Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Piggy]

You could call it perception, I just wouldn't call it visual perception.

I've gotten the impression from this thread that some people think the Berkeley study captured what the cat was actually seeing. So I think it's important to point out that that isn't the case.

But what other kind of perception would it be?

The fact is, we can use our visual apparatus without the chain of response being routed around to the areas of the brain responsible for generating Sofia.

This is consistent with experience, experiment, and the known structure of the brain.

 

[Piggy]

Again, I ask you, how could it be possible for non-carbon-based consciousness to be impossible?

Do you mean in practice, depending on the ability of human bodies to build the machine out of non-organic parts?

Well, that depends on the demands and on the limits of our understanding of the specs and the construction requirements.

It's one thing to say that conscious machines -- by which I mean what is normally understood by "machines", i.e. synthetic devices built by humans -- must be theoretically possible.

It's quite another to say that human beings will be able to design and build such a machine with the resources, internal and external, that we have available to us.

 

[Meed]

But what other kind of perception would it be?

The fact is, we can use our visual apparatus without the chain of response being routed around to the areas of the brain responsible for generating Sofia.

This is consistent with experience, experiment, and the known structure of the brain.

I think perception is generally defined as involving awareness (of course one could define it otherwise). If the person with blindsight has some sort of awareness about what's in front of them then we could call that perception, but it's not based on the visual system (which does extensive processing on the visual information before sofia). So calling it visual perception is a bit misleading. Just depends on whether you define visual perception in terms of the use of visual system processing or in terms of processing of sensory input that came in through the eyes from light. Generally imagination or hallucination is considered visual perception though (no?) so the eyes or light being involved aren't really necessary.

 

[Piggy]

I think perception is generally defined as involving awareness (of course one could define it otherwise). If the person with blindsight has some sort of awareness about what's in front of them then we could call that perception, but it's not based on the visual system (which does extensive processing on the visual information before sofia). So calling it visual perception is a bit misleading. Just depends on whether you define visual perception in terms of the use of visual system processing or in terms of processing of sensory input that came in through the eyes from light. Generally imagination or hallucination is considered visual perception though (no?) so the eyes or light being involved aren't really necessary.

I'm not accustomed to referring to visual hallucinations as a type of visual perception.

On the other hand, if light comes in through the eyes and sets off chain reactions in the visual cortex -- especially if these reactions continue on to motor response -- I'm accustomed to referring to that as visual perception whether or not the modules handling conscious awareness are also involved.

If perception must involve the modules that handle conscious awareness, then we're going to have to come up with some other term for sensory->reaction/memory routines which do not. And I don't see the point in that.

Bottom line: If the sensory apparatus gets input and feeds it into the brain and the brain process it somehow, that's perception, whether or not consciousness is involved.

 

[AkuManiMani]

So, Beth, your turn. Is carbon magical? If not, on what, exactly, do you base your objection?

No, I don't think carbon is magical. I'm agreeing with what cornsail said and share his objections to your claim of certainty regarding the answer to a question when humans do not currently have the ability to verify that answer. I think you are probably correct, but that is as far as I feel the current evidence reasonably supports. You seem to have a religious-like faith in your understanding of reality and the extrapolation of that understanding beyond the boundaries of our current knowledge. I do not share your certainty regarding things beyond our ken.

All you are doing is dodging the question.

I believe she answered your question in the first line of her post, ya blockhead.

 

[Frank Newgent]

Deciding that it's worthwhile to try to figure out how to build a conscious robot is making the (normative) choice that... it's worthwhile. As opposed to a waste of time.

I don't think it's a waste of time myself. I'm glad you're trying.

What I don't understand is how one goes about formalizing the act of making such a choice.

I don't see how that kind of a choice is any different than any other kind of choice, including the ones we know can be formalized.

Do you think there's a difference between the use of reason to decide how to act vs the use of reason to decide what to believe?

Let's begin the process -- why have you decided it is worthwhile?

Same as you I imagine. It's what they taught me in college

 

[Meed]

I'm not accustomed to referring to visual hallucinations as a type of visual perception.

On the other hand, if light comes in through the eyes and sets off chain reactions in the visual cortex -- especially if these reactions continue on to motor response -- I'm accustomed to referring to that as visual perception whether or not the modules handling conscious awareness are also involved.

If perception must involve the modules that handle conscious awareness, then we're going to have to come up with some other term for sensory->reaction/memory routines which do not. And I don't see the point in that.

Bottom line: If the sensory apparatus gets input and feeds it into the brain and the brain process it somehow, that's perception, whether or not consciousness is involved.

I'm fine with that definition, just not sure how standard it is.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think perception is generally defined as involving awareness (of course one could define it otherwise).

As I stated earlier, we use perception to mean different things colloquially (and even in different fields of study). Neurologists and neuroscientists do not use perception to include awareness necessarily because of phenomena such as blindsight; we sometimes speak of non-conscious perception. Psychologists do include awareness, though. Like all words, it covers several different things, so it's always a bit muddy talking about definitions.

If the person with blindsight has some sort of awareness about what's in front of them then we could call that perception, but it's not based on the visual system (which does extensive processing on the visual information before sofia).

Of course it is based on the visual system. The visual system begins with visual receptors all the way back, including the LGN.

So calling it visual perception is a bit misleading. Just depends on whether you define visual perception in terms of the use of visual system processing or in terms of processing of sensory input that came in through the eyes from light. Generally imagination or hallucination is considered visual perception though (no?) so the eyes or light being involved aren't really necessary.

Once again, there is visual processing from the bipolar cells on back. Hallucination and imagination are not considered visual perception precisely, at least not in Neurology (don't know about psychology), because they are 'internally' generated, and we generally speak of external stimuli producing responses in receptors.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think there are three positions in the group opposed to computationalism. There are those who say that since the brain is a physical object it must be possible to duplicate it. There are those who think that it will never be possible to create a conscious robot. My view is that to insist that something must be possible is to place philosophy ahead of experience, which is always dangerous. I think it is probably possible to create a conscious device, but I can't say for absolutely certain.

However, I think it's improbable that a conscious computer program could be created.

Maybe some of the issue concerns the way weasel words come into play (I am not accusing you of using weasel words here)?

Something is either possible or not possible. But we also use possible as opposed to probable to refer to the likelihood of an occurrence. Probably possible might be viewed as a way of trying to equivocate over the likelihood of the occurrence.

If something is probable, then you have generally already decided that it is possible.

Seems better to say that a conscious robot is probable since the possibility is already covered.

I still do not understand how folks are using the phrase "I think it is improbable that a conscious computer program could be created" if you think it is probable that a conscious robot could be created.

I mean, the code isn't what would be conscious and no one argues that it would be. It is the functioning computer/robot that might be conscious; the program simply determines how the logic gates are employed in the computer/robot.

 

[AlBell]

We are conscious machines.

Is a paramecium a machine?

What size device would be needed to replicate one as a man made machine?

Some years ago I estimated the processing power needed to match a human brain would require a cube of Pentium III's 7 miles on a side. I could have been way off on the estimate, but in today's tech, what's the physical size needed?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Is a paramecium a machine?

What size device would be needed to replicate one as a man made machine?

Some years ago I estimated the processing power needed to match a human brain would require a cube of Pentium III's 7 miles on a side. I could have been way off on the estimate, but in today's tech, what's the physical size needed?

Just for reference...

A machine is a device that uses energy to perform some activity. In common usage, the meaning is that of a device having parts that perform or assist in performing any type of work. A simple machine is a device that transforms the direction or magnitude of a force. The word "machine" is derived from the Latin word machina,[1] which in turn derives from the Doric Greek μαχανά (machana), Ionic Greek μηχανή (mechane) "contrivance, machine, engine"[2] and that from μῆχος (mechos), "means, expedient, remedy"

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Machine

And..

Noun
contrivance (plural contrivances)
1. a (mechanical) device to perform a certain task
2. a means, such as an elaborate plan or strategy, to accomplish a certain objective  
3. something overly artful or artificial

http://en.wiktionary.org/wiki/contrivance

I suppose that one could consider an organism like a paramecium to be a machine or dynamic system of molecular machines. But, as the root meaning implies, a machine is a 'contrivance' -- something created as a means of carrying out some purpose(s).

In other words, machines are artifacts of intention. So one may define paramecia and humans as machines, but that designation necessarily implies that they are a means being employed by some conscious entities. Merely stating that they are "machines" or even "conscious machines" still leaves one with having to identify consciousness and how it's causally related to the machinery.

 

[westprog]

I have to repeat rocketdodger's question here.

Where does the uncertainty come in?

Do you doubt that inorganic conscious machines are possible in theory, or in practice, and why?

We can't say that something is possible as a matter of absolute certainty when we don't fully understand the processes involved.

 

[Meed]

Of course it is based on the visual system. The visual system begins with visual receptors all the way back, including the LGN.

Sorry, I meant the visual cortex (V1->V5).

Once again, there is visual processing from the bipolar cells on back. Hallucination and imagination are not considered visual perception precisely, at least not in Neurology (don't know about psychology), because they are 'internally' generated, and we generally speak of external stimuli producing responses in receptors.

I don't know the exact terminology, I just know that imagination uses roughly the same parts of the brain.

 

[Meed]

I'm primarily studying cognitive psychology, not neuroscience.

 

[Beth]

We can't say that something is possible as a matter of absolute certainty when we don't fully understand the processes involved.

That is my opinion as well. I'm not saying it's not possible. I'm just saying that theoretically, it's unknown whether it is possible or impossible. If we ever manage the feat, that will settle the theoretical question decisively. Unfortunately, I'm not sure it's practically feasible even if it is theoretically feasible.

I'm primarily study cognitive psychology, not neuroscience.

A fascinating area of study. I hope you'll continue posting here.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

That is my opinion as well. I'm not saying it's not possible. I'm just saying that theoretically, it's unknown whether it is possible or impossible. If we ever manage the feat, that will settle the theoretical question decisively. Unfortunately, I'm not sure it's practically feasible even if it is theoretically feasible.

I'll go further than that. I don't want us to do it.

A fascinating area of study. I hope you'll continue posting here.

Agreed and agreed.

 

[Meed]

A fascinating area of study. I hope you'll continue posting here.

Thanks, it is.

 

[Meed]

Wasp, do you work in a neuroscience related field? Just curious.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Wasp, do you work in a neuroscience related field? Just curious.

I'm a Neurologist specializing in epilepsy and Neurophysiology.

 

[Meed]

Very nice. I'd like to learn more neuroscience.