Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Piggy]

How do you know you are not just a computer crunching ones and zeros? In some solipsistic simulation?

Tell me which of these claims you dispute. Maybe we can make more progress this way:

1) You only have access to reality through your sensory neurons, and possibly chemicals in your bloodstream that might modify neural processes.

2) It is theoretically possible to trick your sensory neurons into firing in an identical fashion to their natural firing from natural stimuli.

3) Thus it is theoretically possible to simulate all input to your nervous system, including input from your own body.

4) You have no direct access to your nervous system that is not through neurons that could be tricked in a similar fashion. That is, you have no way to confirm that a given input to any neuron is coming from a real stimuli, even from a neighboring neuron, rather than a simulated one.

5) Thus you have no way to know whether you are a simulation or not.

Now seriously, can you offer any logical arguments that refute the above 5 claims?

I can look at my body and see that it's not a computer crunching 1s and 0s. That's how I know.

If you're asking some version of the "brain in a vat" question, that's entirely uninteresting, as always.

The problem is with your conclusion at step 5.

If that scenario is true, then it does not mean that I am a simulation.

It means that my brain is being tricked into believing that a very realistic simulated world is real.

This does not mean that simulations may actually be real.

If I can trick you into believing that I've made an elephant levitate, this does not mean that elephants can levitate.

ETA: When you get into the process of swapping out neurons for something else, you're discussing a model, of course. If it actually functions as a neuron, it's part of a model, not part of a simulation.

 

[Piggy]

Same goes for a computer.

You seem to want to say that how we typically think of computers isn't a good fit for the brain. I agree.

But the proper course of action is to rethink how we view computers and computing, not the other way around.

No, that's not what I'm saying, altho I agree that contemporary computers are not a good fit for the activity of the brain.

I'm saying when you run your algorithm as part of a simulation, it's not the same as when you build a model to perform the actions described by that algorithm.

 

[Piggy]

No.

I am claiming that the stuff going on amongst the transistors is as real as the stuff going on anywhere else.

Right, but the stuff going on in the transistors is not what's being simulated. That's why you can't use simulations of transistors in your computer -- you could only use some actual physical thing that performed the same behavior.

That's also why a simulation of a power plant doesn't allow the computer running the sim to use itself as a power source.

 

[Piggy]

4) You have no direct access to your nervous system that is not through neurons that could be tricked in a similar fashion. That is, you have no way to confirm that a given input to any neuron is coming from a real stimuli, even from a neighboring neuron, rather than a simulated one.

There is also a huge problem here.

If we propose a thought experiment in which a working brain is somehow disconnected from eyes, nose, tongue, skin, ears, etc., and computer-generated stimulation of the nerves is somehow provided instead -- and it's good enough to fool the brain -- then in order for this to happen, we have to have a working brain.

A complete, whole, working brain. In real 4-D spacetime.

We cannot then go on to propose that we begin replacing neurons -- or any other components -- in that working brain with computer simulations of neurons, because this is like proposing that we replace transistors in a computer with digital simulations of transistors.

It cannot be done.

You can replace those neurons, in theory, with some other physical object that does the same thing, in which case you're beginning to replace the brain with a model brain, but you cannot replace neurons with simulations of neurons.

Once again, this is conflating abstraction and reality.

 

[Third Eye Open]

For example, the abacus only means 1,234 if you know how to read it. But a pile of 1,234 rocks is a pile of 1,234 rocks even if you can't count them.

Actually it seems to me that according to you they wouldn't be rocks without us to define them as such. They would just be a collection of particles -oh wait, but we aren't there to define something as a particle either.

 

[Third Eye Open]

You can replace those neurons, in theory, with some other physical object that does the same thing, in which case you're beginning to replace the brain with a model brain, but you cannot replace neurons with simulations of neurons.

Once again, this is conflating abstraction and reality.

How about we replace the brain with some mechanical version that we had built that runs a simulation of neurons behaving as they do in a real brain? Is that 'real' enough for you?

Oh wait, that is the same as a computer running a simulation. The computer is real. The brain is real. What the computer and the brain DO is what you are calling an abstraction for some reason, even thought these 'abstractions' affect reality in concrete observable ways.

 

[Third Eye Open]

What do you mean by "a simulated computer"?

Actually, I don't think I want to know, but I have to ask.

The same thing as is meant by a simulation of anything else.

The 'simulated brain' thought experiment assumes that we have the ability to simulate matter and its behavior and interactions with other matter to arbitrary precision. If we can do this, we can build a computer in the simulation. Why wouldn't it work? Why wouldn't it run programs and do calculations the same as a 'real' computer?

 

[rocketdodger]

post removed

no point in even moving this discussion further with piggy

 

[rocketdodger]

I can look at my body and see that it's not a computer crunching 1s and 0s. That's how I know.

Yeah I expected that kind of answer.

Oh well.

I remember why I never bother to discuss anything with you.

 

[Piggy]

Actually it seems to me that according to you they wouldn't be rocks without us to define them as such. They would just be a collection of particles -oh wait, but we aren't there to define something as a particle either.

No, that's not at all what I'm talking about.

Rocks don't vanish if you stop thinking about them. All those particles you're talking about are still there.

The number on the abacus only exists in your head.

That's what makes a pile of 1,234 rocks different from the number 1,234 on an abacus. Or 1 rock different from any number on an abacus.

 

[Third Eye Open]

No, that's not at all what I'm talking about.

Rocks don't vanish if you stop thinking about them. All those particles you're talking about are still there.

The number on the abacus only exists in your head.

That's what makes a pile of 1,234 rocks different from the number 1,234 on an abacus. Or 1 rock different from any number on an abacus.

This is ridiculous. The word 'piggy' also only exists in my head. That has no bearing on whether you exist or not.

 

[Piggy]

How about we replace the brain with some mechanical version that we had built that runs a simulation of neurons behaving as they do in a real brain? Is that 'real' enough for you?

No. If it really is a simulation of neurons (not a scale model) being run on some machine, then we are not dealing with a real brain. So it cannot be conscious, for the same reason that the computer can't run on a simulation of a home electrical grid.

Only real 4-D spacetime brains can actually behave in the real world, so we can build a model of a brain in 4-D spacetime and use that, but we can't use a 4-D spacetime machine that only generates simulations to actually produce that behavior in reality, because producing a simulation of anything (say, an explosion) does not actually cause that thing to happen in reality.

Oh wait, that is the same as a computer running a simulation. The computer is real. The brain is real. What the computer and the brain DO is what you are calling an abstraction for some reason, even thought these 'abstractions' affect reality in concrete observable ways.

To assert this, you have to first accept that what the computer and brain are doing are equivalent, which we have no reason to accept, and a couple of darn good reasons not to.

And in any case, it doesn't get around the problem....

If you are claiming you can wire a computer to do what a brain does, then you are claiming you can make a working model of the human brain out of computer parts. That's all.

But if you are claiming that you can run a simulation of a working human brain on a computer, then in that case your simulated "working brain" itself is an abstraction, no way around it.

A real working brain, however, is not an abstraction.

So you must decide what you're talking about.

Are you talking about a simulation of a brain (which cannot make the computer running the simulation conscious) or are you talking about a model brain, which can be conscious?

 

[Piggy]

This is ridiculous. The word 'piggy' also only exists in my head. That has no bearing on whether you exist or not.

You're no longer talking about the subject at all.

I'm not discussing how we use words to refer to things.

 

[Third Eye Open]

If you are claiming you can wire a computer to do what a brain does, then you are claiming you can make a working model of the human brain out of computer parts. That's all.

But if you are claiming that you can run a simulation of a working human brain on a computer, then in that case your simulated "working brain" itself is an abstraction, no way around it.

A real working brain, however, is not an abstraction.

So you must decide what you're talking about.

Are you talking about a simulation of a brain (which cannot make the computer running the simulation conscious) or are you talking about a model brain, which can be conscious?

Okee dokee. I no longer have any idea what is going on here.

How is a computer that is simulating the human brain different than a computer that is 'wired to do what a brain does'. Either way it's all bits and bytes moving around, groups of particles behaving one way and causing other groups to behave in other ways, etc.

 

[Third Eye Open]

You're no longer talking about the subject at all.

I'm not discussing how we use words to refer to things.

It sounded like you were saying that numbers don't exist if we aren't around to define them.

 

[Piggy]

The same thing as is meant by a simulation of anything else.

The 'simulated brain' thought experiment assumes that we have the ability to simulate matter and its behavior and interactions with other matter to arbitrary precision. If we can do this, we can build a computer in the simulation. Why wouldn't it work? Why wouldn't it run programs and do calculations the same as a 'real' computer?

Depends on what you mean by "work".

It sounds like you're creating a redundant computer.

Anyway, when you say we're assuming we can produce a simulation that we can magnify all the way down to atoms if we like, that doesn't change a thing.

Conceptually, it's no different from our drawings of Winnie the Pooh, it just has a lot richer detail.

Now if you created a computer that ran a simulation of a computer, then you could ask the real computer and it would query the simulated computer, read the output, then tell you the answer.

I certainly agree that the presence of the simulation wouldn't change your results any. Since it was built to mimic the computer itself, it adds nothing to the system.

But if we run a simulation of a human being on a computer, with atom-level richness of detail, it doesn't change the fact that the simulation can't make the computer conscious, for the same reason that a leak in a fish tank simulated at that level of detail can't make the computer wet.

 

[Third Eye Open]

I feel like I can almost see the difference you are talking about. It's on the tip of my brain.

 

[Piggy]

It sounded like you were saying that numbers don't exist if we aren't around to define them.

That's a fine point of terminology that I wouldn't want to get into, actually.

No, I was just saying that the abacus is a bunch of beads on a string, and the "number" 1,234 -- the "information" or "data" which is the result of the calculation done on it -- exists only in the imagination of the person looking at it, if she knows the symbol system that's used to decode that information and understand it as information.

If we wanted to claim that some addition had been done in OPR which resulted in a group of 1,234, then we'd be talking about something like the pile of rocks after a small landslide. We could count the rocks and find 1,234 of them. And anyone else who counted them would come to their equivalent of that number (that is, the same amount, even if it's in a different base or language or numerals).

But if you don't know what the abacus is and what you're supposed to do with it -- for instance, if you think it's a decoration or a child's toy -- there is nothing about it which would suggest the number 1,234.

The existence of any such amount when it comes to the abacus is entirely in the imagination of the person who sees the positions of its beads in terms of a symbol system she has learned.

All simulations -- the way we're using the term here, as different from scale-model or functional model -- are supported by physical process which are different from those of the event being simulated (unless you're simulating the simulator). So the events being simulated never actually happen. They exist only in the imagination of an interpreter, so they're abstractions.

Information processing is also an abstraction. Like mathematics, IP can't cause anything to happen in OPR, and it makes little sense to claim that any event in the real world is IP and IP alone.

 

[Third Eye Open]

Ok, I think I got it. You are saying it's not WHAT the brain does that makes it conscious, but HOW it does it?

You are saying that if we build a mechanical version of the brain, with mechanical neurons that are all in the correct locations etc, then it will be conscious. But if we instead build a computer that can do all the calculations and process all the information that a brain does BUT it is build in a different way, such as the way a supercomputer might be built, then it wouldn't be conscious.

Is this correct?

 

[Third Eye Open]

That's a fine point of terminology that I wouldn't want to get into, actually.

No, I was just saying that the abacus is a bunch of beads on a string, and the "number" 1,234 -- the "information" or "data" which is the result of the calculation done on it -- exists only in the imagination of the person looking at it, if she knows the symbol system that's used to decode that information and understand it as information.

If we wanted to claim that some addition had been done in OPR which resulted in a group of 1,234, then we'd be talking about something like the pile of rocks after a small landslide. We could count the rocks and find 1,234 of them. And anyone else who counted them would come to their equivalent of that number (that is, the same amount, even if it's in a different base or language or numerals).

But if you don't know what the abacus is and what you're supposed to do with it -- for instance, if you think it's a decoration or a child's toy -- there is nothing about it which would suggest the number 1,234.

The existence of any such amount when it comes to the abacus is entirely in the imagination of the person who sees the positions of its beads in terms of a symbol system she has learned.

All simulations -- the way we're using the term here, as different from scale-model or functional model -- are supported by physical process which are different from those of the event being simulated (unless you're simulating the simulator). So the events being simulated never actually happen. They exist only in the imagination of an interpreter, so they're abstractions.

Information processing is also an abstraction. Like mathematics, IP can't cause anything to happen in OPR, and it makes little sense to claim that any event in the real world is IP and IP alone.

Well, an abacus is a good example for you to use here because it can't operate without someone sitting there moving the beads around. A modern computer can. And the calculations that a computer does aren't just abstractions, they have real physical effects in the real world, electricity moves through the parts of the computer in different ways, different particles go in different places depending on what calculations are done.

Who cares what 1,234 MEANS if we aren't around. Even when we aren't around, when the computer comes up with that answer, physical things happen to it that would be different if it had come up with 1,233.