Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Robin]

Yeah, but does a dog have buddha-nature?

And does the cow have buddha-nature?

 

[!Kaggen]

And does the cow have buddha-nature?

and did jesus have a buddha-nature?

 

[AlBell]

A university student visiting Master Gasan asked: “Have you ever read the Christian Bible?”

“No, read it to me,” said Gasan.

The student opened the Bible and read from the gospel of St. Matthew: “And why take ye thought for rainment? Consider the lilies of the field, how they grow. They toil not, neither do they spin, and yet I say unto you that even Solomon in all his glory was not arrayed like one of these… Take therefore no thought for the morrow, for the morrow shall take thought for the things of itself.”

Gasan said: “Whoever uttered those words I consider an enlightened man.”

The student continued reading: “Ask and it shall be given you, seek and ye shall find, knock and it shall be opened unto you. For everyone that asketh receiveth, and he that seeketh findeth, and to him that knocketh, it shall be opened.”

Gasan remarked: “That is excellent. Whoever said that is not far from Buddhahood.”


http://www.xamuel.com/ten-buddhist-koans/

 

[PixyMisa]

Can human consciousness survive death?

No.

That's the big question here.

Ah. In that case:
No.

 

[PixyMisa]

Penrose is not an expert in any relevant field. Whether he is a physicist or not is besides the point.

More to the point, he's talking complete bollocks.

 

[rocketdodger]

More to the point, he's talking complete bollocks.

I think the reason he is talking complete bollocks is because he is too smart for his own good -- he thinks that just dipping his foot in the metaphorical pool of computer science and neurobiology is enough to get the whole experience of swimming.

I mean, look at how he approaches his big argument about consciousness -- he sets up the idea of a "perfect mathematician" and tries to show how the knowledge of that mathematician is beyond the capacity of any system with merely turing equivalent capabilities.

wtf? How about addressing all the behaviors actual humans exhibit, and all the behaviors actual turing machines exhibit ? Who is a perfect mathetician, why is that even part of his argument? Why wouldn't he try to show that something like love, or happiness, or subjective experience, is beyond the capacity of a system with mere turing equivalent capabilities? He is so smart that he thinks all of this other stuff is besides the point, because darnit a perfect mathematician can't be a turing machine!!!

Thats why I find it so funny when people bring up Penrose when attacking the computational model -- they have no idea what Penrose is actually talking about, because it certainy isn't love or happiness or sofia or anything else that actually matters.

In a way I think Penrose knows that he is fighting a loosing battle, and thats why he focuses on this abstract academic nonsense like "perfect matheticians."

 

[Dymanic]

I think the reason he is talking complete bollocks is because he is too smart for his own good -- he thinks that just dipping his foot in the metaphorical pool of computer science and neurobiology is enough to get the whole experience of swimming.

To be fair, I do seem to recall that Penrose does at least air some disclaimers regarding the speculative nature of his rather ambitious forays. And you gotta give him this: he's all over that Turing machine thing.

 

[Jeff Corey]

Me too. All this simulation, pzombie and other stuff doesn't ring a bell with me. As a behaviorist, I know it's a problem to deal with consciousness scientifically. Maybe we never will.

 

[Meed]

In fact, that's not what I said at all. I said that any possible physical process is simulatable by a Turing machine.

It is perfectly possible to mathematically describe a process that cannot be computed or simulated by a Turing machine. However, no such process is physically possible - cf. hypercomputation, which, as noted earlier, comes in two varieties, the physically impossible and the simply undefined.

The article under discussion claims otherwise. This does not necessarily mean it's correct, but I certainly can't assume your view is correct either, just because you say it is.

All possible physical processes are finite in extent and can be fully described with finite precision (following Heisenberg & Planck); there are no actual infinities involved. Thus no physical process can compute anything that a Turing machine cannot, and any physical process is simulatable by a Turing machine. (To arbitrary precision and accuracy, which is already established to be sufficient.)

How do you draw the conclusion that infinities are the only thing that could make something non Turning-computable? I also recall the article saying that the Church-Turing thesis does not indicate that all physical systems can be simulated by a Turing machine.

 

[Meed]

Cornsail, if you will, I'd like to go back to this for a moment.

You say you lean towards idealism or neutral monism. Now, there are many forms of idealism, so I don't know exactly what you mean there, but neutral monism is straightforward enough - it says that neither the mental nor the physical are the fundamental nature of reality, but that both reduce to a third, "neutral" substance.

The problem with this is that it isn't true. While it is certainly possible that the physical reduces to something else - though why we should care is not as clear - we know perfectly well that the mental reduces to the physical. Neutral monism, unlike most forms of metaphyics, founders not because it is unprovable but because it is provably false.

So why would anyone lean toward it at all?

I don't agree that the mental always reduces to the physical, for the reason I gave in my response to Piggy. That is, physical description cannot capture the subjective experiential quality of a mental state. For example, an individual who has never experienced pain could study in great detail the neurological processes that correspond to what we call pain, but doing so could not lead him or her to know what it is like to feel pain. This is different than saying the mental is not causally determined by the physical.

In general, leaning toward any philosophical mind-body stance is a little silly. But a reason for leaning toward neutral monism is that physical and experiential events seem to be linked causally. If the two are somehow fundamentally different (dualism), such causal interaction between the two would seem not to make sense. However, one could also argue that the two do not seem to be reducible to each other (you obviously don't see it that way). If two things are causally interactive, but not reducible to each other, then a neutral monist interpretation makes sense of this and may be the only way to do so.

On the question of reducibility, it's interesting to look at from the reverse perspective. Are physical events reducible to experiential/mental events? A strong argument could be made for this, given that physical events can only be inferred based on mental events. It is essentially meaningless to say that something physically exists if it has no relevance to mental experience. So there you have an argument for idealism.

 

[PixyMisa]

The article under discussion claims otherwise. This does not necessarily mean it's correct, but I certainly can't assume your view is correct either, just because you say it is.

Well, you can read some of the references they provide - one thing I have to give them, they provide references for everything. Every single one of them is talking about physical impossibilities.

Well, some of them aren't even properly defined, but those that are...

How do you draw the conclusion that infinities are the only thing that could make something non Turning-computable?

That depends on what you are talking about - mathematical systems or possible physical systems. I only care about physical systems here.

I also recall the article saying that the Church-Turing thesis does not indicate that all physical systems can be simulated by a Turing machine.

This is true, but deeply misleading, which is why I criticised that article for making that claim. The Universe is, if not quantised, at least effectively quantised. By that I mean that below a certain scale - the Planck scale - differences have no meaning. A finite region of the Universe can thus be mapped to a probabilistic simple state machine or cellular automata grid. Even if we assert that the probabilities are continuous (when nothing else is), a Turing machine can simulate this to arbitrary accuracy and precision.

The Church-Turing thesis does not say that all physical systems can be simulated by a Turing machine, bcause the Church-Turing thesis does not talk about physical systems at all. However, the Church-Turing thesis does describe a class of problems that can be modeled with a Turing machine, and physics describes a Universe that falls within that class of problems.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't agree that the mental always reduces to the physical, for the reason I gave in my response to Piggy. That is, physical description cannot capture the subjective experiential quality of a mental state. For example, an individual who has never experienced pain could study in great detail the neurological processes that correspond to what we call pain, but doing so could not lead him or her to know what it is like to feel pain.

That's the argument from ignorance.

In general, leaning toward any philosophical mind-body stance is a little silly. But a reason for leaning toward neutral monism is that physical and experiential events seem to be linked causally. If the two are somehow fundamentally different (dualism), such causal interaction between the two would seem not to make sense.

Right. Dualism is not logically coherent.

However, one could also argue that the two do not seem to be reducible to each other (you obviously don't see it that way). If two things are causally interactive, but not reducible to each other, then a neutral monist interpretation makes sense of this and may be the only way to do so.

Except that we have every reason to believe that the mental reduces to the physical, and no reason at all to believe otherwise. And when I say every reason and no reason, I mean every reason and no reason.

On the question of reducibility, it's interesting to look at from the reverse perspective. Are physical events reducible to experiential/mental events?

Nope.

A strong argument could be made for this, given that physical events can only be inferred based on mental events.

Nope.

It is essentially meaningless to say that something physically exists if it has no relevance to mental experience.

Nope.

So there you have an argument for idealism.

How old is the Earth?

 

[westprog]

How is a "signal triggering code" not a computation?

This is why I don't really accept that you have been a professional programmer, or that if you were, you didn't really understand the underlying science of what you were doing.

Well, when I say "data" and you think I mean "computation", then we clearly have quite a different view of the underlying science. What do you think an interrupt signal is, then?

 

[Meed]

You are painting this argument as "A toaster has dreams, I am sure of it" vs. "I don't think you have checked your math correctly."

It is more like "Why can't a robot as complicated as a human have dreams?" vs. "becase, sofia, nyah na na na nyah na na, and Roger Penrose said so."

Are you sure? I thought it was like "I'm a big stupid head! goo goo goo! someone change my diapey!" vs "That's what you get for drinking too much apple juice, m'dear." I guess I should go back over the thread again.

Lets not get confused about who is in which camp, and the apparent education levels here. Everyone in the first camp is either knowledgeable in these fields or else humble enough to not make claims. Everyone in the latter camp is ... neither.

Your delusions of superiority are laughable. If you do possess some in depth knowledge of the subject due to expertise in some area, please share it. Don't divert from real discussion with vague allusions to being more knowledgeable and educated than others.

Do you dispute this? Are there any professionals in any relevant field, be it computer science, neuroscience, behavioral science, biology, or anything like that, in the latter camp on this forum?

I studied cognitive science at IU. I'm now a graduate student / research assistant at OU. My research area is cognitive psychology with a mathematical focus. I've studied a little computer science, but not much (it started out as my undergrad major, but I changed my mind). I help teach statistics and cognitive psychology.

Do I win the internet? Or is that too green for you? To be honest, I don't think any of that makes my views on this discussion over simulations anymore valuable or correct. I brought it up once in the thread, because I thought someone was making some off claims about the current capabilities of psychology and brain sciences. I do think it makes my views more valuable and likely to be correct in that context.

I'm in the latter camp in that I think mental phenomena such as consciousness are hardware dependent, as opposed to the idea that they can be generated by carrying out an algorithm with a pencil and paper for example. I'm open to the idea that computers or robots could have consciousness in the future, but again I think it would depend on how their hardware is structured.

PS- has "nyah na na na nyah na na" actually been refuted yet?

 

[westprog]

Right. And you claim what what you did might not be considered "algorithms?"

This is like someone claiming they were once a mechanic but actually an internal combustion engine might not have any moving parts.

No, it isn't. The irrelevant and inappropriate metaphor is quite a speciality, isn't it?

Whether or not the designs for real time programs should be considered "algorithms" or not is merely a matter of nomenclature. What is important to realise is that such designs are of a very different nature to computations which follow the Turing model. Here's a metaphor for you - an inability to distinguish between real-time and non-real-time programming is a category error similar to putting diesel in a petrol engine.

The reason that this is relevant is that the brain is clearly, without any doubt, performing real-time operations. Such operations cannot be performed according to the Turing model, and hence a Turing machine cannot perform the function of the brain.

If Pixy is claiming that a Turing machine can perform any computation, then what the brain is doing is clearly not computation. What was previously merely unproven and unsupported is now actually disproved.

So pardon me for not paying much attention to your supposed "credentials."

Oh, I don't take it personally. I'm fully aware that the only criteria for credentials on this subject relate to how closely a person agrees with a particular position.

I thought that post was specifically about Pixy's CT claims. I don't recall that anectdotal statement referencing the other stuff being discussed in this thread. Am I wrong?

I think it's fairly obvious that if somebody is working in an academic field where they have access to somebody who worked with one of the leading figures in this field, they cannot be dismissed as having nothing to contribute on the subject. The blustering attack on all the people participating in this thread who have unacceptable views is revealed to be without basis.

Penrose is not an expert in any relevant field. Whether he is a physicist or not is besides the point.

The idea that Physics is not relevant to this field is simply ludicrous.

When Roger Penrose says "well, I worked on trying to produce conscious programs for years, and everything we thought would do it just failed" then we will listen to him. But for someone who likely hasn't ever written a program with more than a few thousand lines of code to make sweeping generalizations about the field of computer science is what we call talking out of one's <rule8>.

I don't care how smart Penrose is when it comes to math or physics, he doesn't know jack about the only aspect of computer science that even matters here -- what happens in really complex systems. Nobody can know that, until they themselves work with really complex systems.

And that is my main point -- people like you and piggy and kaggen etc. who don't seem to even understand the fundamentals of computer science, never mind have written or even worked with something complex enough to pronounce judgement one way or another, just repeatedly vomit this "nu-uh, because I said so" nonsense into threads and call it a "discussion."

Piggy and !Kaggen and I have never claimed that something is true because we said so. The only person who's claiming that he has the right to speak ex cathedra on this subject because of his qualifications is you.

It's plainly absurd to claim that the inability to produce anything that comes remotely close to demonstrating conscious behaviour is a qualification to make pronouncements on the subject.

This isn't a discussion, it never has been, it is fairly intelligent people arguing with what seem like walls.

It's fairly intelligent people making unsubstantiated assertions which they attempt to justify by reference to other people who are "experts" by dint of believing the same things.

Wait, you think that people have careers in neuroscience, computer science, biology, etc, just because they want to prove that strong AI is possible?

???

Yeah, everybody who works in neuroscience, computer science, biology etc agrees with you. That's so obvious it doesn't even need any evidence.

The people who actually accept the outlandish and excessive claims that have been made on this subject - and that includes the idea proposed in the OP - are in fact very few and far between, and tend not to include experts in neuroscience, computer science and biology. The people making the extreme claims are typically philosophers.

 

[westprog]

Oh, forgive me.

How about this:

The argument is between people who think that every behavior, both private and public, exhibited by entities that are known to be conscious could also be exhibited by any computational process of sufficient complexity and organization, and those that believe this is unproven, unlikely, or wrong.

Better?

That's a considerable improvement.

 

[Meed]

Well, you can read some of the references they provide - one thing I have to give them, they provide references for everything. Every single one of them is talking about physical impossibilities.

Isn't a Turing Machine itself a physical impossibility in that it assumes infinite tape? I'll look at some of the references at a later time.

Well, some of them aren't even properly defined, but those that are...


That depends on what you are talking about - mathematical systems or possible physical systems. I only care about physical systems here.


This is true, but deeply misleading, which is why I criticised that article for making that claim. The Universe is, if not quantised, at least effectively quantised. By that I mean that below a certain scale - the Planck scale - differences have no meaning. A finite region of the Universe can thus be mapped to a probabilistic simple state machine or cellular automata grid. Even if we assert that the probabilities are continuous (when nothing else is), a Turing machine can simulate this to arbitrary accuracy and precision.

The Church-Turing thesis does not say that all physical systems can be simulated by a Turing machine, bcause the Church-Turing thesis does not talk about physical systems at all. However, the Church-Turing thesis does describe a class of problems that can be modeled with a Turing machine, and physics describes a Universe that falls within that class of problems.

As long as you aren't claiming that it is a mathematical fact that the Church-Turing conjectures proved that a Turing Machine can do everything a brain can do, or whatever you originally said, I have no real beef with your argument. It is not proven, but a reasonable case can be made that a TM could simulate or any physical system to a close degree of precision (despite use of approximations).

Then there is the other issue of whether symbolically describing a physical system perfectly makes the machine equivalent to the system it is simulating or the idea that it can "do anything the physical system can do". This I think is clearly false.

 

[Dancing David]

And does the cow have buddha-nature?

No, it is not capable of following the eight-fold path that we know of. The dog or cow are alive and sentient, but they are not going to be capable of unconditioned existence as implied in nibbana.

A cow may or may not have a milk nature.

 

[PixyMisa]

Isn't a Turing Machine itself a physical impossibility in that it assumes infinite tape? I'll look at some of the references at a later time.

Yep. Specifically a Universal Turing Machine, but that's what we're talking about. But this isn't actually a problem when representing possible physical systems.

As long as you aren't claiming that it is a mathematical fact that the Church-Turing conjectures proved that a Turing Machine can do everything a brain can do, or whatever you originally said, I have no real beef with your argument. It is not proven, but a reasonable case can be made that a TM could simulate or any physical system to a close degree of precision (despite use of approximations).

I did say - about 30 pages back - that I had compressed two different points into one statement. That was due to explaining them about 30 times previously, but still, I failed to make my case clearly.

One thing though - a Turing machine cannot only simulate any physical system to a close degree of precision, it can simulate it to any arbitrary degree of precision. And since, below the Planck scale, further precision has no physical meaning, it follows that a Turing machine can simulate any physical system precisely.

Then there is the other issue of whether symbolically describing a physical system perfectly makes the machine equivalent to the system it is simulating or the idea that it can "do anything the physical system can do". This I think is clearly false.

Then you're not only wrong, you're professing to a logically incoherent belief system.

It's either a precise simulation or it isn't.

If it is, the simulation produces all the behaviours of the system being simulated.

If it's not, you contradicted the premise you had just accepted.

If you're asserting that simulated oranges don't contain physical Vitamin C, then you're committing a category error.

Whichever one it is, I can't help you any further. I'll just leave you in the Fire Swamp for the ROUSes to gnaw at your bones.

 

[PixyMisa]

Oh, and P.S., Cornsail: How old is the Earth?