Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Meed]

Correct, your question was not a category error. Please excuse the implication that it was on my part -- I've heard the question asked in a seemingly innocent way many times when the implication was that one side was committing that particular category error. The implication of the question sometimes is that one side thinks that a simulation is identical to reality. I realize you were simply asking a question.

Did Pixy claim that a simulated orange would or could contain real vitamin C? That doesn't sound like the kind of mistake he would make. He may have left out a word in his response. A simulated orange could certainly "contain" simulated Vitamin C and if it were close to a model of a real orange and was in a robust simulation act within the simulation the same way that a real orange acts in this world.

This was the exchange that sparked the question:

Then there is the other issue of whether symbolically describing a physical system perfectly makes the machine equivalent to the system it is simulating or the idea that it can "do anything the physical system can do". This I think is clearly false.

Then you're not only wrong, you're professing to a logically incoherent belief system.

It's either a precise simulation or it isn't.

If it is, the simulation produces all the behaviours of the system being simulated.

If it's not, you contradicted the premise you had just accepted.

If you're asserting that simulated oranges don't contain physical Vitamin C, then you're committing a category error.

Whichever one it is, I can't help you any further. I'll just leave you in the Fire Swamp for the ROUSes to gnaw at your bones.

Possibly he meant that asserting that simulated oranges don't contain physical Vitamin C would be an error in the sense that it would not invalidate his argument. I interpreted it as a claim that the orange would contain physical vitamin C.

Either way my claim was only that a simulated physical system can not do whatever a real physical system can do. Describing one as real and one as simulated (i.e. not real) is a meaningful distinction. Yet I have the impression (correctly or incorrectly) that PM would say that describing a simulation as not real would be meaningless.

 

[AlBell]

Sure, but it's not exactly within my ability to do so. We have plenty of evidence to support the idea that it is theoretically possible to do this, and we have the baby step of the pseudo-new-cell that was recently announced. It is pretty easy to see that life is a biochemical process.

The evidence basically runs:

1. We have never encountered life that was not based in biochemistry
2. We understand many of these biochemical processes and realize which are the most important for maintaining life
3. When we disrupt any of these processes life ceases

We do need to take the next step, as you mention, and start the process from scratch or semi-scratch to nail it down. But I don't see much room for vitalism in there.


ETA:

I mean, if you had to bet on this, wouldn't you bet on a physical solution? I certainly would.

Define physical.

I admit I hold out the slightest irrational hope we'll never manage that final step, although I'm not certain what that might mean. It could just mean the human mind (in the current version at least) just doesn't have the horsepower to assimilate and combine all the needed pieces and inter-relationships.

1. We have never encountered consciousness that was not based in biochemistry
2. We understand many of these biochemical processes and realize (at least some of) which are the most important for maintaining consciousness
3. When we disrupt any of these processes consciousness ceases

Would you bet we will ever build a conscious machine not based on biochemistry?

I'll bet if we ever do, and it surpasses us in intelligence and knowledge, it'll decide humans need to be exterminated forthwith as an anathema to all other lifeforms.

 

[PixyMisa]

Hmm. Religion and Philosophy section, not Science, check. (I see !Kaggen beat me to it.)

I'd be happy to read a major thread in Science about what we actually know about consciousness. I have no doubt Wasp, Pixy and many others have much to teach.

Even given SRIP, C-T thesis, and GEB, the answer to "What is this magic that makes consciousness different from everything else in the Universe?" is no more known to us today today than it was to the ancient Mesopotamians.

Again, you are simply avoiding the question. Avoiding even thinking about the question.

What magic? Why do you think any magic is necessary? Why do you think any magic is possible?

Before trying to explain consciousness, maybe seeing if we can answer "What is this magic that makes Life different from everything else in the Universe?" would offer a starting place.

No problem. None whatsoever.

Back to you Al.

 

[PixyMisa]

No, that would make it a category accuracy.

Nope.

"In the world of the simulation" means in someone's imagination

It means nothing of the sort.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yeah.

And whatever all the brain's doing, it's doing something physical which is generating this feeling of awareness somewhere in the general area of my brain cavity at this moment.

Computation.

I am observing the effects of something the brain is doing physically, because I'm observing the effects of an event locatable in 4-D spacetime, somewhere in my brain.

So? A simulation can certainly do that.

Some physical activity of my brain -- whatever it may turn out to be

Computation.

-- is responsible for this effect that I observe as long as I can observe anything.

So? A simulation can certainly do that.

And it can't be only sufficient "hardware" to support "information flow" because if you're serious about that, then you're allocating no other physical resources for whatever it is that makes conscious awareness happen over and above any flow of information.

So?

What else is necessary, and why do you think that?

Consciousness is not information, it's a bodily function.

Consciousness is an informational process. Carried out by the brain. Sure, that makes it a bodily function. It also makes it something a simulation can do.

It has to be carried out by some sort of "hardware" just like everything else our bodies do.

That would be the brain, Piggy. Which is a computer. Which can be emulated or simulated at whatever level of detail and abstraction you require.

There is no magic.

 

[PixyMisa]

This was the exchange that sparked the question:

Possibly he meant that asserting that simulated oranges don't contain physical Vitamin C would be an error in the sense that it would not invalidate his argument.

I meant that it would be an error that would invalidate your argument.

I interpreted it as a claim that the orange would contain physical vitamin C.

How on Earth could you arrive at that interpretation?! Have you not been paying attention to anything that's been said?

Here's the point again:

• It's either a precise simulation or it isn't.
• If it is, the simulation produces all the behaviours of the system being simulated.
• If it's not, you contradicted the premise you had just accepted.
• If you're asserting that simulated oranges don't contain physical Vitamin C, then you're committing a category error.

Which raises two main questions that you need to actually think about:

• Why would anyone think that simulated Vitamin C is the same as physical Vitamin C?
• Why would anyone think that a simulated emotion is not the same as a physical emotion? And what's the difference, and how do you know, and why does it matter?

Either way my claim was only that a simulated physical system can not do whatever a real physical system can do.

Of course it can. We've already established that.

Describing one as real and one as simulated (i.e. not real) is a meaningful distinction. Yet I have the impression (correctly or incorrectly) that PM would say that describing a simulation as not real would be meaningless.

Close, but no.

Real is the wrong word. Simulations are real. A simulation has a different substrate to our world. Simulated oranges are not oranges in our world, and if we are in a simulation then oranges in the world above are not oranges in our world either.

But simulated information is information. That's the entire reason we run simulations.

Confusing these two facts - and yes, they are facts, they are not something you can dispute - is a category error.

 

[Frank Newgent]

• It's either a precise simulation or it isn't.

Please bear with me. I am not being flippant in asking this: what's the difference?

 

[PixyMisa]

Please bear with me. I am not being flippant in asking this: what's the difference?

Not a problem. Precise has - as it were - a precise meaning here. I'm using it as it's used in science and statistics, which is why I usually (but not always) speak of simulating something to arbitrary accuracy and precision.

What I'm saying here is that there is a finite limit to how precisely - and how accurately - we can meaningfully measure things in our Universe - the Planck scale. A simulation based on accurate and precise measurements at that scale, and applying the same laws of physics as in our Universe, will produce the same behaviours. It cannot do otherwise.

With one proviso - our Universe is not deterministic, and a simulation will simulate that. The usual standing caution on category errors also applies.

 

[!Kaggen]

Not a problem. Precise has - as it were - a precise meaning here. I'm using it as it's used in science and statistics, which is why I usually (but not always) speak of simulating something to arbitrary accuracy and precision.

What I'm saying here is that there is a finite limit to how precisely - and how accurately - we can meaningfully measure things in our Universe - the Planck scale. A simulation based on accurate and precise measurements at that scale, and applying the same laws of physics as in our Universe, will produce the same behaviours. It cannot do otherwise.

With one proviso - our Universe is not deterministic, and a simulation will simulate that. The usual standing caution on category errors also applies.

Very well put.

I have a few questions.

What is the number of physical facts needed for creating an arbitrary accurate and precise simulation?

Assuming we have chosen enough physical facts for creating an arbitrary accurate and precise simulation should we stop searching and/or adding physical facts to our simulation, even if they make no difference to the observed behavior of the simulation?

For example we have found lots of DNA in cells that appear to serve no purpose (at least we have not found it yet), should we leave these physical facts out of a simulation of a cell?

Does it matter that our simulated world may have less physical facts than the world we are simulating, but the same behavior?

How long do we keep monitoring the behavior of our simulation to make sure we have an arbitrary accurate and precise simulation?

 

[PixyMisa]

Very well put.

I have a few questions.

What is the number of physical facts needed for creating an arbitrary accurate and precise simulation?

Many. But finite and well-defined. You'd have to define the system being simulated, then we could calculate the upper bound.

Assuming we have chosen enough physical facts for creating an arbitrary accurate and precise simulation should we stop searching and/or adding physical facts to our simulation, even if they make no difference to the observed behavior of the simulation?

The whole idea of the Planck scale is that there is a point at which there is simply no more detail. Any finite physical system can be fully described by a finite amount of information.

For example we have found lots of DNA in cells that appear to serve no purpose (at least we have not found it yet), should we leave these physical facts out of a simulation of a cell?

Well, the DNA is actually, measurably there, and changing the DNA will have an actual, measurable effect, even if it still codes for all the necessary proteins. Depends on what you're trying to do with the simulation.

Does it matter that our simulated world may have less physical facts than the world we are simulating, but the same behavior?

Possibly. It would tell us something. For example, if we build an accurate biological simulation but leave out the "junk" DNA, and we end up with the expected behaviours, then we know the "junk" DNA is really junk - to whatever extent the simulation runs. If we observe different behaviours, that would indicate that the "junk" DNA actually has a function.

How long do we keep monitoring the behavior of our simulation to make sure we have an arbitrary accurate and precise simulation?

For a Planck scale simulation, you know exactly the scope of the information you need before you even start.

For a simulation at a higher level of abstraction or a larger granularity, you do need to check to see if your abstraction is correct. How long that took would depend on the simulation in question.

 

[Meed]

I meant that it would be an error that would invalidate your argument.


How on Earth could you arrive at that interpretation?! Have you not been paying attention to anything that's been said?

Here's the point again:

• It's either a precise simulation or it isn't.
• If it is, the simulation produces all the behaviours of the system being simulated.

• 
  
  Simulates != produces. This may be where I'm having a problem.
  
  Saying "you are committing a category error" does not make it any less true that:
  
  -An orange can squirt juice in my face
  -A simulated orange cannot squirt juice in my face
  -Squirting juice in my face is a behavior
  -Therefore the simulation cannot produce all the behaviors of the system
  
  But it can simulate them.
  
  

  [*]Why would anyone think that simulated Vitamin C is the same as physical Vitamin C?
  [*]Why would anyone think that a simulated emotion is not the same as a physical emotion?

  
  For the same reason we don't think simulated vitamin C is the same as physical vitamin C.
  
  

  And what's the difference, and how do you know, and why does it matter?

  
  If you think ascribing real world physical capabilities to a simulation is a category error, then surely you agree that the difference is merely that one is a simulation and thus not the same.
  
  

  Real is the wrong word. Simulations are real. A simulation has a different substrate to our world. Simulated oranges are not oranges in our world, and if we are in a simulation then oranges in the world above are not oranges in our world either.
  
  But simulated information is information. That's the entire reason we run simulations.

  
  I have no problem calling them real as long as the distinction is maintained between a simulation and what it is simulating.
  
  As for information, I don't think that has a clear definition.

 

[PixyMisa]

Simulates != produces. This may be where I'm having a problem.

Saying "you are committing a category error" does not make it any less true that:

-An orange can squirt juice in my face
-A simulated orange cannot squirt juice in my face

Category error.

-Squirting juice in my face is a behavior
-Therefore the simulation cannot produce all the behaviors of the system

YOU ARE NOT IN THE SYSTEM.

 

[PixyMisa]

For the same reason we don't think simulated vitamin C is the same as physical vitamin C.

How does that follow?

If you think ascribing real world physical capabilities to a simulation is a category error, then surely you agree that the difference is merely that one is a simulation and thus not the same.

No. Absolutely not. Think about what a simulation is.

I have no problem calling them real as long as the distinction is maintained between a simulation and what it is simulating.

What's that distinction?

As for information, I don't think that has a clear definition.

Bwah. Have you tried looking it up?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_information
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Theory

It's complicated. It's subtle. But saying that it doesn't have a clear definition is just lazy.

 

[Meed]

Category error.

I'll consider this a non-response, given I began with "Saying 'you are committing a category error' does not make it any less true that: [...]" and I don't feel like going in circles.

(It still does not make it any less true, BTW)

YOU ARE NOT IN THE SYSTEM.

Obviously, I'm not in the orange. Maybe you meant I'm not in the simulation? That also does not make any of my premises or my conclusion any less true.

 

[PixyMisa]

I'll consider this a non-response, given I began with "Saying 'you are committing a category error' does not make it any less true that: [...]" and I don't feel like going in circles.

Then stop comitting blatant category errors.

Obviously, I'm not in the orange. Maybe you meant I'm not in the simulation? That also does not make any of my premises or my conclusion any less true.

That's exactly what it does.

You said:

Simulates != produces. This may be where I'm having a problem.

Saying "you are committing a category error" does not make it any less true that:

-An orange can squirt juice in my face
-A simulated orange cannot squirt juice in my face
-Squirting juice in my face is a behavior
-Therefore the simulation cannot produce all the behaviors of the system

YOU ARE NOT IN THE SYSTEM.

The simulation can produce all the behaviours of the system. Why would it produce the behaviours of other systems?

 

[Meed]

What's that distinction?

I think we just went over this. As you put it "Simulated oranges are not oranges in our world". Since I don't know of any other world but "our world", I think it's fair to say that simulated oranges are not oranges.

Why would you take this attitude toward oranges, but not emotions (which are also a function of physical systems "in our world").

Bwah. Have you tried looking it up?

http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Physical_information
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Information_Theory

It's complicated. It's subtle. But saying that it doesn't have a clear definition is just lazy.

I'm familiar with Shannon's information theory. I actually had to make some calculations with it this past summer. Not that I'm by any means an expert on the area. My familiarity with it comes from the fact that information theory was attempted to be applied to psychology (where it failed rather dismally) and there are a couple electrical engineers working with my lab. My adviser is also developing his own theory of information (quite different than Shannon's). It's notable that Shannon was never happy that the word "information" stuck to his theory.

Physical information I'm not really familiar with.

What does it mean to "simulate information" in your view?

 

[!Kaggen]

Category error.


YOU ARE NOT IN THE SYSTEM.

So If I understand you correctly a simulated brain can only have simulated consciousness in a simulated world if we are to avoid a category error?

 

[Meed]

YOU ARE NOT IN THE SYSTEM.

The simulation can produce all the behaviours of the system. Why would it produce the behaviours of other systems?

I think I see what you're saying. An orange squirting juice in my face would be a behavior of the system "me and an orange". So a simulated orange not being able to do this does not mean it cannot do everything the system its simulating can do in that sense.

However, you could also look at the contrast between the system "me and an orange" versus the system "me and a simulation of an orange". This is where it becomes true to say that the simulation cannot produce the same behaviors as the orange. I still differentiate between "produce" and "simulate". If a simulation doesn't exist in "our world" then I maintain that it doesn't exist period, unless you know of any other worlds.

 

[westprog]

I think your analogy is a bit off, Piggy. Creating a leg that functions just like a leg but without muscles tells us plenty about how a leg moves -- which is what we would be after in such a situation.

That it wouldn't tell us much about muscles is analogous to a robot constructed with other material than neurons telling us quite a bit about consciousness but telling us nothing about neurons. We know it won't inform us much about neurons, but that is not what we are after. We are after an explanation for consciousness. If we can see how a robot is constructed to produce that type of behavior we can get a good idea how other types of networks might be constructed to do it. Sure, it wouldn't be exactly how a brain does it, but that's why it is an analogy.

I'm not sure how one could possibly separate behavior that is indistinguishable from conscious behavior and call it not-conscious. Consciousness is that behavior, it is an action.

That it can be carried out by neurons or silica chips is the trivial bit.

For a start, we cannot assume that a robot will exhibit the behaviours of consciousness, and then use that as evidence that a robot can be conscious. So far, there has been no AI that has come remotely close to passing a Turing test. The assumption used to be that by 2001 HAL would be able to talk to us just like a human being over a slightly fuzzy phone line. Nowadays, most people (even those who believe in the computational approach) don't expect robots or computers to exhibit signs of consciousness for the foreseeable future.

What Piggy has indicated that simply producing a machine designed to produce one form of activity doesn't mean that it will exhibit another form of activity. If we don't know (and despite the endless assertions, we still don't know) what, precisely, produces consciousness in the only physical structure in which we know it exists, we can't, therefore, leave out aspects and be sure that the baby hasn't been thrown out with the bathwater. Either the precise mechanism that produces consciousness must be found, or else we cannot assume that it will be there.

To say as a counterargument that the hypothetical robot will exhibit consciousness is meaningless, until a robot can be found that actually does so.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

I think I see what you're saying. An orange squirting juice in my face would be a behavior of the system "me and an orange". So a simulated orange not being able to do this does not mean it cannot do everything the system its simulating can do in that sense.

However, you could also look at the contrast between the system "me and an orange" versus the system "me and a simulation of an orange". This is where it becomes true to say that the simulation cannot produce the same behaviors as the orange. I still differentiate between "produce" and "simulate". If a simulation doesn't exist in "our world" then I maintain that it doesn't exist period, unless you know of any other worlds.

I'm not sure what the point of all this is, but I think there is a bit of confusion over what has or what might be claimed based on the examples being provided.

You and an orange are part of a system -- part of the physical world. Within that world physical objects interact with one another, so an orange may squirt you in the face physically.

In a simulation there is a digitial 'you' and a digital 'orange'. Within that system the digitial orange can squirt the digital you in the face digitally.

A physical orange cannot squirt a digital you in the face and a digital orange cannot squirt a physical you in the face because they exist in different systems, differnt frames of reference.

The only reason this arises in discussions of consciousness is because of confusions over the words we use. When we speak of an orange squirting, we speak of an actual emission, a physical presence that is emitted. But is the true of all actions? Running, for instance, must be realized in a physical system, but what is 'running' exactly? It seems to consist in the translational movement of a being through movement of various body parts. One can simulate running in a digital environment where the simulation is close to what happens in the real world -- simulate the natural physical laws, all the atoms at play, the biological processes of the being, etc. In that situation would we not speak of the simulated body as 'running'?

I think we would, and I think we would because, while running must involve a body, the actual process - running - is constituted by the interaction of the parts. It "is" an action and not a thing.

The same is probably true of consciousness. Consciousness is an action and not a 'thing'. That is why a simulation of consciousness could be said to 'be' consciousness enacted. It would not be the same thing we see in the physical world but it could be very close and it could teach us quite a lot about the process that occurs in the brain.

When thinking about simulations we should never think of them like computer games that currently exist. While those are simulations, that is not the kind of thing that is being discussed here.