Has consciousness been fully explained?

[AkuManiMani]

The catch there is that some philosophers use the existence of qualia to indicate the existence of consciousness. If consciousness determines the existence of qualia, we need something else to determine the existence of consciousness.

The confusion comes from lack of clarification. 'Qualia' is just a term for what experiences reduce to.

I could see qualia as those patterns that distinguish one perception from another, which is clearly important to our functioning. But this flies in the face of the concept of p-zombies, which are supposed to be exactly like us except they lack qualia. I can't see any way to make p-zombies a coherent concept, so that's the type of qualia that can't exist.

The closest thing to a p-zombie that one could make in reality is an automaton programmed with a behavioral model of an individual. Assuming that the physical presentation were sufficiently realistic, it would be possible to fool some individuals into believing the simulacrum is itself conscious. Even so, the automaton would itself have to be a product of a conscious agent. Even though it does not have it's own inherent consciousness it would require, at the very least, a conscious agent to model from and conscious agency to design the model.

In any case, I'd suggest that there are certain objective indicators one can use to discern if a given system is conscious or at least capable of consciousness.

 

[Beth]

Are you implying that consciousness perceives?

An interesting question. No, I didn't mean to imply that. I basically am not sure if consciousness can be separated from perception. I haven't really given that aspect much thought before, but I wouldn't say that consciousness 'perceives'. I think of it more as perception being a crucial part of consciousness.

Seems to me that functioning brains perceive and are capable of being fooled by illusions. Functioning brains also 'produce' consciousness. All that anyone means by saying that consciousness is an illusion is that consciousness is not what is appears to be -- such as something that perceives, as in 'a subjective consciousness'.

Are you implying that consciousness does not perceive? That it is possible to separate consciousness from perception of the world around you?

 

[AkuManiMani]

Are you implying that consciousness does not perceive? That it is possible to separate consciousness from perception of the world around you?

A lot of meditative practices actually focus on turning one's awareness towards one's own consciousness and it's contents rather than the 'outside' world. Consciousness does not perceive, per se; perceptions are derivations of consciousness.

 

[!Kaggen]

The Reality Religion. I like it. The fact that there are no miracles is the miracle.

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[Beth]

A lot of meditative practices actually focus on turning one's awareness towards one's own consciousness and it's contents rather than the 'outside' world.

True. Buy they still perceive the world around them, they are simply choosing not to be consciously aware of those perceptions.

Consciousness does not perceive, per se; perceptions are derivations of consciousness.

I don't know what you mean by this.

 

[AkuManiMani]

A lot of meditative practices actually focus on turning one's awareness towards one's own consciousness and it's contents rather than the 'outside' world.

True. Buy they still perceive the world around them, they are simply choosing not to be consciously aware of those perceptions.

Yep. It involves tuning out sensory information. However, what I was getting at is that consciousness itself (that awareness) is still there regardless of whether or not any sensory data reaches it.

Consciousness does not perceive, per se; perceptions are derivations of consciousness.

I don't know what you mean by this.

I guess another way of putting it is that perceptions are 'made of' one's consciousness. What is perceived, and how it is perceived to be, is relative to the subjective configuration and quality of an individual consciousness.

ETA:

Okay, some examples would be a synesthete having a radically different perception of sound than the average person, or a psychopath that can only experience very dim or shallow emotions even in scenarios that are deeply evocative for the average individual.

 

[Pulvinar]

The confusion comes from lack of clarification. 'Qualia' is just a term for what experiences reduce to.

I'm afraid that doesn't help clarify your meaning for me. Maybe your p-zombie position will, if considered carefully.

The closest thing to a p-zombie that one could make in reality is an automaton programmed with a behavioral model of an individual. Assuming that the physical presentation were sufficiently realistic, it would be possible to fool some individuals into believing the simulacrum is itself conscious. Even so, the automaton would itself have to be a product of a conscious agent. Even though it does not have it's own inherent consciousness it would require, at the very least, a conscious agent to model from and conscious agency to design the model.

Remembering that it's a thought experiment there's no limit to what behavior the automaton could produce, including any behavior that you would produce to convince me that you are conscious.

On the other hand I could consider you just a very good simulacrum of *your* creator's consciousness (your parents).

In any case, I'd suggest that there are certain objective indicators one can use to discern if a given system is conscious or at least capable of consciousness.

Instead of considering things like thermodynamic equilibrium, I'd look at those behaviors which we can use to clearly differentiate conscious/non-conscious in ourselves with as much as possible being equal, such as binocular rivalry. That's one that any definition of consciousness should accommodate.

 

[Beth]

Yep. It involves tuning out sensory information. However, what I was getting at is that consciousness itself (that awareness) is still there regardless of whether or not any sensory data reaches it.

I think consciousness can survive for at least brief periods without sensory data. I used to occasionally relax in a sensory deprivation tank. It's an interesting experience and not completely without sensation.

I am not sure how long consciousness could survive without any sensory data reaching it. Hallucinations might be a way for the mind to keep itself together by inventing the sensory data. I'm just musing out loud. Wasp, do you know what the longest period of time that someone could be considered conscious while lacking any sensory data?

I guess another way of putting it is that perceptions are 'made of' one's consciousness. What is perceived, and how it is perceived to be, is relative to the subjective configuration and quality of an individual consciousness.

ETA:

Okay, some examples would be a synesthete having a radically different perception of sound than the average person, or a psychopath that can only experience very dim or shallow emotions even in scenarios that are deeply evocative for the average individual.

Okay. My initial statement was that I don't see how sensory data can be separated from consciousness. I think this makes my point. Were you agreeing or disagreeing with that statement?

 

[Pulvinar]

Yes, well, I don't find p-zombies to be a plausible concept. OTOH I thought p-zombies lacked consciousness not qualia.

To some the two are linked so p-zombies must lack both. That's where their reasoning gets tied into some serious knots...

 

[AkuManiMani]

The confusion comes from lack of clarification. 'Qualia' is just a term for what experiences reduce to.

I'm afraid that doesn't help clarify your meaning for me. Maybe your p-zombie position will, if considered carefully.

The closest thing to a p-zombie that one could make in reality is an automaton programmed with a behavioral model of an individual. Assuming that the physical presentation were sufficiently realistic, it would be possible to fool some individuals into believing the simulacrum is itself conscious. Even so, the automaton would itself have to be a product of a conscious agent. Even though it does not have it's own inherent consciousness it would require, at the very least, a conscious agent to model from and conscious agency to design the model.

Remembering that it's a thought experiment there's no limit to what behavior the automaton could produce, including any behavior that you would produce to convince me that you are conscious.

On the other hand I could consider you just a very good simulacrum of *your* creator's consciousness (your parents).

Its thought experiments like the "p-zombies" that cause me to conclude that consciousness is not the organic substrate, the morphology, programmed instincts, behavior, or the mind. Consciousness is 'simply' the spark of awareness -- that 'beingness' -- which interfaces with and shapes those subsystems in order to interact with the world. Absent the ability to directly experience another's consciousness, one can only use such external things as possible indicators of it.

In any case, I'd suggest that there are certain objective indicators one can use to discern if a given system is conscious or at least capable of consciousness.

Instead of considering things like thermodynamic equilibrium, I'd look at those behaviors which we can use to clearly differentiate conscious/non-conscious in ourselves with as much as possible being equal, such as binocular rivalry. That's one that any definition of consciousness should accommodate.

Binocular rivalry is just an adaptive program that particular organisms utilize to operate in their given environmental niche. Such adaptations do not, in themselves, demonstrate that the system in question is conscious or even necessarily capable of consciousness.

 

[AkuManiMani]

I think consciousness can survive for at least brief periods without sensory data. I used to occasionally relax in a sensory deprivation tank. It's an interesting experience and not completely without sensation.

I am not sure how long consciousness could survive without any sensory data reaching it. Hallucinations might be a way for the mind to keep itself together by inventing the sensory data. I'm just musing out loud.

Can't really say for sure in that regard, but I think you're right that one's consciousness can simply conjure up experiences when in a sensory vacuum. The content of the hallucinations might be genuinely novel or just dredged up from one's subconscious and cobbled together. This is probably whats happening when an individual is dreaming.

Okay. My initial statement was that I don't see how sensory data can be separated from consciousness. I think this makes my point. Were you agreeing or disagreeing with that statement?

Outside of the context of an organism there its just 'information' or raw physical data. When that information triggers an organisms sensory system(s) it becomes sensory-data. After that sensory data reaches one's awareness it becomes a perception/experience. Once committed to memory it can then be considered knowledge. The conceptual frame one uses to interpret and organize that knowledge is what we call understanding. Blindsight would be an example of a failure of significant aspects of sensory-data reaching one's awareness.

So the short answer to your question would be, yes; I kinda disagree with your statement. One can conceptually distinguish sensory data from consciousness.

 

[Pulvinar]

Its thought experiments like the "p-zombies" that cause me to conclude that consciousness is not the organic substrate, the morphology, programmed instincts, behavior, or the mind. Consciousness is 'simply' the spark of awareness -- that 'beingness' -- which interfaces with and shapes those subsystems in order to interact with the world. Absent the ability to directly experience another's consciousness, one can only use such external things as possible indicators of it.

That's exactly what your p-zombie twin would say, since it would be convinced that *it's* conscious and not a p-zombie. You would say it's fooling itself. Can you give us a test that you use to convince yourself that you're not fooling yourself?

Binocular rivalry is just an adaptive program that particular organisms utilize to operate in their given environmental niche. Such adaptations do not, in themselves, demonstrate that the system in question is conscious or even necessarily capable of consciousness.

What do you call what binocular rivalry distinguishes then?

 

[Beth]

So the short answer to your question would be, yes; I kinda disagree with your statement. One can conceptually distinguish sensory data from consciousness.

This isn't quite what I was saying though. I agree that we can conceptually distinguish sensory data from consciousness [eta: in some situations]. I'm not so sure that we can distinguish consciousness from sensory data. It's a subtle difference, do you understand what I'm getting at? I might be wrong; I think the meditation example is a more direct counter to what I am thinking.

 

[tsig]

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It never fails you get a good idea and find out it's already been done.

 

[AkuManiMani]

Its thought experiments like the "p-zombies" that cause me to conclude that consciousness is not the organic substrate, the morphology, programmed instincts, behavior, or the mind. Consciousness is 'simply' the spark of awareness -- that 'beingness' -- which interfaces with and shapes those subsystems in order to interact with the world. Absent the ability to directly experience another's consciousness, one can only use such external things as possible indicators of it.

That's exactly what your p-zombie twin would say, since it would be convinced that *it's* conscious and not a p-zombie. You would say it's fooling itself. Can you give us a test that you use to convince yourself that you're not fooling yourself?

Thats just the thing. The p-zombie has no 'self' to convince or to fool; its just a sophisticated collection of mechanisms designed to deceive entities that do. Another critical difference is that, over time, the original conscious individual would develop and diverge away from the model the p-zombie is based off of. Unless it is constantly updated to match the persona produced by the evolving consciousness its trying to emulate its artificiality will eventually become apparent.

Binocular rivalry is just an adaptive program that particular organisms utilize to operate in their given environmental niche. Such adaptations do not, in themselves, demonstrate that the system in question is conscious or even necessarily capable of consciousness.

What do you call what binocular rivalry distinguishes then?

Sensory data feeds.

 

[AkuManiMani]

This isn't quite what I was saying though. I agree that we can conceptually distinguish sensory data from consciousness [eta: in some situations]. I'm not so sure that we can distinguish consciousness from sensory data. It's a subtle difference, do you understand what I'm getting at? I might be wrong; I think the meditation example is a more direct counter to what I am thinking.

Ah okay, I think I see what you're getting at. You see consciousness as a kind of activity sustained by sensory inputs, so once it runs out of those inputs it 'burns out'?

 

[Pulvinar]

Thats just the thing. The p-zombie has no 'self' to convince or to fool; its just a sophisticated collection of mechanisms designed to deceive entities that do. Another critical difference is that, over time, the original conscious individual would develop and diverge away from the model the p-zombie is based off of. Unless it is constantly updated to match the persona produced by the evolving consciousness its trying to emulate its artificiality will eventually become apparent.

How would it become apparent? Can you give a specific example? That's the test I'm looking for.

 

[AkuManiMani]

How would it become apparent? Can you give a specific example? That's the test I'm looking for.

I suppose if it persistently falls prey to the same trolling techniques, falls into repetitive formulaic behavior patterns until disturbed by an outside influence, or consistently gives nonsensical responses to novel queries -- stuff to that effect.

Such signs would indicate that if the entity in question is conscious that consciousness is extremely "dim"

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

An interesting question. No, I didn't mean to imply that. I basically am not sure if consciousness can be separated from perception. I haven't really given that aspect much thought before, but I wouldn't say that consciousness 'perceives'. I think of it more as perception being a crucial part of consciousness.


Are you implying that consciousness does not perceive? That it is possible to separate consciousness from perception of the world around you?

I see two different issues -- that it is consciousness that does the perceiving and if consciousness is necessary for perception.

I think the answer to the first is no (I realize others disagree). The answer to the second depends on the definition of perception. As I use the word, the answer would also be no since we know of phenomena like blindsight, which seem to involve some type of perception but with no consciousness. I think it would be proper to speak of some 'lower' animals perceiving sensory information but without consciousness (but I realize that others consider all living things conscious).

 

[Pulvinar]

I suppose if it persistently falls prey to the same trolling techniques, falls into repetitive formulaic behavior patterns until disturbed by an outside influence, or consistently gives nonsensical responses to novel queries -- stuff to that effect.

Such signs would indicate that if the entity in question is conscious that consciousness is extremely "dim"

Your examples seem to have one thing in common: the ability to learn. That's the main distinguishing feature I attribute to consciousness too, but I wouldn't call it just a spark. It's a necessary part of our functioning. An event that you're not conscious of is unlikely to modify your future behavior.

And experience is also a form of learning-- it's learning what happened at a given time, though in a consolidated "executive summary" form for use in future reasoning and planning. If the brain recorded all the sense data it receives it would be much more difficult for it to apply general rules to it.