Has consciousness been fully explained?

[PixyMisa]

No.

 

[Democracy Simulator]

Go on then. I'm keen to learn.

What is the definition of 'Self' in SRIP?

 

[Meed]

"Read GEB" in 5.. 4.. 3.. 2..

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

The problem I see with their argument is that they are arguing for what I would consider to be the ‘soul’ of a person. This is my definition of a soul: the unique pattern of relationships that comprise who we are as an individual. Further, because it is a pattern and not a physical thing, it is eternal.

Can we build a machine that has a soul? By my definition of soul, certainly we can and perhaps, already have. I’m not sure if consciousness is even required for this definition, on reflection I think not. Rather, consciousness could be described as a certain class of such patterns.

Just some musings.

Why is that a problem, though?

That consciousness is an action, a pattern, a process should mean that it can be recreated in another medium. I have argued with Christians that this is exactly what they should be arguing for, in fact, rather than the silly notion that the soul is some form of magic. Paul was quite explicit that the resurrection would be 'in the body'. This way of looking at things absolutely requires some type of body to carry out the process. The idea of an immaterial soul that is composed of a magical substance does not, leaving aside the issue of the idea being essentially incoherent.

 

[PixyMisa]

"Read GEB" in 5.. 4.. 3.. 2..

Good suggestion.

Seriously, anyone who has gotten this far in the thread and still hasn't read Godel, Escher, Bach needs to slap themselves, and then read the damn book already.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Since this 'world' does not exist in a 'real sense', then it either does not exist at all or it merely exists in our minds as a (perhaps useful) abstraction. The latter is what Piggy and westprog have been saying. I see no third option.

How does it not 'exist' when you can see it on a monitor? Turn your back and pay no attention and the simulation continues, so it continues to exist. It simply does not exist in the way that other 'things' exist, as physical entities. It 'exists' in its implementation in the same way that running exists when a horse runs. You simply cannot use the same categories that you for objects with the simulation.

Steps being carried out within the computer certainly have location. And that is the only action that takes place in the simulation as far as I can see (other than the mental actions of the people interpreting the simulation's outputs).

It has a location in exactly the same way that Descartes could speak of John Smith's soul. The soul carries out actions within a person, but the action of the soul is still without location. The implementation of a simulation must occur in a physical space, but the actions themselves are without location. You can't touch any of them.

Also, I wouldn't call the simulation "an action". In a computer implemented simulation, for example, if you save it to a hard disk and turn off the system then does the computer not still contain the simulation? And where is the action involved?

If you turn off the system, then the simulation ceases. It no longer exists. The possibility for it to resume exists within the hard drive of the system.

In the same way, if we had the possibility of recreating a person in every detail and exactly replicated every neural pattern, then after that person dies we could bring her back to life.

I would define an 'action' merely as a change in the world. As cognizers we can recognize certain changes as being similar or equivalent to each other and from that we categorize actions into different sets. So, 'running' refers to a set of patterns of change that are related in some way. I think you would agree with that definition(?)

Anyway, given that definition, an action must be something that is attributed to a "thing". Now, we could attribute an action to an imaginary thing that we have conceptualized, but the action would be equally imaginary, would it not? There is nothing actually undergoing that change outside of our mind. An action can, of course, cause another action, but each action still must be an action of something.

An action has to occur within some thing, such as a computer. Why does an action have to be an action 'of something' where that 'something' is defined as a physical entity? Take a computer for instance. I can input a number into the system and it 'exists' as a way in which the system functions -- it is an action. There is no number there for me to touch. I can input another number -- same thing. I can add those two numbers together and get a new number. So, I have performed an action on two 'things' that do not exist. Did I not add those numbers simply because there was no "thing" there to manipulate?

Most of the mental activity that we perform does not involve actual 'things', but actions about actions. That is what planning and daydreaming are all about. That it all occurs in our mind is a trivial issue -- of course it does.

The bottom line is that we perform actions on actions all the time. I don't see anything controversial about this at all. Yes, it all takes place within a physical space, but it is still all just action (movements of ions through ion channels changing neuronal potentials, etc.).

 

[PixyMisa]

How does it not 'exist' when you can see it on a monitor?

Because that would invalidate his argument.

 

[AlBell]

How does it not 'exist' when you can see it on a monitor? Turn your back and pay no attention and the simulation continues, so it continues to exist. It simply does not exist in the way that other 'things' exist, as physical entities. It 'exists' in its implementation in the same way that running exists when a horse runs. You simply cannot use the same categories that you for objects with the simulation.

Aren't we back to 'when a tree falls in the forest and there's no around to hear it' territory; the argument for the primacy of subjective consciousness from each of our viewpoints?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Aren't we back to 'when a tree falls in the forest and there's no around to hear it' territory; the argument for the primacy of subjective consciousness from each of our viewpoints?

You can say that and use that sort of argument, but that is a different argument than whether or not there is some type of existence for the simulation. That would still put the simulation in the same category as everything else -- if you believe things only exist when they are being experienced, then the simulation only exists when it is being experienced. But the same is true of a 'real orange' in that type of thinking.

I don't ascribe to that way of thinking. I fully accept that the world keeps going whether my eyes are open or not. The simulation has its own 'reality' whether I experience it or not. It does not exist only as an abstraction in my mind. It exists as an action within a computer system. We can certainly call that an abstraction if we want.

And the answer to the "is there a sound if a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to listen" does have an answer and the answer is 'no' but for trivial reasons. Sound is, by definition, a perception. If there is no perceiver there is no perception. The sound waves would still be there, but there is no sound without the perception of it.

 

[AlBell]

You can say that and use that sort of argument, but that is a different argument than whether or not there is some type of existence for the simulation. That would still put the simulation in the same category as everything else -- if you believe things only exist when they are being experienced, then the simulation only exists when it is being experienced. But the same is true of a 'real orange' in that type of thinking.

I don't ascribe to that way of thinking. I fully accept that the world keeps going whether my eyes are open or not.

Of course; for the tree-fall rarefaction & compression waves radiate, leaves tremble, etc., and the CRT emits photons.

The simulation has its own 'reality' whether I experience it or not. It does not exist only as an abstraction in my mind. It exists as an action within a computer system. We can certainly call that an abstraction if we want.

If all life ceased in an instant, abstraction for what? The simulated person looking at a simulated computer screen emitting nothing?

And the answer to the "is there a sound if a tree falls in the forest and no one is there to listen" does have an answer and the answer is 'no' but for trivial reasons. Sound is, by definition, a perception. If there is no perceiver there is no perception. The sound waves would still be there, but there is no sound without the perception of it.

Yeah, that darn perception problem just won't go away.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

If all life ceased in an instant, abstraction for what? The simulated person looking at a simulated computer screen emitting nothing?

Abstraction is not my word for it. In the radical absence of people it isn't really the right word, so it isn't really the right word to apply, as you point out. Action is a much better word.

It is a type of abstraction though (at least in the way we use that word), within the computer system because the simulation is not a thing but an action or process. There won't be anyone around to define it as such, but the nature of what goes on in the simulation remains the same whether there is anyone looking or not.

That is one of the problems that I think Searle runs into when he defines computation in purely 'perceptual terms'. He states that someone must view an action as a computation for it to be a computation, but there are actions going on in the world that perform the exact same functions -- computation -- whether or not anyone defines them as such. That's what nervous tissues does -- it computes (summing inputs to produce an new output). It was 'designed' by nature and its function did not require any human to ascribe the term computation to it.

ETA:

I guess to really answer your question, it would be an abstraction for us -- because that is how we use the word. In the radical absence of us there would be no one to abstract, so there would be no abstraction; which is why I say above that abstraction is not really the right word here. Process or action is.

 

[AlBell]

For some reason I think we just cycled back to the tree-falling problem.

ymmv.

Moving on, is it safe to assume Mr. Data is the 'simulation' Pixy and RD intend to imply as the final, future, end-point of where they assert we are today, with machine consciousness already here there and everywhere?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

For some reason I think we just cycled back to the tree-falling problem.

ymmv.

Not really, since the issue with sound as perception and the way we use abstraction depend on a perceiver and an abstractor. That's just a definition thing and has nothing to do with the nature of reality. It is still the case that a simulation would keep running even in the radical absence of people, and its nature would not change.

Moving on, is it safe to assume Mr. Data is the 'simulation' Pixy and RD intend to imply as the final, future, end-point of where they assert we are today, with machine consciousness already here there and everywhere?

I'm not sure I follow the question, Data being a fictional character an all. Do you mean is that the form folks think that machine intelligence will take?

As for machine consciousness being here, that depends critically on one's definition of consciousness. There is clearly no machine consciousness that is anything like a human.

 

[Beth]

By your definition of soul, wouldn't all machines have them?

Yes. In fact, everything would. Perhaps 'spirit' is a closer term to what I am thinking of.

Why is that a problem, though?

It's not a problem for me. I find inconsistent with other beliefs I recall from other threads when used by some individuals.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

It's not a problem for me. I find inconsistent with other beliefs I recall from other threads when used by some individuals.

Really? I don't think it is at all inconsistent, but maybe we are talking about two different views and are not understanding one another?

The idea is that consciousness is an action that takes place within a particular body, a body being required for it to occur. That body can be a physical human body or a computer or a dog or other animal or alien species. That there is no magic involved is their main point.

Within a simulation we would have actions (simulations of particles) being responsible for the 'body' associated with any particular consciousness, but none of it works without the computer running it. There's just an extra level of 'abstraction' if you will. No action is possible without a physical process to perform the action whatever level of abstraction intercedes.

If you are thinking of the way the 'transporter problem' is discussed, that is often a different issue. I think everyone agrees that an identical pattern of 'you' over there would be 'you'. The problem with the transporter problem is that we are often asked how we would feel about being killed in the process of creating the new 'me'. Emotion being what it is, I would still feel queasy about having to die, even knowing that I have been resurrected over there.

 

[Malerin]

Really? I don't think it is at all inconsistent, but maybe we are talking about two different views and are not understanding one another?

The idea is that consciousness is an action that takes place within a particular body, a body being required for it to occur. That body can be a physical human body or a computer or a dog or other animal or alien species. That there is no magic involved is their main point.

Within a simulation we would have actions (simulations of particles) being responsible for the 'body' associated with any particular consciousness, but none of it works without the computer running it. There's just an extra level of 'abstraction' if you will. No action is possible without a physical process to perform the action whatever level of abstraction intercedes.

If you are thinking of the way the 'transporter problem' is discussed, that is often a different issue. I think everyone agrees that an identical pattern of 'you' over there would be 'you'. The problem with the transporter problem is that we are often asked how we would feel about being killed in the process of creating the new 'me'. Emotion being what it is, I would still feel queasy about having to die, even knowing that I have been resurrected over there.

No they don't.

 

[Malerin]

Abstraction is not my word for it. In the radical absence of people it isn't really the right word, so it isn't really the right word to apply, as you point out. Action is a much better word.

It is a type of abstraction though (at least in the way we use that word), within the computer system because the simulation is not a thing but an action or process. There won't be anyone around to define it as such, but the nature of what goes on in the simulation remains the same whether there is anyone looking or not.

That is one of the problems that I think Searle runs into when he defines computation in purely 'perceptual terms'. He states that someone must view an action as a computation for it to be a computation, but there are actions going on in the world that perform the exact same functions -- computation -- whether or not anyone defines them as such. That's what nervous tissues does -- it computes (summing inputs to produce an new output). It was 'designed' by nature and its function did not require any human to ascribe the term computation to it.

ETA:

I guess to really answer your question, it would be an abstraction for us -- because that is how we use the word. In the radical absence of us there would be no one to abstract, so there would be no abstraction; which is why I say above that abstraction is not really the right word here. Process or action is.

Back to the tree-falling problem. "Summing" doesn't happen in a mindless universe. The beads of an abacus may move if it falls from a tree and hits the ground, but with no one around there's no computation going on.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

No they don't.

OK. I would say that it would be 'you' in a sense, but that if the original you were looking at him you wouldn't feel like it was 'you'. That is just the way emotion is, being localized in space and available to only one observer. But that issue is tied to identity and several other issues that don't concern whether or not a computer simulation could produce consciousness (and would constitute a derail, so we should probably let it go unless we want to start another transporter problem thread).

 

[Malerin]

Good suggestion.

Seriously, anyone who has gotten this far in the thread and still hasn't read Godel, Escher, Bach Dianetics needs to slap themselves, and then read the damn book already.

Sound familiar anyone?

 

[Malerin]

OK. I would say that it would be 'you' in a sense, but that if the original you were looking at him you wouldn't feel like it was 'you'. That is just the way emotion is, being localized in space and available to only one observer. But that issue is tied to identity and several other issues that don't concern whether or not a computer simulation could produce consciousness (and would constitute a derail, so we should probably let it go unless we want to start another transporter problem thread).

LOL. Do you want to talk about identity or not derail the thread?