Has consciousness been fully explained?

[rocketdodger]

Thta's the part most here mean by consciousness that SRIP!

You are fooling yourself if you really think so.

Especially since every time someone tries to explain where a particular aspect of experience comes from, the first response is to point out how that explanation doesn't account for subjectivity.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Because we don't understand exactly what biophysical feature of neurons [or the body as a whole, for that matter] allows them to collectively produce and support conscious experience. Without this understanding we cannot design a relevant model, let alone a synthetic reproduction.

Um, I'm not sure why you would say that. We have clear evidence for a few things -- that if we turn off the function of neurons (their firing) folks lose consciousness. That if we stop the function of a certain small number of neurons in the right place -- reticular activating system -- folks lose consciousness. That if we interfere with the functioning of another region -- anterior cingulate -- folks develop akinetic mutism.

People under anaesthesia have neurons that otherwise carry out their normal functions. They just don't fire in a coordinated way as they do in the conscious waking state.

It is the pattern of firing of neurons that is important. Make most neurons do the same thing at the same time and you lose consciousness -- with all other regular cellular funcitons maintained.

 

[PixyMisa]

But that process of "defining" seems pretty arbitrary to me. I could define something else, and we'd argue until eternity which was is better. Like Euclidean vs non-Euclidean geometry.

No, because consciousness is something real, an observable behaviour. Same goes for self-referential information processing.

That doesn't mean I don't see the merit of your definition, but I don't see how it leads to any objectively testable hypothesis.

There are certain behaviours we associate with consciousness. The hypothesis is that when we examine the physical origins of those behaviours, we will always find self-referential information processing centrally involved.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I already explained.

The life system has a higher chance of existing into the future than non-life systems, all else being equal, due to the behaviors it exhibits as a result of computations.

In other words, it does stuff to keep itself going, not the least of which is the controlled use of energy to maintain local order.

For the most part, I think you and I agree on this. I think we had a similar discussion about this a couple years ago when we were comparing the differences between the computational processes going on in a bacterium and those of a puddle. The self-organizing energy controlling properties that allow single celled organisms to exist and behave as they do are an extremely scaled down version of the same capacity that allows us to control the organization of our surrounding environments to produce artificial constructs [i.e. art and technology]. This leads me to strongly suspect that the thermodynamic properties of life are, at the very least, a necessary condition for a system's ability to support consciousness

 

[dlorde]

It has an estimable historical foundation though - cogito ergo sum is clearly talking about self-referential information processing.

Yes, indeed... Perhaps we could make some progress by first examining in more detail what is required to support SRIP...

The reason I settled on the single minimal definition is that (a) it's widely accepted as necessary, if not sufficient, and (b) when you start adding requirements you tend to run face first into this list:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Category:Neurological_disorders

And find that there are actual living breathing people who act like they are conscious in every way except what you were just proposing to add. Things like aboulia, ideational apraxia, or anterograde amnesia. (Never mind the truly weird and disturbing stuff like Capgras or Cotard delusion.)

Agreed, which is why I see the application of SRIP to consciousness to require some general-purpose problem solving features, i.e. I'm dubious whether simply adding SRIP to a dedicated single-purpose system (e.g. washing machine) is sufficient. OTOH it would help to know how SRIP could be usefully integrated into such a system. It may be that to do this would require sufficient architectural restructuring to produce rudimentary conciousness in the finished article, but I'm sceptical

 

[AkuManiMani]

Because we don't understand exactly what biophysical feature of neurons [or the body as a whole, for that matter] allows them to collectively produce and support conscious experience. Without this understanding we cannot design a relevant model, let alone a synthetic reproduction.

Um, I'm not sure why you would say that. We have clear evidence for a few things -- that if we turn off the function of neurons (their firing) folks lose consciousness. That if we stop the function of a certain small number of neurons in the right place -- reticular activating system -- folks lose consciousness. That if we interfere with the functioning of another region -- anterior cingulate -- folks develop akinetic mutism.

People under anaesthesia have neurons that otherwise carry out their normal functions. They just don't fire in a coordinated way as they do in the conscious waking state.

It is the pattern of firing of neurons that is important. Make most neurons do the same thing at the same time and you lose consciousness -- with all other regular cellular funcitons maintained.

Knowing that manipulating neural functioning affects a subject's conscious experience does not tell us how neurons produce those experiences in the first place, or why it seems that only this particular line of cells does so. I don't discount the importance of studying neurons and the brain -- in fact I think it's absolutely vital. However, like I pointed out in Malerin's thread, what we need is an understanding of how conscious experience figures into the biophysics of neural processes and/or how the subjective figures into physics in general.

 

[Orbini]

There are certain behaviours we associate with consciousness. The hypothesis is that when we examine the physical origins of those behaviours, we will always find self-referential information processing centrally involved.

But if these behaviors you seek are equal to 'processes information', and 'can refer to itself' then it's self-evident that you'll find self-referential information processing involved.

Or did you have other behaviors in mind that you associate with consciousness ?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Knowing that manipulating neural functioning affects a subject's conscious experience does not tell us how neurons produce those experiences in the first place, or why it seems that only this particular line of cells does so. I don't discount the importance of studying neurons and the brain -- in fact I think it's absolutely vital. However, like I pointed out in Malerin's thread, what we need is an understanding of how conscious experience figures into the biophysics of neural processes and/or how the subjective figures into physics in general.

Yes, of course we need to know the details, but we have some vital information -- that neuron function (firing neurons) underlies what we call consciousness. We don't seem to need anything else at this point.

 

[Orbini]

what we need is an understanding of how conscious experience figures into the biophysics of neural processes and/or how the subjective figures into physics in general.

Is there way you can suggest we can do this, and produce objectively verifiable results ? If you had a $1 billion budget, where would you start ?

 

[PixyMisa]

But if these behaviors you seek are equal to 'processes information', and 'can refer to itself' then it's self-evident that you'll find self-referential information processing involved.

The fact that the hypothesis is correct does not invalidate it.

Or did you have other behaviors in mind that you associate with consciousness ?

I'm open to suggestions, though see my warning note above about the risks involved in that.

 

[PixyMisa]

Yes, of course we need to know the details, but we have some vital information -- that neuron function (firing neurons) underlies what we call consciousness. We don't seem to need anything else at this point.

Yes. Known neuron function, the number of neurons, and their interconnection, together with the correlation between patterns of activity and observable behaviours, seems sufficient to account for everything.

On the other hand theories like quantum consciousness and electromagnetic field consciousness run head-on into physical impossibilities, and things like Orch-OR are simply incoherent.

So, without saying that it is a completely solved problem, we can say that there is no reason to think that anything else is necessary.

 

[dlorde]

...
This leads me to strongly suspect that the thermodynamic properties of life are, at the very least, a necessary condition for a system's ability to support consciousness

It still sounds like a non-sequitur to me. Is there some non-trivial minimum time an entity must continue to exist before it can be considered conscious?

Biological organisms do have sophisticated metabolism and repair capabilities, but these eventually fail and the organism dies. Sometimes they fail very early due to inherent faults. A house mouse can live for about 4 years, but may dies much earlier. If we can consider it to have a rudimentary consciousness over that lifespan, would it not count as consciousness if it only lived for one month? We can build complex electronic machines that function reliably for many years. They can find suitable power sources, and we can give them multiple redundancy and reconfigurablility to make them more resilient, but their repair facilities aren't as sophisticated as those of living things, but why is this a problem for supporting consciousness?

What is the essential connection you think you see between the thermodynamics of life and consciousness?

 

[Orbini]

I'm open to suggestions, though see my warning note above about the risks involved in that.

I don't have anything better to offer. Let's solve the "easy problem", and let the philosophers worry about what it means.

 

[PixyMisa]

I don't have anything better to offer. Let's solve the "easy problem", and let the philosophers worry about what it means.

Sounds good to me.

My personal "hard problem" is trying to kill Typhon at the end of Titan Quest. I shal return to that endeavour forthwith.

 

[Malerin]

Just to expand (again) on one particular point, Malerin, since I don't believe you have ever grasped this.

Something is self-referential when it refers to itself. Not a self. And self is defined as whatever is doing the referencing:
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Self-reference
http://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Reflection_%28computer_science%29

Ahhhh, no.

self·-referential (-ref′ə ren′s̸həl)

adjective

1.making reference to itself or oneselfhttp://www.yourdictionary.com/self-referential

self-ref·er·en·tial (slfrf-rnshl)
adj.
Referring to oneself or itselfhttp://www.thefreedictionary.com/self-referential

self-ref·er·ence   /ˈsɛlfˈrɛfərəns, -ˈrɛfrəns/ Show Spelled
[self-ref-er-uhns, -ref-ruhns] Show IPA

–noun
1. reference made to oneself or one's own experience.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/self-reference

That's what self-referential means. If you want it to mean something else, you have to argue for your definition. You can't just make **** up and expect people not to call you out on it.

 

[AkuManiMani]

...
This leads me to strongly suspect that the thermodynamic properties of life are, at the very least, a necessary condition for a system's ability to support consciousness

It still sounds like a non-sequitur to me. Is there some non-trivial minimum time an entity must continue to exist before it can be considered conscious?

Biological organisms do have sophisticated metabolism and repair capabilities, but these eventually fail and the organism dies. Sometimes they fail very early due to inherent faults. A house mouse can live for about 4 years, but may dies much earlier. If we can consider it to have a rudimentary consciousness over that lifespan, would it not count as consciousness if it only lived for one month? We can build complex electronic machines that function reliably for many years. They can find suitable power sources, and we can give them multiple redundancy and reconfigurablility to make them more resilient, but their repair facilities aren't as sophisticated as those of living things, but why is this a problem for supporting consciousness?

What is the essential connection you think you see between the thermodynamics of life and consciousness?

I actually addressed this in the portion of my post that you sniped out:

For the most part [, rocketdodger], I think you and I agree on this. I think we had a similar discussion about this a couple years ago when we were comparing the differences between the computational processes going on in a bacterium and those of a puddle. The self-organizing energy controlling properties that allow single celled organisms to exist and behave as they do are an extremely scaled down version of the same capacity that allows us to control the organization of our surrounding environments to produce artificial constructs [i.e. art and technology]. This leads me to strongly suspect that the thermodynamic properties of life are, at the very least, a necessary condition for a system's ability to support consciousness

Like I've already emphasized in previous posts, organisms are self-sustaining systems. They exist in a state far from thermodynamic equilibrium by continually recomposing themselves at every scale of their organization. As soon as this self-organizing process of continual flux and turnover ceases the very structure of the organism ceases to be as it quickly decays into the thermodynamic background of it's environment. Their very existence as entities depends not so much on their static structure, but in their sustained ability to continually reconstitute an unstable configuration.

Non-living systems, like our present day electronic devices, do not all exhibit these properties. They exist as they are largely due to the stability of their structural bonds; whatever thermodynamic wear and tear they accrue over time must continually be repaired by living, conscious systems -- namely us. They are not dynamically self-generating or self-sustaining. Living systems are the only systems that exhibit this property, and conscious systems exhibit this property so such an extent that they extend their creative and organizational capacities beyond the confines of their biological structure to the surrounding environments. In humans this capacity is expressed in our material culture. I suspect that whatever property allows single celled organisms to self-generate and self-sustain is either a physical requisite of consciousness, or a rudimentary level of consciousness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

what we need is an understanding of how conscious experience figures into the biophysics of neural processes and/or how the subjective figures into physics in general.

Is there way you can suggest we can do this, and produce objectively verifiable results ? If you had a $1 billion budget, where would you start ?

Before a budget is drawn up for an experimental study we must adequately frame the problem and resolve the philosophical difficulties surrounding it. Once that is done the groundwork will be laid for serious theorycrafting based on inferences we can draw from current knowledge we have of the 'internal' and 'external' aspects of consciousness. It is only then that we will have the means for formulating workable and relevant hypotheses to be tested.

I'm not sure how far the thermodynamic inferences get us in that regard, but I am fairly certain that such a recognition is a necessary step in developing a theory concerning the physics of consciousness.

 

[rocketdodger]

This leads me to strongly suspect that the thermodynamic properties of life are, at the very least, a necessary condition for a system's ability to support consciousness

A more logically valid conclusion is that thermodynamic properties similar to those exhibited by life are a necessary condition for a system's ability to support consciousness.

 

[rocketdodger]

It still sounds like a non-sequitur to me. Is there some non-trivial minimum time an entity must continue to exist before it can be considered conscious?

Yes. It must be able to change behavior due to computation. Any longer is just icing on the cake.

What is the essential connection you think you see between the thermodynamics of life and consciousness?

Computation.

However, many things besides life exhibit computation ...

 

[rocketdodger]

Ahhhh, no.

self·-referential (-ref′ə ren′s̸həl)

adjective

1.making reference to itself or oneselfhttp://www.yourdictionary.com/self-referential

self-ref·er·en·tial (slfrf-rnshl)
adj.
Referring to oneself or itselfhttp://www.thefreedictionary.com/self-referential

self-ref·er·ence   /ˈsɛlfˈrɛfərəns, -ˈrɛfrəns/ Show Spelled
[self-ref-er-uhns, -ref-ruhns] Show IPA

–noun
1. reference made to oneself or one's own experience.
http://dictionary.reference.com/browse/self-reference

That's what self-referential means. If you want it to mean something else, you have to argue for your definition. You can't just make **** up and expect people not to call you out on it.

???

Everything you just cited exactly confirms what Pixy said ...

.... are you not aware that "itself" is just a different grammatical form of "oneself?"