Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Beth]

Because it is not actually disembodied. It's a framing problem. They would see their 'neurons' causing thought to occur, but it would really be electrons passing through gates; same issue with their bodies.

I get that. It's not a disembodied mind from their perspective, but from ours.

We could be in a simulation right now and it would mean not that we have disembodied minds but that we are wrong about the nature of our reality.

I don't think this is a negation of my point, but a confirmation of it. If we are wrong about the nature of our reality, then disembodied minds are a possibility. We need only consider our consciousness from a frame of reference analogous to our reality as our reality is to the reality of the hypothetical simulation. Bodies would be considered 'real' only in the world that contains the pattern of the relationships, not in the reality that contains and supercedes it.

I think the analgous situation, assuming monism is correct, to what you are proposing would be idealism. When we, in this world, think that the nature of reality is that there are physical things and consciousness arises from it we think we have a grasp on the nature of reality. But it might be the case that what really exists is the mind of God, which acts to produce the stuff that we see as matter; and the actions of that matter produces what we see as human consciousness.

Idealism is just as unfalsifiable as materialism. We simply can't know which is correct. I don't know that there is much different from supposing that we only exist in the mind of god and supposing we only exist in a supercomputer running a simulation. Just different ways of describing the same idea. There is no reason to suppose the denizens of the hypothetical simulation would not eventually wonder about such things. Further, they would be correct if they decided to believe in such thing. Depending on how the simulation was set up, they might never be able to tell they were correct and simulated materialists could arise claiming that their simulated world was the only reality that actually existed.

We could simply be wrong about the nature of reality, but assuming monism is correct this does not produce disembodied minds.

Whether monism or no, it is assuming that consciousness is independent of substrate is what leads to the conclusion that disembodied minds might exist.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I get that. It's not a disembodied mind from their perspective, but from ours.

No, it's not, because we know that it's just electrons passing through gates.

I don't think this is a negation of my point, but a confirmation of it. If we are wrong about the nature of our reality, then disembodied minds are a possibility. We need only consider our consciousness from a frame of reference analogous to our reality as our reality is to the reality of the hypothetical simulation. Bodies would be considered 'real' only in the world that contains the pattern of the relationships, not in the reality that contains and supercedes it. Idealism is just as unfalsifiable as materialism. We simply can't know which is correct. I don't know that there is much different from supposing that we only exist in the mind of god and supposing we only exist in a supercomputer running a simulation. Just different ways of describing the same idea. There is no reason to suppose the denizens of the hypothetical simulation would not eventually wonder about such things. Further, they would be correct if they decided to believe in such thing. Depending on how the simulation was set up, they might never be able to tell they were correct and simulated materialists could arise claiming that their simulated world was the only reality that actually existed. Whether monism or no, it is assuming that consciousness is independent of substrate is what leads to the conclusion that disembodied minds might exist.

Not assuming monism, no. Some idealists try to fudge their way of thinking and end up with dualism. So they will have everything be an action of the mind of God, with what appears to be matter being the action of the mind of God, but then they seem to want to put human consciousness into a separate category, which is either God thinking directly or something else.

Thinking clearly about idealism as a strict monism, the only thing that actually exists is God with everything else being a function of God thinking. All matter would be God thinking. The world would like just the same, and we would see the same thing we do now -- human brains would produce human consciousness. But that would be the action of God's mind producing what we call matter which in turn produces what we call human thought. Turn off a human brain and you turn off human thought. There are no disembodied minds involved or possible.

Disembodied minds are only possible in dualism because for a mind to be disembodied requires two different types of substance. In monism mind can only be a function of body or body a function of mind. They cannot be separable.

 

[Beth]

No, it's not, because we know that it's just electrons passing through gates.

I don't understand this comment. Why does the fact that we know it consists of electrons passing through gates make it embodied from our point of view any more than an simulated orange would be considered to be embodied from our point of view. Both are just arbitrary collections of electrons. They are likely to be unconnected physically, just linked together in relationships within the program.

Not assuming monism, no. Some idealists try to fudge their way of thinking and end up with dualism. So they will have everything be an action of the mind of God, with what appears to be matter being the action of the mind of God, but then they seem to want to put human consciousness into a separate category, which is either God thinking directly or something else.

If we adopt the terminology of computers and simulations, this becomes: They will have everything be an action of the computer, with what appears to be matter being the action of electrons within the computer. Therefore, all consciousness is clearly the action of electrons within the computer or something else.

I don't get why we need the something else in either case. I think you can assume monism and if you also assume that consciousness is substrate independent, you can conclude disembodied minds.

Thinking clearly about idealism as a strict monism, the only thing that actually exists is God with everything else being a function of God thinking. All matter would be God thinking. The world would like just the same, and we would see the same thing we do now -- human brains would produce human consciousness. But that would be the action of God's mind producing what we call matter which in turn produces what we call human thought.

If we consider reality to bea computer running a simulation, we would get:

Thinking clearly about idealism as a strict monism, the only thing that actually exists is the computer with everything else being a function of the computer running. All matter would be the computer running.

What is not monistic about this?

Turn off a human brain and you turn off human thought. There are no disembodied minds involved or possible.

I agree that if you turn off a human brain, you turn off human thought. If you turn off a simulated consciousness in a computer, it won't be thinking anymore either. But that doesn't imply the simulated consciousness has a body from our point of view. It doesn't. From our point of view, it is only relationships between electrons and those electrons can be (and probably are) scattered about the computer and it's memory. I term that disembodied. Particularly when you consider that networking would allow such a simulation to store the various electrons in different physical locations.

Disembodied minds are only possible in dualism because for a mind to be disembodied requires two different types of substance. Otherwise mind can only be a function of body.

I don't agree. If mind is 'just' relationships then it is not tethered to a body as we perceive ours to be, but would exist in any arbitrary set of monistic particles that maintains the appropriate relationships between the particles.

 

[westprog]

Church-Turing says all this physical stuff should be computable.

Church Turing does not say that. It might be what Pixy says that Church Turing says.

 

[Guybrush Threepwood]

Church-Turing says all this physical stuff should be computable.

Church Turing does not say that. It might be what Pixy says that Church Turing says.

Well, the last thing significant thing written by PixyMisa about Church-Turing in this thread was this:

The Universe is, if not quantised, at least effectively quantised. By that I mean that below a certain scale - the Planck scale - differences have no meaning. A finite region of the Universe can thus be mapped to a probabilistic simple state machine or cellular automata grid. Even if we assert that the probabilities are continuous (when nothing else is), a Turing machine can simulate this to arbitrary accuracy and precision.

The Church-Turing thesis does not say that all physical systems can be simulated by a Turing machine, because the Church-Turing thesis does not talk about physical systems at all. However, the Church-Turing thesis does describe a class of problems that can be modelled with a Turing machine, and physics describes a Universe that falls within that class of problems.

No-one has refuted it. If you have a mathematical demonstration that it's wrong, then please provide it.

All this squabbling about what Church-Turing really says seems slightly pointless anyway. I would certainly be strongly influenced by any of the non-computationalists coming up with a physical object, or process that could be proved to be not modellable by a Turing machine, if you can do that then that's a big hole in the argument surely? If you can't then PixyMisa's interpretation of Church-Turing is probably accurate.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I don't understand this comment. Why does the fact that we know it consists of electrons passing through gates make it embodied from our point of view any more than an simulated orange would be considered to be embodied from our point of view. Both are just arbitrary collections of electrons. They are likely to be unconnected physically, just linked together in relationships within the program.

If we adopt the terminology of computers and simulations, this becomes: They will have everything be an action of the computer, with what appears to be matter being the action of electrons within the computer. Therefore, all consciousness is clearly the action of electrons within the computer or something else.

I don't get why we need the something else in either case. I think you can assume monism and if you also assume that consciousness is substrate independent, you can conclude disembodied minds.


If we consider reality to bea computer running a simulation, we would get:

Thinking clearly about idealism as a strict monism, the only thing that actually exists is the computer with everything else being a function of the computer running. All matter would be the computer running. What is not monistic about this?

I agree that if you turn off a human brain, you turn off human thought. If you turn off a simulated consciousness in a computer, it won't be thinking anymore either. But that doesn't imply the simulated consciousness has a body from our point of view. It doesn't. From our point of view, it is only relationships between electrons and those electrons can be (and probably are) scattered about the computer and it's memory. I term that disembodied. Particularly when you consider that networking would allow such a simulation to store the various electrons in different physical locations.
I don't agree. If mind is 'just' relationships then it is not tethered to a body as we perceive ours to be, but would exist in any arbitrary set of monistic particles that maintains the appropriate relationships between the particles.

I'm not sure I understand your point. Are you saying that a computer could produce consciousness theoretically without it seeming to be a part of a body within a simulation? If so, I agree, it doesn't have to be the function of a body within a simulation.

Otherwise I'm not sure where you are getting the idea of a disembodied mind from any of this.

We should be able to create what looks like a disembodied mind within the simulation, but that mind would still be created by a physical thing -- a computer. An actual disembodied mind would not be possible within monism, only the mistken impression of one.

Or am I missing something?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

If mind is 'just' relationships then it is not tethered to a body as we perceive ours to be, but would exist in any arbitrary set of monistic particles that maintains the appropriate relationships between the particles.

Are you not tethering mind to a set of monistic particles, then? That's what monism says. Everything that exists is made of the single substance. Again, I cannot see anywhere, taking the entire monistic system into account, that a disembodied mind is possible. If you have any answer that creates a disembodied mind 'in reality' then you have thought about it wrongly.

The only reason we can talk about a disembodied mind in a simulation is because anyone in the simulation might not understand the nature of reality. But any mind within a simulation is always tethered to the reality of electrons passing through gates.

A mind being relations of relations does not mean that any of the 'relationships' can be cut. Everything is tethered to ultimate reality no matter how many levels of 'abstraction' we can imagine.

 

[Beth]

I'm not sure I understand your point. Are you saying that a computer could produce consciousness theoretically without it seeming to be a part of a body within a simulation? If so, I agree, it doesn't have to be the function of a body within a simulation.

Otherwise I'm not sure where you are getting the idea of a disembodied mind from any of this.

We should be able to create what looks like a disembodied mind within the simulation, but that mind would still be created by a physical thing -- a computer. An actual disembodied mind would not be possible within monism, only the mistken impression of one.

Or am I missing something?

The electrons in a computer that comprise the simulation of a conscious creature may not be connected physically (it's only happenstance if they are) and they are only a tiny portion of the particles that comprise the computer itself. The connections and relationships between the particles that comprise the simulated consciousness would be represented symbolically within the computer, not physically. I would no more consider the computer to be a physical embodiment of the simulated consciousness any more than I would consider the entire universe to be the physical embodiment of my own.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Whether monism or no, it is assuming that consciousness is independent of substrate is what leads to the conclusion that disembodied minds might exist.

Maybe this is the real issue underlying our discussion? Consciousness is not truly independent of substrate. It is theoretically independent of the type of system that enacts it -- so it can theoretically be realized in people or computers or whatever. But it is not independent of any substrate. As an action it must ultimately be tied to something that produces an action; energy has to be in there somewhere. If energy is there, you've got a 'body' in some form.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The electrons in a computer that comprise the simulation of a conscious creature may not be connected physically (it's only happenstance if they are) and they are only a tiny portion of the particles that comprise the computer itself. The connections and relationships between the particles that comprise the simulated consciousness would be represented symbolically within the computer, not physically. I would no more consider the computer to be a physical embodiment of the simulated consciousness any more than I would consider the entire universe to be the physical embodiment of my own.

The means by which the electrons pass through gates is connected together physically. If those connections are not there the computer doesn't work.

I'm sorry, please bear with me, I'm still not understanding your point.

Beth, does this get at what you are after:

I have said that consciousness is an action. Within a simulation, the action of consciousness can be caused by another action -- simulated particles. So, it appears that actions may cause actions. But it is still the case that within a computer the original action must be caused by the physical functioning of the computer. Any action caused by an action must therefore be tethered to something physical. There is no way to divorce or cut the chain of actions or relations because actions (or relations) are always of something. A bare relation makes no sense.

ETA:

Although I've got to admit that saying things like "an action of an action" makes me uncomfortable because that is just my simple way of trying to conceptualize it and may not reflect what actually happens with a computer simulation. Maybe someone who understands what actually goes on in the computer could help out?

By that I mean that it somehow doesn't seem quite right to say that simulated particle 1 bumps into simulated particle 2 to make particle 2 move. How would you go about coding that? And what actually happens in the computer while this is being simulated?

 

[AlBell]

...

If you have what we could call isomorphic actions, for the sake of argument -- they are identical in form in every way -- with actions defined as changing relations of parts, then in what possible way are the changing relations of parts in the simulation different from the changing relations of parts in the real world? I don't see any way to separate them -- they are just changing relations of parts. Sure in one situation the parts are simulated, but if the relations of the parts are identical, how are they different? I don't see a way to consider them different. This is true of all actions, not just consciousness.

On the comments on electrons in the computer vs electrons in biochemistry there's seems to me a vast difference. How is using electrons in the computer to simulate electrons in the brain (or more correctly in the entire body) and then asserting the result is 'conscious' any different than asserting a simulation of a single living cell is 'alive'?

 

[Beth]

Maybe this is the real issue underlying our discussion? Consciousness is not truly independent of substrate. It is theoretically independent of the type of system that enacts it -- so it can theoretically be realized in people or computers or whatever. But it is not independent of any substrate. As an action it must ultimately be tied to something that produces an action; energy has to be in there somewhere. If energy is there, you've got a 'body' in some form.

On the comments on electrons in the computer vs electrons in biochemistry there's seems to me a vast difference. How is using electrons in the computer to simulate electrons in the brain (or more correctly in the entire body) and then asserting the result is 'conscious' any different than asserting a simulation of a single living cell is 'alive'?

I think it would be more analogous to asserting that a computer virus is alive. Which is an arguable point.

 

[AlBell]

It's also an arguable point if a virus is alive.

 

[Meed]

Cornsail,

Let me try this one out on you; I don't know if it will help, but it might explain more how I envision this.

Again, I don't know how possible such a scenario could be, but we are really just using it as a thought experiment.

So, we try to create a simulated world. Let's say we start with a very simple set of commands that simulates a particle. That tells the comuter which gates to open and close. We repeat this simple instruction many times and we have another set of instructions that tell this simulated world what the 'laws of physics' are. So, there is very little coding going on here.

Those simple sets of instructions tell the electrons (in the actual computer) where to go and in what sequence. If motion is introduced into the simulated world, then the simulated particles should interact according to the 'laws of physics', again just a few lines of code. But shouldn't those simple few lines of code be able to produce all sorts of different changing ways that electrons (in the actual computer) move through gates as the 'particles' interact? The code won't be growing, but the way the electrons move through the gates will change over time according to the rules of the game. Now assuming that we were God and could recreate our world precisely, knowing all the contingencies, we should need just a few bits of code to ensure that things happen in this universe just as it did in 'the real world'.

What I imagine is a similar pattern of those electrons passing through gates that match what occurs in someones brain with ions passing through channels, etc.

If a brain can produce consciousness through physical means, why could not a computer? The difference I see is that the "rules of the game" simply come from different places -- in 'the real world' we speak of them being inherent to the universe, and in the computer simulation they are imposed from the top-down.

It's possible it could and I think it's a decent argument (aside from being speculative), but I disagree for the reasons I've previously gone over.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It's possible it could and I think it's a decent argument (aside from being speculative), but I disagree for the reasons I've previously gone over.

Fair enough.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

On the comments on electrons in the computer vs electrons in biochemistry there's seems to me a vast difference. How is using electrons in the computer to simulate electrons in the brain (or more correctly in the entire body) and then asserting the result is 'conscious' any different than asserting a simulation of a single living cell is 'alive'?

If you could find a way to take the information within the simulation for a living cell and have it influence the parts that make up a cell in the real world, is there some way that the information from the simulation would not keep that stuff in the real world alive?

The problem, of course, is that the stuff in the real world would simply organize into a living cell most likely on its own, so there would be no way to carry it out as an experiment.

The simulation consciousness is not properly conscious in the real world, but we can interact with it the same as we can with someone in the real world. The consciousness would still be in the simulation, just as a simulated cell would be alive in the simulation. It would not be alive in the real world, nor would a simulated ball rolling be rolling in the real world. The actions, however, would be the same in the simulation as they are in the real world.

 

[Beth]

It's also an arguable point if a virus is alive.

True. They are on the borderline of life/non-life.

 

[Beth]

The means by which the electrons pass through gates is connected together physically. If those connections are not there the computer doesn't work.

They are not contiguous. If you have ever read GEB, it would be like the conscious ant hill. If you are correct, then that is just another instantiation of the pattern of relationships that comprise consciousness. Is there something that it is like to be an ant colony?

I'm sorry, please bear with me, I'm still not understanding your point.

Beth, does this get at what you are after:

I have said that consciousness is an action. Within a simulation, the action of consciousness can be caused by another action -- simulated particles. So, it appears that actions may cause actions. But it is still the case that within a computer the original action must be caused by the physical functioning of the computer. Any action caused by an action must therefore be tethered to something physical. There is no way to divorce or cut the chain of actions or relations because actions (or relations) are always of something. A bare relation makes no sense.

Does the concept of addition have any existence apart from being a part of our thoughts? Apparently it is a part of the very structure of our central nervous system, to a degree I had not realized previous to our conversation here. What is the concept of addition if not a bare relation bereft of any physical embodiment? All of mathematics is nothing but bare relationships devoid of physicality.

ETA:
Although I've got to admit that saying things like "an action of an action" makes me uncomfortable because that is just my simple way of trying to conceptualize it and may not reflect what actually happens with a computer simulation. Maybe someone who understands what actually goes on in the computer could help out?

By that I mean that it somehow doesn't seem quite right to say that simulated particle 1 bumps into simulated particle 2 to make particle 2 move. How would you go about coding that? And what actually happens in the computer while this is being simulated?

Many years ago I took a course that required actual binary coding. All computer code in any language gets translated into binary - or at least that was the case twenty some years ago. Going from binary to actually moving electrons around on chips is beyond me though.

 

[PixyMisa]

Whether monism or no, it is assuming that consciousness is independent of substrate is what leads to the conclusion that disembodied minds might exist.

No.

As I explained earlier, independent means that it doesn't matter what the substrate is. It doesn't mean that it doesn't matter whether there is a substrate.

There is always a substrate. There are no disembodied minds. The notion is not even meaningful.

 

[PixyMisa]

Sorry to jump in, Ich_wasp -- Beth and others are posing some excellent questions and I'm having fun just following along as someone who's not convinced either way by the simulation arguments -- but I'm curious on a couple of points that you keep coming back to [hilited above] in your replies; how much does your conviction in the 'reality' of the simulated consciousness depend on:

-- electrons passing through gates? Would it matter if we replaced them with some other mechanism, like the push-pegs or gear-teeth in Babbage's jacquard looms and analytical engines?

It wouldn't matter; that's the Church-Turing thesis in a nutshell.

-- one-to-one correspondence? Would it matter if the computer program used compression algorithms to store information (so that an array of 1000 neurons say, all in the same 'zero' state, was stored as "1000" (9 bits, 9 switches), rather than "000... rpt 1000 times ...000")?

No, representation wouldn't matter. It doesn't matter in computer programs either - lossless compression (the kind you're talking about) is invisible.

...to encapsulate the above point better (or worse): is there an inevitable ontological difference between virtual reality, which is prescribed by the computer program; and physical reality, which isn't -- necessarily at least, as far as we know (the universe itself may be a quantum computer, who knows? but not everyone is ready to abandon basic substance for "turtles all the way down" just yet) -- where the physical laws we observe are situated in a pre-existing spacetime vacuum that doesn't have to be described and to which things seem to conform, which seems to form things -- that's just the way the cookie crumbles / quanta fluctuate, so to speak -- rather than rule-following -- where the "physical laws" are specified by a computer program; that is relevant to consciousness?

Actually, matter and energy shape space and time. Spacetime is not a static, independent, pre-existing framework; it is something that stretches and shifts according to the laws of physics.

Even briefer: are relations really sufficient for consciousness, or must there be something there to relate? (this last two-part long-winded question elaborates a point others have been raising)

There must be something to relate. Consciousness is a physical process, not an abstract concept.