Has consciousness been fully explained?

[Drachasor]

Not exactly, but that's not within this topic, nor relevant to it.

Living things exist, and at our level have arguments about subjectivity and objectivity.

Eh, if you don't think objective reality exists, then I think it certainly affects your thoughts on consciousness.

When you think a computer works according to subjective principles, then you might as well say the same thing of the brain and the rest of reality.

 

[Malerin]

Everything we label as consciousness.

Give an example of something we label as consciousness.

 

[AlBell]

Then nothing is different from anything else unless it is being experienced, which is a pretty useless concept, though perfect for solopsism.

Nope. "Life" experiences things. The exact boundary life vs non-life is unknown, but we can agree objectively that life exits.

The choice to deny solipsism has no logical basis under any ontology.

Eh, if you don't think objective reality exists, then I think it certainly affects your thoughts on consciousness.

When you think a computer works according to subjective principles, then you might as well say the same thing of the brain and the rest of reality.

I do not deny we share what we name objective reality, nor do I suggest that computers in our shared (objective) reality work by subjective principles.

 

[Drachasor]

I do not deny we share what we name objective reality, nor do I suggest that computers in our shared (objective) reality work by subjective principles.

So then you now agree that rocks and computers are objectively different?

 

[AlBell]

Computers are far better at 'doing things' that we, in our subjective ways, agree are useful. Rocks do fewer things we deem useful.

What's so difficult for you, here?

 

[Drachasor]

Computers are far better at 'doing things' that we, in our subjective ways, agree are useful. Rocks do fewer things we deem useful.

What's so difficult for you, here?

The part where you say stuff like:
"I'm still waiting with westprog for your explanation of how rocks and computers are different. " and similarly ridiculous stuff.

By your standard for rocks and computers, explain how something alive or with consciousness is different from a rock or computer?

Oh, and "Go ahead an detail how they differ in a way that doesn't depend on our subjectively to notice the difference. "

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Nope. "Life" experiences things. The exact boundary life vs non-life is unknown, but we can agree objectively that life exits.

We can agree objectively that we define some things as living.

Life experiences things? Paramecia experience? There is something that it is like to be a paramecium? A tree? What does a chrysanthemum experience?

And what does this have to do with your claim that when no subjective opinions are available they make fine doorstops?

A computer continues to perform whatever actions it is designed to perform whether or not someone is there to watch. A computer controlling a production process continues to control the production process.

A rock does not.

Do trees continue to exist when our backs are turned or is our subjective experience all that counts?

 

[AlBell]

We can agree objectively that we define some things as living.

Life experiences things? Paramecia experience? There is something that it is like to be a paramecium? A tree? What does a chrysanthemum experience?

In some sense, all life experiences, imo, yes.

And what does this have to do with your claim that when no subjective opinions are available they make fine doorstops?

I actually mean none available, not that your back was turned. Think 'human life has disappeared from earth' scenario.

And I'm surprized you didn't understand that was my meaning.

A computer continues to perform whatever actions it is designed to perform whether or not someone is there to watch. A computer controlling a production process continues to control the production process.

A rock does not.

And under the no-humans-left scenario, who cares?

Going further afield, for things as complex as computers at least higher primate intelligence would be needed to notice an apppreciable difference from a rock.

Do trees continue to exist when our backs are turned or is our subjective experience all that counts?

I did not suggest "our" experience; I suggested 'life' as the agent that experiences, and note that the boundary separating life from non-life is ill-defined.

 

[westprog]

I may have missed the curve, but thought RD was suggesting replacing a neuron in a living, working, brain with an artificial neuron.

If that is what he's suggesting (and who knows), then it supports the position of the physicalists, not the computationalists. The people who've supported the physicalist position - notably Piggy - have never denied the possibility of replacing a neuron with an artificial substitute.

The computationalist position is that it's possible to produce a computer simulation of a brain and that the subjective experience would be exactly the same, if the same algorithm were to be executed. In such a simulated brain the neurons might be purely software.

Now, it's obviously not possible to replace a real neuron with a software component. So this particular thought experiment doesn't support the computationalist position at all.

Of course, there are many different shades of opinion on this subject, apart from the computationalist and physicalist. The Wasp isn't a computationalist, but doesn't regard the refutations of the computationalist viewpoint as being valid. Pixy's views are so far out that I can't believe he really believes them himself. Your position may well be different again.

 

[westprog]

Sure, the static interactions in say...a rock.

That's entirely contrary to the physical definition of information.

Wiki on Physical information

The engineering definitions of information deal with the exchange of information between human beings.

 

[westprog]

Of course not, because purely computational devices do not exist except in fairy land.

There are, however, devices whose function is solely computational. What do we call them again?

Of course any device in the real world will have many different side-effects. When we say that you can't use a computer to heat your house, the implication is that a simulation of a fire doesn't produce actual heat. It may well be that a particular computer does generate enough heat to warm a house, but that doesn't imply anything about essential function of the devices as a class.

When you design a component, whether it's a nut and bolt or an artificial neuron, then you need to design in the functionality - not rely on side effects. To design an artificial neuron, you need it to interface with other neurons.

If time is viewed as an ordered sequence of causal events -- and it should be, because that is what it is -- then obviously for a sequence of events to be replaced with an equivalent one the order and sequence needs to be maintained.

If the causal sequence is what we call our reality, then obviously a replacement neuron needs to be able to interact with that causal sequence -- you could call it a "coupling" requirement. The causal sequences need to be able to "couple."

IOW, it won't be a computational device.

Pixy is talking about replacing the whole sequence with a different one -- a simulation. This is just fine, because there is no coupling problem in that case either. But I am not interested in that issue right now.

Then what does this particular thought experiment prove, or disprove? How does the use of a device that duplicates the physical action of a neuron cast doubt on the contention by Piggy and myself that consciousness is tied to particular physical activity?

It's always been the computational claim that's been disputed.

 

[westprog]

Do you actually suggest your course of action will ever be ethically acceptable?

Well, you could do it to a dog. Or to someone with brain damage to replace lost tissue.

In any case, it's a thought experiment. There's no prospect of replacing even a single neuron for a long, long time.

 

[westprog]

Not unless someone makes the effort to pass the same sort of voltage and amperage through it as we do with computers, no I don't.

So it has to be exactly the same voltage and amperage as a computer?

 

[westprog]

But if we can find ways that lifeforms are different from rocks, can't we find ways that other things are different from rocks as well?

That's also not at issue. What's at issue is the claim that cells and computers have a physical commonality that doesn't apply to rocks.

The rest is diversionary tactics.

 

[westprog]

We can agree objectively that we define some things as living.

Life experiences things? Paramecia experience? There is something that it is like to be a paramecium? A tree? What does a chrysanthemum experience?

And what does this have to do with your claim that when no subjective opinions are available they make fine doorstops?

A computer continues to perform whatever actions it is designed to perform whether or not someone is there to watch. A computer controlling a production process continues to control the production process.

A rock does not.

Use a rock to stick behind your rear wheel to stop your car running down the hill, and it will perform the actions it is designed to perform whether or not someone is there to watch. It will continue to control the car's motion.

Do trees continue to exist when our backs are turned or is our subjective experience all that counts?

You don't actually know. If this is a simulation, then it would seem to be an unnecessary luxury. Why waste all those cycles on a planck level simulation of a tree nobody is looking at?

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

In some sense, all life experiences, imo, yes.


I actually mean none available, not that your back was turned. Think 'human life has disappeared from earth' scenario.

And I'm surprized you didn't understand that was my meaning.


And under the no-humans-left scenario, who cares?

Going further afield, for things as complex as computers at least higher primate intelligence would be needed to notice an apppreciable difference from a rock.



I did not suggest "our" experience; I suggested 'life' as the agent that experiences, and note that the boundary separating life from non-life is ill-defined.

Just trying to piece out your meaning.


I'm afraid I have to say that you are simpy repeating a truism -- in the absence of valuation there are no values. Of course we can agree to that.

But that has nothing to do with the differences between computers and rocks.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

So it has to be exactly the same voltage and amperage as a computer?

That's how I set it up. Also billions of switches a second, just like a computer.

There are all sorts of other constraints we can mention, just to highlight the differences.


The point is that the differences we see amongst these objects -- as I have mentioned previously -- is not in some grand, ontological characterization. The differences arise out of the constraints involved in their function. There are distinct physical differences between a functioning computer and a rock; that is why we can differentiate between the two. As far as we know there are no spiritual differences between them -- so the differences are going to be physical.

 

[Ichneumonwasp]

Use a rock to stick behind your rear wheel to stop your car running down the hill, and it will perform the actions it is designed to perform whether or not someone is there to watch. It will continue to control the car's motion.

That is an answer to an entirely different issue, since I was getting at the idea of object permanence in that post.

You don't actually know. If this is a simulation, then it would seem to be an unnecessary luxury. Why waste all those cycles on a planck level simulation of a tree nobody is looking at?

Who said anything about me knowing or not kowing if a tree experiences? I was asking Al his opinion.

As to the simulation -- once again you are showing that you are not speaking of the same simulation as everyone else.

 

[westprog]

That's how I set it up. Also billions of switches a second, just like a computer.

There are all sorts of other constraints we can mention, just to highlight the differences.


The point is that the differences we see amongst these objects -- as I have mentioned previously -- is not in some grand, ontological characterization. The differences arise out of the constraints involved in their function. There are distinct physical differences between a functioning computer and a rock; that is why we can differentiate between the two. As far as we know there are no spiritual differences between them -- so the differences are going to be physical.

Which is perfectly fine. I'm well able to tell the difference between a computer and a rock. I can also tell the difference between a person and a computer. In fact, if asked to choose the odd one out between a chunk of unrefined silicon, a chunk of refined silicon with wires, and Keira Knightley, I know what I'd pick.

 

[westprog]

As to the simulation -- once again you are showing that you are not speaking of the same simulation as everyone else.

Well, that's why I keep defining what I mean. I find that the slippery concept of a simulation is being used to mean different things to prove different things.

I know that it's possible to replace a leg with a wooden simulated leg, and that it's not possible to replace it with a computer program that simulates the action of a leg. I know the difference, and I'm trying to get people to say what kind of simulation they mean.

Personally I don't believe that the world is a planck level simulation, but I can't prove that it isn't.