Has consciousness been fully explained?

[westprog]

As I said, it spans several threads. That claim comes from a thread discussing what would happen to a conscious machine if its processing speed were slowed to a crawl.

Pixy, Rocket Dodger, and drkitten (iirc) all supported the notion that a pen-and-paper brain would literally be conscious, based on Turing-Church.

I think that there was an opinion put forward that if a pen-and-paper brain were to exactly duplicate the algorithm running in a human brain, then it would have the identical experience to the human brain. PM and RD are participating in this thread, so they can confirm or deny this.

 

[my_wan]

Almost all human cognitive empirical work involves behavioral criteria. We make inferences about mind/brain functionality by observing behavior under controlled conditions.

Listen to Jeff Hawkins take on this behavioral issue. He's fairly detailed in rebutting it.
http://www.youtube.com/watch?v=G6CVj5IQkzk
My consciousness doesn't require any action or observable behavior. The behavioral criteria was an operational acceptance of the limits in what we could observe. In its initial form, it made no claim behavior actually defined what consciousness is, only that it provided an empirical handle on observing it. From this the notion was then born the that if we couldn't recognize the difference in behavior between a real and artificial AI it must indeed be conscious. Listen to Hawkins for a more complete set of issues with this.

We can't do this

We are quiet limited in the extent to what we can a priori read from brain waves alone, and most such approaches require some training. It also makes the engineering easier. But we most certainly can tell whether you are looking at a table or a chair. etc., from brain waves alone, and without prelearning required. The most basic structures are robust across languages, cultures, etc. Obviously we can't follow your reasoning process while doing a math problem from brain waves. We can also give you a set of choices and know what choice you are going to make before you do, from brain waves alone. Although it uses some preconditioning, Japanese researchers are partially successful at creating video recordings of your dreams.
http://www.memebox.com/futureblogger/show/1424-japanese-researchers-close-to-recording-your-dreams
http://www.cns.atr.jp/dcn/en/
Where is the "behavioral criteria" in that.

I think I know which study you're referring to. It's not very impressive in my opinion. Certainly far less than some people make it out to be in free will discussions and such.

Naturally there are limitations, and this instance limits choices and time frames such that we know up from what part of the brain waves to look at. Some of the limitations can be overcome, as a result of large scale similarities in our brains. Others, like preconditioning for video recording dreams it's likely to have the same limitations our own brains have. A baby is not born knowing how the control mechanism for their arms for instance works. And what is learned likely consist of leaning the specifics of inputs and outputs unique to that individual. If so, which it is essentially certain it is below some large scale, the notion of fine scale reading of peoples brains without first learning from that particular brain would be as silly as a baby born already knowing calculus. As I'll point out below, even the apparent knowledge of where your body is, or any of its parts are, can be maniplulated.

It's not a whole lot more impressive than a pulse game controller or a blood pressure game controller would be, really. More fun, yes. I think they're cool actually, just not very impressive from a cognitive science perspective.

Is the video dream recorder cool? Does it work like a "blood pressure" trick? I think not, however limited it might be.

The main difference between strict behaviorism and today's cognitive science is that behaviorists would say you cannot make conclusions about the brain/mind based on behavioral criteria, whereas now that is not generally the case. Both still are primarily based on observing behavior (including things like self reports).

Define behavior here. Fundamentally all empirical science theory is based consistency with observational data. Yet today we are in no way limited by self reports or external behaviors to observe the brain in operation. We can watch individual neuron activations, we can artificially activate that neuron and watch the effect on the global neural response, we can see what effect it has on body movements, etc., which happen without the choice of the subject. "Observing behavior" is not limited to an individuals behavior.

Ever heard of mirror neurons? These neurons are not about your actions, but acting as though someone else's actions are your actions.
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/vs_ramachandran_the_neurons_that_shaped_civilization.html

I'm pretty sure this is not accurate.

It is absolutely accurate. Here's how we learned about it:
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mind.html
The phantom limb treatment he discusses afterwords is based on the same phenomena used to create ultra realistic out of body experiences with more elaborate equipment.

I'm inclined to agree it's not a "whole body phenomena" although a lot of that dispute may come down to semantics.

As the existence and later disappearance of the phantom limb in the above video indicates, your body is modeled in your brain and takes feedback from it. Yet with the proper feedback cues that brain model can entirely mismatch reality, creating parts that don't exist and disappearing parts that do exist. Thus the "whole body phenomena" appears valid so long as the model in your brain matches reality. Yet reality mismatch inconsistencies described above show that it's an illusion created by model consistency. OBE's are very cool when you can watch yourself sitting across the room from you, and not that difficult to do. The trick to getting it to work is to include more location feedback than just visible. Such as prodding you in your imaginary location while giving you real tactile feedback from the prodding.
http://www.msnbc.msn.com/id/20411858/

 

[westprog]

Then, by my current working definition of conscious experience (the existence of self actions in a narrative constructed from memory and under evaluation), the thermostat would be conscious. Though it would be an experience that we probably cannot imagine in comparison with our own.

Let's consider the idea that a thermostat with a recording device (or some other such device) has, in some sense, a form of consciousness. Evaluating this as a theory, I'd ask the following questions:

• How does the hypothesis of consciousness help explain the behaviour of the system?
• How would we, even conceptually, measure this property?
• How would we quantify consciousness in such a system?
• How would we test the hypothesis that such a device is conscious?
• How would this hypothetically conscious device differ from one that was hypothetically not conscious?
• Given the answers to the above questions, of what scientific application is this theory?

 

[westprog]

Well, it is easier if you work through the issue on your own. Think about this:

1) what is the difference between a cell and a rock?

2) what are the behaviors exhibited by a cell that are responsible for that difference?

3) what cellular systems are responsible for those behaviors?

4) how do those systems work, on a molecular scale?

5) how do those molecules work, on a quantum scale?

The point is that a cell and a rock behave differently. Period. There is no denying this (no matter how much people try to ... ). Now you might be able to add more recursions than I did here (I only have 4 levels of recursion above) but eventually you should reach a point where you are comfortable agreeing that somewhere "in there" the difference lies and we should be able to identify and define it.

That is, we know a cell and a rock are different. Somehow. We also know that cells and rocks are made of the exact same species of fundamental particles, which we know behave identically, quantum randomness notwithstanding. So at the bottom level of recursion cells and rocks are the same. At the top level, they are very different. What happens in between, that leads to such a divergence in behavior?

Note that westprog's argument is that since they are the same at the bottom level of recursion, they are somehow necessarily the same at the top level as well, despite his admittance that cells and rocks are clearly not the same. *confused*

What RD has done, characteristically, is to ignore the central issue of his contention - i.e. if we refine the rock, introduce some impurities, and run electrical current through it - it is the same as the cell, and the cell and the chip share some property which is not present in the rock.

He's consistently failed to justify this contention in any systematic way, and so has produced the absurd and dishonest strawman idea that I'm claiming that you can't tell the difference between a cell and a rock. If RD's theory simply consisted of saying that we can tell the difference between things that are, in fact, different, it wouldn't be very controversial. In fact, he's contending that there is some property common to living creatures and devices created by living creatures, which is not present in other matter or systems of matter.

I've been able to show that whenever he tries to define this property precisely, it's actually present in rocks as well as cells and chips. This tends to either demolish his theory, or to make it so vague as to be worthless. His response to this is to claim, without foundation, that I can't tell the difference between a cell and a rock. He's done this many times before, and will doubtless do it again. Note the absence in his post above of any mention of computation devices, which are precisely the point of contention - the very thing that the argument is about. I'm the one claiming that it is in fact quite possible to divide conscious beings from computers and rocks.

 

[westprog]

I've heard that people who are in sensory deprivation tanks start to hallucinate after a short while. In anycase, a brain being kept alive in a nutrient bath would still be conscious. I wouldn't want to be that brain, but still.

But what are the hallucinations of? What do people dream about?

Try to imagine what the consciousness of someone who'd never had sensory experiences might be. Would it be anything like the consciousness of somebody in a sensory deprivation tank?

Connections to the senses are a fundamental part of the brain. Even if we were to cut off the signals, the brain's role as an interpreter of those signals would not change. For example - I'm sitting here with a ringing noise in my left ear. I know that there is no actual air vibration generating the noise. I know that it's a residue of standing next to a speaker stack for an hour. But nevertheless my brain interprets the signal as noise. Hence the "phantom limb" phenomenon, for example.

Considering the brain as something separate from its sensory input simply doesn't make sense, IMO. And hence any consideration of the brain as a purely algorithmic processor is also flawed.

 

[my_wan]

If conscious awareness requires functioning memory, then a person with no capability to form new memories would be one possible type of p-zombie. However, not really, because the lack of working memory also impairs overall cognition to the point of not being able to respond as a conscious person does, which then does not qualify as a p-zombie. So, p-zombies remain an impossibility.

I had an experience in my school years, and am going to give my take on it. For all intent an purposes, I was a p-zombie during this short time. What brought me out of it is also interesting.

I went skating and took a pretty good hit to the head. I went back to skating for an unknown period of time, till my Uncle was ready to bring me home. At that time I began asking: Did you see what happened? [No]. Did you see what happened? [No]. Over and over every few minutes. When I got home the repeated question apparently became: Do you know what happened? I still called people by their name: Rob, do you know what happened. I could navigate, and otherwise perform actions based on primary expectations. Yet I had no clue what my relationship with the world was. The experience left after the fact memory traces, but more dream like and without a capacity for defining what expectations were realistic. It seemed as if the only point of reference to regain comprehension was to find out what happened, and nobodies answers were usable.

What brought me out of it is when my mother sit me down to ask questions. My reaction was: OMG, these questions are so stupid, and BOOM, it was over that quick. As soon as I made an emotional judgment for myself it was over. I do NOT consider myself conscious during that period of time. In that state I could respond to very complex expectation values, but no apparent mental relationships existed defining those responses. Had you put a gun to my head and said stop it, I would have responded: Do you know what happened? As if knowing what happened was my way out. Even dreams have emotional and situational content this experience lacked.

Later that year I seen the exact same thing happen to another guy on the basketball court. Only his question was: What day is this? It's a complete loss of the capacity to place yourself in a meaningful context with the world around you, even an imaginary one. Had I been permanently stuck in this state, I don't find the notion of me personally being euthanized the least bit disturbing. Not suggesting it as a valid notion.

So I'm not buying the notion of consciousness in low level physical phenomena. That doesn't remove the validity of these phenomena as valid members of the bag of tricks that produces consciousness.

 

[Meed]

First, all conjectured forms of computation are of equivalent power - that's what the Church-Turing thesis proves. (More precisely, it's a collection of proofs establishing that no well-defined model of computation conjectured to date is more powerful than a UTM.)

But the brain is not captured by a well-defined model of computation.

Second, all physical systems are simulable. This means that even without knowing how the brain works at a high level, we can simulate it at a low level and come up with the same result anyway.

Can you clarify what you mean by "simulate at a low level"? Do you mean we can recreate any physical system?

 

[AlBell]

How is biology immune from mathematics, exactly?

You are the person who seems to believe they are the same, and presumably would agree that (in principal) a non-biological mechanical device can be constructed that is as alive as you are.

 

[westprog]

But the brain is not captured by a well-defined model of computation.

Stanford Philosophy on Church-Turing. is a good guide to what Church-Turing actually says, and just as importantly, lists most of the misinterpretations, most of which have been claimed on these threads.

Can you clarify what you mean by "simulate at a low level"? Do you mean we can recreate any physical system?

It's fairly clear that whatever the brain is, it is certainly a means to monitor and control the human body. It's clear that the functionality of a Turing machine has nothing to do with this function. So any claim that anything that the brain can do can be done by a Turing machine is palpably false.

 

[westprog]

Dan Dennett pointed out a correlation between something Lee Siegel said about magic and the way we perceive consciousness. As Lee Siegel pointed out, when people speak of "real magic" they are talking about magic that is not real. But not real magic refers to magic that is real, conjuring tricks that can actually be done. Likewise, as Dennett pointed out, if you explain consciousness as a bag of tricks peoples reaction is that it's not real consciousness, consciousness is not a bag of tricks. Dennett's point was to convince people that consciousness really is just a bag of tricks. Many of the objections here almost appear as if it's a denial that trick X can be conscious. Well OK, true, consciousness consist of the whole bag of tricks. Not just the one under discussion. What can't be supported by the evidence is the notion that this whole bag of tricks can't be conscious, just because it consist of a bag of tricks. Not real magic is the real magic.

Then when PixyMisa points to a trick in the bag, trying to show how the trick quality generalizes to the whole bag, he gets accused of calling that singular trick actually conscious. That is, from the evidence of all the post I've read, what the claims of what PixyMisa claimed is based on. Such claims of what PixyMisa has claimed, from all I've been able to find, appear totally misguided and outright false. I'm still waiting on a reference to demonstrate otherwise. Still unable to find it myself.

AFAIAA, PM has consistently made the claim that consciousness springs entirely from the function of the brain as a Turing Machine - and nothing else. I'm quite sure that he can correct this if he wishes.

That seems to be just one trick.

 

[Meed]

My consciousness doesn't require any action or observable behavior. The behavioral criteria was an operational acceptance of the limits in what we could observe. In its initial form, it made no claim behavior actually defined what consciousness is, only that it provided an empirical handle on observing it.

I'm not claiming behavior defines what consciousness is. You said:

"It appears the breadth of empirical science you are making presumptions from is intensely limited. In fact we have a far better gauge than any "behavioral criteria" can ever dream of conceiving."

I'm saying empirical science that informs psychology generally involves behavioral criteria.

We are quiet limited in the extent to what we can a priori read from brain waves alone, and most such approaches require some training. It also makes the engineering easier. But we most certainly can tell whether you are looking at a table or a chair. etc., from brain waves alone, and without prelearning required.

Which studies have demonstrated this?

The most basic structures are robust across languages, cultures, etc. Obviously we can't follow your reasoning process while doing a math problem from brain waves. We can also give you a set of choices and know what choice you are going to make before you do, from brain waves alone.

Like I said, I think I know which study you're talking about, but can you clarify?

Although it uses some preconditioning, Japanese researchers are partially successful at creating video recordings of your dreams.
http://www.memebox.com/futureblogger/show/1424-japanese-researchers-close-to-recording-your-dreams
http://www.cns.atr.jp/dcn/en/
Where is the "behavioral criteria" in that.

I'd have to read the study to answer that. Presumably they'd need behavioral criteria to gauge how much accuracy their technique has. It doesn't look to me like they've had much success yet, but again I'd have to read the study.

Is the video dream recorder cool? Does it work like a "blood pressure" trick? I think not, however limited it might be.

It's a cool idea, but it's not a video game... which is where I brought the comparison with blood pressure and pulse measurements. I was talking about games like Jedi Force Trainer.

Define behavior here. Fundamentally all empirical science theory is based consistency with observational data. Yet today we are in no way limited by self reports or external behaviors to observe the brain in operation.

I think I'm defining it pretty much the same way you are (external behaviors and self reports).

We can watch individual neuron activations, we can artificially activate that neuron and watch the effect on the global neural response, we can see what effect it has on body movements, etc., which happen without the choice of the subject.

To my knowledge we cannot do this, but I'd be interested to see what you're talking about.

We know exactly what do do to your brain so everything is normal, except that you will not recognize your mother while looking at her.

I'm pretty sure this is not accurate.

It is absolutely accurate. Here's how we learned about it:
http://www.ted.com/talks/lang/eng/vilayanur_ramachandran_on_your_mind.html

This video does not show that "we know exactly what to do to your brain" to produce the effect you mentioned. It shows that an effect like that happened to someone as a result of a natural accident.

 

[rocketdodger]

I've been able to show that whenever he tries to define this property precisely, it's actually present in rocks as well as cells and chips.

So rocks can reproduce? Rocks can metabolize? Rocks have complex biochemical control pathways?

What an amazingly stupid corner you have backed yourself into.

And just so you know, literally nobody else is even paying attention to our conversation because of how absurd your position is -- so you don't need to keep speaking to an audience. You really are the only person on this forum who honestly thinks an unrefined rock has the same properties as a refined silicon semiconductor.

 

[rocketdodger]

AFAIAA, PM has consistently made the claim that consciousness springs entirely from the function of the brain as a Turing Machine - and nothing else. I'm quite sure that he can correct this if he wishes.

That seems to be just one trick.

Wrong.

He has consistently made the claim that any turing equivalent system can be conscious.

He has never, ever, ever made any post to the effect that 'if a turing machine is just sitting there it will be conscious because it is a turing machine' or any of the other absurd strawmen that people are throwing around.

 

[rocketdodger]

It's fairly clear that whatever the brain is, it is certainly a means to monitor and control the human body. It's clear that the functionality of a Turing machine has nothing to do with this function. So any claim that anything that the brain can do can be done by a Turing machine is palpably false.

Yet

1) we could replace your brain with a turing machine that could control your body in exactly the same way your brain does ( with sufficient technology )

2) people are conscious at times when their brain is not controlling their body in any way that a reasonable person would consider as having anything to do with the consciousness.

Try again?

 

[rocketdodger]

Let's consider the idea that a thermostat with a recording device (or some other such device) has, in some sense, a form of consciousness. Evaluating this as a theory, I'd ask the following questions:

• How does the hypothesis of consciousness help explain the behaviour of the system?
• How would we, even conceptually, measure this property?
• How would we quantify consciousness in such a system?
• How would we test the hypothesis that such a device is conscious?
• How would this hypothetically conscious device differ from one that was hypothetically not conscious?
• Given the answers to the above questions, of what scientific application is this theory?

Let's consider the idea that a thermostat with a recording device (or some other such device) has, in some sense, a form of running. Evaluating this as a theory, I'd ask the following questions:

• How does the hypothesis of running help explain the behaviour of the system?
• How would we, even conceptually, measure this property?
• How would we quantify running in such a system?
• How would we test the hypothesis that such a device is running?
• How would this hypothetically running device differ from one that was hypothetically not running?
• Given the answers to the above questions, of what scientific application is this theory?

 

[Meed]

So rocks can reproduce? Rocks can metabolize? Rocks have complex biochemical control pathways?

What an amazingly stupid corner you have backed yourself into.

And just so you know, literally nobody else is even paying attention to our conversation because of how absurd your position is -- so you don't need to keep speaking to an audience. You really are the only person on this forum who honestly thinks an unrefined rock has the same properties as a refined silicon semiconductor.

I've followed it and I have to agree with westprog. It seems that you're misinterpreting his objections.

 

[PixyMisa]

And just so you know, literally nobody else is even paying attention to our conversation because of how absurd your position is -- so you don't need to keep speaking to an audience.

We do look in occasionally to see if he's come up with any new absurdities.

You really are the only person on this forum who honestly thinks an unrefined rock has the same properties as a refined silicon semiconductor.

It's pretty clear that he doesn't believe that either. Ask him why he uses a computer instead of a block of limestone to connect to this forum, and you get no answer.

 

[my_wan]

It's a cool idea, but it's not a video game... which is where I brought the comparison with blood pressure and pulse measurements. I was talking about games like Jedi Force Trainer.

This bit is confusing. Of course it's not a game. You likened that to a blood pressure trick, so I used this as a clearer illustration that is most certainly not a blood pressure trick. No such comparison is possible even though the same principles you called a blood pressure trick are being used for this. This is videoing the images you are dreaming.

 

[Myriad]

Is the cruise control on my car conscious?

I must say I find this question, in direct response to my proposed definition of consciousness, surprising. It's as though I said "consciousness is round, yellow, and made of steel" and you asked "then is a banana conscious?" I can only surmise that either your idea of the characteristics of a banana (that is, what a cruise control does and doesn't do) greatly differs from mine, or you weren't paying much attention to my description of consciousness.

However, to give a straightforward answer: no, cruise controls do not compare present and immediately recent input with narrative reconstructed from memory that includes their self actions. So by my present understanding of the phenomenon of conscious experience, the cruise control on your car is not conscious.

Respectfully,
Myriad

 

[Meed]

This bit is confusing. Of course it's not a game. You likened that to a blood pressure trick, so I used this as a clearer illustration that is most certainly not a blood pressure trick. No such comparison is possible even though the same principles you called a blood pressure trick are being used for this. This is videoing the images you are dreaming.

I compared brain wave game controllers to a blood pressure trick.

What you are talking about now ("dream recording") does not use the same principles as a brain wave detector. It uses an fMRI, which tracks blood oxidization levels in the brain, not brain wave frequencies.

And as far as I can tell it hasn't been very successful in videoing the images you are dreaming.