made it up.

Further to this, there was a suggestion that the microtubules could be pumped into a coherent state by biochemical energy.

They have no evidence for any such thing. They just made it up.

Finally, it is suggested that the configuration of the microtubule lattice might be suitable for quantum error correction, a means of holding together quantum coherence in the face of environmental interaction.

They have no evidence for any such thing. They just made it up.

This is not science. It's not even pseudo-science. It's just garbage.

This argument is not sufficient to conclude it is impossible. So, according to PM, if we can’t detect something, it can be conclusively concluded that it has no effect at all.

If something is impossible to detect, what effect can it have?

At the same time you are also claiming that any effects would be lost in the noise of all the similar effects that we are constantly subjected to.

I said nothing of the sort. I pointed out that we are already subject to random effects of the same sort but orders of magnitude stronger, and if the effect worked as claimed we'd all be dead.

That, all by itself, proves that what you are suggesting is impossible.

Neither of those are convincing arguments.

If you knew anything at all about physics, they would be. If your proposed effect is orders of magnitude below the noise floor, it's time to give up and go home.

Do you need me to explain why or do you know enough about science to understand why those arguments are not strong enough to conclude that something is impossible?

Please do.

So you say. Yet, like most of your claims, I have seen no evidence for such results. For example, it has recently been documented that photosynthesis depends on quantum properties.

Sure.

Does photosynthesis happen only in the region of absolute zero?

Different quantum processes are involved. Quantum doesn't mean magic.

Clearly, biological entities can make use of quantum properties for biological processes unrelated to consciousness. Why should I conclude it is impossible that consciousness might be a biological process that makes use of such properties?

What quantum process? Everything is based on quantum processes. Penrose and Hameroff proposed quantum superpositions within microtubules as the origins of consciousness, and it has been conclusively proved that this is physically impossible, as well as being completely at odds with the entirety of neuroscience.

The only problem with claiming it is nonsense is the empirical data that supports the notion.

There's no such thing.

If you were to take your own advice and PAY ATTENTION, you might have noticed that I haven’t claimed anything of the sort.

That is exactly what you have been claiming all along.

I’ve brought up these speculations as reasons why I cannot be certain that your claims are correct. I am not claiming those speculations are correct, only that they are alternative possibilities.

They aren't possibilities at all.

You say they are impossible, which is a very strong claim.

Yes, but one which happens to be true.

You have not provided any arguments that, when examined, actually support such a strong claim.

You have not at any point bothered to examine the arguments.

I can’t help but notice that you’ve neglected to provide any cites that would support your claims regarding the impossibility of such things. Telling me I should study basic physics is not an appropriate response to a request for evidence in the form of studies that would actually support your claims.

It is entirely appropriate, because it is basic physics.

 

[PixyMisa]

What does physically impossible mean when you use it? For example, would you say wormholes are physically impossible?

Depends. Stable macro-scale wormholes certainly appear to be physically impossible.

What is this threshold value that you seem to have decided is necessary before any particular effect is strong enough to have an influence on consciousness

It has to be above ambient noise, for a start. As I said to Beth, we can rule these things out with a most basic understanding of physics and statistics.

(which, by the way, you can't explain except by hand waving in the general direction of emergent properties)?

You haven't been paying attention either, have you?

I have a suggestion for you. Try to imagine that you might be wrong. Seriously. It's the first step to wisdom.

Try being right. It's hard work, but it's fulfilling.

Kind of like how the the subtle and weak effects of individual photons (or are those waves?) impacting the cells in our retina have no effect on our consciousness?

Nope. Not like that at all. As I said, individual photons are detectable. The things Beth is proposing aren't.

There is actually a specific physical mechanism for detecting photons wired up to our brains. There is no such mechanism for any of the things Beth is proposing.

There you go again...

Only because it's true, Clive. Only because it's true.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and the final paragraph from that Wikipedia article on Hameroff's quantum brain nonsense:

Most of the above mentioned putative augmentations of the Orch-OR model are not undisputed. "Cortical dendrites contain largely A*-lattice microtubules" is one of 20 testable predictions published by Hameroff in 1998[31] and it was hypothesized that these A-lattice microtubules could perform topological quantum error correction. The latter testable prediction had already been experimentally disproved in 1994 by Kikkawa et al., who showed that all in vivo microtubules have B-lattice and a seam.[32][33] Other peer-reviewed critiques of Orch-OR have been published in recent years. One of these is a paper published in PNAS by Reimers et al.,[34] who argue that the condensates proposed in Orch-OR would involve energies and temperatures that are not realistic in biological material. Further papers by Georgiev point to a number of problems with Hameroff's proposals, including the lack of explanation for the probabilistic firing of the axonal synapses,[35] an error in the calculated number of tubulin dimers per cortical neuron,[36] and mismodeling of dendritic lamellar bodies (DLBs) discovered by De Zeeuw et al.,[37] who showed that despite the fact that DLBs are stained by antibody against gap junctions, they are located tens of micrometers away from actual gap junctions. Also it was shown that the proposed tubulin-bound GTP pumping of quantum coherence cannot occur neither in stable microtubules[38] nor in dynamically unstable microtubules undergoing assembly/disassembly.[39]

A beautiful theory bunch of nonsense demolished by a whole lot of ugly facts. If you read closely, you'll note that Hameroff's hypothesis came pre-falsified.

 

[Clive]

This is like saying we can't be sure some huge number is reachable using normal arithmetic because nobody has done it yet.

Maybe new mathematics would be needed to get to that number, eh?

Actually what Pixy and you want to do seems to me more like suggesting we can definitely find the square root of 10^11+1 by starting at zero and the repetitively adding one for long enough. But anyway, in that vein, let's try something mathematical.

Q1. Do you believe a single "neuron" plus a finite number of suitable connections in any particular arrangement (to itself or just "waving in the wind" in this case?!) can produce consciousness to any degree at all under any circumstance?

I'll assume for now that your answer is no, but please correct me if I'm wrong.

So, moving on, now assume we have a network of neurons and appropriate connections that is incapable of producing consciousness to any degree at all (and also regardless of how those connections might be rearranged).

Q2. Is it possible that adding a single neuron to such a network and additional connections (to or from that newly added neuron) now allows the expanded network to produce any consciousness at all?

Pixy and your position (if I understand it correctly) is that a suitably large network with appropriate connections can definitely produce consciousness (i.e. it's "mathematically proven") without requiring anything more than what what could be essentially be described as a conventional "artificial neural network". If this is correct then either there is "a little bit of consciousness" possible in even the smallest of such networks, or else it must suddenly "pop into existence" once the network has grown to a large enough configuration (and also with the appropriate connections/weights etc.)

Q3. Is the lowest such number of nodes that allows consciousness (call it N_min) greater than one but still finite?

I'd like to hear your yes/no answers to these three questions but perhaps there are some "maybe" or "not sure" answers also? My guess is that it's "no", "yes", and "yes" respectively. If that's correct then I'd like to hear your explanation of how adding one more neuron (plus connections) to an existing completely non-conscious network can now produce at least glimmer of self-awareness. What did adding that extra node (plus connections) do? Would also love to hear your opinion on the size (even roughly) of the smallest such network.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Actually what Pixy and you want to do seems to me more like suggesting we can definitely find the square root of 10^11+1 by starting at zero and the repetitively adding one for long enough. But anyway, in that vein, let's try something mathematical.

Q1. Do you believe a single "neuron" plus a finite number of suitable connections in any particular arrangement (to itself or just "waving in the wind" in this case?!) can produce consciousness to any degree at all under any circumstance?

I'll assume for now that your answer is no, but please correct me if I'm wrong.

So, moving on, now assume we have a network of neurons and appropriate connections that is incapable of producing consciousness to any degree at all (and also regardless of how those connections might be rearranged).

Q2. Is it possible that adding a single neuron to such a network and additional connections (to or from that newly added neuron) now allows the expanded network to produce any consciousness at all?

Pixy and your position (if I understand it correctly) is that a suitably large network with appropriate connections can definitely produce consciousness (i.e. it's "mathematically proven") without requiring anything more than what what could be essentially be described as a conventional "artificial neural network". If this is correct then either there is "a little bit of consciousness" possible in even the smallest of such networks, or else it must suddenly "pop into existence" once the network has grown to a large enough configuration (and also with the appropriate connections/weights etc.)

Q3. Is the lowest such number of nodes that allows consciousness (call it N_min) greater than one but still finite?

I'd like to hear your yes/no answers to these three questions but perhaps there are some "maybe" or "not sure" answers also? My guess is that it's "no", "yes", and "yes" respectively. If that's correct then I'd like to hear your explanation of how adding one more neuron (plus connections) to an existing completely non-conscious network can now produce at least glimmer of self-awareness. What did adding that extra node (plus connections) do? Would also love to hear your opinion on the size (even roughly) of the smallest such network.

PixyMisa already has his own definition of "consciousness" that does not require him to explain anything. He defines "awareness" as "referential information processing" [for instance, a thermostat is "aware" by this definition -- I'm not joking, he's actually argued this]; he defines "consciousness" as "self-referential information processing". From that he forms a self-consistent circular explanatory loop that satisfies its own internal logic and needs no meaningful connection to -actual- consciousness.

He draws his inspiration from Hofstadter's books Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid and I Am a Strange Loop. To cut to the chase, Hofstadter's philosophy is simply that meaningless processes and symbols become meaningful merely by 'referencing' themselves or other meaningless symbols. Sure, if one assumes the above definitions of "aware" and "consciousness" the argument appears logically sound -- but -only- if you assume the definitions. However, all it really amounts to is basically a circular ideological loop that manages to be irrelevant, nonsensical, and just plain wrong. Ironically enough, these are all PixyMisa's favorite adjectives

 

[Third Eye Open]

Seems to lately be a lot of

"You can't prove it wrong"
"We don't really know for sure"
"For all we know (insert something ridiculous)"

coming from people I regard as very intelligent.

Kinda depressing.

 

[Third Eye Open]

PixyMisa already has his own definition of "consciousness" that does not require him to explain anything. He defines "awareness" as "referential information processing" [for instance, a thermostat is "aware" by this definition -- I'm not joking, he's actually argued this]; he defines "consciousness" as "self-referential information processing". From that he forms a self-consistent circular explanatory loop that satisfies its own internal logic and needs no meaningful connection to -actual- consciousness.

He draws his inspiration from Hofstadter's books Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid and I Am a Strange Loop. To cut to the chase, Hofstadter's philosophy is simply that meaningless processes and symbols become meaningful merely by 'referencing' themselves or other meaningless symbols. Sure, if one assumes the above definitions of "aware" and "consciousness" the argument appears logically sound -- but -only- if you assume the definitions. However, all it really amounts to is basically a circular ideological loop that manages to be irrelevant, nonsensical, and just plain wrong. Ironically enough, these are all PixyMisa's favorite adjectives

So you're just going to take shots at Pixy for the rest of the thread then? Not to mention every other thread he participates in that have nothing to do with consciousness...

 

[AkuManiMani]

So you're just going to take shots at Pixy for the rest of the thread then?

Nah. Just 'till I get tired of it or until he can demonstrate to me that he's a person worthy of my respect, whichever comes first. Its of no consequence anyway since apparently he has no feelings -- at least not any hes willing to confront or acknowledge.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Seems to lately be a lot of

"You can't prove it wrong"
"We don't really know for sure"
"For all we know (insert something ridiculous)"

coming from people I regard as very intelligent.

Kinda depressing.

To be ignorant is human. To refuse to acknowledge one's own ignorance is #@&*ing retarded.

 

[PixyMisa]

PixyMisa already has his own definition of "consciousness"

Not mine, of course. Hofstadter and Dennett and others take that credit.

that does not require him to explain anything.

Well, that's obviously untrue. It requires me to show that (a) what I am saying happens, can in fact happen and (b) that it accounts for the properties we ascribe to consciousness, or at least, those that actually exist.

He defines "awareness" as "referential information processing" [for instance, a thermostat is "aware" by this definition -- I'm not joking, he's actually argued this];

Certainly.

he defines "consciousness" as "self-referential information processing".

Yes.

From that he forms a self-consistent circular explanatory loop that satisfies its own internal logic and needs no meaningful connection to -actual- consciousness.

Again, this is blatantly untrue, as noted above.

He draws his inspiration from Hofstadter's books Gödel, Escher, Bach: An Eternal Golden Braid and I Am a Strange Loop.

And Dennett, of course. Not just inspiration, though - Dennett and Hofstadter lay out the whole thing and show why it is the best model and why all other models have failed.

To cut to the chase, Hofstadter's philosophy is simply that meaningless processes and symbols become meaningful merely by 'referencing' themselves or other meaningless symbols.

[I misread AkuManiMani here. I won't withdraw or alter my response at this point, but having re-read this line, the error I think AkuManiMani is making here is rather more subtle than the error I originally assumed. The rest of the points above all stand unchanged.]

No. That's absurd. Naturally Hofstadter says nothing of the sort; nor does Dennett; nor do I.

 

[PixyMisa]

Nah. Just 'till I get tired of it or until he can demonstrate to me that he's a person worthy of my respect, whichever comes first.

You could instead try addressing the argument.

Presenting strawman versions - whether deliberatly or through simple failure of comprehension - does not count.

Its of no consequence anyway since apparently he has no feelings -- at least not any hes willing to confront or acknowledge.

Which is, once again, blatantly untrue. And utterly irrelevant.

 

[PixyMisa]

To be ignorant is human. To refuse to acknowledge one's own ignorance is #@&*ing retarded.

I wouldn't go that far. Some people just get hung up on particular concepts, for example, taking a strawman version of someone else's argument and being quite unable to see beyond that no matter how many times they are corrected.

 

[AkuManiMani]

To cut to the chase, Hofstadter's philosophy is simply that meaningless processes and symbols become meaningful merely by 'referencing' themselves or other meaningless symbols.

No. That's absurd. Naturally Hofstadter says nothing of the sort; nor does Dennett; nor do I.

Thats odd...I actually got around to reading a copy of GEB, as you suggested -- interesting stuff. You see the problem is Hofstadter actually does say exactly this as in "Meaningless symbols acquire meaning despite themselves". Ringing any bells?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Nah. Just 'till I get tired of it or until he can demonstrate to me that he's a person worthy of my respect, whichever comes first.

You could instead try addressing the argument.

I'm not addressing the arguments, I'm addressing you.

Presenting strawman versions - whether deliberatly or through simple failure of comprehension - does not count.

I'm quoting your bible and your own words. Wheres the straw?

Its of no consequence anyway since apparently he has no feelings -- at least not any hes willing to confront or acknowledge.

Which is, once again, blatantly untrue.

So you DO have feelings? Tell me, what are you feeling right now?

And utterly irrelevant.

Oh, I beg the differ. Feelings are not only relevant to this discussion; they're at the very heart of this discussion.

 

[dlorde]

... While I agree that complex systems can and do arise without any purpose or design behind them I think there are still significant differences between such systems and those that are designed or directed by intent.

Such as?

Biological systems are intrinsically purposeful and artifacts of biological systems (like bee hives, beaver damns, birds nests, human tools, etc) are extrinsically purposeful. The same cannot be said of other complex systems which are neither goal directed or intentional.

How can you tell the difference between what you call a 'purposeful' non-human artefact and a non-purposeful one?

What I'm saying is that purpose and intent are not properties of the system or the artefact, they are abstract labels assigned by us. We judge them to be there. Purpose and intent have meaning for us as useful abstract labels for types of behaviours entities display, and types of artefact they produce, but they are a human invention.

Bee hives are the result of a vast chain of evolutionary events - they are made by bees the way they are simply because a myriad other variations could not support a viable bee population. Bees make them that way because hive making bees that produced other variations did not survive. You ascribe them a purpose because that's how humans think about such things. Does an individual bee have a purpose? I really don't see where there is an obvious demarcation between what is purposeful and has intent and what is not. Does an amoeba intend to engulf it's food particle? Is that it's purpose? It is a complex mechanism that responds to specific chemical gradients in specific ways given specific environmental and internal contexts - at what point does it have purpose or intent? At the point we describe it's behaviour in those terms.

This suggest that there is some subjective dimension to operation of biological systems. Unfortunately we don't know enough yet to definitively say if this property can be instantiated into inorganic substrates.

Not sure what you mean by 'some subjective dimension to operation of biological systems' - can you clarify?

 

[PixyMisa]

I'm not addressing the arguments, I'm addressing you.

Well, there's your problem.

 

[PixyMisa]

Thats odd...I actually got around to reading a copy of GEB, as you suggested -- interesting stuff. You see the problem is Hofstadter actually does say exactly this as in "Meaningless symbols acquire meaning despite themselves". Ringing any bells?

What is meaning, AkuManiMani?

I actually misread you when you said

Hofstadter's philosophy is simply that meaningless processes and symbols become meaningful merely by 'referencing' themselves or other meaningless symbols.

And didn't note the inclusion of the word processes, which changes things substantially. I apologise for that.

Now, as to whether this is an accurate representation of Hofstadter, and in any case, whether it is true, rests on something else:

What is meaning?

 

[dlorde]

...
If you can't make accurate predictions, then your understanding is not sufficient to support the claims you have been making.

I'm not sure this is true. In the natural world, just as many features are fractal in form and amenable to analysis via fractal maths, many features are mathematically chaotic in form and amenable to analysis via the maths of chaos theory. It is the chaotic behaviour of natural processes that gives rise to many of the patterns and self-organisation found in nature, e.g. spatio-temporal chaos in reaction-diffusion reactions.

We can't predict the exact forms that will result from the activities of such systems, but we can predict the kind of forms they will produce - they are amenable to mathematical analysis. The brain is a complex self-ordering structure and is known to have chaotic features in its functioning, and it seems reasonable to suppose that while its functioning may be unpredictable, it may be amenable to mathematical analysis, and it may be possible to emulate some aspects of its complex activities using such mathematical techniques.

 

[AkuManiMani]

... While I agree that complex systems can and do arise without any purpose or design behind them I think there are still significant differences between such systems and those that are designed or directed by intent.

Such as?

Biological systems are intrinsically purposeful and artifacts of biological systems (like bee hives, beaver damns, birds nests, human tools, etc) are extrinsically purposeful. The same cannot be said of other complex systems which are neither goal directed or intentional.

How can you tell the difference between what you call a 'purposeful' non-human artefact and a non-purposeful one?

The most significant difference is that the former perform acts in order to accomplish some subjectively determined goal(s), the latter just acts. The only quantitative difference that comes to mind ATM would be thermodynamic differences. Living systems utilize energy to push themselves away from thermodynamic equilibrium; non-living systems do not.

What I'm saying is that purpose and intent are not properties of the system or the artefact, they are abstract labels assigned by us. We judge them to be there. Purpose and intent have meaning for us as useful abstract labels for types of behaviours entities display, and types of artefact they produce, but they are a human invention.

I highlighted key portions to illustrate my point.

Consciousness refers to the pronouns -- the "I", the "us", the "we"; artifacts are the external byproducts of deliberate conscious acts. Consciousness is the stuff of meaning, it is the substance of intent, it is the source of purpose. These things are not abstractions but phenomena in and of themselves.

Bee hives are the result of a vast chain of evolutionary events - they are made by bees the way they are simply because a myriad other variations could not support a viable bee population. Bees make them that way because hive making bees that produced other variations did not survive. You ascribe them a purpose because that's how humans think about such things. Does an individual bee have a purpose? I really don't see where there is an obvious demarcation between what is purposeful and has intent and what is not. Does an amoeba intend to engulf it's food particle? Is that it's purpose? It is a complex mechanism that responds to specific chemical gradients in specific ways given specific environmental and internal contexts - at what point does it have purpose or intent? At the point we describe it's behaviour in those terms.

The mechanisms you listed are simply examining those systems in terms of the relevant "whats" and the "hows". When speaking of consciousness the perspective shifts to examining those same systems in terms of "whos" and "whys".

This suggest that there is some subjective dimension to operation of biological systems. Unfortunately we don't know enough yet to definitively say if this property can be instantiated into inorganic substrates.

Not sure what you mean by 'some subjective dimension to operation of biological systems' - can you clarify?

Meaning that those systems are governed or influenced by some "interior" dynamics that can only be described in inherently subjective, qualitative terms.