Has consciousness been fully explained?

[rocketdodger]

Ah, an actual definition. So, it's a "gross external state change" that is significant. Which is odd, because both computers and brains can assimilate and process enormous amounts of information without any gross external state change whatsoever.

They do.

But more typically they exhibit a gross one.

For example, if you detect that a rock is about to fall on you, you can actually move your position to get out of the way!

If a muscle cell detects ions from a neuron, it can actually change it's shape!!

If a computer gets a packet from the network, it can actually change the light coming from the monitor!!

These kinds of things happen all the time. One could say they are typical of life and computers. Oh, thats what I said.

 

[westprog]

Wikipedia suggests: "Information is any type of pattern that influences the formation or transformation of other patterns. In this sense, there is no need for a conscious mind to perceive, much less appreciate, the pattern. Consider, for example, DNA. The sequence of nucleotides is a pattern that influences the formation and development of an organism without any need for a conscious mind"

I can certainly see how you can define information physically in a way that doesn't need a conscious mind. Such a definition would of course include everything. One can also make a sound definition of information as only that which impinges on a conscious mind.

What is going on here is an attempt to define information in a halfway house way, that will have a special no-go area from which rocks are excluded, but computers are allowed in. I don't say that such a definition is necessarily impossible, but I do require a definition beyond just a guest-list of privileged information consumers.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

We are not talking past one another -- make no mistake.

Everyone knows darn well that the computational side is all about function.

The dispute is over what that function is. Obviously, the religious side wants there to be some function that cannot be matched by an artificial system. Otherwise, their heaven would no longer be so special.

That is really the heart of the argument -- if the necessary function for consciousness can be found in other substrates, other things can be conscious, and the whole religious dogma falls apart. Is there heaven for conscious robots? For simulated beings? I don't want to have to think about that, because it decreases my faith in my worldview, so I am going to take the position that there is some function that cannot be found in other substrates.

I don't know about everyone involved, but religious concerns are definitely not the case with Piggy and I suspect not the case with Cornsail or Frank Newgent.

 

[westprog]

I'm afraid that really didn't answer the issue Drachasor raised. In your view, is it possible for information to have any sort of meaning in the absence of a conscious observer?

Either all information has meaning or none does. I'm not aware of any physical definition of "meaningful information".

 

[westprog]

Right. It's just when we come to talk about intelligent systems and consciousness, we're talking about selecting -- editing and ultimately organizing -- information in the way the cell handles and encodes light, versus the way the tree handles the weather. One-to-one selectivity shows how the information is encoded, and makes the parallel with computer I/O.

What the human brain does is to discard information. That's how computers are designed - to exclude as much information from the environment as possible.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I can certainly see how you can define information physically in a way that doesn't need a conscious mind. Such a definition would of course include everything. One can also make a sound definition of information as only that which impinges on a conscious mind.

What is going on here is an attempt to define information in a halfway house way, that will have a special no-go area from which rocks are excluded, but computers are allowed in. I don't say that such a definition is necessarily impossible, but I do require a definition beyond just a guest-list of privileged information consumers.

I don't know how to do the link thing yet, but the relevant posts that define this are 2695, 2743, and 2763.

 

[rocketdodger]

I don't know about everyone involved, but religious concerns are definitely not the case with Piggy and I suspect not the case with Cornsail or Frank Newgent.

Piggy is a special case.

Cornsail and Frank are definitely religious in some way, even if only "spiritual."

People want there to be magic.

I don't understand this because the possibilities in this universe due to what science has found are already beyond imagination.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Either all information has meaning or none does. I'm not aware of any physical definition of "meaningful information".

Blobru's way of explaining it makes perfect sense to me.

Everything potentially is information. All physical interactions involve transfers of information. Read the relevant posts that I mentioned above and see if you have any problems with them.

Receptors exclude all sorts of available information since they only respond to a small subset of that available information. That's how nervous systems do it. We design computers to be much better at it.

 

[westprog]

Non sequitur.

Yes, I must be there to see that action as addition.

But I don't have to be there in order for it to be a fact that two objects have indeed been aggreggated with two other objects to create a group of four objects.

And also one object has been added to two objects. And to three objects. For any such physical interaction, there's an effectively infinite number of interpretations that can be applied.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

What the human brain does is to discard information. That's how computers are designed - to exclude as much information from the environment as possible.

Right, exactly. That is what nervous systems do as well, right down to their most basic level. Heck even single celled organisms do that.

 

[westprog]

Although the computer is certainly behaving differently in a detailed way when running different sims, it is not behaving differently in a way that mirrors the difference between the real-world systems it's simulating.

Have a machine run a sim of a power plant, an aquarium, and a racecar. In each case, the computer will simply be acting like a computer.

As for the brain, I'm not comparing its behavior to a physical presence.

In fact, it's possible for a computer to run exactly the same program to simulate entirely different systems, the interpretation of the results being what decides what is being simulated.

 

[westprog]

By "simulation" I mean specifically "digital simulation", which is how I've been consistently using the term here.

If you actually create a functional scale model with real air, then you've made a "model".

If we don't keep those terms straight somehow, then we can't have a clear conversation.

So indeed, a model tornado does generate actual wind speed, an actual funnel cloud, in reality. But a digital simulation of a tornado does not.

It would certainly help to clarify matters if we described something that performed the same physical actions as a model, and something that replicated the physical actions on something like a computer as a simulation. However, the confusion between the two concepts and the blurring of the differences is an essential part of the argument, so don't expect this to be adopted any time soon.

 

[AlBell]

You seem to have missed the point.

People say "a circle can roll" all the time.

It is understood that a "downward" force, and an incline, or a forward force and just some surface, all in reality, are needed as well.

If you don't understand a similar thing about turing machines, then you need to read some textbooks. Because after reading many textbooks, and being a professional programmer, it is crystal clear to me. Turing machine's don't really exist. Circles don't really exist. This fact doesn't prevent us from using those terms in language every day.

The person that missed the point was you. Circles and rolling are easy to objectively define, mathematically and in reality.

The subjectivity of consciousness is a category as yet unto itself. At the moment no mathematical definition is possible, and I suspect will never be, and Turing will stand mute.

 

[rocketdodger]

The person that missed the point was you. Circles and rolling are easy to objectively define, mathematically and in reality.

The subjectivity of consciousness is a category as yet unto itself. At the moment no mathematical definition is possible, and I suspect will never be, and Turing will stand mute.

Oh -- yes, that is a different story. I don't agree that no mathematical definition is possible, but it isn't as easy as rolling, you are correct.

I was specifically addressing westprog's argument that a turing machine can't do certain things, like replace a neuron.

 

[westprog]

Durr.

Any "program" runs on a physical substrate.

So actually, nothing can be gotten by programming alone.

Please answer the question -- if a computer is running a simulation of a brain, and it is hooked up to i/o devices, and the whole construct acts conscious in the real world, is the simulation now a model?

Your distinction between a model and a simulation is arbitrary. You keep asking this stupid question "is simulated water wet?" Why don't you answer the other question -- is modeled water wet? What does that even mean?

Let's try again, slowly. A model reproduces the physical aspects of the system it is copying. Depending on how authentic it is, it will reproduce some all the physical actions. A perfect model would be identical to the thing it is modelling.

A simulation reproduces the mathematical relationships of the system it is copying. In this way, the behaviour of the system can be predicted. A perfect simulation would perfectly predict the behaviour of the system it is copying. It would not, however, ever reproduce the physical behaviour of the system.

The fact that both models and simulations actually exist in the real world does not imply that a simulation can, if sufficiently detailed, reproduce the physical behaviour of the system it is copying. Reproducing the physical behaviour is not what a simulation is for.

The difference between simulations and models is to be seen in computers, where software can be written to, say, control a power station. Often, such control software is tested by connecting it to a simulation of the power station. The control software has to be written as control software, though. A simulation of the power station controller can't just be "hooked up" to a real power station. That's not how control software works. It has to be designed from the start.

It's not uncommon for programmers designing control systems to mock up simple simulations to study the system they are controlling. It's also not unknown for non-technically-minded managers to suggest "hooking up" the simulation to the actual power plant, or water works, or space shuttle re-entry system. Such category errors can be very expensive if unrecognised.

It's also the case that models of necessity must be also simulations - if they reproduce the physical relationships, they must de facto reproduce the mathematical relationships as well. Simulations may also be models - even if the only physical attribute that they copy is the appearance, say.

 

[westprog]

No; I don't know how you could get that interpretation. I meant 'beings' in its most generic sense. Computers are useless to most beings in the world here and now; we don't need to be radically absent for that situation to be the case.

In its most generic sense, beings include anything that exists.

I think we already have a good definition of information between RD and Blobru that fits pretty much everything that I was trying to say.

There we differ.

 

[Frank Newgent]

I don't know about everyone involved, but religious concerns are definitely not the case with Piggy and I suspect not the case with Cornsail or Frank Newgent.

Piggy is a special case.

Cornsail and Frank are definitely religious in some way, even if only "spiritual."

People want there to be magic.

I don't understand this because the possibilities in this universe due to what science has found are already beyond imagination.

Why do you say this?

 

[westprog]

I just realized your problem. You have a fundamental misunderstanding of the nature of mathematics in general and in particular computer science.

The fact that no turing machine actually exists isn't irrelevant. It illustrates that any mathematical description is merely that -- a description.

When pixy says that a turing machine can be conscious, he isn't saying that the magical fairy turing machine in abstract land can be conscious. That is absurd. Abstract land doesn't exist, unless you subscribe to some very loony schools of philosophy. Reality exists.

What he is saying is that any system which satisfies the behavior constraints we call turing complete -- idealized by the definition of a turing machine -- we can be conscious. That is a very, very, very different claim than what you seem to think he is saying.

This is equivalent to saying "anything that is round -- idealized by the definition of a circle -- can roll." Period. No different. "Round" and "turing equivalent" are the same kind of thing in human language -- a description, a mathematical description, of a class of behaviors of real stuff, regardless of what one thinks of the ultimate "nature" of that stuff.

"Round" is the class of behaviors that lead to a system interacting with other systems in a way that is mathematically isomorphic -- after much filtering is done by the observer -- to a circle. There is a location within the system that each location on the surface of the system is equidistant from. The idealized description is what we call a circle -- so what. Nothing perfectly round exists. No circle actually exists. Hmmm... kind of like no perfect turing machines exist? Yet you don't complain when people say "anything circular can roll," do you?

Likewise, "turing equivalent" is a class of behaviors that are mathematically isomorphic, after much filtering done by the observer, to a turing machine. <insert formal definition of turing machine>

The thing that allows a round object to roll is how near it is to the idealized circle. But you still need a hill, gravity, etc, or else nothing can roll. But nobody bothers to argue this point because it is utterly stupid, given that when someone says "a circle can roll" everyone knows what they mean -- we have grown up and this concept is so familiar it isn't an issue.

To pixy and I, who are very familiar with computer science, saying "a turing machine can do X" is not controversial in the least. We understand that the implicit meaning is "a turing equivalent system can do X, probably with the help of lots of stuff that isn't necessarily part of the ideal turing machine, just like a round object can't roll without the help of many things that have nothing to do with the ideal circle."

Why is that so hard for you to understand? Turing machines don't really exist. Circles don't really exist. When people speak of either they are referencing reality, not fairy land.

I am entirely aware of the difference between the abstract definition of the Turing model, and the implementation of that model.

So when I say "a Turing machine cannot perform control functions" I am not claiming that it is incapable because it is an abstract model. I'm claiming this because it is not part of the specification.

When I say that a Ford Mondeo can't fly, I don't mean the abstract definition of a Ford Mondeo - I mean that an actual machine, produced according to the abstract definition, couldn't perform that function in the real world. Could a Ford Mondeo be fitted with wings and a jet engine and then be able to fly? Yes - but then it would not accord with the abstract design and functionality of the concept.

Turing machines are instantiated in the real world, and in the real world, they are able to do certain things - including perform computations. Reasoning about Turing machines can be applied to the real-world constructs, and we can predict the behaviour of the actual systems according to the theoretical constructs.

We can also say what isn't part of the functionality of a Turing machine, and this is equally valid as a prediction of the behaviour of the actual systems. When we say that a Turing machine can't perform a particular function, that might not have any implications for the computer hardware hosting the Turing machine. Indeed, it's almost certainly the case that the computer itself could perform real-time control and monitoring functions. The computer is not the Turing machine. The Turing machine is a particular function of the computer. The Turing machine can't do certain things that the computer on which it is implemented is able to do.

I see that I have to keep reiterating these points, because otherwise there will be people reading this who think that the points you are refuting are the points I'm making.

 

[westprog]

Huh?

Why can't we model water with cabron tetrachloride? It has similar bipolar properties, it can act as a bipolar solvent, can it not?

See this is what I am talking about. You people say that a mechanical bird is a model bird just because it flies, but disagree that carbon tetrachoride can be model water despite the fact that it is a bipolar solvent.

You can't just arbitrarily choose a function and ignore all the others. I mean, you can, but then it is arbitrary.

Thats why I claimed the distinction was ... arbitrary.

No, it is not. No model models all the physical functions of a system. No simulation simulates all mathematical relationships in a system. That doesn't imply that there is no difference between a model and a simulation, or that the difference is a matter of degree.

Carbon tetrachloride is a valid model of water. It models its liquid behaviour, and appearance. It doesn't model other things.

 

[westprog]

We are not talking past one another -- make no mistake.

Everyone knows darn well that the computational side is all about function.

The dispute is over what that function is. Obviously, the religious side wants there to be some function that cannot be matched by an artificial system. Otherwise, their heaven would no longer be so special.

That is really the heart of the argument -- if the necessary function for consciousness can be found in other substrates, other things can be conscious, and the whole religious dogma falls apart. Is there heaven for conscious robots? For simulated beings? I don't want to have to think about that, because it decreases my faith in my worldview, so I am going to take the position that there is some function that cannot be found in other substrates.

There you are, Piggy. Your hidden religious agenda exposed at last.